Ethical Dimensions of Marxist Thought
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Ethical Dimensions of Marxist Thought

Cornel West

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eBook - ePub

Ethical Dimensions of Marxist Thought

Cornel West

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In this fresh, original analysis of Marxist thought, Cornel West makes a significant contribution to today's debates about the relevance of Marxism by putting the issue of ethics squarely on the Marxist agenda. West, professor of religion and director of the Afro-American studies program at Princeton University, shows that not only was ethics an integral part of the development of Marx's own thinking throughout his career, but that this crucial concern has been obscured by such leading and influential interpreters as Engels, Kautsky, Luk?cs, and others who diverted Marx's theory into narrow forms of positivism, economism, and Hegelianism.

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1
Radical Historicism

The radical historicist approach to ethics claims that the search for philosophic criteria, grounds, or foundations for moral principles is doomed. By “philosophic” I mean criteria, grounds, or foundations that carry the weight of rational necessity and/or universal obligation—that we are compelled to accept by some kind of philosophic rationality, or that we are all obliged to endorse by some overarching law or rule. The radical historicist approach calls into question the very possibility of an ethics (Kantian ethics, for example) that claims to rest upon philosophic notions of rational necessity and/or universal obligations.
There are two reasons for this radical historicist claim. First, the radical historicist sees the dynamic historical processes as subjecting all criteria, grounds, and foundations to revision and modification. Whereas notions such as “rational necessity” and “universal obligation” are employed by philosophers precisely in order to secure immunity from revision and modification. By rejecting these notions, the radical historicist is precluding the possibility of either timeless criteria, necessary grounds, or universal foundations for ethics. Second, for the radical historicist, the only plausible candidates for the criteria, grounds, or foundations in question would be the contingent, community-specific agreements people make in relation to particular norms, aims, goals, and objectives. These agreements, owing to their dynamic character, do not carry the weight of rational necessity or universal obligation.
By calling into question the possibility of securing either timeless criteria, necessary grounds, or universal foundations for moral principles, the radical historicist approach is calling into question a particular conception of objectivity in ethics and hence the possibility of ethics as a philosophic discipline. Without such criteria, grounds, or foundations to serve as a last court of appeal for adjudicating between rival moral principles, objectivity in ethics or valid justification of moral principles becomes but a dream, a philosopher’s dream which results from an obsession with philosophic certainty and security in the flux of historical change and development. In this sense, ethics as a philosophic discipline has no subject matter.
The radical historicist approach to ethics holds that people make ethical judgments in light of moral principles, employ criteria to under-gird such principles and give reasons to justify their criteria, principles, and judgments. But it claims that these judgments, principles, and criteria are philosophically groundless or that they do not rest upon philosophic foundations.
Therefore, for the radical historicist, the search for philosophic foundations or grounds for moral principles is but an edifying way of reminding (and possibly further committing) oneself and others to what particular (old or new) moral community or group of believers one belongs to. Instead of focusing on the status (objective or subjective, necessary or contingent, universal or particular) of moral principles, the radical historicist approach stresses the role and function these principles (or any principles) play in various cultures and societies. Instead of accenting the validity or objectivity of the justification of moral principles, the radical historicist approach highlights the plausible descriptions and explanations of the emergence, dominance, and decline of particular moral principles under specific social conditions in the historical process. Instead of philosophic notions such as status, validity, objectivity, the radical historicist approach prefers theoretic notions such as role, function, description, and explanation.
The radical historicist approach discards the quest for philosophic certainty and the search for philosophic foundations because, it claims, this quest and search rests upon a misguided picture of philosophy—a picture of philosophy as the discipline that enables us to grasp necessary and universal forms, essences, substances, categories, or grounds upon which fleeting cultural and historical phenomena can rest. For the radical historicist, philosophy itself is but a part of the fleeting cultural and historical phenomena, and it is hence incapable of grounding anything else. The vision of philosophy as a quest for philosophic certainty and search for philosophic foundations is an ahistorical vision, a hapless attempt to escape from the flux of history by being philosophic, that is, by being bound to certainty, tied to necessity, or linked to universality.
Two noteworthy implications for moral philosophy result from the radical historicist approach to ethics. First, the distinction between moral philosopher and social critic breaks down. The moral philosopher is no longer viewed as either engaging in an investigation into the nature of the “logic of moral discourse” or generating timeless criteria, necessary grounds, or universal foundations for moral principles which should regulate human behavior. Rather the moral philosopher attempts to put forward “moral” guidelines or insights as to how to solve particular pressing problems, overcome urgent dilemmas, and alleviate specific hardships. Of course, the moral philosopher must still “justify” guidelines or insights, but the notion of justification is understood in a new way.
This new way of understanding the notion of justification is the second noteworthy implication for moral philosophy which results from the radical historicist viewpoint. No longer does the idea of justification serve as the last court of appeal which stands above the contingent and variable world of fleeting morals. Instead, as we noted earlier, the notion of justification is understood to be a way of reminding ourselves and others which particular community or set of we-intentions (e.g., “we would that …”) we identify with.
Since the radical historicist approach to ethics rejects the idea of philosophic grounds or foundations for moral principles, the idea of a last philosophic court of appeal that stands above contingent and variable morals is precluded. The point is not to lift oneself out of the flux of history—an impossible task—but rather to immerse oneself more deeply into history by consciously identifying with—and digesting critically the values of—a particular community or tradition.
For the radical historicist, the task of ethics is not philosophic, it is not to put forward irrefutable justifications of particular moral viewpoints. Rather the task of ethics is theoretic: the task is to discover ways in which to develop a larger consensus and community, such as through example and exposure, through pressure and persuasion, without the idea of a last philosophic court of appeal in the background. If one disagrees with a particular consensus or community, the task is not to seek philosophic foundations for one’s view, but rather to put forward a realizable alternative, a new possibility for consensus and community, and then to make it attractive to others.

Radical Historicism and Moral Relativism

The radical historicist approach in ethics is often understood to be identical with moral relativism. In this section, I shall try to show that this identity-claim is misleading—not primarily because the radical historicist makes claims different from those of the moral relativist about objectivity and validity in ethics, but rather because the radical historicist assumes a different conception of philosophy than does the moral relativist. To put it crudely, the moral relativist is on the right track but is still captive to the vision of philosophy as the quest for certainty and the search for foundations, whereas the radical historicist is a moral relativist liberated from this vision and hence no longer to be labelled by terms which presuppose it.
Before I examine moral relativism, I shall briefly define what ethical view moral relativism is reacting against, namely, hard objectivism, or solid foundationalist ethics. This viewpoint takes many forms. I shall note only two forms. First, absolutism, which claims it is possible to generate and justify rationally necessary or universally obligatory, moral standards against which to judge rival ethical judgments (or beliefs). Second, scientific naturalism, which holds that it is possible to reduce moral truths or facts to nonmoral, i.e., scientific, truths or facts, and thereby be as “objective” as scientists. Although the absolutist view posits the radical autonomy of ethics and the scientific naturalist view posits a radical reduction of ethics, both subscribe to the basic claim of hard objectivism: that there must be necessary grounds, universal foundations, for moral principles.
I will present three versions of moral relativism and examine the claims put forward in each version.1 The first of these versions—descriptive relativism—is an empirical thesis that pertains to the diversity of fundamental ethical beliefs; the second—strong relativism—is a thesis about the existence of rational procedures or standards to adjudicate between conflicting ethical beliefs or judgments; the third—weak relativism—is a thesis about the existence of rational criteria to guide one’s choice between rational procedures or standards that adjudicate between conflicting ethical beliefs or judgments. Descriptive relativism claims that the fundamental ethical beliefs of people in diverse cultures and societies differ and even conflict. Strong relativism holds that there are no rational procedures or objective (universal) standards that permit one to justify ethical beliefs or judgments against others. Weak relativism says that there are some rational procedures or objective standards for justifying certain ethical beliefs or judgments against others, but that there are no rational criteria for choosing between sets of rational procedures or standards. Let us briefly examine these three versions.
Descriptive relativism puts forward an empirical claim. It does not hold that people in different cultures and societies make different ethical judgments. This is obviously true. Rather it claims that people in different cultures and societies have different fundamental ethical beliefs. The distinction between ethical judgments and fundamental ethical beliefs is a crucial one. Ethical judgments are based on fundamental ethical beliefs and factual beliefs (about the self, the world, and God). Since factual beliefs are theory-laden, we can legitimately infer that ethical judgments appeal to fundamental ethical beliefs in light of theories about the self, the world, and God.
For example, imagine two societies—one secular, the other religious—which accept and follow the fundamental ethical belief that people should attend to the welfare of the physically handicapped. Suppose the first society is guided by a secular theory about the self and the world which denies life after death. Furthermore, it holds that physically handicapped people are biologically disabled human beings owing to discernible mishaps in nature. Only persistent and prolonged scientific investigations into the natural causes of such mishaps provide a clue for their cure. Until such cures are found, this society collectively decides that physically handicapped people should reside in the homes of loved ones or in hospitable public residences. This decision serves as evidence that this secular society accepts and follows the fundamental ethical belief that the welfare of physically handicapped people ought to be attended to.
Suppose the second society is regulated by a religious theory about the self, the world, and God which affirms life after death. Furthermore, it holds that physically handicapped people will have divine status in the hereafter if they are put to death before the age of one. So the society decides to kill all physically handicapped newborn infants. Despite this affront to our modern sensibilities, these killings serve as evidence that this society accepts and follows the same fundamental ethical belief as the secular society described above.
This crude example is not a case of descriptive relativism. It illustrates how different ethical judgments can be reached based on the same fundamental ethical belief and conflicting theories about the self, the world, and God. Both societies value the welfare of physically handicapped people, but they arrive at diverging ethical decisions owing to their different understandings of the notion of “welfare” within their different theories about the self, the world, and God.
Now imagine our societies one hundred years later. Suppose the religious society has now acquired the same theory about the self and the world as the secular society. The formerly religious society now denies life after death and no longer holds that physically handicapped infants under one year old will have divine status in any hereafter. Yet this society continues to kill physically handicapped newborn infants.
This second example, reconstructed from the first one, clearly is a case of descriptive relativism. The two societies share the same theory about the self and world, yet still arrive at different ethical judgments regarding the welfare of physically handicapped people. We are forced to conclude that the formerly religious society (now secular) no longer accepts and follows the fundamental ethical belief that the welfare of physically handicapped people ought to be attended to.
Strong relativism is a more complicated doctrine. Its basic claim is that there is no Archimedian point from which to adjudicate between conflicting ethical beliefs or judgments. It denies the possibility of sub specie aeternitatis from which to judge rival ethical beliefs of judgments.
This doctrine is complicated because its implications are diverse. First, it could yield an extreme moral nihilism which claims that there are no moral truths or facts. Admittedly, it is a bit misleading to call extreme nihilism a form of moral relativism since it denies even relativistic moral claims about right and wrong, just and unjust, good and bad. For the extreme moral nihlist (like Max Stirner, as we shall see in chapter 3), moral claims—relativistic or objectivistic—are mere illusions.
Second, strong relativism could lead to what is often called normative relativism, which holds that a particular ethical belief or judgment may be right for one person or society and not right for another person or society, given that there are no morally significant differences in the two societies. This doctrine differs from extreme moral nihilism in that it does not deny moral truths or facts. Instead, it claims that there are moral truths or facts and that these moral truths or facts are always relative to a given person, group, or society.
Normative relativism denies the universalizability of moral truths or facts, whereas extreme moral nihilism denies the existence of moral truths or facts. Of course, some objectivistic Kantians would claim that the denial of the universalizability of moral truths or facts is tantamount to denying the existence of moral truths or facts. But this claim only illustrates an affinity between some objectivistic Kantians and extreme moral nihilists: an obsession with universal foundations for moral facts or truths. The important point here is that both extreme moral nihilism and normative relativism reject the possibility of a rational, objective, universal standard from which to adjudicate between rival ethical judgments (or beliefs). In short, both fall under the rubric of strong relativism.
Finally, strong relativism could possibly yield a view which is usually referred to as meta-ethical relativism, namely, the view that rival ethical judgments (or beliefs) can both be right or equally valid. This view differs from extreme moral nihilism in that it accepts a notion of validity in regard to moral judgments, whereas the extreme moral nihilist does not. Meta-ethical relativism claims that it is possible for there to be conflicting ethical judgments (or beliefs) about a particular case, both judgments being fully correct.
This view indeed sounds counterintuitive, but it is possible if we were to imagine a relativist C overhearing two nonrelativists, A and B, putting forward conflicting ethical judgments about a specific issue. For example, if A says that the death penalty is right and B holds that the death penalty is wrong, they surely are both right from their own nonrelativist perspectives. But for the relativist C overhearing the conversation, the nonrelativistic ethical judgment of A is justified and valid for A but not for B and the nonrelativistic ethical judgment of B is justified and valid for B but not for A. In C’s relativistic meta-ethical perspective, both conflicting ethical judgments of A and B would be correct.
It is important to note that being committed to strong relativism does not commit one to all of its sub-relativisms, but that it does commit one to at least one of them. That is, if one adheres to the doctrine of strong relativism, one is either a moral nihilist or a normative relativist and/or a meta-ethical relativist. Being a moral nihilist means that one cannot be a normative or meta-ethical relativist, whereas one can be both a normative relativist and a meta-ethical relativist.
Weak relativism holds that it is possible to arrive at rational procedures or objective, universal standards that justify certain ethical beliefs or judgments against others. It also claims that there can be a plurality of such procedures and standards between which there can be no adjudication. Therefore weak relativism puts forward a weaker claim than strong relativism. It would not yield moral nihilism, normative realism, or meta-ethical relativism.
Weak relativism would not yield moral nihilism because it affirms the existence of moral truths and facts. It would not lead to normative relativism because it endorses the universalizability of moral facts and truths. And it would not produce meta-ethical relativism because it assumes there to be a general convergence between the plurality of rational procedures and objective, universal standards regarding ethical judgments and also because it refuses to view nonrelativistic ethical judgments through a relativistic lens.
Weak relativism, like strong relativism, holds that there is no Archimedian point from which to adjudicate conflicting ethical beliefs or judgments. But unlike strong relativism, it does not go on to claim that there are no last philosophic courts of appeal. Instead, weak relativism holds that there are philosophic criteria—such as logical consistency, theoretical coherency, simplicity—which permit the affirmation of some rational procedures and objective, universal standards and the rejection of less rational procedures and less objective, universal standards. Weak relativism tries to cling to some threadbare notion of universal validity or ethical objectivity without appealing to a timeless standard or Archimedian point. In this sense, weak relativism may be called moderate historicism or soft objectivism. It is the halfway house between radical historicism and hard objectivism. It attempts to take history seriously, like radical historicism, yet like hard objectivism, to preserve philosophic notions of objectivity and validity in ethics.
Weak relativism can be viewed as endorsing a sifting process through which prospective moral procedures or standards must pass. Some are deemed more rational, objective, and universal than others, i.e., they pass the test and thereby deserve to be viewed as serious ethical view-points. The sifting process consists roughly of rigorously applying philosophic criteria (usually generated by professional moral philosophers) to prospective moral procedures and standards.
For example, the major contemporary prospective moral procedures or standards consist of various versions of Kantianism, act and rule utilitarianism, intuitionism, perfectionism, egoism, and forms of consequentialism. These all represent attempts to establish moral validity or ethical objectivity in the sense that they provide relevant reasons—reasons that carry weight, that can persuade and convince rational, impartial human beings—for arriving at ethical judgments. From the standpoint of the contemporary community of professional moral philosophers, the most logically consistent, theoretically coherent, and formulaically simple procedures provide good, relevant reasons and more logically inconsistent, theoretically incoherent, formulaically obscure procedures yield bad, unconvincing reasons.
At the present time in America, certain sophisticated forms of consequentialism (usually nonutilitarian versions) an...

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