Civil-Military Relations in Taiwan

Identity and Transformation

Dean Karalekas

• Publisher: Emerald Publishing Limited
• Year: 2018
• Print ISBN:
  9781787564824
• eBook ISBN:
  9781787564817
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Asian Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

The armed forces of the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan are in dire need of reform to address a plethora of problems including inadequate training, low morale, poor public perception, and low recruitment numbers. This book uses the postmodern military model to measure how public perception of the military is influenced by self-identification in Taiwan, and it shows that the public has little confidence or trust in their military, even as they remain acutely aware of the threat posed by an increasingly belligerent China and its ever-growing People's Liberation Army.

While there has been much analysis as to what strategies and weapons systems should be adopted by ROC defense planners, relatively little has been written on how to create a more relevant military within Taiwan society. Ultimately, this book addresses these matters and provides policymakers within the ROC government and military, as well as researchers of Asia Pacific security, with an understanding of the current relationship between military and society, to assist in the creation of a more accountable military.

CHAPTER 1

MOSKOS’S POSTMODERN MILITARY MODEL

ABSTRACT

This first chapter provides a background on the theoretical framework employed in this research. The postmodern military model (PMMM), promulgated by Moskos, Williams, and Segal, posits that militaries faced with a shift from the threat perception of enemy invasion or nuclear attack to primarily nontraditional threats such as terrorism and ethnic violence undergo changes to their force structure, personnel requirements, and their relationship to the wider society. The model was originally developed as a means of examining the changes taking place in the US military by establishing a framework for military transformation, from the mass standing army dedicated to warfighting that was marked by a different ethos than the civilian society which it was charged with protecting, to a more multipurpose force marked by the professional soldier, more civilian interpenetration, and responding to a very different threat profile. Many militaries have undergone such a shift, primarily those of the western European and North American nations, as they and their associated societies transitioned into the postmodern era. The questions of interest in the current book are how Taiwan’s military scores according to this theoretical framework. Moskos is one of the world’s foremost military sociologists and his theories have been essential in our understanding of civil–military relations, and so it is important for planners and policymakers in Taiwan to take such scholarship into account as they see their society evolving toward postmodernism and attempt to push their military to follow.

Keywords: Civil–military relationship; Moskos; threat perception; military sociology; postmodernism; military transformation

The postmodern military model (PMMM), promulgated by Moskos, Williams, and Segal (2000), posits that militaries faced with a shift from the threat perception of war (such as enemy invasion or nuclear attack) to primarily nontraditional threats (such as terrorism and ethnic violence) undergo changes to their force structure, personnel requirements, and their relationship to the wider society. This work is built upon the foundation established by Morris Janowitz, who in Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (1960) famously used the techniques of social science to examine the relationship between the military establishment and civil society in the United States. Janowitz first commented on trends such as the trend toward a managerial-type officer and increasing civilianization that Moskos would build upon and include in the PMMM.

The model was originally developed as a means of examining the changes taking place in the US military by establishing a framework for military transformation, from the mass standing army dedicated to warfighting that was marked by a different ethos than the civilian society which it was charged with protecting, to a more multipurpose force marked by the professional soldier, more civilian interpenetration, and responding to a very different threat profile. The PMMM has been employed not just to describe conditions in America, but as a means of studying the shifts that have been experienced by a number of militaries in various countries. An example is the shift that occurred in the western nations in the post-Cold War era, becoming what Moskos et al. (2000) term “postmodern” militaries. Many militaries have undergone such a shift, primarily those of the western European and North American nations, as they and their associated societies transitioned into the postmodern era. Thus, in addition to being used as a descriptive tool to describe military transformation in these countries, the model may also be applicable as a predictive tool to assess the state of civil–military relations in these and other countries. Moskos is one of the world’s foremost military sociologists and his theories have been essential in our understanding of civil–military relations, and so it is important for planners and policymakers in Taiwan to take such scholarship into account as they see their society evolving toward postmodernism and attempt to push their military to follow. The effort to transition to an all-volunteer force is, in essence, an attempt to follow a western pattern of development, but one that has been embarked upon without appropriate research, and so it stands to reason that the very model that describes this pattern so well be used to assess the Republic of China (ROC) military’s readiness for such a change.

In determining how the ROC military fits into the definition of a modern, late modern, or postmodern military according to the theoretical construct developed by Moskos et al. (2000), an assessment must be made of the 11 distinct dimensions of the model (see Table 1.1). The model has been applied to a study of the ROC military before, in a study by Chia-sheng Chen (2009), who used it as a framework to explain the organizational changes witnessed by the ROC military since 1949 and illustrate how this transformation was associated with Taiwan’s democratization, economic growth, and foreign military assistance. Chen concluded that the ROC military exhibited the characteristics of a late modern military. In detailing the transformation of the ROC military, Chen identified four discrete stages of Taiwan’s political-military development. First is the joint defense stage (1949–1978), dominated by the US–Taiwan mutual defense treaty. Following this, the self-defense stage (1979–1986) saw a shift of responsibility for Taiwan’s defense falling squarely on the ROC’s shoulders, with little to no assistance from the international community. Next is the democratization stage (1987–1996), marked by changes in military organization in response to wider social shifts. Finally, the democracy stage (1997 to present) saw a series of changes to ROC military culture and organization, influenced by the transfer of political power in 2000 and other democratic and social forces. These distinct stages, or eras, are a useful hermeneutic tool and will be referenced in this study.

Table 1.1. Dimensions of the Postmodern Military Model.

1.1. PMMM DIMENSIONS

There are several dimensions for which public perception is extremely helpful in making a determination as to their place on the PMMM spectrum. Moreover, most assessments that have come before do not incorporate survey data on public attitudes but rather based their assessments on other measures – such as military members’ attitudes, for example, or an analysis of laws and regulations. This approach, while adequate, can only benefit from incorporation of public perceptions, and this is the best way to develop an appreciation for the state of civil–military relations. Let us first review the spectrum of the PMMM dimensions.

1.1.1. Perceived Threat

The relationship between a nation’s military and the wider society is greatly influenced by the perceived threat. Not only does the threat of war – from what likely enemy or enemies, what sort of war, how imminent is the threat, and other similar factors defining the said threat – contribute greatly to the structure and operation of the military tasked to defend against it, but also it is ever-present in the minds of the nation’s civilian population as well. As such, it is a defining factor in society–military relations, and the first listed by Moskos et al. (2000) in enunciating the PMMM.

In the modern military – that which existed primarily in the pre-Cold War period, from roughly 1900 to the end of the Second World War in 1945 – the threat that was most commonly perceived was an invasion. Indeed, since man first raised sticks and rocks to take that which was his neighbor’s, the threat of invasion of one’s territory (or later, that of a political ally) has been the main concern of statesmen and military commanders seeking strategies for defense. Naturally, this necessitated (both for the defenders as well as the aggressors) large standing armies for much of this period, influenced as time progressed by advances in weaponry and tactics. Societies, still largely agrarian, lived in constant proximity to the threat of foreign armies marching in, with the risk that their farmland would become battlefields.

This calculus changed greatly in the Cold War as the nature of the perceived threat evolved from one of invasion to the specter of nuclear war. The early twentieth century witnessed mankind’s great technological leaps forward and advances in industrial-scale production turned to the practice of war, making it possible for the old paradigm of armed invasion to be conducted on a scale never before imagined, in terms not only of speed and efficiency, but also of body count. Not only did the savagery of the Great War, and after it the Second World War, usher in new aspirations for nationhood (in the form of the European Union and other transnational regional groupings predicated on a new conception of the value of national sovereignty), but they also spurred scientific and technological developments in the manufacture of weapons that would change the threat perception of nations forever: they led to the development of nuclear weapons.

At first, atomic weapons were little more than a terrifyingly effective bomb, with admittedly previously unseen side effects in the form of radiation and fallout. Once both sides in the bipolar world order that coalesced after World War II (WWII) had acquired not only the weapons but also systems capable of delivering them to enemy territory across great distances, the primary threat to nations, their militaries, and their societies became that of a nuclear attack. Peace – or at the very least, the absence of open hostilities – during this era was predicated on a precarious balance perhaps best described by the concept of mutually assured destruction (MAD); nuclear weapons are so deadly and so terrifying, and there are so many of them ready for deployment against the United States and her allies as well as against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, that any first strike would be quickly followed by a conflagration capable of effectively destroying both sides. Societies on either side of the iron curtain were acutely aware of the deadly potentialities of nuclear war – made so by their respective governments not only as a means to ensure that protective measures could be performed, but also more importantly as a means of building nationalist-based support for the political and military regime, and against the much-feared enemy. This dynamic defined perceived threat during the late modern military, lasting from roughly 1945 to 1990.

This tenuous balance, predicated on MAD, saw the world survive to the end of the Cold War, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the fall of the Berlin Wall. After a short period during which the western nations enjoyed a peace dividend marked by lower defense spending and the spread of democratic institutions abroad with an almost missionary zeal, a new threat perception emerged, and one that was so terrifying and chaotic that many longed for the simpler days of the Cold War threat of nuclear annihilation. This new and current threat perception is, of course, terrorism. This, along with other subnational threats, was largely poorly perceived by society in general until the attacks on September 11, 2001. As much as the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, this event was a game changer in terms of threat perception by Americans, and to a lesser degree by nations around the globe.

In addition to terrorism, other aspects of subnational threats include ethnic conflicts, such as the Balkanization of the former Yugoslavia early in the postmodern era, or the attempted genocides and ethnic cleansing perpetrated on ethnic groups in Rwanda, for example, and the Central African Republic, giving lie to the international community’s post-WWII vow of “never again.”

No longer is the threat of nuclear annihilation society’s boogeyman, unless it pertains to the possible use of a dirty bomb by an otherwise technologically unsophisticated terrorist group such as Al-Qaeda or the Islamic State, or one of the domestic so-called lone-wolf terrorists inspired and sometimes supported by these groups. Moreover, with threat perception dominated by terrorism, it takes the impetus for the buildup to a war out of the hands of high politics and delivers it into the hands of jihadists and – as perceived by citizens in the West – madmen. War no longer is primarily an extension of politics, to paraphrase von Clausewitz, but the whim of a madman. Thus, the lack of any guiding logic behind the decision to wage war creates an even deeper sense of loss of control on the part of the citizen, and an ever-greater respect for the soldier to put himself in harm’s way in a war in which the other side is not bound by the Geneva Conventions and which famously takes no prisoners, unless it is for a subsequent videotaped beheading.

1.1.2. Force Structure

Up to and during the modern era (1900–1945), the ROC military has followed the model described by Moskos et al. and concerned itself mainly with fronting a large standing army. Even such conscript armies, it should be noted, rely on a core group of professional soldiers in the officer class, but most importantly in the class of non-commissioned officers (usually sergeants and above) to provide guidance, cohesion, and stability. Moreover, even conscript armies require some professional soldiers in certain trades that require technical proficiency.

During the Cold War, late modern (1945–1990) militaries generally shifted their force structure somewhat – armed forces were still large in terms of troop numbers, but they were increasingly professional. With the shift in threat perception from invasion to nuclear attack, and with the advancements made in weapons systems and military strategy during and after WWII, nations required more from their soldiers than simply being proficient with a gun. During this period, many nations made the shift to an All-Volunteer Force (AVF), recruiting a higher-caliber, better-motivated serviceman, especially in trades that required technical sophistication.

By the postmodern era (1990–present), most of those nations that had managed to avoid making the AVF transition found it amenable to do so, with the end of the Cold War and a redefinition of the threat perception. The new threat of subnational, largely ethnic-based, violence and the rise of Islamic terrorism demanded a new force structure. The requirement for professionalism in the armed services was even more pronounced. To engage in peacekeeping deployments under the UN umbrella, and to fight jihadists in the deserts of Iraq and Afghanistan, what was needed were greater numbers of the very type of special-forces soldiers that were the exception rather than the rule during the Cold War. The postmodern soldier is often deployed on missions requiring his interaction with people of different cultures and values, who speak another language and may be embroiled in a struggle involving religious or ethnic conflicts. This requires not only a higher standard in recruitment, but also a higher level of training in order to handle such challenges (Costa & Ivenicki, 2016, p. 226).

1.1.3. Major Mission Definition

The major mission definition is a critical aspect of any determination of whether a particular nation’s military has reached the postmodern stage. As a reflection of, and reaction to, the perceived threat, as well as a major contributing factor in decisions related to force structure, a military’s main mission definition is intrinsically tied in with the military’s sense of itself, and therefore with its place in the larger society.

In the modern era (roughly 1900–1945) – and indeed, for much of history leading up to that era – the major mission definition of a military was one of homeland defense. This reflects the threat being primarily one of invasion and the force structure being a large standing army fed by conscription. In the late modern (Cold War/1945–1990) military, the major mission definition changed to reflect the realities of that age, and became one of alliance support. As described by Moskos et al., the postmodern (post-Cold War/since 1990) military is marked by a subsequent shift from a mission definition based on alliance support to one based on a host of new types of mission theretofore largely unseen. These include peacekeeping operations, international Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HA/DR), and other noncombat taskings grouped under the category of Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW).

1.1.4. Dominant Military Professional

The postmodern military is marked by shifts in perceived threat, from one predicated on nuclear attack to a host of threats at the subnational level including terrorist attacks and ethnic violence. This naturally necessitates a reevaluation of the major mission definition and hence a redrawing of the nation’s force structure in order to accomplish that mission. The dominant military professional will likewise undergo a shift in order to exercise the most effective leadership in the new military/threat environment. Moskos et al. identified how the focus of the dominant military professional changed from the modern (pre-Cold War/1900–1945) period from one of a combat leader proficient in the art of war and in exercising effective leadership under combat conditions, to a more managerial role in the late modern (Cold War/1945–1990) military, and thence to a skill set heavy on diplomacy and scholarship in the postmodern (post-Cold War/since 1990) era.

It is self-evident that, for much of human history, the best military leaders have been those most capable of fighting and winning wars, with little focus on – indeed, with little need for – the skills of the technician or the diplomat. From Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus to Vice Admiral Horatio Lord Nelson, and from Xiang Yu to Sun Tzu, military leaders of the premodern period were renowned for their leadership, tactics, and warfighting prowess, and earned promotion and glory on that basis. This continued into the modern period, coming to an end only with the Cold War. This new threat, and hence the new means of fighting it, demanded new skills: relatively few conventional wars were waged compared to the previous eras, at least by the global superpowers holding large stockpiles of nuclear weapons, and so as a means of earning promotion, glory on the battlefield gave way to technological and administrative proficiency, befitting the new era of technological weaponry that had become the decisive factor in defeating the enemy. This shift is perhaps best described by Janowitz (1960). In the postmodern military, the skills that lead to success and promotion, as identified by Moskos et al., are those of the soldier–scholar and the soldier–statesman. This is especially important in the realm of civil–military relations, where military leaders must handle such challenges as dealing with a free and independent media, or navigating the intricacies of international relations.

1.1.5. Public Attitude Toward the Military

At the very heart of the issue of civil–military relations, and the focus of this study, is the public’s attitude toward the military. Regardless of whether there is civilian leadership of the armed forces, or a significant public-relations effort being made to humanize the army and those serving in it, the bottom line comes back to just how the members of the public perceive the military, and what are their feelings toward it. This is an important variable in the work of Moskos et al., as they sought to examine and define the postmodern military concept, and it is arguably one over which military and political leaders have the least control. Indeed, it is the sum and the result of the other factors combined, and hence one that requires close study.

As a nation’s military shifts from the modern to the late modern, and thence to the postmodern, the national public’s attitude toward the military likewise changes. In the modern (pre-Cold War/1900–1945) military, the public is supportive of the military. The dominant perceived threat – one of enemy invasion – is felt keenly by the population at large, and hence there is often a sense of admiration and respect for those warriors who put themselves in harm’s way to protect the nation. Moreover, there is often a policy of universal conscription in effect during this phase, and therefore a greater portion of the population familiar – and therefore sympathetic – with the realities of military life and service.

By the late modern (Cold War/1945–1990) period, the public becomes more ambivalent about the military. Support remains, but it is not as strong, with anti-military sentiments appearing in some parts of society, such as academia and among the intelligentsia. By the postmodern (post-Cold War/since 1990) era, the public attitude toward the military is largely one of indifference. By this phase, many western nations had completed their transition to the all-volunteer force, and the military life is distinct and separate from society at large, with the realities of that lifestyle largely alien to much of the population. This lack of familiarity helps create a gulf between military and society, with much less overlap than in previous generations.

A good indicator of how the public views the military can be seen in portrayals of military personnel in popular media. During the modern era and immediately afterward, military personnel are largely treated as heroes in movies and television programs: though not exclusively so, t...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title Page
• Introduction: The Armed Forces of the Republic of China (ROC)
• Chapter 1 Moskos’s Postmodern Military Model
• Chapter 2 Ethnic Self-identification
• Chapter 3 Threat Perception in Taiwan
• Chapter 4 Force Structure and Conscientious Objectors
• Chapter 5 Major Mission Definition
• Chapter 6 Dominant Military Professional and Civilian Employees
• Chapter 7 Spouses and the Military Community
• Chapter 8 Women and the Military
• Chapter 9 Homosexuals in the ROC Military
• Chapter 10 Public Attitudes and Media Relations
• Chapter 11 Summary of Findings
• Chapter 12 Policy Recommendations
• References
• Index