Science Studies

An Advanced Introduction

David J Hess, David J. Hess

• Publisher: NYU Press
• Year: 1997
• Print ISBN: 9780814735640
• eBook ISBN: 9780814773239
• Topic: Education
• Subtopic: Education General

The first comprehensive survey of the nascent field of "science studies"

Thrust into the public eye by the contentious "Science Wars"—played out most recently by physicist Alan Sokal's hoax—the nascent field of science studies takes on the political, historical, and cultural dimensions of technology and the sciences.

Science Studies is the first comprehensive survey of the field, combining a concise overview of key concepts with an original and integrated framework. In the process of bringing disparate fields together under one tent, David J. Hess realizes the full promise of science studies, long uncomfortably squeezed into traditional disciplines. He provides a clear discussion of the issues and misunderstandings that have arisen in these interdisciplinary conversations. His survey is up-to-date and includes recent developments in philosophy, sociology, anthropology, history, cultural studies, and feminist studies.

By moving from the discipline-bound blinders of a sociology, history, philosophy, or anthropology of science to a transdisciplinary field, science studies, Hess argues, will be able to provide crucial conceptual tools for public discussions about the role of science and technology in a democratic society.

1
Introduction

Science has become an integral part of many issues of public concern–medical, informational, and environmental, to name a few. Scientific experts frequently square off on the evening news. At work, professional discourses have become increasingly technical, and at home we face an ocean of competing claims about topics such as carcinogens in our food or the technical features of competing appliances.

Science studies provides a conceptual tool kit for thinking about technical expertise in more sophisticated ways. Science studies tracks the history of disciplines, the dynamics of science as a social institution, and the philosophical basis for scientific knowledge. It teaches, for example, that there are ways of developing sound criteria for evaluating opposing theories and interpretations, but also that there are ways of finding the agendas sometimes hidden behind a rhetoric of objectivity. In the process, science studies makes it easier for laypeople to question the authority of experts and their claims. It teaches how to look for biases, and it holds out a vision of greater public participation in technical policy issues.

In short, science studies provides a forum where people who are concerned with the place of science and technology in a democratic society can discuss complicated technical issues. Because of that role, science studies is not always a popular field. In the mid-1990s the “science wars”–a wave of attacks on some prominent figures in science studies–became particularly intense. These attacks tended to single out a few feminists and radical cons true tivists, subject them to distorting readings, then dismiss the entire field as a hotbed of postmodern irrationalism. Although I am not in agreement with the radical relativism that characterizes a corner of the science studies community, I am more disturbed by the attackers’ dismissive caricatures and distortions of a huge volume of theory and research. I have experienced science studies as a vibrant intellectual field that is bubbling with novel research and ideas. This book presents some of that exciting work.

The issues surrounding science, technology, and society are of increasing interest in our technological society not only to the public in general but also to scientists and other researchers. Scientists have come to recognize the political nature of the institutions of science, and their research problems have become increasingly tied to public and private agendas outside their disciplines. Likewise, as humanists and social scientists encounter technological issues with increasing frequency, they also find themselves drawn into the interdisciplinary field. However, as newcomers from all disciplines enter the field, they sometimes end up reinventing the wheel because they do not have a background in its principal concepts and theories.

There is widespread need, then, for a concise overview of the key concepts of the interdisciplinary field as a whole, one that points the way to the more specific literatures of the philosophy, sociology, anthropology, history, cultural studies, and feminist studies of science and technology. This book introduces many of the key concepts and provides one map of a wide range of the terrain. In the process, the debates that have received media attention as the “science wars” are set in their proper context as only one of the issues that are part of an ongoing dialogue within the field. When outside critics dismiss the field for its relativism, they are actually riding on debates internal to the field, and not particularly new or interesting ones at that.

The book had its origin as a teaching text for graduate students and advanced undergraduates. Students who were new to the field–including many graduate students who were established professionally in other fields, such as engineering–complained of confusion when they first confronted the interdisciplinary Babel of science studies. They found my focus on some of the interdisciplinary misunderstandings helpful, and they used the text to provide a menu of what to study in more detail.

The field can be very confusing for newcomers, as I remember well from my own relatively recent entrance in the mid-1980s. Even the name of the field is not uniform. Some people preferred to use their disciplinary designations and call themselves, for example, philosophers of science. Others preferred the initials HPS (history and philosophy of science) to describe a position known as philosophical historicism, which was considered quite distinct from the more social science–oriented studies of science, technology, and society. Sociologists who studied scientific knowledge at first tended to refer to the field as “science studies” in contrast to the more institutionally oriented sociology of science. As they became more interested in technology, they began to add a “T” for technology: STS.

However, even the acronym “STS” is controversial. There has been a debate over whether it should mean science, technology, and society studies or simply science and technology studies. The first definition reflects a time when social studies of science and technology were more separate from the history and philosophy of science and technology. By the late 1980s there had been so much interdisciplinary dialogue among social scientists, historians, and philosophers–not to mention natural scientists and more recent arrivals from anthropology, cultural studies, and feminist studies–that there has been an increasing tendency to use the term STS to mean “science and technology studies.” I am among those who think of STS as an interdisciplinary conversation among a wide range of “constituent disciplines,” rather than merely the social studies of science, technology, and society. However, to those who came to the field with a background in science activism, dropping the term “society” signaled the lamentable professionalization of the field and a waning concern with social justice issues. Furthermore, to those who speak languages in which “studies” begins with an “e” or some other letter (etudes, estudios), the switch was a reminder of Anglophone hegemony in the field. Many continue to use the term “science studies” as a more identifiable phrase or a designation for a subset of STS that is parallel to technology studies. I’ve used “science studies” for the title of this book because it has come to be used colloquially as a broad and inclusive name for the field.

Notwithstanding the growth of interdisciplinarity, the disciplinary divisions remain strong, and they underlie the organization of this book. Chapters 2, 3, and 4 are therefore organized as introductions to the philosophy of science, the sociology of science, and the sociology of scientific knowledge. These fields still constitute the major sources of specialist terminology and theorizing. The title of chapter 5, “Critical and Cultural Studies of Science and Technology,” is suggestive of my view of where the field is moving. This chapter introduces theoretical concepts from a number of overlapping fields: anthropology, critical social theory, cultural studies, feminist studies, critical technology studies, and the cultural history of science.

The interdisciplinary field embraces a vast literature, and I cannot claim to be fluent in all areas or to cover it all in this short introduction. Rather, I have selected concepts with an eye toward interdisciplinary dialogue and with a sense of their salience in transdisciplinary theorizing. There are introductions available for some of the constituent disciplines, and a guide to the introductory literature is included at the end of the book. But Science Studies provides the first overview of the field that is not restricted to one of the constituent disciplines. In addition, I cover important developments during recent years, such as philosophical naturalism and realism, actor-network theory, the anthropology of science and technology, and cultural/ feminist studies. Other introductory books also tend to miss the cross-disciplinary misunderstandings. In contrast, I explore in more detail the interdisciplinary cross-talk, and I occasionally suggest solutions.

Consistent with contemporary science studies theories, I do not claim to draw a neutral or value-free map of the interdisciplinary territory. However, I do claim to approach the project with a modicum of fairness and a spirit of interdisciplinarity, and I do provide the reader with the courtesy of presenting my best understanding of the positions of others before I give my own position. Even so, there will be some areas that are not covered. The book has an American focus and, as the title suggests, it focuses more on science issues than technology issues. The book also sticks to the major concepts of the interdisciplinary nexus of history, philosophy, and the social and cultural studies of science. Consequently, other fields such as the psychology and rhetoric of science, which up to now have made relatively marginal contributions to the main lines of the interdisciplinary discussion, receive relatively short coverage. Policy discussions occur in almost all the journals and across the disciplines, and policy implications are flagged throughout the book. My own approach to policy issues is provided in the conclusion.

The field can be acrimonious, perhaps because science and technology are so fundamental to the people involved. Imagine a religious studies conference in which theologians and practicing clergy from a range of religions, as well as historians and social scientists, came together to discuss their ideas, and one can get a sense of why “science wars” tend to flare up. My hope is that a better understanding of the various constituent disciplines may help the reader avoid some of the interdisciplinary misunderstandings. Many students and scholars tend to dismiss everything about an author or a subfield because they disagree with one or two points. I try to encourage instead what some of my more open-minded colleagues call a charitable reading: examining the other text or discipline for what it has to offer one s own projects. Certainly, I have found a wide range of concepts and disciplines useful for developing what I believe is a more coherent framework for my own special areas of empirical research interest.

My hope, then, is to realize the transdisciplinary promise of an ongoing conversation among philosophers, sociologists, anthropologists, political scientists, historians, and others, including natural scientists. Each field, even each theorist and each empirical study, has a unique contribution to make, if read with the proper spirit. Sometimes I disagree with the excesses and more grandiose claims, but my vision is always focused on finding those moments of transdisciplinary insight that occur when we put on someone else’s lenses, if only for a moment. By moving from the discipline-bound blinders of a sociology, history, philosophy, or anthropology of science to a transdisciplinary field, science studies is able to provide a valuable set of conceptual tools for public discussions of the role of science and technology in a democratic society.

2
The Philosophy of Science
An Interdisciplinary Perspective

The Philosophy of Science in an Interdisciplinary Context

Although STS or science studies is becoming an increasingly interdisciplinary conversation, there is still a gulf of understanding among the different constituent disciplines, especially between the philosophical and social studies wings. I use the term “social studies” to include historians, cultural studies researchers, and social scientists. Following the American usage, I use “social scientist” to refer to sociologists, cultural anthropologists, political scientists and policy analysts, economists, management and administration scientists, and some other researchers such as geographers. (In other countries the term “social scientist” has a much more restricted usage, generally referring to anthropologists, sociologists, and political scientists.) In contrast, the term “humanities” refers to fields such as history, literature and cultural studies, rhetoric, philosophy, and perhaps some of the more humanistically minded cultural anthropologists and sociologists. Sometimes “human sciences” is used as an umbrella term for the social sciences and humanities. Although the humanities/social science divide has been the subject of controversy within some disciplines, in the STS field the most significant disciplinary division has been between those who have some allegiance to traditional Anglo-Saxon and German philosophy of science and those who have a more social or cultural orientation. The term “philosophy” is generally adequate to cover the first group (even though there is a continental philosophical tradition that is more influential in technology studies), but some other term is necessary to cover the second group of socially oriented social scientists and humanists. In the Anglophone world, “social studies” is probably the best term to designate descriptive, empirical research that includes the work of social scientists as well as humanities scholars in history, cultural studies, and other humanities fields. In the humanities, “cultural studies” is sometimes used as an umbrella term, but the term would exclude several of the social sciences. Thus, I will use “social studies” as a generic but imperfect term to cover social scientists and those humanists who are concerned with social aspects of the world they study.

This chapter begins the survey of key concepts in science studies by reviewing the philosophy of science through an interdisciplinary lens. Introductions by professionally trained philosophers can accomplish a much more detailed and inclusive level of discussion than will be achieved here.¹This chapter complements those introductions by focusing on two aspects of the philosophy of science in the general interdisciplinary setting: misunderstandings and possibilities in the sometimes acrimonious dialogue between philosophers and social studies researchers, and the application of the philosophy of science to the problem of designating good criteria for choice among major theories or research programs. Following Steve Fuller (1988), I will seek a middle ground in the dialogue between philosophers and social studies researchers by beginning with the distinction between prescriptive and descriptive approaches to science and technology. Although some philosophies of science (such as evolutionary epistemology) are descriptive, for the most part it is helpful to see the central problem of the philosophy of science as making clarifications that could help scientists decide how they should go about improving the ways they think about and do science. Fuller has probably developed the prescriptive role of the philosophy of science more clearly than any other philosopher, and he has introduced the term “social epistemology” for one type of prescriptive use of the philosophy of science. In his words, the fundamental question of social epistemology is,

How should the pursuit of knowledge be organized, given that under normal circumstances knowledge is pursued by many human beings, each working on a more or less well-defined body of knowledge and each equipped with roughly the same imperfect cognitive capacities, albeit with varying degrees of access to one another’s activities? (1988: 3)

Although social epistemology brings the philosophy of science into the realm of prescriptive work for science in society, I will also interpret the traditional philosophy of science as prescriptive in a more narrow sense: its contribution to understanding how to make better scientific theories and explanations. Fullers work is a good starting point because it clearly locates the division of labor between philosophy and social studies in the distinction between prescription and description, or normative versus empirical approaches (xi). Although philosophers certainly describe science and technology, and social studies researchers often engage in discussions of policy and activism that can be explicitly prescriptive, Fuller s distinction is useful as a way of moving toward a productive dialogue between philosophical and social studies outlooks on science and technology. In other words, philosophy may be helpful to social scientists and humanists when they are in the prescriptive mode, and likewise the research of social and cultural studies may be helpful to philosophers when they are making descriptive claims about science and technology.

This review of some concepts in the philosophy of science will focus on one type of prescriptive question: what grounds should scientists use to justify their choices among major theories or research programs? To answer this question, as in other philosophical problem areas, philosophers pursue a dialogue of arguments and counterarguments. Although the dialogue may never result in a final consensus, the back-and-forth procedure makes it possible to progress by finding the shortcomings in previous solutions and providing alternatives that answer those shortcomings. This review will cover the following major positions: positivism, conventionalism, falsificationism, historicism, naturalism/realism, constructivism/relativism, and feminism.

Positivism

In the philosophy of science “positivism” is shorthand for logical positivism or logical empiricism, terms that are not exactly identical but will be treated so here for the sake of simplicity. In STS circles the term “positivism” is usually associated with the philosophical positions that emerged around the Vienna Circle. However, for social scientists the word “positivism” may also refer to the thought of Auguste Comte, a nineteenth-century French social theorist. Comte believed in the unity of sciences and supported an evolutionary theory of scientific progress that led to a positive stage that happened to match his nineteenth-century understandings of science. In this sense the term “positive” might be glossed as “I’m positive I’m right because my position is founded on science.” In the humanities and cultural studies, another use of the word sometimes appears. “Positivist” can be a pejorative label for (1) someone perceived to have a simplistic and uncritical view of science, and/or (2) someone who wishes, in a very simplistic way, to base social science or humanities methods on an ideal version of those in the natural sciences. In polemical debates, the label “positivist” is usually opposed to “postmodernist,” although in debates where these labels get hurled back and forth there is usually little substance.

Returning now to philosophical positivism, the Vienna Circle was a group of philosophers whose work flourished during the interwar period. Many were trained in physics and influenced by British formal philosophy in the tradition of Bertrand Russell. Because some were Jews and some were leftists, their social position set the stage for the fragmentation of the circle when the Nazis came to power. Most of the circles members moved to Britain or the United States, where they had an important impact on the Anglo-American philosophy of science. Members of the Vienna Circle included Moritz Schlick, Ernst Mach, Otto Neurath, and Rudolf Carnap; A. J. Ayer, Herbert Feigl, Kurt Godel, and Hans Reichenbach were among those associated with the circle. Karl Popper maintained close ties with some of the members of the circle, but he was not considered a true positivist.

Perhaps the key concept associated with the positivist philosophy of science, at least in its early versions, was the verifiability principle, which held that statements are meaningful if verifiable. (A weaker version of this principle held that statements are meaningful if confirmable to some degree.) Although some statements could be verified by logic or by definition, the more important means of verification was experience. For example, the sentence “Crows are fifteen” is meaningless because the sentence cannot be confirmed as either true or false in the sense that the sentence “Crows are black” can be.² Although the verifiability principle lost importance with the passage of time, the empiricist interpretation of meaning continued to underlie the sharp distinction that positivists often drew between theoretical terms and observational terms. Theoretical terms such as energy in physics can therefore be interpreted as meaningless in the strict sense because they are not observable directly or even relatively directly through measuring devices.

The interpretation of meaning as reference contrasts sharply with the semiotic understanding of meaning that is common in the humanities and some social sciences. This is one of the first major opportunities for cross-disciplinary misunderstandings. For example, under Ferdinand de Saussure s definition of value, the meaning of a statement derives from its relative position in various codes of semantic difference.³ Thus, the meaning of the sentence “The coyote is laughing” is understood through a series of contrasts. These include the contrast between the coyote and other animals (it is not a raven, a swan, or a crow); the contrast between laughing and other activities (it is not remaining black, turning white, or flying into a wall); the grammatical juxtaposition of coyote and laughing in a sentence compared with other possibilities; and the semantic mapping of associations of “coyote” and “laughing” (for example, the coyote clan may harbor a tricksterish shaman whose attributes are like those of the coyote totem). This view of meaning has been enormously influential in contemporary linguistics, cultural anthropology, history, and literary/cultural studies through the various intellectual currents known as structuralism, poststruct-uralism, and deconstruction.

Thus, one view of meaning associates a word with the thing to which it refers, whereas another view opens up a world of interpretations. In contrast with the positivists’ project to formulate a universal, formal language, semiotic approaches to meaning interpose languages and cultures as a necessary point of reference. Although the differences between the positivist and semiotic views of meaning are profound, the two can nonetheless be made compatible. In effect, they are...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• Acknowledgments
• 1 Introduction
• 2 The Philosophy of Science An Interdisciplinary Perspective
• 3 The Institutional Sociology of Science
• 4 Social Studies of Knowledge
• 5 Critical and Cultural Studies of Science and Technology
• 6 Conclusions
• For Additional Information
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index
• About the Author