Cheating Welfare

Public Assistance and the Criminalization of Poverty

Kaaryn S. Gustafson

• Publisher: NYU Press
• Year: 2011
• ISBN:
  9780814732915
• Topic: Derecho
• Subtopic: Derecho público

Over the last three decades, welfare policies have been informed by popular beliefs that welfare fraud is rampant. As a result, welfare policies have become more punitive and the boundaries between the welfare system and the criminal justice system have blurred—so much so that in some locales prosecution caseloads for welfare fraud exceed welfare caseloads. In reality, some recipients manipulate the welfare system for their own ends, others are gravely hurt by punitive policies, and still others fall somewhere in between.

In Cheating Welfare, Kaaryn S. Gustafson endeavors to clear up these gray areas by providing insights into the history, social construction, and lived experience of welfare. She shows why cheating is all but inevitable—not because poor people are immoral, but because ordinary individuals navigating complex systems of rules are likely to become entangled despite their best efforts. Through an examination of the construction of the crime we know as welfare fraud, which she bases on in-depth interviews with welfare recipients in Northern California, Gustafson challenges readers to question their assumptions about welfare policies, welfare recipients, and crime control in the United States.

1
Introduction

Mention the word welfare in a room full of people in the United States and you can expect to see brows furrow and mouths tighten in disgust. Welfare, the colloquial term for some public benefits in the United States, no longer holds its original meaning: well-being. Instead, it has become a pejorative term used to label “welfare mothers” or “welfare queens.” And while welfare use has always carried the stigma of poverty, it now also bears the stigma of criminality.

Welfare rules assume the criminality of the poor. Indeed, the logics of crime control now reign supreme over efforts to reduce poverty or to ameliorate its effects. As government policies targeting the poor have changed with time, so have the experiences of poor families who use welfare. Many of today’s welfare policies are far removed from basic goals of ensuring the well-being of families. Rather, policies are, first and foremost, intended to deter welfare use, to guard against misuse, and to punish welfare cheating. Policing the poor and protecting taxpayer dollars from fraud and abuse have taken priority over providing security to economically vulnerable parents and children. Today’s welfare system treats those who use public benefits, or who even apply for benefits, as latent criminals. Nationwide, welfare recipients are treated as presumptive liars, cheaters, and thieves. Their lives are heavily surveilled and regulated, not only by the welfare system, but also by the criminal justice system. Changes in public attitudes and government practices have led to what can be described as the criminalization of poverty.

The term criminalization is used in this book to describe a web of state practices and policies related to welfare. There are several different strands of criminalization. First, there are a number of practices involving the stigmatization, surveillance, and regulation of the poor. These practices are historically embedded in aid programs to the poor but seem to be expanding.

Second, many welfare policies and practices assume a latent criminality among the poor. Reforms over the last two decades have been aimed at excluding from welfare those individuals who have engaged in illicit behavior in the past and have also aimed at imposing harsh penalties on those who engage in illicit activities while receiving public benefits. These policies adopt the get-tough-on-crime approach once relegated to the criminal justice system.

Third, criminalization involves the growing overlap between the welfare system and the criminal justice system. This intersection includes not only overlapping goals and attitudes toward the poor but also collaborative practices and shared information systems between welfare offices and various branches of the criminal justice system. Very concrete examples of this criminalization exist—most notably, aggressive investigations of and prosecutions for welfare fraud.

Despite this criminalization of the welfare system, poor families continue breaking the rules of welfare receipt and continue hiding information from welfare officials. Many of those who receive public benefits actually do cheat. But they do not all cheat for the same reasons. Some cheat because of the need to provide food and shelter for themselves and their families, some cheat because they have figured out how to avoid getting caught, some cheat because they perceive no risks of cheating, and some cheat because they cannot comprehend the complicated rules of the system. Some cheat for several of these reasons.

The title of this book, Cheating Welfare, is intended to rouse readers to think about not only the ways welfare recipients cheat the welfare system but also the ways the existing system is at odds with the welfare of families and the welfare of society. This study looks at the welfare system from two vantage points: from the policy level and from the perspective of those who use public benefits. It provides insight into the history, social construction, and lived experience of welfare and shows why cheating is all but inevitable—not because poor people are more immoral than anyone else but because ordinary individuals navigating complex systems of rules are likely to become entangled despite their best efforts. It also challenges readers to question their assumptions about welfare policies, welfare recipients, and crime control policies in the United States. The book examines the creation of welfare rules by the lawmakers; the reconstruction of those welfare rules by administrators; the acceptance of or resistance to those rules in the abstract by the poor; the day-to-day negotiation of the rules by welfare recipients; and, finally, the punitive responses of the state to rule violations. It examines the construction of the crime we know as welfare fraud and, relying on in-depth interviews with welfare recipients in Northern California, examines the hold that welfare rules have—and do not have—over low-income and no-income parents in the wake of federal welfare reform.

With an eye to the rules and penalties instituted under the United States’ federal welfare reforms of 1996, the book’s empirical research is driven by four main questions: First, what knowledge do welfare recipients possess of welfare rules and the consequences of rule breaking? Second, to what extent do welfare recipients comply with the welfare rules—both the formal rules and the rules as they understand them? Third, do individuals immersed in a system of complex rules with which compliance is difficult question the legitimacy of and resist either the welfare system or the broader legal system? Finally, do welfare recipients display the potential to transform the system?

The findings reveal that while all too often treated as a monolithic group, welfare recipients display significant variation in their rule knowledge, rule compliance, and views about the rules’ legitimacy. The personal stories the interviewees share are startling, angering, and heartbreaking. Most respondents in this study found it difficult to comply with the rules and therefore cheated routinely. Some of the rule breaking was done knowingly, some done unknowingly. Surprisingly, the state’s zealous pursuit of welfare fraud in the county where the interviewees lived was actually capturing those who were trying best to comply with the rules and who were most likely to believe the rules were fair.

The data undermine the rational actor model so commonly applied to welfare recipients, a model based on the assumption that the welfare rules are known and understood, are guiding behavior, and are the reason welfare rolls dropped dramatically after the federal welfare reforms of 1996. In addition, the types of resistance the interviewees displayed were not those that would challenge the welfare system and create change that would improve their lot but instead resistance that merely reinforced legal understandings, cultural symbols, and punitive policies deployed against them. Most of the interviewees, despite receiving welfare themselves, embraced negative stereotypes of welfare recipients and supported punitive welfare policies. Rather than challenging widely held views of welfare recipients as morally deviant, they simply described themselves as different from, and better than, other welfare recipients. In the end, welfare recipients reified rather than resisted law’s power over the poor.

This book engages with—and addresses gaps in—three bodies of literature: empirical research on welfare policies and their effects; criminology; and law-and-society literature on legal consciousness and resistance. The following sections outline some of the questions drawn from those bodies of scholarship.

Examining the Root Issues of Welfare Policy

Over the last three decades, welfare policies have been informed by popular beliefs that welfare fraud is rampant. As a result, welfare policies have become more punitive, and the boundaries between the welfare system and the criminal justice system have blurred—so much so that in some locales, at certain points in time, prosecution caseloads for welfare fraud have exceeded welfare caseloads. And though the welfare and criminal justice systems have been converging in many ways, scholars who study poverty, public policy, and crime seem not to have taken notice.

Welfare policies are informed by rational choice models of behavioral social science. Much of the policy literature examines changes in policy and subsequent changes in behavioral outcomes, such as rates of welfare use or employment rates. Much of the quantitative research about welfare receipt and welfare cheating has emerged in policy studies of the efficacy of welfare fraud prevention strategies and relies upon administrative data, thus examining welfare recipients in the aggregate (Lange 1979; Chi 1984; Gardiner 1984; Gardiner and Lyman 1984; Hutton 1985; Wolf and Greenberg 1986). These studies examine, for example, discrepancies between calculations of need and the benefits actually provided. Or they triangulate income and resource data from governmental databases to search for income sources that welfare recipients have failed to report. These studies can uncover only a limited amount of rule breaking, for they measure only noncompliance that can be observed in administrative records. In addition, these studies examining welfare recipients in the aggregate cannot discern intentional from unintentional rule breaking, though intent is central to notions of culpability in American criminal law.

Other studies of welfare rule violation examine the sanction rates for welfare recipients who fail to meet their work requirements or other requirements (Cherlin et al. 2002; Kalil, Seefeldt, and Wang 2002). While these studies may give an indication of how many individuals failed to comply with the formal rules, they can offer no indication of how many decided to break the rules, how many simply could not comply, or how many broke the rules unknowingly. And, of course, these studies do not discuss the cases where individuals broke the rules without getting caught. Much of the welfare research of the last two fifteen years has examined the effects of welfare rules on welfare recipients’ wage earning (Bloom et al. 2000) or the effects of policy changes on welfare recipients’ departures from the welfare system (commonly known as “leaver studies”) (e.g., Anderson, Halter, and Gryzlak 2004; California Department of Social Services 2000; Lower-Basch 2000; Verma and Hendra 2003). All of these studies problematically assume that welfare recipients know the rules well enough to factor them into their decision making and that complying with the rules and regulations is a choice they can fully exercise. As a result, these studies assume causation between rule changes, individual choice, and policy outcomes when, in fact, there may be less informed choice and direct causation involved than these studies conclude.

Most researchers, in fact, have failed to ask some of the most interesting, relevant, and basic research questions about welfare policy. For example, there has been little research on what would seem to be crucial questions for both welfare policy analysts and criminologists, namely, whether individuals who are subject to rules—particularly punitive rules—possess accurate knowledge of the rules and the consequences of rule breaking. This question, it would seem, is antecedent and necessary to any convincing discussion of the effects of policy changes and rule enforcement.

Herbert Simon writes that perfect rationality “requires a complete knowledge and anticipation of the consequences that will follow on each choice” (1997, 93). Therefore having knowledge of, or even access to gaining knowledge of, the rules and the consequences of complying or not complying with them is important in the exercise of rationality, whether in the context of welfare or elsewhere. Most studies of welfare policies employ simplistic behavioral models and take for granted that welfare recipients fully comprehend both the vast set of rules that govern their behavior and the consequences for violating these rules. For the most part, however, policy analysts have not tested assumptions that welfare recipients possess complete knowledge of rules and regulations.

Rather than assuming perfect information and unconstrained choice, Herbert Simon has urged scholars to acknowledge “bounded rationality” (1997, 89), the notion that individuals and organizations must sometimes act despite limited information and constraints on available choices and actions. Simon writes that the neoclassical economic models of human action—the very models predominant in public policy studies of welfare recipients—fail to “ask how the actors acquire the information required for these decisions, how they make the necessary calculations, or even, and this is the crux of the matter—whether they are capable of making the kinds of decisions postulated in utility-maximizing or profit-maximizing theory” (20). Many welfare policy studies based on economic models fail to consider bounded rationality.

This book examines a bounded rationality and contextualized negotiation of welfare rules. It looks at how individuals obtain information about rules, rights, and the consequences of rule breaking. The study makes clear not only that rule knowledge is rarely complete among individuals who are subject to the welfare rules but also that the level of rule knowledge is not uniform among individuals subject to the rules. Moreover, this study goes beyond analyses of rule compliance based on simple economic models—models that assume rule knowledge—and offers a more nuanced analysis of legal knowledge, where both action and inaction are viewed not only in relationship to formal rules and rights but also in relationship to individual competence, in response to the hegemonic power of legal symbols, and in resistance to or in flow with law’s power.

Studying the Intersection of Welfare Law and Criminal Law

Generally, the welfare system and the criminal justice system have been treated as distinct realms of law. That is not the case. The logics of criminology have come to reign over means-tested public aid programs. And though the welfare and criminal justice systems have converged in many ways, only a few scholars seem to have taken notice (see Garland 2001; Wacquant 2001, 2008, 2009a, 2009b). Many poverty law scholars and criminal law scholars seem to have overlooked the trends, even as the federal government and many states have been implementing policies that punish welfare cheating increasingly harshly and that punish through criminal prosecution rather than civil penalties. Much of this book explores and questions the convergence of the welfare system, traditionally the benevolent arm of the state, and the criminal justice system, the punitive arm of the state. It also examines the effects of this convergence on the individuals in the midst of this shifting state power.

The body of qualitative research on the lives of welfare recipients is growing (e.g., Berrick 1995; Edin and Lein 1997; Gilliom 1997, 2001; Kingfisher 1996; Rank 1994; Sarat 1990; Schein 1995; Seccombe 1999; Soss 2000; Stack 1975). Recent literature on the economic coping strategies of the poor has revealed rule breaking as common practice among welfare recipients (Berrick 1995; Edin and Lein 1997; Edin and Jencks 1993; Gilliom 1997, 2001; Kingfisher 1996; Seccombe 1999). These findings about rule breaking, however, have been only tangentially related to the central questions of these studies. These works include individual stories that hint at the motivations behind noncompliant actions with welfare rules, some of which might lead to prosecution for welfare fraud. These writings also reveal practices that are not captured in statistical analyses or discovered by welfare fraud investigators. They point to the negative effects of welfare fraud investigations for families on aid. They also lead to a couple conclusions: first, that some welfare recipients have to break the rules to make ends meet; second, that welfare recipients who break the rules may not necessarily do so intentionally.

Criminologists have neglected the possibilities of research on noncompliance with welfare rules and criminal welfare fraud in particular. This is a significant oversight for many reasons. First and foremost, fraud is a common criminal charge, with felony fraud making up between 20 and 30 percent of the prosecutions in California at the time of the data collection in this study. Violent crimes, however, tend to capture the attention of researchers more easily—to be “sexier”—than property crimes.

A second reason why welfare fraud is a surprising omission in scholarly work on crime is that it would appear to fit well within Marxist analyses of crime and social inequality. In an overview of Marxist analyses of the causes of crime, David Greenberg discusses numerous studies examining the links between crime rates and levels of inequality or unemployment, many of them studies of property crimes (1993, 69). It is easy to envision studies of welfare fraud contributing to this literature. While this study does not pursue that analysis, the data may be of some interest to Marxist scholars, particularly those who might wish to see data on property crimes that have occurred later than the nineteenth century.

Finally, crimes of fraud—or at least the ones prosecuted—tend to be perpetrated by women rather than men, making those crimes unusual. While women made up only 17 percent of U.S. felony convictions in 2002, they made up 42 percent of felony fraud convictions that year (Durose and Langan 2004, 6, table 5 (defining fraud charges to include forgery and embezzlement)). Data assembled by the U.S. Department of Justice on arrests and convictions in forty large U.S. urban counties revealed that in 2002 women made up 41 percent of defendants charged with felony fraud (Kyckelhahn and Cohen 2008, 2), down from 52 percent in 1998 (Reaves 2001, 4, table 3). In no other categories of felony convictions do women come even close to making up such large percentages of convictions (Durose and Langan 2004, 6, table 5). Moreover, in contrast to other felonies, the majority of those charged with fraud (55 percent) have had no prior convictions (Cohen and Kyckelhahn 2010, 5, table 4).

The gender disparity in felony fraud convictions is also interesting because men have a higher rate of arrest for fraud. In 1994, there were 158 men arrested for fraud per 100,000 men in the population, and 98 women arrested for fraud per 100,000 women in the population (Daly and Tonry 1997, 210, table 1A). There appears to be a dramatic and unexplained gender difference that occurs somewhere between arrest and prosecution and that results in such a large number of felony fraud prosecutions brought against women despite the higher arrest rate for men. Also, between 1975 and 1994 the number of fraud arrests increased more quickly among women than among men, with a 140 percent rate of increase for women and a 108 percent increase for men (Daly and Tonry 1997, 212, table 1D). One would expect the distinctiveness of fraud statistics to spark social scientists and legal scholars to delve deeply into the nature of fraud. Until now, however, such has not been the case.

Even scholars in the area of feminist criminology have sidestepped analyses of welfare fraud. The gendered aspects of fraud prosecutions should make welfare fraud particularly interesting to feminist criminologists. Perhaps one explanation for the oversight is that much of the scholarship within feminist criminology examines women as the victims of crime (especially rape and domestic violence) rather than the perpetrators of crime. Dana Britton has rightly complained that better understandings of women’s interactions with the law “require a new, more nuanced conception of women offenders that disrupts the dichotomy in which they have been seen only either as innocent victims or as hardened offenders” (2000, 72).

Feminist legal scholars have sometimes argued that gender-neutral theories of rationality are problematic for women (Okin 1989, 71). Most women are mothers and therefore factor both the interests and the outcomes of others (their families) into their decisions and their actions. As Martha Fineman explains, women are more likely than men to experience “derivative dependency” as a result of the “inevitable dependency” of their children or of others relying upon their caregiving (1995, 8). This dependency—distinct from the commonly disparaged “welfare dependency”—leaves women more economically vulnerable than men. However, issues of dependency, economic opportunity, and need have been underexamined in the scholarship on women’s criminal behavior generally and welfare fraud specifically. This study is not intended to, nor could it possibly, address all of the gaps in criminological research. It may, however, provide some perspectives on welfare rule breaking that motivate more extensive research on wo...