The Last Crusade in the West

Castile and the Conquest of Granada

Joseph F. O'Callaghan

• Publisher: University of Pennsylvania Press
• Year: 2014
• Print ISBN:
  9780812245875
  9780812245875
• eBook ISBN:
  9780812209358
• Topic: Storia
• Subtopic: Storia europea

By the middle of the fourteenth century, Christian control of the Iberian Peninsula extended to the borders of the emirate of Granada, whose Muslim rulers acknowledged Castilian suzerainty. No longer threatened by Moroccan incursions, the kings of Castile were diverted from completing the Reconquest by civil war and conflicts with neighboring Christian kings. Mindful, however, of their traditional goal of recovering lands formerly ruled by the Visigoths, whose heirs they claimed to be, the Castilian monarchs continued intermittently to assault Granada until the late fifteenth century.Matters changed thereafter, when Fernando and Isabel launched a decade-long effort to subjugate Granada. Utilizing artillery and expending vast sums of money, they methodically conquered each Na?rid stronghold until the capitulation of the city of Granada itself in 1492. Effective military and naval organization and access to a diversity of financial resources, joined with papal crusading benefits, facilitated the final conquest. Throughout, the Na?rids had emphasized the urgency of a jih?d waged against the Christian infidels, while the Castilians affirmed that the expulsion of the "enemies of our Catholic faith" was a necessary, just, and holy cause. The fundamentally religious character of this last stage of conflict cannot be doubted, Joseph F. O'Callaghan argues.

Chapter 1

Pedro I: An Era of Ambivalence

After Alfonso XI’s death, his only legitimate son, Pedro I (1350–69), not yet sixteen years old, ascended the throne and, in time, gained the sobriquet, the Cruel.¹ Absent the threat of Marinid invasion, he made no attempt to conquer Granada though he intervened in Naṣrid civil strife. While he engaged in a frenetic war against Aragón, the bitter hostility of his half-brother, Enrique, the count of Trastámara, eventually plunged the realm into civil war and led to his violent overthrow. That conflict enabled Muḥammad V of Granada, for many years Pedro I’s loyal vassal, to recover Algeciras. Both Pedro I and Enrique share responsibility for its loss.²

Pedro I, Granada, and Morocco

At his accession, Pedro I, though faced with internal opposition, was at peace with Granada and Morocco. The emir, Yūsuf I (1333–54), who was anxious to foster the prosperity of his realm, on 17 July 1350 agreed to a truce (including Morocco) running to 1 January 1357. Merchants on both sides were given security to buy and sell goods, except horses, arms, and wheat, and an exchange of captives was arranged. Pedro I also demanded tribute and, when required, the service of three hundred jinetes or light cavalry for three months. Although Yūsuf I was recorded as a vassal confirming Alfonso XI’s last privileges, Pedro I’s privileges do not list his name. López de Ayala remarked that the truce guaranteed the tranquility of the frontier except for about two months when Pedro I intruded into the Naṣrid civil war.³

Despite the truce, Yūsuf I’s attitude toward his Castilian neighbor was ambivalent. When Count Enrique, soon after his father’s death, took refuge in Algeciras, Yūsuf I made no effort to assist him in using it as a base of opposition to Pedro I, whose forces were able to take possession. Like his father, Pedro I included Algeciras in the royal intitulation.⁴ The king soon required a reluctant Yūsuf I to send three hundred jinetes to help subdue the rebel Alfonso Fernández Coronel in his fortress of Aguilar. Coronel’s son-in-law, Juan de la Cerda, after unsuccessfully seeking help from the Naṣrids and Marinids, withdrew to Portugal before returning to Castile, where he renewed his allegiance. Appointed governor of El Puerto de Santa María, he executed the traitorous custodians of Algeciras who tried to sell it to the Marinids. Although Yūsuf I outwardly remained a faithful vassal, he privately expressed the hope that God would thwart Pedro I’s attempt to suppress his other disloyal half-brother Fadrique.⁵

Meanwhile, civil war in Morocco attracted the attention of Pedro I and Yusūf I. Though driven from the throne by his son Abū ‘Inān Fāris (1348–58), the Marinid sultan Abū l-Ḥasan (1331–48) held on to the hope of regaining power until his death in 1351. Torn between them, Yūsuf I ultimately favored Abū ‘Inān. However, when the latter’s rebellious brothers, Abū Sālim and Abū l-Faḍl, fled to Granada, Yūsuf I refused to extradite them. Rather, he urged Abū l-Faḍl, the elder of the two, to seek Pedro I’s protection. Hoping to “launch an arrow against the Muslims and to unsheathe a sabre for civil war,” the king provided a ship to take him to Morocco, but he was captured and strangled in 1354. Abū ‘Inān also executed the rebel governor of Gibraltar.⁶

That unrest likely prompted Pedro I to contemplate a Moroccan crusade. Soon after his accession, emissaries from ‘Abd Allāh, the ruler of Montes Claros located south of the Atlas Mountains, who had previously informed Alfonso XI that he wished to become a Christian, exhorted Pedro I to intervene in Morocco. ‘Abd Allāh, perhaps the son of the lord of Montes Claros who died during Abū l-Ḥasan’s siege of Tarifa in 1340, may have been a Marinid prince hoping to make himself sultan with Castilian aid. Forwarding the Muslim’s letters to Pope Innocent VI (1352–62) in 1354, Pedro I requested the concession of the crusading indulgence and appropriate financial assistance, as well as a banner as a sign of papal approval.⁷ However, nothing further was heard of this projected crusade. As Abū ‘Inān consolidated his rule, the prospect of a successful Castilian incursion waned and Pedro I soon had to contend with other matters.

Although neither the Naṣrids nor the Marinids represented a significant danger, Pedro I’s counselors, expressing concern that they might take advantage of his youth, urged him to marry so as to avert possible civil disorder should he die without a legitimate heir. That “would be a great danger for all of Christendom” because the Muslims might assault Castile. Acquiescing, in 1353 he married Blanche of Bourbon, a niece of the king of France, but two days later he abandoned her and returned to the arms of his lover, María de Padilla. Enrique of Trastámara and other nobles attempted to defend Blanche’s rights, but soon had to take refuge in Aragón.⁸

Meanwhile, Yūsuf I was assassinated on 19 October 1354 and his sixteen-year-old son, Muḥammad V (1354–59, 1362–91), was acclaimed in his stead.⁹ Determined to remain at peace with his neighbors, he asked Pedro I to continue the truce and agreed to pay tribute, but he was not listed among those confirming the king’s privileges. Perhaps because the two men were near in age, they developed a close friendship.¹⁰ Indeed, Pedro I awarded him the Order of the Scarf or Band, an Order of Chivalry founded by Alfonso XI. The Order’s shield appears on the blade of Muḥammad V’s sword and also on the wall of the Cuarto de los Leones in the Alhambra. Demonstrating an affinity for Muslim culture, Pedro I employed Muslim workmen in constructing the alcázar of Seville in the Mudejar style between 1362 and 1364. His enemies later condemned him for his openness to Islamic cultural influences.¹¹

Muḥammad V also sought closer ties with Abū ‘Inān of Morocco. Emphasizing the constant Christian menace, the Naṣrid envoy Ibn al-Khaṭīb pleaded with the sultan: “Deprived of your aid, the people of Spain will not keep their homes or their land. In a word, that country has only one desire: the protection of your majesty.” The sultan responded positively and the tension that marked Yūsuf I’s latter years seemed to dissipate. In time, however, new sources of friction arose.¹²

However, Muḥammad V’s interaction with Pedro IV (1336–87) of Aragón was strained. After Yūsuf I’s assassination, the king nullified his ten-year truce with Granada and Morocco. One source of difficulty was the activity of Catalan and Granadan corsairs in the Mediterranean. The emir protested, for example, that Christians from the Balearic Islands had captured Muslims and sold them as slaves in Valencia and elsewhere.¹³

The Castilian-Aragonese War

Intermittent hostilities between Granada and Aragón were soon absorbed in the broader quarrel between Castile and Aragón. Although the two kings ratified a treaty of alliance in 1352, Pedro I of Castile launched an offensive against Aragón in 1356.¹⁴ While Enrique of Trastámara joined Pedro IV of Aragón, Juan de la Cerda and Álvar Pérez de Guzmán stirred up rebellion in Andalucía. When the municipal authorities of Seville executed Juan de la Cerda, Álvar Pérez fled to Aragón.¹⁵

The Naṣrids and Marinids were also drawn into the conflict, but on opposite sides. As a faithful vassal, Muḥammad V provided Pedro I with three galleys and dispatched troops to harry the frontier between Murcia and Valencia. Conversely, Abū ‘Inān of Morocco and Pedro IV agreed to collaborate against Castile in the Strait of Gibraltar. The sultan also urged Muḥammad V to cease paying tribute, but the emir, while acknowledging that payment was repugnant, asserted the importance of maintaining good relations with Castile. Irritated by that rebuff, Abū ‘Inān complained that Muḥammad V failed to show proper deference by not congratulating him on his recent conquests in Africa. Moreover, according to Ibn Khaldūn, Abū ‘Inān decided to invade Spain and make himself master of al-Andalus, as the Moors called the peninsula.¹⁶

With that in mind, Abū ‘Inān, in July 1357, concluded a five-year pact with Pedro IV, but, as the latter had reached a truce with Castile in May and also with Granada, he could only promise neutrality in a Moroccan war against either of them. However, he denounced Pedro I for launching an unjust war and allying himself “with Moorish kings and other persons quite contrary to our religion.” A month later, at the sultan’s request, Pedro IV extended the pact to ten years and granted a similar extension to Granada. Even though the Marinids controlled Gibraltar and Ronda, it was unlikely that the sultan would be able to expand his peninsular holdings. Admonishing Pedro IV for his alliance with the Marinids, Innocent VI queried: “What Catholic prince today would presume to treat of such matters with the infidels?” In reply, the king blamed Pedro I for aligning himself with the Naṣrids, who dispatched two thousand Saracens to invade the kingdom of Valencia. Charging Pedro I with having twice violated his pledge of alliance, he questioned whether any infidel ruler could be more faithless.¹⁷

Despite his truce with Aragón and the treaty between Morocco and Aragón, Pedro I attempted to induce Abū ‘Inān to join an offensive against the lands of Pedro IV’s half-brother, Fernando, marquess of Tortosa. Pedro IV had always resented his stepmother, Leonor, a sister of Alfonso XI, and her efforts to aggrandize her son, Fernando. At the outset of the war Fernando sided with Castile, but, fearing for his life after Leonor and his brother Juan were executed by Pedro I, he renewed his allegiance to Pedro IV. As neither Fernando nor his lands in Murcia were included in the treaty between Morocco and Aragón, Pedro I argued that both the Marinids and Naṣrids could participate in an assault without violating the truce. Upholding the opposite view, Pedro IV emphasized that now that Fernando had returned to his service, the truce precluded the Moors from attacking him. He also complained that Muḥammad V failed to adhere to their truce.¹⁸ Abū ‘Inān, realizing that if he invaded Granada, a Castilian fleet might cut off his communications with Morocco, soon abandoned his aspirations in the peninsula.

In 1359 a papal legate sent to arrange a truce between Castile and Aragón affirmed that the pope regarded Pedro I “as the shield and defender of Christendom because he maintained war against the Moors on both sides of the sea. For that reason his ancestors were always very much esteemed among the other kings of Christendom.” Nevertheless, the pope was distressed because the conflict with Aragón interrupted the struggle against “the Moors, enemies of the faith of Jesus Christ,” and could lead to great trouble for Christendom. Notwithstanding that plea, Pedro I did not abandon hostilities against Aragón. In order to counter him, Pedro IV vainly attempted to persuade the Naṣrids and Marinids to join an anti-Castilian coalition. Pedro I of Portugal (1357–67) also refused and, opting for a Castilian alliance, deployed ten galleys for service against Aragón. Utilizing those ships and three provided by Granada, Pedro I of Castile threatened Barcelona and then Ibiza in April 1359.¹⁹

Dynastic Upheavals in Morocco and Granada

Dynastic upheavals among the Marinids and Naṣrids altered their involvement in the war of the two Pedros. Abū ‘Inān’s death in December 1358 threw the Marinid realm into disarray, but by July 1359 his brother Abū Sālim Ibrāhim (1359–61) had emerged as the new ruler. While exiled in Granada, he heard of his brother’s death, but the Naṣrids would not permit him to cross the strait. He then persuaded Pedro I to provide him with a vessel to return to Morocco. Once in power, he exiled several opponents, including princes of the blood, sequestering them in Ronda. One of them, his nephew Muḥammad b. ‘Abd al-Raḥmān, escaped to Granada and then took refuge in the Castilian court, where he remained until he seized the Moroccan throne in 1361. On the pretext of shipping the exiles from Ronda to the East, Abū Sālim loaded them on a ship and had them thrown overboard. “Thus he was delivered from all his rivals. He remained the sole master of the empire. God’s will rules events!” He quickly concluded an alliance with Muḥammad V.²⁰

Shortly after, Muḥammad V was overthrown by his half-brother, Ismā‘īl II (1359–60). Escaping to Guadix, he appealed to Pedro I for asylum, but the latter, needing troops for his Aragonese war and unimpeded passage along the Mediterranean coast, acknowledged the new emir. Abū Sālim, promising to restrain the deposed emir from attempting to regain his throne, brought him to Morocco. In exchange, Abū Sālim demanded that Ismā‘īl II imprison his potential opponents, namely, the Marinid princes living in Spain. Fearing Ismā‘īl II’s wrath, the shaykh al-ghuzāt or commander of the Marinid volunteers in Naṣrid service fled to Castile. As Pedro I was unwilling or unable to assist him, he appealed to Abū Sālim, who allowed him to use Ronda as a base for opposing Ismā‘īl II.²¹

An ineffectual ruler, Ismā‘īl II reigned for less than six months before he was assassinated in June 1360 through the machinations of his cousin, Muḥammad VI (1360–62), known to the Castilians as “el Rey Bermejo”—“the Red King,” so-called because of his red hair. After describing the beheading of Ismā‘īl II and his younger brother, whose naked bodies, covered only with rags, were exposed to the crowd, Ibn al-Khaṭīb remarked: “What happened to them offers much matter for meditation.”²² El Rey Bermejo’s first act was to align himself with Pedro IV but he would not side with Aragón against Castile. Although he refused to pay tribute to Pedro I, he decided to establish friendly relations with him, lest he assist Muḥammad V in reclaiming his throne. Still at war with Aragón, the king accepted a truce, but in the long run regarded Muḥammad VI as an enemy. Concluding that he could not carry on a war on two fronts and leave Andalucía exposed to Naṣrid attacks, Pedro I reluctantly made peace with Aragón in May 1361. Nevertheless, Pedro IV assured Muḥammad VI of his continued friendship.²³

Pedro I and the Restoration of Muḥammad V

The cessation of hostilities with Aragón enabled Pedro I to intervene in the Naṣrid civil war and to undertake his first campaign against the Moors, but he apparently did not ask the pope to declare a crusade. Blaming el Rey Bermejo for forcing him to make peace with Aragón, he appealed to Abū Sālim to allow Muḥammad V to return to Spain. Though the sultan initially refused, he relented and ceded Ronda to Muḥammad V to enable him to recover Granada. Pedro I provided 30,000 dinars as financial assistance. In the late summer of 1361 the king reminded his Aragonese namesake of his obligation, according to their recently concluded pact, to provide six galleys for service against the Moors. As an excuse for not doing so, Pedro IV declared that he understood that Castile and Granada were at peace. Denying that, Pedro I announced his intention to invade Granada in September. Nevertheless, Pedro IV delayed compliance lest he be drawn into the war.²⁴

With six thousand knights and jinetes from Andalucía, Pedro I planned his assault on Granada in conjunction with Muḥammad V, who had four hundred knights. After an unsuccessful attempt to seize Antequera northeast of Ronda, the ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half title
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• A Note on Money
• Genealogical Tables
• Introduction. Castile and the Emirate of Granada
• Chapter 1. Pedro I: An Era of Ambivalence
• Chapter 2. The Early Trastámaras: An Era of Peace
• Chapter 3. The Crusades of Antequera and Ceuta
• Chapter 4. The Failed Crusades of Juan II
• Chapter 5. The Intermittent Crusades of Enrique IV
• Chapter 6. Fernando and Isabel’s Crusade: From Alhama to Málaga
• Chapter 7. The End of the Crusade: From Baza to Granada
• Chapter 8. The Frontier in Peace and War
• Chapter 9. A War of Religions
• List of Abbreviations
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index
• Acknowledgments