Russia and the New World Disorder

Bobo Lo

• Publisher: Brookings Inst. Press/Chatham House
• Year: 2015
• ISBN:
  9780815725572
• Topic: Política y relaciones internacionales
• Subtopic: Política rusa

A Brookings Institution Press and Chatham House publication

The Russian annexation of Crimea was one of the great strategic shocks of the past twenty-five years. For many in the West, Moscow's actions in early 2014 marked the end of illusions about cooperation, and the return to geopolitical and ideological confrontation. Russia, for so long a peripheral presence, had become the central actor in a new global drama. In this groundbreaking book, renowned scholar Bobo Lo analyzes the broader context of the crisis by examining the interplay between Russian foreign policy and an increasingly anarchic international environment. He argues that Moscow's approach to regional and global affairs reflects the tension between two very different worlds—the perceptual and the actual.

The Kremlin highlights the decline of the West, a resurgent Russia, and the emergence of a new multipolar order. But this idealized view is contradicted by a world disorder that challenges core assumptions about the dominance of great powers and the utility of military might. Its lesson is that only those states that embrace change will prosper in the twenty-first century.

A Russia able to redefine itself as a modern power would exert a critical influence in many areas of international politics. But a Russia that rests on an outdated sense of entitlement may end up instead as one of the principal casualties of global transformation.

Part I

Context

one

The Domestic Context of Russian Foreign Policy

In Russia there is no law. There is a pillar, and on that pillar sits the crown.

ALEXANDER PUSHKIN

It has become axiomatic that a country's conduct of international relations reflects the influence of domestic factors. Indeed, the link is so strong that one might turn to Carl von Clausewitz's famous maxim to argue that diplomacy is merely the continuation of domestic politics by other means.¹ Yet such generalizations also invite misunderstanding and misrepresentation. They may reinforce crude national stereotypes, tendentious readings of history, and deterministic views of the future. And they are often misused to justify actions that are anything but pragmatic or logical.

These problems are especially evident in the case of Russia. Few countries have been subject to mythmaking on such an industrial scale. Many observers, foreign and Russian, surround it in a cloud of mysticism, in effect agreeing with the nineteenth-century poet Fyodor Tyutchev that “Russia cannot be understood by the mind alone…in Russia, one can only believe.”² This has led to a host of trite simplifications and sometimes outright falsehoods—about the “Russian soul,” the “strong leader,”³ the alleged unreadiness and dislike of its people for democracy,⁴ and Russia's timeless identity as a great power. It has also encouraged a self-serving, relativistic attitude along the lines that since Russia is so very different, it cannot be expected to behave like a “normal” nation.

On the other hand, there are those who treat Russian foreign policy as if domestic influences and considerations were of little relevance. They proceed from a (Western) moralist perspective, talking up universal values, common threats and challenges, and shared interests, only to discover that Moscow's perspectives and priorities often differ substantially from their own. When reality hits home, disappointment leads to accusations of bad faith and double-dealing. The Obama administration's reset policy exemplified these failings (see chapter 6).

Before discussing Russia's interaction with the new world disorder, it is critical to understand the different elements that constitute the domestic context of its foreign policy. They amount to an amalgam of ideas, interests, and instincts, whose influence varies, not only from issue to issue, but also according to time and circumstance. Taken together, however, they are the foundation of a particular attitude toward the world and Russia's place in it.

The most immediate of these elements is policymaking—that is, the mechanics of who makes policy and how they develop and implement it. This, in turn, ties into the question of political culture. It is not enough to identify the decisionmakers; we also need to know where they are coming from. What influences lead them to think and act the way they do? It has become almost de rigueur to emphasize the connection between authoritarianism at home and an adversarial foreign policy. This chapter argues, however, that deeper structural factors, such as geography and history, are much more influential in shaping Russia's approach to the world.

At the same time, foreign policy is not just the product of long-term realities, but is buffeted by unforeseen events. There is a tendency to exaggerate the inexorability of larger trends. Yet if history teaches us anything, it is that nothing is inevitable. Putin's conduct of foreign policy reveals strong predispositional influences. But it is also the “accidental” and unstable result of contemporary political conditions, economic outcomes, and social pressures. These establish realities that may frequently be short-lived, yet exert a powerful influence on decisionmakers at critical moments.

Policymaking

Analysts have become so accustomed to using generic terms such as “Russia,” “Moscow,” and the “Putin regime/elite” that they tend to give little thought to what they mean by them. Partly this is an issue of practicality; some generalization is unavoidable in order to communicate information coherently. But it also tacitly acknowledges that in many cases it is impossible to delve much deeper. Trying to understand the inner workings of decisionmaking is a challenging enterprise even in relatively transparent political systems. It is especially so in an environment where there is such a strong culture of secrecy and informal networking, as in Putin's Russia.⁵

In effect there are two broad policy milieus—the real and the virtual. The latter is what outsiders see. This is the world of public policy statements, such as the Foreign Policy Concept, the Concept of National Security, and the Military Doctrine. Such documents present sweeping visions of Russia's destiny, unequivocal expositions of basic principles, and upbeat assessments of important relationships. They can be important in highlighting trends in Russian foreign policy, but offer few clues as to how it is actually made. Indeed, they convey a misleading clarity and certainty of thought.

By contrast, the real policy world is exclusive and almost invisible. This is where the big decisions are made. The vast majority of the political class plays little role, and public input is minimal. A particular order comes from the Kremlin, but without exceptionally privileged access it is often impossible to know who influenced whom, what, and how. It is often a case of “those who know don't tell, and those who tell don't know.”

There is consequently a substantial element of guesswork involved in trying to understand the mechanics of Russian foreign policy. The difficulties are compounded by the fact that decisions rarely, if ever, reflect an “objective” national interest (whatever that means), but are made by individuals with their own particular biases, prejudices, and vested interests. As the commentator Igor Torbakov has noted, “The line between what is generally understood as national interests and…group interests is completely blurred in Russia.”⁶

The policy landscape

Nevertheless, there is much to learn even from a brief review of major actors and decisionmaking processes. One way of doing this is to distinguish between different policy functions: decisionmaking; ideational inspiration; implementation; and rationalization. Although there is considerable overlap between these functions, each represents a distinct dimension with its own exponents.

The most important function is decisionmaking, and this is reflected in the identity of those responsible for it. They include, most obviously, President Putin, but also other senior regime figures, such as the chairman of Rosneft, Igor Sechin, Prime Minister (and former president) Dmitry Medvedev, Head of the Presidential Administration Sergei Ivanov, and Secretary of the Security Council Nikolai Patrushev. Of course, whereas Putin is the supreme decisionmaker, the influence of the others is fairly limited—both because they are subordinate to him and because their areas of responsibility and interest are narrower. Thus Sechin's role in foreign policy focuses largely on the energy sector, in particular oil cooperation with China and Arctic development. Although as chairman of Rosneft he was the prime mover behind the cooperation agreements concluded with ExxonMobil in 2012 and CNPC (China National Petroleum Corporation) in 2013, there is little evidence of any larger impact on the bilateral relationships with the United States and China.⁷

Ideational inspiration is not normally associated with policymaking, given the latter's emphasis on bureaucratic institutions and processes. However, its effect on Russian foreign policy has been considerable; ideas matter, even in a society notorious for its cynicism. In the first instance, they inform a general philosophical outlook. Putin has acknowledged the influence of nationalist thinkers such as Konstantin Leontiev and Ivan Ilyin on his view of Russia and its place in world civilization.⁸ Ideas also feed into strategic culture. The thinking of Yevgeny Primakov (foreign and later prime minister under Yeltsin) has underpinned much of Putin's pursuit of a multipolar order, the vision of Russia as an independent center of global power, and notions of geopolitical balancing. Primakov may no longer be closely involved in policy circles, but his ideas have actually become more influential in recent years.⁹ Finally, ideas shape concrete policies. Igor Rogachev, who served a remarkable thirteen years as Russian ambassador in Beijing from 1992 to 2005, was central to the development of a Sino-Russian partnership. Although he died in 2012, his legacy endures.

Implementation is a much underestimated area of foreign policy. It lacks glamor, and those who carry out decisions—principally the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)—tend to be dismissed as actors of little consequence. In fact, while the MFA and organizations such as the Ministry of Defense (MOD) are rarely the instigators of policy initiatives, they retain substantial preventative powers. Their restraining influence is especially important in discussions about strategic disarmament and missile defense.¹⁰ The highly technical nature of these subjects ensures a high level of dependence by the leadership on specialist expertise and advice. Likewise, the Ministry of Economic Development (MED) plays a leading role in foreign economic and trade policy. Without its close involvement, projects such as the Eurasian Union and Russia's World Trade Organization (WTO) accession would not have gotten off the ground. These examples underline the reality that without effective implementation there is no policymaking.

The last function, policy rationalization, is difficult to pin down. It amounts to more than the public diplomacy performed by the MFA's Information Department, or the skewed news coverage of media outlets such as RT and Rossiya Segodnya¹¹ (which in tone and content are similar to Fox News in the United States). It also goes beyond the standard formulations found in public policy documents, such as the Foreign Policy Concept. Instead, it might be described as the “intellectualization” of foreign policy—the explanation and justification of Russian positions to an outside, predominantly Western, audience. Its chief exponents include English-speaking Duma deputies such as Alexei Pushkov and Vyacheslav Nikonov, respectively chairman and deputy chairman of the International Affairs Committee; and Sergei Markov, co-chairman of the National Strategic Council of Russia. Revealingly, all three worked as journalists or in think tanks, or both, before they entered formal political structures.

The supreme decisionmaker

The current policy landscape is centered on individuals and their networks rather than formal institutions. This is demonstrated above all by President Putin. No single person in the six decades since the death of Stalin has been so intimately identified with power and policy in Russia.¹² Such is his domination that he has engendered his own “ism.” Putinism has emerged as a hybrid of centralized political power, economic rent-seeking,¹³ social materialism, conservative morality, and an assertive international posture. In this connection, the comparison that is sometimes made with Charles de Gaulle undersells the extent to which Putin has become synonymous with political Russia.¹⁴ For all that de Gaulle towered above his contemporaries, he nevertheless had to operate under far greater democratic and institutional constraints.

Putin's personal stamp is most apparent in the way decisions are made. Although a strong culture of secrecy existed in Soviet and Tsarist times, this has been systematically reinforced over the past fifteen years following a period of relative openness under Gorbachev and Yeltsin. There are very few people involved in decisionmaking, and the content of their deliberations is almost hermetically sealed. Putin operates on the principle that “fewer is better”—at once more cohesive, more secure, and more effective. The mechanics of his response to the 2014 Ukrainian revolution are instructive here. There was no wide, much less public, consultation process. Neither Kyiv nor Western capitals, and almost no one in Moscow, had any inkling as to how he would respond to the overthrow of Viktor Yanukovych.¹⁵ This meant that when he did decide to act—embarking on the annexation of Crimea, and initiating separatist actions in eastern Ukraine—Russia's “enemies” were confounded. The surprise was near-total, enabling the Kremlin to sustain the diplomatic as well as military initiative.

It follows from this closed style of decisionmaking that Putin exerts a crucial influence on individual policies. Unsurprisingly, this is most apparent in priorities to which he assigns the greatest importance: Ukraine, Eurasian integration, Russia's energy ties, and the handling of international crises, such as the Syrian conflict. It is Putin who determines the fortunes, on the Russian side, of key relationships with the United States, Europe, and China. The political rapprochement with Europe in 2000 (after Kosovo), the post-9/11 “strategic choice” in favor of Washington, and the steady expansion of ties with Beijing all owed a tremendous amount to his direct involvement. Equally, the deterioration of relations with the United States and, to a lesser extent, Europe during 2004-08 was fueled by his anger over Western participation in the color revolutions in Georgia and especially Ukraine, and aversion to American “unipolarity.”¹⁶ Putin's personal sense of obida (offense) at U.S. support for the public demonstrations against him in late 2011 and early 2012 was the single most important reason behind the hardening of Russian policy toward Washington.

The Putinization of Russian foreign policy has never been more evident than in relation to Ukraine. For the past decade Putin has involved himself directly and repeatedly in its affairs. In the run-up to the Ukrainian presidential elections of December 2004, he visited Kyiv on several occasions to support Yanukovych, but above all to oppose the Western-leaning Viktor Yushchenko.¹⁷ Although Putin had previously worked with Yushchenko when the latter was Ukrainian prime minister,¹⁸ he decided that a functional relationship between them was impossible. The subsequent Orange Revolution was therefore not only a setback for Russian foreign policy, but also a personal humiliation. Similar considerations were in play following the 2014 Maidan revolution. Russia's strategic interests suffered a major blow with the political demise of Yanukovych, but no less important was Putin's embarrassment at the unexpected turn of events. In the circumstances, he felt that he had no option—as a man as well as a national leader—but to strike back. His credibility and legitimacy, not to mention his self-esteem, were on the line.

There are parallels here with the 2008 Georgia war. In both cases Moscow had substantive policy concerns that contributed to the likelihood of conflict, such as the expansion of Western influence in the post-Soviet space, and its perceived impact on the regional balance of power. In both cases Putin was personally invested in outcomes to an exceptional degree. In 2008 his loathing for Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili gave him added incentive to teach Tbilisi a lesson. In 2014 he risked becoming a diminished figure at home and abroad unless he reacted vigorously to the change of power in Kyiv. Most important of all, in Ukraine as in Georgia the victory of Russian arms became portrayed as Putin's personal triumph—not just over hapless regional (and domestic) adversaries, but also over a shocked West.¹⁹

Putin's individual contribution has been critical in shaping Russia's energy diplomacy. His long-time interest in the geopolitics of energy explains his determined opposition to the EU's Third Energy Package (see chapter 3) and other projects to reduce European dependence on Russian gas, such as alternative pipelines circumventing Russia. Likewise, Gazprom's charmed existence is due almost entirely to his personal patronage. He has resisted calls to break up the company, which has become synonymous with poor performance—both because Gazprom serves the rent-seeking interests of the elite and because Putin regards it as a vital instrument of geopolitical influence (see below). More concretely, Putin has occasionally intervened to finalize an energy deal. One instance was the thirty-year gas supply contract between Gazprom and CNPC during his May 2014 visit to Shanghai. The deadlock in price negotiations looked set to continue before a last-minute compromise was reached—an outcome that would have been impossible without his direct involvement.²⁰

All that said, Putin's reach or level of interest in foreign policy should not be exaggerated. There are many areas where his role is superficial or nonexistent. Anecdotal accounts suggest, for example, that he has very little involvement in managing Russia's G-20 agenda, and the often highly technical issues associated with global rebalancing and a “new financial architecture.”²¹ On nuclear disarmament and WMD proliferation Putin adheres firmly to the principle of strategic parity with the United States, but leaves the details of how this is to be achieved to the specialists in the MFA and MOD. Similarly, he is committed to realizing th...