Theory and Practice
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Theory and Practice

Nomos XXXVII

Ian Shapiro, Judith Wagner Decew

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Theory and Practice

Nomos XXXVII

Ian Shapiro, Judith Wagner Decew

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With 16 original essays all published here for the first time, Theory and Practice focuses on the relationship between philosophical tradition and everyday life in the Western tradition. In this comprehensive volume, Ian Shapiro and Judith Wagner DeCew have gathered contributions from some of the most influential thinkers of our generation including Cass Sunnstein, Jean Bethke Elshtain, Martha Nussbaum, Jeremy Waldron, and Kent Greenwalt.

What are the relations between philosophical theories and everyday life? This question, as old as it is profound, is the central focus of Theory and Practice. The contributors include some of the most influential thinkers of our generation, among them Cass Sunnstein, Jean Bethke Elshtain, Martha Nessbaum, Jeremy Waldron, and Kent Greenwalt. In sixteen chapters--all published here for the first time—the authors examine major attempts to reconcile theory with practice in the Western tradition from Herodotus, Plato, and Aristotle to Kant and Heidegger.

Considerable attention is devoted to the role of theory in judicial decision-making, debates between defenders of the value of pure theory and those who argue for the priority of practice, the political implications of theory, practical problems such as global warming, and the theoretical commitments of practitioners from Karl Marx to Vaclav Havel. One of the most expansive volumes in the NOMOS series to date, Theory and Practice will be of interest to philosophers, lawyers, and social scientists from a wide range of disciplines.

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PART I
FOUNDATIONS OF THE DEBATE ON THEORY AND PRACTICE

1
THE DECLINE AND REPUDIATION OF THE WHOLE: NOTES ON ARISTOTLE’S ENCLOSURE OF THE PRE-SOCRATIC WORLD

NORMA THOMPSON
Herodotus’ reputation in the ancient world is something exceptional which must be explained.
—Arnaldo Momigliano
Much of political thought as we know it today exists within a universe designed by Aristotle, whose conception of theoria and praxis is tied up with his notion of the best possible lives for human beings. As is well known, Aristotle found in the theoretical or contemplative life the possibilities for complete human happiness,1 while for him the practical life of politics offered happiness of a “secondary” sort (NE 1178a9). Even so, in his practical writings, Aristotle certainly sought to achieve an integrative conception of theory and practice; in his explication of the phronimos, for example, we confront the individual who can, through experience and wisdom, deliberate correctly about what are the best actions and about how to pursue those actions in particular circumstances. Yet Aristotle’s work, as variously interpreted over the ages, generally came to be understood as justifying the dominance of theory over practice: practice could not be entirely understood or rightly conducted without close attention to theory.
Reactions to this main stream of interpretation quite naturally appear from time to time,2 but contemporary critics and thinkers once again are calling for a renewed scrutiny of Aristotelian categories of thought. The concern at present is that out of Aristotle’s conception of theoria and the theoretikos may emerge something fundamentally despotic; thus we find a considerable body of writing “against” theory, produced by those who identify themselves as “anti-foundationalist.”3 The “privileged” role of theory and the theorist is not easily defended in an anti-elitist age: “Theory, in the sense of sustained reflection upon society in order to render one’s understanding as comprehensive and as coherent as possible, is for the few; practice is for the many.”4
However worthy this may be as an intellectual movement, like other reactions to the main current of political thought across the centuries it seems unlikely to provide lasting satisfaction. Indeed, anti-foundationalism could be interpreted itself as a theory, smuggling aboard foundations in disguise under cover of obscurity and setting a course for its own version of despotism by casting off the anchor of admitted theory to leave all to the mercy of raw power politics. Thus, we remain unable to locate satisfactory alternatives to the Aristotelian universe of theoria and praxis, and remain subject to mood swings between the two, now favoring one, now the other. The theoretically inclined seek comprehensive explanations that ultimately fail to satisfy; the pragmatically inclined eventually come to believe, with cause, that no practice long endures in the absence of its theory. We require more than a mixture of the two positions.
In order to meet this requirement, we might reexamine that Aristotelian moment in which “The Philosopher” establishes his orientation over against a previous pre-Socratic thinking. It has been observed that when Aristotle eschewed Plato’s dialogue form in favor of his own “monologue,” he was advocating the “replacement of myth by logos.”5 This statement will be explicated in due course; for the moment, I will put a name to it, and claim that the “myth” which Aristotle’s “logos” was intended to replace was essentially Herodotean.
Momigliano refers to the near-uniform contempt in which Herodotus came to be held in his time, and wonders why. He goes on to note that Herodotus recovered from the attack of Thucydides only after two thousand years.6 In some form or another, this charge has been repeated throughout the ages, and yet it is incomplete; unmentioned is Herodotus’ more unremitting critic, Aristotle. The observations that follow are offered with the suggestion that a close reading of Aristotle’s pronouncements on history and historical argumentation indicate that he defined his intellectual system against Herodotus and scorned Herodotus’ “ancient” ways of thought as chaotically inclusive of virtually all dimensions of human life. In their place, Aristotle constructed the more controlled, dichotomous, demarcated, and abstract structures that have framed and helped to shape Western and world thought ever since.
In this endeavor, Aristotle may be seen as contributing his own version of an apology of the philosophic life. The statement traditionally attributed to Aristotle that Athens was not to be allowed “to sin twice against philosophy” may be apocryphal, but it is certainly true to the spirit and rhetoric of his practical writings; no philosopher has ever moved more cautiously among the “common opinions” of mankind. Tessitore has rightly emphasized “the apologetic dimension” of the Nicomachean Ethics in particular: “Aristotle’s rhetorical art is calculated to win an at-least-partial acceptance of philosophy on the part of those who are or will be most responsible for directing the affairs of the city.”7 Lobkowicz adds that Aristotle’s discussion certainly has an “ideological component”: “It serves to justify the way of life of the philosopher who pursues interests which, at first glance, have nothing to do with the problems of society.”8 I intend to demonstrate through an examination of Aristotle’s assessment of Herodotus that he considered the (urgent) task of defending the philosophic life as unfinished by his teacher, Plato, or at least in need of reformulation, and that this Aristotelian task would be fulfilled at the expense of the “unsystematic” point of view associated with Herodotus.
For obvious reasons, Plato’s apology of the philosophic life did not have the same effect as Aristotle’s in establishing the primacy of systematic argumentation; the dialogue form itself seems to counteract any “despotic” tendencies of theory. Indeed, the dramatic action within a Platonic dialogue often serves to subvert rather than to buttress the claims of theory. Thus, the extreme character of the “city in speech” as constructed in The Republic does not eventuate in the sense of Plato’s own extremism regarding the role of theory. “Few [works] give such substance to visions of ideality and longings for perfection,” observes Euben, “only to suggest the dangers of precisely what they commend.”9 The dialogue points continuously beyond its borders, and sabotages its own “closure,” as Clay writes: “By opening new frontiers of argument, and reopening arguments that had seemed settled … the Republic is an open dialogue. … [It] seems to challenge its reader to engage it from without, as do Glaukon, Adeimantus, and Polemarchus within.”10 Something beyond the reach of fixed theoretical propositions propels the movement of the dialogue, and this is related to something beyond the reach of theory that propels Socrates himself: “The power of the daimon leaves Socrates speechless and replaces the voice of the philosopher with a more primeval one, the voice of the soul.”11 Thus Plato, who depicts the philosopher’s complete estrangement from society and requires the expulsion of the poets for the philosopher’s proper role in society to be realized, still seems to limit the claims for philosophical theory by depicting its more primal—and more poetic—dependencies.
In contrast, Aristotle describes in his practical works a world more congenial for philosophers and seemingly more accepting of poets. It turns out, however, that in the “old quarrel” between philosophy and poetry that Socrates refers to, Aristotle delivers the harsher blow against poetry.12 Among the “poetry” most affected is the poetic history of Herodotus. The History is “poetic” in that Herodotus “made the long and complicated story both one and eusunopton,” as Gomme writes, “capable of being taken in in one view,”13 though it must be added that his history still lacks the closure that Aristotle favored. Thus, when the Herodotean character Croesus asks “who is the happiest of mankind?” his question will be answered but never settled. The single image of Croesus serves to connect and illuminate other instances reported by Herodotus that pertain to the question of human flourishing; the image is repeatedly evoked and further disclosed, yet it never becomes the source for metaphysical propositions. For poetry “drives thinking away from philosophy,” as Bruns claims; philosophy “wants to stay in place, not so much residing as presiding, instituting, fixing, determining, clarifying, planning for the future.”14 Aristotle’s recasting of the poetic impulse conceals its status as prior to philosophy.
The fact that Aristotle only infrequently names Herodotus as his adversary has masked the character of this defining debate; most commentators have assumed that it was Thucydides to whom Aristotle was referring. A close look at Aristotle’s argument reveals that his antagonist was Herodotus. In the following pages, this uncovered aspect of intellectual archaeology will be examined in four steps. First, I will note the striking disagreement among interpreters about how to assess Aristotle on theory and practice; this is a consequence of the mixed signals that Aristotle sends in his thoroughgoing attempt to disparage pre-Socratic thinking as represented by Herodotus. Aristotle intentionally exaggerates his distance from Herodotus and, in the process, exaggerates his claims for the determinative role of theory. Next, I will proceed through three broad categories in which Aristotle identifies himself over against Herodotus. These categories include style, evidence, and the contingent nature of the historian’s material.
Aristotle directs toward Herodotus a series of erroneous or misleading criticisms, all in the service of promoting his own philosophical tendencies: to fix definitions, to fix evidence, and to aspire to the theory that holds. The minds of both the philosopher and the historian are revealed to be universal; each seeks to explain all. But Aristotle constantly overestimates his distance from Herodotus and seems oblivious to their common ground. What is remembered is only the theory that holds. It is a triumph of rigorous intellectualization over a way of inquiry more willing and able to comprehend uncertainty, contingency, inconsistency, and the varied sources of human constancy and change. It is the beginning of the academic enclosure of the human commons.

ARISTOTLE’S DOUBLE LEGACY

Depending on one’s emphasis, Aristotle may be read as either an inspiration for our thinking on theory and practice or a deleterious influence to be overcome. At the root of this dual reading of Aristotle is his basic association of theoria with “divine” and praxis with “human.” This is evident first, in his threefold distinction between ways of knowing and his consequent ranking of the “theoretical” sciences as highest; and second, in his tripartite division of the most choiceworthy lives and his consequent ranking of the theoretical or contemplative life as best. From these formulations, it is easy to construct “settled” theories, even regarding such changeable matters as human conduct.
Aristotle mentions three forms of intellectual activity (theoretical, practical, and productive sciences); of these, he grants superiority to the theoretical sciences of theology, mathematics, and physics on account of the necessity and unchanging principles of their subject matter.15 Theoria involves things that cannot be otherwise, and even the “scanty conceptions to which we can attain of celestial things” give us, Aristotle says, “more pleasure than all our knowledge of the world in which we live.”16 His ranking of the most choiceworthy human lives follows from this estimation of theoria and, from the point of view of some readers, is accordingly suspect; it seems to validate the life of the researcher unattached to “mere” human concerns: “For it is absurd to think that Political Science or Prudence is the loftiest kind of knowledge, inasmuch as man is not the highest thing in the world” (NE 1141a22).
The theorizing that Aristotle defends seems to be uninvolved with the world around us, and, as Adkins writes, there seems to be no persuading a theoretikos “at a time when he is engaged in theoria that he should perform some moral or political action instead.”17 That life is deemed highest which is in contact with the “unalterable and unmodified, living the best and most self-sufficient of lives.”18 The life of contemplation is said to be not only superior to any other human life, it is higher than human: “Human beings are able to live it in virtue of some divine principle within. … Accordingly, we should athanatizein (play the immortal) so far as in us lies and do our best to live in accordance with the best part of us.”19 In this way, Aristotle encourages us to associate theory with the divine and practice with the human, thus leading some readers to conclude that his separation of theory from practice is so stark as to open the way to extremism: “[There is not] any sustained attempt to bridge the gulf, to show continuity, between the principles of justice which all men must respect and the contemplative activities without which no man can be truly happy.”20
Nevertheless, because there is a gulf between the realms of theory and practice for Aristotle does not mean that there is an absolutist role for theorizing in human life. Salkever is correct in stating of Aristotle that “the relationship of theory to practice is not direct—not a form of natural law deductivism—but rather an indirect connection that avoids both dogmatism and relativism.”21 Aristotle’s appeal today seems to be in line with the search for pluralist thinking with a strong core. Although he recognizes that different political communities define their own versions of the common good, he also subjects them to scrutiny on the question of their “authoritative element”: “It is ei...

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