Emperor Hirohito and the Pacific War

Noriko Kawamura

• Publisher: University of Washington Press
• Year: 2015
• eBook ISBN: 9780295806310
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: 20th Century History
• Index: History

This reexamination of the controversial role Emperor Hirohito played during the Pacific War gives particular attention to the question: If the emperor could not stop Japan from going to war with the Allied Powers in 1941, why was he able to play a crucial role in ending the war in 1945? Drawing on previously unavailable primary sources, Noriko Kawamura traces Hirohito's actions from the late 1920s to the end of the war, analyzing the role Hirohito played in Japan's expansion. Emperor Hirohito emerges as a conflicted man who struggled throughout the war to deal with the undefined powers bestowed upon him as a monarch, often juggling the contradictory positions and irreconcilable differences advocated by his subordinates. Kawamura shows that he was by no means a pacifist, but neither did he favor the reckless wars advocated by Japan's military leaders.

CHAPTER 1

The Aftermath of the
Paris Peace Conference,
1919–1933

IN 1919, IN THE WAKE OF WORLD WAR I, THE PARIS PEACE CONference was a turning point in world history—or, as historian Margaret MacMillan calls it, the “six months that changed the world.” The conference meant different things to different countries. From the United States’ perspective, it was a battlefield for ideas about a new world order: Ray Stannard Baker, spokesperson for US president Woodrow Wilson, stated that the peace conference was a contest between the Old Diplomacy of imperialism and the New Diplomacy of Wilsonian liberal internationalism. According to historian N. Gordon Levin Jr., the conference was a three-party race, with European conservative imperialism on the right, socialism and communism on the left, and Wilsonian liberal capitalist internationalism in the middle. In the colonial world, the “Wilsonian Moment,” in the words of historian Erez Manela, inspired anticolonial nationalists to found a wide range of organizations bent on self-determination and decolonization. In the trans-Pacific region, World War I and the subsequent peace at Paris produced the tipping point that strained relations between the two naval powers, the United States and Japan. Japanese leaders, who had been studying the realpolitik of the European game of imperialism, were alarmed by the success of the Bolshevik revolution in Russia and at the same time became apprehensive about the prospect of a new, Western-centered, Wilsonian world order. By the war’s end, opposing worldviews had emerged between the Wilson administration and Japan’s leadership. While President Wilson was promoting Anglo-American-style internationalism as a universal model, Japan, driven by its sense of national and racial identity, as well as by its sense of vulnerability in the new era of total warfare, was moving toward an anti-Western and particularistic regionalism, with a focus on Asia. The tragic aspect of Japan’s regionalism was the military’s attempt to pursue an autarkic state at the expense of China and other Asian neighbors.¹

The problems began in 1919, for the Japanese delegation to Paris was poorly prepared to face the new challenges of the liberal Wilsonian peace program. The Japanese leadership’s priority at the peace table was to legitimize the Asia-Pacific footholds that Japan had won from Germany during the war: that is, the German concessions in Shandong, China; and the German islands in the Pacific, north of the equator. However, the Japanese delegation encountered unexpectedly strong opposition from President Wilson, who was determined to protect the Open Door policy in China. The Japanese delegates fought hard to secure the territory Japan had taken from Germany, even at the expense of alienating the governments of the United States and China. Japanese leaders in Tokyo, although they suspected the League of Nations to be largely an attempt by Western powers to dominate the new international order, reluctantly allowed their delegates to join the league for fear of diplomatic isolation. At the same time, both the delegation and the Tokyo leadership were reminded of the harsh reality of Japan’s inferior position in the new, Western-dominated world order. Neither the United States nor Japan’s ally, Britain, supported Japan’s proposal to insert a clause supporting racial equality into the Covenant of the League of Nations. Overall, Japan’s experience at Paris in 1919 left most of the Japanese leadership in Tokyo with a negative opinion of the peace conference. However, Japan’s chief delegates—the men who were in the forefront of diplomacy at Paris (Genro Saionji Kinmochi, Makino Nobuaki, and Chinda Sutemi), along with Prime Minister Hara Takashi (Kei) in Tokyo—understood that cooperation with the Western powers was essential for Japan’s survival. Thus, in post-1919 Japan, there emerged two divergent visions of Japan’s role in the world: one held by those who believed in international accommodation; the other held by those who wanted to build a self-sustaining Japanese empire in Asia.

THE YOUNG CROWN PRINCE

Hirohito, the future emperor of Japan, was an eighteen-year-old crown prince at the time of the Paris Peace Conference. During the seven years between 1914 and 1921, while the world underwent tremendous changes (World War I, the Russian Revolution, and the Paris Peace Conference and its aftermath), the crown prince and five classmates, selected by the Imperial Household Ministry, received a secondary-school education at a special academy known as the Togu Gogakumonjo (Academy in the Eastern Palace). Besides subjects commonly taught in most Japanese middle schools in the 1910s, the crown prince also had to take special classes in military science, horsemanship, and, most important of all, in teiogaku (learning for the emperor, imperial studies, or imperial ethics), a course of study designed to prepare the crown prince for his future role as emperor of Japan. Crown Prince Hirohito was especially interested in the military and political history of Europe, international politics, and domestic security issues.² Of this period in the young prince’s life, Kanroji Osanaga (court chamberlain for seventy years, from 1890 to 1959), later noted in his memoir, “Since the time he [Hirohito] was a very young man he studied ancient and modern history as well as monarchial history.”³

How did young Crown Prince Hirohito see Japan’s place in the rapidly changing world after the Paris Peace Conference? Although sources on his reaction to international affairs during his formative years are scarce, it is apparent that Hirohito’s original views on the new world order, views inspired by the Wilsonian idealism of the Paris Peace Conference, changed dramatically over the next two and a half decades. In 1920, the crown prince optimistically welcomed the new international order, symbolized by the establishment of the League of Nations, and expressed his conviction of the importance of cooperating with the Western powers. However, in 1946, after Japan’s devastating defeat in World War II, Emperor Hirohito’s ex post facto comments on the impacts of the Versailles system on Japan were conspicuously negative. During the period between the 1919 Paris Peace Conference and Japan’s withdrawal from the League of Nations in March 1933, an ominous series of domestic and international emergencies began to challenge and transform the emperor’s views.

March 1933 became a significant turning point for Japan because the government’s decision to withdraw from the League of Nations signaled Japan’s intent to depart from a policy of accommodation with Western powers and to pursue an independent path, especially in East Asia. The events that led to Japan’s withdrawal from the League of Nations affected the emperor’s youthful, optimistic views of international cooperation with Western powers and made him aware of the harsh realities of achieving international accommodation. By the time of Japan’s withdrawal from the League of Nations, even though the emperor had not considered the Versailles-Washington system as an impediment to the advancement of Japan’s national interests, he no longer felt that he could insist on international accommodation at the expense of domestic opposition. His primary concern was domestic political stability.

In January 1920, after the Japanese government ratified the Treaty of Versailles, in response to the Taisho Emperor’s public announcement that peace had been established, Crown Prince Hirohito wrote an essay in his ethics class under the guidance of Sugiura Shigetake (Jugo). What is remarkable about this document is the crown prince’s acute awareness of the new international trends in the wake of World War I. He first quoted the Taisho Emperor’s words, which had no doubt been drafted by Prime Minister Hara and his cabinet: “Now the world trends have altered dramatically and the state of affairs is rapidly changing.” Then the crown prince wrote,

How did the world trends change? The realm of ideas in the world has become chaotic; radical thoughts are spreading throughout the world; and labor problems are rising. The peoples of the world who saw the miseries after the war are craving for peace and seeking international cooperation. Now we have witnessed the establishment of the League of Nations, and an international labor conference has been held. The world has thus changed. In these circumstances, as the emperor proclaimed, our people must persevere and make efforts to adapt themselves to the changing trends of the time.⁴

The crown prince went on to express his sense of the particular significance of the League of Nations: “I congratulate the establishment of the League of Nations. I will respect the Covenant of the League, promote its spirit, and carry out the important duty to establish eternal peace in the world. What should I do to fulfill this duty? If we show our tolerance as members of the empire, consider each country’s well-being and rule with moderation and cooperation [with other powers], and follow international law and world trends, we should be able to attain lasting peace.”⁵

These words by Crown Prince Hirohito emphasize international cooperation and sound sympathetic to the ideas of Wilsonian internationalism, but it is important to note that the original Japanese terms he used to express the spirit of international cooperation came from Confucian terms for harmony. This may be partly a result of limited choice, within the Japanese vocabulary, in translating Wilsonian concepts originally expressed in English, but it may also be due to the emphasis placed on Confucianism by his ethics teacher, Sugiura. Evidence of this latter possibility lies in the last section of the essay, in which the crown prince added a typical Confucian warning not to lose the virtues of austerity and frugality: “Now our country is drifting toward arrogance and luxury. Today this is the point that we must pay special attention to.”⁶

The other important aspect of the crown prince’s essay is that his teachers and advisers seem to have inculcated in him a strong sense of nationalism and patriotism, in the tradition of the Meiji slogan “Fukoku kyohei” (Rich country, strong military). This slogan was a harsh reminder that Japan, as a non-Western late developer, must unite and survive in a hostile international environment controlled by Western imperialist powers. Quoting his father’s declaration that “[Japan] must adapt itself to the trend of the time by strengthening its national power,” the crown prince wrote, “If [Japan] fails to build a sufficient national defense, it will be unable to defend itself in case of emergency, and in the realm of diplomacy, it will be difficult to assert its national interests and secure them. Japan will not become a wealthy country unless it promotes and grows industries and transportation, and increases labor productivity. If we neglect these, we will not be able to keep up with the Western great powers.” Therefore, the crown prince argued that in order to improve the fortunes of his country, the people must wholeheartedly unite and work together—upper and lower classes, military men and civilians, workers and capitalists. He concluded his essay by saying that he who “will be entrusted with an important duty of leading the nation in the future” must keep these points in mind and contribute to the peace and prosperity of the country.⁷

The thinking expressed in Hirohito’s essay is similar to that of the three Japanese chief delegates to the Paris Peace Conference: Saionji Kinmochi, Makino Nobuaki, and Chinda Sutemi. The government of Prime Minister Hara, the leading advocate of international accommodation, selected these men to represent Japan at the Paris talks because of their international experience, their familiarity with the way the Western powers operated, and their personal connections with the leaders of the Allied Powers. At that time, these three men were also known within Japan as advocates of cooperation with Britain and the United States (i.e., a pro-Anglo-American faction, or Ei-bei-ha). Perhaps the best way to understand these delegates is to view them as “international accommodationists.”⁸ That is, although the delegates were patriotic defenders of Japan’s national interests, and although they believed in Japan’s superiority and its special place in Asia, they also understood the wisdom of the idea of taisei junnō (conformity to world trends). The Japanese delegates to Paris, especially Makino Nobuaki, more than once urged the Hara cabinet in Tokyo to take a more conciliatory position on Japanese claims; and in the end, the delegates were instrumental in persuading Tokyo that Japan should join the League of Nations.

This approach to international relations greatly influenced Hirohito, for in the years following the Paris Peace Conference, these three men became the crown prince’s closest advisers. For example, Makino Nobuaki became minister of the imperial household in February 1921, and his importance as adviser to the crown prince was crucial after Prime Minister Hara was assassinated by a young ultranationalist on November 4 of the same year. Three weeks after the assassination, on November 25, Crown Prince Hirohito took over his father’s duties as regent (sesshō) under Makino’s political guidance. Makino went on to assume the position of the lord keeper of the privy seal in March 1925, and after Hirohito ascended to the throne on December 25, 1926, Makino continued to serve the young emperor as his closest adviser until December 1935. There is no doubt that Makino played a critical role in defining the emperor’s role in Japan’s power structure or that he exerted tremendous influence over Hirohito in the early years of his reign, as the emperor came to understand his role as Japan’s sovereign and to develop his own views about Japan’s role in the world.

Chinda Sutemi, another member of the Paris delegation, also had considerable influence over Hirohito. Chinda was one of the most distinguished diplomats in Japan and had served as Japan’s minister to Germany, the United States, and Great Britain. He accompanied the crown prince for six months in 1921, as his chief attendant, during the prince’s unprecedented and historic tour in Europe. After returning to Japan, Chinda continued to serve the crown prince in the Eastern Palace, and he later served as Emperor Hirohito’s grand chamberlain from 1927 until his (Chinda’s) death in 1929.

The nominal but prestigious head of the Paris delegation, Prince Saionji, known as “the last genro [elder statesman],”⁹ was Japan’s most influential court noble and senior politician. He served as the most respected guiding force of the imperial court, as well as holding great influence among party politicians, throughout the 1920s and 1930s.

Throughout the 1930s, Makino and Saionji were seen as committed international accommodationists: they provided a moderating influence on Japanese politics and helped restrain reckless military adventurism on the Asian continent. Because of their views, both men were targets of assassination attempts by army extremists in the May 15 Incident of 1932 and the February 26 Incident of 1936 (which they narrowly escaped). One can safely assume that these two advisers continued to encourage Emperor Hirohito to keep faith in the possibility of international cooperation with Western powers, along the lines that the emperor had expressed in his student essay on the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles.

However, two and a half decades later, shortly after Japan surrendered to the Allied Powers in World War II, Emperor Hirohito made another—very different—comment about the peace made at Paris in 1919. This time, the context was entirely different: in the spring of 1946, the emperor spoke to five of his trusted aides, dictating his recollection of the turbulent years that led to the devastating wars in Asia and the Pacific (presumably as part of his preparation for the coming war crimes trials by the Allied Powers). Contrary to the opinions expressed in his 1920 essay, Emperor Hirohito’s 1946 retrospective opinion about the consequence of the Paris Peace Conference was negative. According to two separate records, written by the aides Kinoshita Michio and Terasaki Hidenari, the emperor traced the origins of Japan’s wars in Asia and the Pacific to the outcome of the 1919 peace conference.

Terasaki’s version of this meeting, now known as “The Showa Emperor Monologue” (Showa tenno dok...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half title
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Acknowledgments
• Introduction
• Chapter 1 The Aftermath of the Paris Peace Conference, 1919–1933
• Chapter 2 Crises at Home and Abroad: From the February 26 Incident to the Sino-Japanese War
• Chapter 3 The Road to Pearl Harbor
• Chapter 4 An Uneasy Commander in Chief
• Chapter 5 Imbroglio: Moves to End the War
• Chapter 6 The “Sacred Decision” to Surrender
• Epilogue
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index