Free Time

Julie L. Rose

• Publisher: Princeton University Press
• Year: 2016
• Print ISBN: 9780691183442, 9780691163451
• eBook ISBN: 9781400883684
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Political Philosophy
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Recent debates about inequality have focused almost exclusively on the distribution of wealth and disparities in income, but little notice has been paid to the distribution of free time. Free time is commonly assumed to be a matter of personal preference, a good that one chooses to have more or less of. Even if there is unequal access to free time, the cause and solution are presumed to lie with the resources of income and wealth. In Free Time, Julie Rose argues that these views are fundamentally mistaken. First, Rose contends that free time is a resource, like money, that one needs in order to pursue chosen ends. Further, realizing a just distribution of income and wealth is not sufficient to ensure a fair distribution of free time. Because of this, anyone concerned with distributive justice must attend to the distribution of free time.

On the basis of widely held liberal principles, Rose explains why citizens are entitled to free time—time not committed to meeting life's necessities and instead available for chosen pursuits. The novel argument that the just society must guarantee all citizens their fair share of free time provides principled grounds to address critical policy choices, including work hours regulations, Sunday closing laws, public support for caregiving, and the pursuit of economic growth.

Delving into an original topic that touches everyone, Free Time demonstrates why all citizens have, in the words of early labor reformers, a right to "hours for what we will."

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 HOURS FOR WHAT WE WILL

Many people, including in the contemporary United States, have little free time. They must spend long hours in paid work, household labor, personal care, and caregiving. They have little time to devote to any ends beyond meeting the necessities of life. This book argues that in the just society all citizens would have their fair shares of free time, time they could devote to the pursuit of their own projects and commitments.

As a matter of liberal egalitarian justice, all citizens are entitled to a fair share of free time—time not consumed by meeting the necessities of life, time that one can devote to one’s chosen ends. Free time is a resource that citizens generally require to pursue their conceptions of the good, whatever those may be. Without the resource of free time, citizens lack the means to exercise their formal liberties and opportunities. In order to ensure that citizens can exercise their freedoms, a central commitment of liberal egalitarian theories of justice, citizens must be guaranteed their fair shares of free time.

This argument is absent from contemporary political philosophy, but it can be found in the origins of liberal egalitarian ideas, among nineteenth-century labor reformers. Early American journeymen argued that they had a “just right” to the time necessary to exercise their political liberties. In order to exercise their rights as enfranchised citizens, they argued that they required free time to acquire information and study the interests of their country. Unrelenting work diminished the value of their liberties, as it rendered “the benefits of our liberal institutions to us inaccessible and useless.”¹ Over the course of the nineteenth century, as labor’s call went from ten hours of work to eight hours with a day of rest, workers drew on this argument more broadly to claim time to exercise their full set of liberties, for education, family, association, and religion.² As trade union leader William Sylvis argued, “It is true that churches are erected, school houses are built, mechanics’ institutes are founded and libraries ready to receive us … but alas! We lack the time to use them—time.”³ To enjoy their rights to “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness,” they must have the “means” to make use of them.⁴ The final extension of this line of argument was that workers were entitled to free time not only for the exercise of a set of specific and fundamental liberties, but to do anything they wished. Workers argued that they were entitled to “eight hours for work, eight hours for rest, and eight hours for what we will.”⁵

This book defends that idea: we have a just claim to “hours for what we will.” Citizens are entitled to time that is not consumed by meeting the necessities of life, so they can have time to devote to any other pursuits they might choose—whether familial, religious, associational, recreational, political, creative, productive, or of any other sort. They are entitled to time to find and follow their own projects and commitments. They are entitled to a fair share of free time.

1.2 THE CLAIM TO FREE TIME

Contemporary liberal egalitarian theories of justice have given little attention to the demand for more “hours for what we will.” They have instead implicitly assumed that how much leisure time citizens have is not an appropriate concern of a liberal theory of justice. They have understood leisure to be part, to varying extents, of some ideas of the good life, and not a part of others. Because it is not the proper role of a politically liberal state to promote some conceptions of the good life over others, it is presumptively impermissible for the state to act with the aim of providing or promoting leisure time.⁶

Instead, in accordance with the standard liberal egalitarian approach to distributive justice, liberal proceduralism, it is held that so long as just background conditions—that is, a just distribution of liberties, opportunities, and resources like income and wealth—obtain, citizens can choose their leisure patterns based on their own ideas of the good life, and whatever distribution of leisure results is presumptively just. Some citizens will want to work long hours and have little leisure, while others will want to work few hours and have more leisure. The resulting distribution of leisure will be unequal, true, but on this approach that in itself is not a cause for concern. On the contrary, for the state to aim at some particular distribution of leisure, absent some special justification, would be objectionable, for it would be impermissibly paternalistic, perfectionist, or otherwise partial to one conception of the good over another. Instead of attending to the distribution of leisure, the state should ensure that just background conditions under which citizens can fairly choose to pursue work or leisure, obtain.

The liberal proceduralist approach to distributive justice is to ensure that all citizens have fair access to specific goods, the particular components of one’s particular conception of the good, by ensuring a fair distribution of resources, the all-purpose means that are generally required to pursue any conception of the good. Leisure has been understood, on the basis of both its philosophical and economic treatments, as a specific good. Leisure is variously defined as time engaged in intrinsically valuable activities, or as time in play and recreation, or as time not engaged in paid work, and on each understanding, as a specific good.

This narrow understanding of leisure time is, however, incomplete. Though “leisure” does correspond to goods that are appropriately regarded as specific goods (contemplation, play, time not working), it also refers to an idea that is best understood as a resource. This is the idea that the slogan “hours for what we will” captures—it is the time one can spend at one’s discretion, pursuing one’s own ends. It is, in a word, free time. Citizens require such time—time not committed to meeting the necessities of life—to pursue their conceptions of the good, whatever those may be.

When one redescribes the specific good of leisure as the resource of free time, the liberal’s neglect of time loses its foundation. If free time is a resource, then its just distribution is no longer something that results from just background conditions. Rather, the just distribution of free time instead must be recognized as a component of just background conditions.

Specifically, I argue that justice requires that all citizens have a fair share of free time. Citizens have legitimate claims to free time on the basis of the effective freedoms principle, a foundational tenet of liberal egalitarian justice, which holds that citizens have legitimate claims to a fair share of the resources that are generally required to exercise their formal liberties and opportunities. In the same way that citizens generally require the resources of income and wealth to exercise their freedoms, so too do they generally require the resource of free time. To have their fair shares of free time, citizens must have time not committed to the necessities of life, time they can predictably use for their own ends, and time they can share with other citizens. Ensuring a just distribution of income and wealth is insufficient to guarantee such a just distribution of free time, and so our theories of justice and our public policies must treat free time as a distinct object of distributive concern to guarantee citizens “hours for what we will.”

1.3 OVERVIEW

The argument begins, in Chapter 2, with the analytical framework, that of liberal proceduralism, and its distinction between specific goods and resources. Surveying the neglect of leisure or free time in contemporary theories of justice, I argue that this neglect owes to the way that political philosophers in general, and liberal egalitarians in particular, have conceptualized leisure as a specific good. Generally, leisure has been understood as either time engaged in philosophical contemplation or recreational activities, or time not engaged in paid work. As a specific good, leisure is presumptively not an appropriate object of concern for a liberal theory of justice. This understanding of leisure time is, however, unjustifiably limited, for it neglects the way in which time is also a resource. (To distinguish these ideas, I refer to leisure when understood as a specific good and free time when understood as a resource.)

Chapter 3 constructs this conception of free time as a resource. To be a resource, and thus an appropriate concern of a liberal theory of justice, free time must, first, be a necessary input for the pursuit of a wide range of individual ends and, second, be measurable in a way that meets the constraints of a public and feasible theory of justice. I argue for a particular conception that meets these criteria and is properly a resource: free time, understood as time not committed to meeting one’s own, or one’s dependents’, basic needs, whether with necessary paid work, household labor, or personal care. Citizens generally require free time, so understood, to pursue their conceptions of the good, whatever they may be.

In Chapter 4, the book’s normative core, I argue that all citizens are entitled to a fair share of free time on the basis of the effective freedoms principle. Without the means to make use of them, citizens’ freedoms are of little value. As I show, citizens generally require free time to exercise their formal freedoms, whether to participate in politics, practice their religions, or do almost anything they are legally free to do. Thus, on the basis of the effective freedoms principle, citizens have legitimate claims to free time.

Furthermore, I argue that, in order to ensure that citizens have their fair shares of free time, our theories of justice and public policies must treat time as a distinct object of distributive concern. Contrary to a widely held assumption, the time-money substitutability claim, realizing a just distribution of income and wealth is not sufficient to ensure a just distribution of free time. Neither of the assumptions on which this claim depends, the perfect divisibility of labor demand and the perfect substitutability of money and basic needs satisfaction, obtains, as a consequence of both empirical and ethical limitations of economic markets. As such, how much free time citizens have must be separately assessed, and a just distribution of free time must be realized through specifically targeted interventions.

Chapters 5 and 6 extend the arguments of the preceding chapters to two areas, freedom of association and gender and caregiving. Chapter 5 shows that, on the basis of the effective freedoms principle, citizens are also entitled to periods of shared free time because such time is generally required to have effective freedom of association. The central exercises of freedom of association, whether civic, religious, or intimate, depend on sharing time together. As such, potential associates face a temporal coordination problem. I consider three possible solutions—a universal basic income, mandated work hours flexibility, and a common period of free time—and I argue that the third may be the most effective and feasible for circumstances proximate to our own. Drawing on the arguments of the justices of the U.S. Supreme Court in McGowan v. Maryland (1961), I argue that Sunday closing laws, in a modified form consistent with economic and religious freedom, are a means of realizing effective freedom of association.

Chapter 6 turns to gender and caregiving, and shows how recognizing citizens’ claims to free time contributes to a liberal egalitarian theory of gender justice. I argue that gender justice requires that men and women not only have free choices from among equal options, but also choose from among just background conditions. One of those conditions is that all citizens must have their fair shares of free time, with caregiving for children and other dependents treated as a necessary activity like necessary paid work. I show how this entails that citizens must be able to choose to engage in paid work and caregiving and still have free time, as realized through a set of workplace accommodations for parents and other caregivers. Gender justice requires, apart from the conditions for free choice and equal options, that men and women choose their household responsibilities from among these just background conditions.

The final chapter addresses how to provide free time. For citizens to possess their fair shares of free time, they must both have their fair amount of free time, and have it under fair conditions to make effective use of it, with access to generally usable periods of free time on a predictable schedule. Addressing the question of how to provide free time demonstrates how recognizing citizens’ claims to free time provides grounds, first, to support both a range of contested welfare and employment policies and distinctive labor regulations and, second, to challenge the presumption in favor of unceasing economic growth as a social goal.

Several features of the argument warrant emphasis at the outset. First, the core argument—that citizens are entitled to a fair share of free time—applies to any theory that is committed to ensuring that citizens possess the means to exercise their freedoms. All liberal egalitarian theories share this commitment, and the argument is developed within this approach. Liberal egalitarianism, however, encompasses a broad family of views, which combine the dual values of liberty and equality in a variety of ways. So that the core argument applies broadly to any theory that holds this commitment, it is constructed to not depend on taking a particular position on a range of contested issues within this family of views. (These points of divergence notably include the scope and site of justice, the significance of individual responsibility, and the appropriate distributive principle and metric.) After establishing the core argument, in extending the argument in later chapters, I do take positions on some of these issues, but one who takes different positions could develop the argument in ways other than I do here. Indeed, once recognized as an all-purpose resource, free time ought to be incorporated in various ways across different theories of justice.

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Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication Page
• Contents
• Acknowledgments
• Chapter 1: Introduction
• Chapter 2: Leisure as a Specific Good
• Chapter 3: Free Time as a Resource
• Chapter 4: The Claim to Free Time
• Chapter 5: Shared Free Time
• Chapter 6: Free Time for Caregivers
• Chapter 7: Conclusion: Time for What We Will
• Bibliography
• Index