Suez Deconstructed

An Interactive Study in Crisis, War, and Peacemaking

Philip Zelikow, Ernest May

• Publisher: Brookings Institution Press
• Year: 2018
• ISBN:
  9780815735731
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Political History & Theory
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Experiencing a major crisis from different viewpoints, step by step

The Suez crisis of 1956—now little more than dim history for many people—offers a master class in statecraft. It was a potentially explosive Middle East confrontation capped by a surprise move that reshaped the region for years to come. It was a diplomatic crisis that riveted the world's attention. And it was a short but startling war that ended in unexpected ways for every country involved.

Six countries, including two superpowers, had major roles, but each saw the situation differently. From one stage to the next, it could be hard to tell which state was really driving the action. As in any good ensemble, all the actors had pivotal parts to play.

Like an illustration that uses an exploded view of an object to show how it works, this book uses an unprecedented design to deconstruct the Suez crisis. The story is broken down into three distinct phases. In each phase, the reader sees the issues as they were perceived by each country involved, taking into account different types of information and diverse characteristics of each leader and that leader's unique perspectives. Then, after each phase has been laid out, editorial observations invite the reader to consider the interplay.

Developed by an unusual group of veteran policy practitioners and historians working as a team, Suez Deconstructed is not just a fresh way to understand the history of a major world crisis. Whether one's primary interest is statecraft or history, this study provides a fascinating step-by-step experience, repeatedly shifting from one viewpoint to another. At each stage, readers can gain rare experience in the way these very human leaders sized up their situations, defined and redefined their problems, improvised diplomatic or military solutions, sought ways to influence each other, and tried to change the course of history.

PART ONE

What to Do about Nasser’s Egypt

SEPTEMBER 1955 TO JULY 26, 1956

PART ONE

MOSCOW

CAROL R. SAIVETZ

In 1955 the Soviet Union took the strategic initiative to reset the future of the Middle East and its place in the global Cold War. But in Moscow, among those running the country, the maneuvers with Egypt were part of a much bigger and more dangerous game much closer to home. To outsiders, it might seem that the basic parameters of the Cold War—the division of Europe, German rearmament, the Korean stalemate, and the nuclear standoff between the two superpowers—were hardening. But the USSR was still undergoing a prolonged succession struggle. Following the March 5, 1953, death of Joseph Stalin, several potential rulers struggled for power.

At issue among the contenders for power were such questions as the following: Should we end the Stalinist reign of terror? Should we reorient Soviet investment from heavy industry to the consumer sector? What shape should the global competition between the United States and the USSR take in the thermonuclear age?

Where and how to wage the Cold War became an especially critical issue in the succession struggle. Within those discussions, how much assistance to provide to potential allies in the Third World assumed an increasingly prominent place.

STALIN’S DEATH AND THE SUCCESSION STRUGGLE

The earliest challenger for Stalin’s mantle was Lavrenti Beria, the chief of Stalin’s security services. All accounts of the period make it clear that Beria intended to use his position as head of the secret police apparatus to assure his rise to the pinnacle of power, but Beria’s ascendancy was short-lived. He was arrested on June 26, 1953, and, ultimately, shot.

The second contender was Vyacheslav Molotov, the foreign minister. A doctrinaire Stalinist, he firmly believed that war between the capitalist and communist systems was inevitable. He described U.S. foreign policy as “preparations ‘for a new world war—a war to restore the world domination of capitalism.’”¹ Molotov remained a significant force in the foreign policy debates until he was replaced as foreign minister in June of 1956.

The third candidate, Georgi Malenkov, had been Stalin’s heir apparent, but within weeks of the leader’s death he gave up the post of party secretary and retained only the premiership.² In his speech at Stalin’s funeral, Malenkov stated: “There are not contested issues in U.S.-Soviet relations that cannot be resolved by peaceful means.”³ Approximately a year later, Malenkov elaborated. A new world war, he asserted, “given modern weapons, would mean the destruction of world civilization.”⁴ The then premier argued that Moscow’s possession of nuclear weapons would incline the West toward cooperation out of fear of Soviet retaliation.⁵ His views found little support among the other members of the Politburo at the time, and he was dismissed from the premiership in February 1955.

Nikita S. Khrushchev, the fourth contender, was indignant that Malenkov had attempted to steal the role of reformer.⁶ Khrushchev initially sought to carve out a position between Molotov and Malenkov. He rejected the Stalinist line—promoted by Molotov—that war between the two world systems was inevitable at the same time that he dismissed Malenkov’s assertion that the West would come to the same sober assessment of the need to cooperate in the nuclear age. Early in 1955 Khrushchev was denouncing Malenkov for not being tough enough.

Then, after Malenkov had effectively been defeated (though he was still in the ruling circle), Khrushchev and Molotov turned on each other.⁷ According to Khrushchev, Moscow’s primary foreign policy objective should be to “convince” the West to cooperate.

Khrushchev’s reliance on the deterrent value of nuclear weapons could allow him to declare, following the 1955 Geneva summit, that the USSR had stood its ground with the West.⁸ The summit had been convened to discuss Germany and disarmament. Although it was, as one scholar observed, conducted in an atmosphere of “superficial friendship and amiability,”⁹ it accomplished nothing. Khrushchev’s attitude toward the summit and toward the West was summed up in his memoirs:

We returned to Moscow from Geneva knowing that we hadn’t achieved any concrete results. But we were encouraged, realizing now that our enemies probably feared us as much as we feared them. They rattled their sabers and tried to pressure us into agreements which were more profitable for them than for us because they were frightened of us. As a result of our own showing in Geneva, our enemies now realized that we were able to resist their pressure, and see through their tricks.¹⁰

An outgrowth of Khrushchev’s view of the nuclear standoff was the idea of “peaceful coexistence,” which he interpreted to mean a sharp ideological struggle between the East and the West. He could emphasize a nuclear buildup while cutting back on the huge size of Soviet conventional forces. This included a July 1955 troop reduction of 640,000 men and a further cut in May 1956.¹¹

Meanwhile, in the name of this ideological contest, he reached out to the newly decolonized states of Africa and Asia. In 1955, Khrushchev expanded his travels beyond Yugoslavia and the Geneva summit to include much-publicized trips to India, Indonesia, Burma, and Afghanistan. While in India, he proclaimed: “We say to the leaders of the capitalist states: Let us compete without war.”¹² He meant without a war between the superpowers. The Soviet Union simultaneously approved its first arms transfer to Egypt.

When the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) held a full congress, which did not happen every year, the occasion was always a landmark for setting out the party’s new policy line. The CPSU’s Twentieth Party Congress, in February 1956, was, therefore, a landmark occasion for Khrushchev to consolidate his leadership and articulate his line. In his formal speech at the congress, Khrushchev concluded that even prominent bourgeois figures must admit “there can be no victors in an atomic war.” And recognizing the dangers inherent in the nuclear age, he claimed: “We want to be friends with the United States and to cooperate with it for peace and international security.”¹³

Yet this enunciation of the need for “peaceful coexistence” and the noninevitability of war, in effect, shifted the locus of further conflict from Europe to the Third World. Khrushchev explained:

The forces of peace have been considerably augmented by the emergence in the world arena of a group of peace-loving European and Asian states which have proclaimed nonparticipation in blocs as a principle of their foreign policy.… As a result a vast “peace zone,” including both socialist and nonsocialist peace-loving states in Europe and Asia, has emerged in the world arena.¹⁴

During the congress Molotov did not oppose Khrushchev directly; in fact, he admitted shortcomings in the performance of the Foreign Ministry.¹⁵ Yet even as he acknowledged the emerging nuclear parity between the United States and the USSR, he urged the Soviet Union to remain vigilant about the West. “Of course, insofar as imperialism exists, there is a danger of a new world war, not to mention other military conflicts.”¹⁶

Dmitry Shepilov, soon to succeed Molotov as foreign minister, more clearly echoed Khrushchev’s views. He devoted much of his speech to describing the ideological battle between capitalism and socialism being fought in the Third World. According to the future foreign minister:

One of the characteristic features of our epoch is the combining of socialist revolution in individual countries with a mass struggle of “all the downtrodden and discontented.…”

Communists are opponents in principle of sectarian narrowness. They advocate that the efforts of all kinds and varieties of mass movements of the present day must be merged into an anti-imperialist stream. The great aspirations of all the downtrodden peoples, whether they be the peoples of the Arab, Asian or Latin American countries … will find their realization in the struggle against social oppression, against colonialism, in the struggle for peace and democracy.¹⁷

The reference to “sectarian narrowness” was a coded attack on those within the party who opposed Khrushchev’s outreach to neutralist, noncommunist Third World states.

CHANGING VIEWS OF THE MIDDLE EAST

The Soviet leaders were clearly having intense debates, offstage, about how to deal with the forces of decolonization in the Third World. The central question was this: Should the USSR value relations with local communist parties higher than those with nationalist leaders, or should it advance ties with nationalist leaders who were noncommunist or even leaders who killed or imprisoned local communists, just because they were anti-British or anti-French?

Nowhere was this question more squarely posed for the Soviet leadership than in the Middle East. For example, when in 1952 the Egyptian Free Officers Movement overthrew the monarchy and began demanding the withdrawal of British troops, official Soviet statements seemed to see no difference between the new military leaders and the former king. In fact, the 1952 edition of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia described the coup as follows: “On the night of July 23, 1952, power in Cairo was seized by a reactionary officers’ group connected with the USA.”¹⁸

Two years later, Soviet statements praised those Middle East forces opposed to the British-sponsored Baghdad Pact. In this it seemed that Soviet objectives and Nasser’s coincided, as the latter attempted to rally the Arabs against the proposed alliance. Indeed, in a paper prepared for Dmitry Shepilov’s trip to Egypt, the USSR vowed support for Egypt as it sought to “strengthen its state sovereignty and national independence.”¹⁹

When upheaval in Syria brought to power new leaders more sympathetic to Nasser’s position, Syria and Egypt declared their joint opposition not only to the proposed Turkish-Iraqi pact but to all other defense deals in the region. The Soviet Union, which had earlier signed an arms deal with Syria (late 1954), now officially announced its readiness to assist Syria in defending its independence and sovereignty. And in Egypt, the Soviet ambassador sounded out the Cairo government on its formal stance toward the West.²⁰

In a statement issued on April 16, 1955, the Soviet Foreign Ministry definitively criticized the Baghdad Pact and promised to counter it.

The situation in the Near and Middle East has recently become considerably more tense. The explanation of this is that certain Western powers have been making new attempts to draw the countries of the Near and Middle East into the military groupings which are being set up as appendages to the aggressive North Atlantic bloc.…

[The basis of this policy is] the desire of certain Western powers for the colonial enslavement of these countries.…

As has frequently happened in the past, now, too, efforts are being made to cloak the aggressive nature of the Near and Middle Eastern plans of the United States and Britain with ridiculous fabrications about a “Soviet menace” to the countries of that area.… Upholding the cause of peace, the Soviet government will defend the freedom and independence of the countries of the Near and Middle East and will oppose interference in their domestic affairs.²¹

But the USSR was concerned not only about Egypt and Syria.

If the creation of the Baghdad Pact was seen as a setback by the Kremlin, the rise of several varieties of home-grown socialism and the vehement anti-Westernism articulated by many Third World leaders were seen as opportunities.²² In fact, Khrushchev urged those attending the Twentieth Party Congress “to work untiringly to strengthen the bonds of friendship and cooperation with the Republic of India, Burma, Afghanistan, Egypt, Syria, and other countries whic...