The Indoctrination of the Wehrmacht

Nazi Ideology and the War Crimes of the German Military

Bryce Sait

• Publisher: Berghahn Books
• Year: 2019
• ISBN:
  9781789201505
• Edition: 1
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Holocaust History
• Index: History

Far from the image of an apolitical, "clean" Wehrmacht that persists in popular memory, German soldiers regularly cooperated with organizations like the SS in the abuse and murder of countless individuals during the Second World War. This in-depth study demonstrates that a key factor in the criminalization of the Wehrmacht was the intense political indoctrination imposed on its members. At the instigation of senior leadership, many ordinary German soldiers and officers became ideological warriors who viewed their enemies in racial and political terms—a project that was but one piece of the broader effort to socialize young men during the Nazi era.

Chapter 1

A POLITICAL MILITARY?

When the National Socialists came to power in 1933, their leader, Adolf Hitler, had ambitious plans to reshape Germany. The new society that he wished to build would be based upon the values of race and militarism, with wars of conquest as the ultimate goal.¹ In fact, Nazism was inseparable from war. Its ideology revolved around it, and once they had gained power, the Nazis steered Germany on a ‘remarkably consistent, if irrational and self-destructive, course to war’.² Of course, in order to achieve these goals, much would depend upon the German military. Weakened by the First World War and the resulting Treaty of Versailles, it needed rebuilding. Just as importantly, Hitler needed to gain the military’s support to cement his domestic authority and to implement his agenda.³

During the Weimar Republic, the military, then known as the Reichswehr, had remained officially ‘apolitical’ and committed to upholding the constitution. Its members had to swear an oath to the Weimar constitution⁴ and they were banned from taking part in party politics.⁵ However, beneath the surface of apolitical service to the republic, there was much about the situation in which the Reichswehr found itself that caused deep resentment among its soldiers and officers. The nature of the new democratic and, because of the Versailles Treaty, demilitarised German state meant that the military had been drastically downsized. Moreover, it had also lost the influential position within society that it had held during the imperial age. Many within its ranks felt rejected and alienated by the new state.⁶ The new constitution had signalled an end to many of the special rights, as well as the social prestige, that had been enjoyed by members of the Imperial German Army, causing deep resentment among both the soldiers themselves and numerous right-wing political parties.⁷ The absence of conscription not only reduced the number of personnel available to the military, it also resulted in much less interaction taking place between the military and wider society, adding to the army’s sense of estrangement from the Weimar Republic.⁸

The Reichswehr officer corps was led by the right-wing, antisemitic Hans von Seeckt.⁹ Seeckt was not a supporter of the Weimar Republic; at best he accepted it only as a temporary state of affairs due to the lack of alternatives.¹⁰ He organised the interwar army as a kind of ‘state within a state’, never fully integrating it into the political life of the Weimar Republic.¹¹ Many members of the armed forces, having been socialised in the old army structures, and particularly in the case of the officer corps, drawn from the upper classes, shared Seeckt’s sentiments. They viewed the new democratic model of government with disdain, seeing it as alien to the world of the army and the officer corps, and at odds with their own political views, with many having links to anti-republican forces.¹² In turn, the Reichswehr was the institution that stood furthest from democracy and the state during the Weimar Republic.¹³

A directive issued by the Reichswehr ministry shortly before the Nazis came to power gives an idea of the military’s position during the Weimar Republic. It contained lines such as ‘Unlike in earlier wars of conquests, unlike campaigns of the Kings and other such expeditions and plundering … our voluntary army serves purely for the defence of the nation’s borders’.¹⁴ The Reichswehr was to protect the Fatherland, which although

reduced in size, weakened, indebted and humbled, is still our Fatherland, our home, and in spite of all the hardships that have fallen upon us, our future and the future of our children is tied up with its future. Although our country is war-torn, beneath the ruins there exists the possibility for a new, better life for us all, but this is only achievable through hard work.¹⁵

This was hardly the sort of rhetoric that would inspire loyalty within the officer corps who had served the Kaiser. Its resigned tone seemed to offer little to soldiers in comparison to what the Nazis promised.

The Nazi regime’s formation signalled a substantial change in the situation facing the Reichswehr. For many members of the armed forces, Hitler presented an appealing alternative to the future they saw under the Weimar Republic.¹⁶ According to Robert O’Neill, there existed ‘fertile soil awaiting the policies and ideas of Adolf Hitler’.¹⁷ Many within the military viewed the Nazi Party as the promise of an ideal regime. It was authoritarian and nationalistic, and it seemed to guarantee the remilitarisation of German society and the restoration of the military’s former standing within the state.¹⁸ The Nazis’ seizure of power was also a long-awaited opportunity to discard the democratic Weimar model, and to suppress liberal and left-wing elements within the country.¹⁹ National Socialism found particularly high levels of support among younger officers.²⁰ According to one officer who was later to become involved in resistance against Hitler, General Hans Oster, many members of the armed forces welcomed the return to ‘a vigorous patriotic policy, rearmament, reintroduction of military service’, since ‘to the officers, this meant a return to older traditions’.²¹

This is not to say, however, that the Nazi regime was greeted with unconditional enthusiasm by all members of the military. Some senior, conservative officers, Generals Werner von Fritsch, Ludwig Beck and Kurt von Hammerstein among the most prominent, were disturbed by the radical nature of the Nazi Party, and were appalled by the Nazis’ use of street violence and coercion.²² The socialist leanings held by some members of the Nazi Party and the SA also alarmed many within the officer corps, not only because of their conservative politics, but also because many of them were drawn from the upper classes.²³ They also saw in the SA, the paramilitary wing of the Nazi Party, a possible competitor for the role as the main military force within Germany.²⁴

While these elements did exist, and continued to oppose the onset of Nazism within the military, for many officers the perceived benefits of the new regime won out over any misgivings they may have had about the extremists that had taken power.²⁵ The military was in a difficult position, both domestically and internationally, and felt itself extremely vulnerable within both spheres. The Treaty of Versailles had resulted in a drastic downsizing of the German armed forces, restricting it to 100,000 men. On an international level, the restrictions placed upon the Reichswehr had rendered it incapable of defending Germany from foreign aggression,²⁶ with the military making attempts to skirt the regulations of Versailles through secret rearmament and involvement with veteran soldiers’ associations that helped to boost its resources.²⁷ From the perspective of the officer corps in 1933, the highly desirable goals of overthrowing the restrictions of Versailles and of regaining military might could most logically and easily be pursued under Hitler.²⁸

The Nazi Party’s agenda sought to address the military’s issues. On 3 February 1933, shortly after becoming Chancellor, Hitler gave a speech to a number of Reichswehr generals, promising to ‘stand at the side of’ and ‘work for’ the army, which he said he regarded as the most important institution of the state. More specifically, he expressed his plans to crush Marxism and democracy, to overturn the Treaty of Versailles, to rebuild the economy and the military, and to militarise German society.²⁹ The Nazis also seemed to have learned the lessons of the First World War. They would prepare Germany for future conflicts by harnessing the entire resources of a nation and ensure that the military would not suffer another humiliating defeat. Furthermore, it was clear that the new regime would suppress domestic dissent and ignore international protests against their rearmament plans.³⁰ Hitler had also spoken of the military as acting as one of the two ‘pillars’ of the state. The Nazi movement would be one pillar, supporting the nation politically, and the armed forces would be the other, supporting it militarily as the nation’s ‘sole bearer of arms’.³¹ Hitler’s statements implied that many of his political aims aligned with the military’s own interests, however untruthful his proclamations regarding the military’s future autonomy within the state might have been.

Perhaps the most enthusiastic of the military elites in his support of the new regime was the minister of defence, General Werner von Blomberg. Appointed in 1933, Blomberg made it clear that the military would abandon its role as a supposedly apolitical organisation,³² ordering his men to back the new ‘national movement’ in a directive on 11 April 1933.³³ Blomberg also sought to coordinate the military’s ideology with that of the regime. He took the notable step of ordering that the 7 April 1933 ‘Law for the Restoration of the Professional Civil Service’ would apply to the ranks of the military. This law, which legislated the dismissal of ‘non-Aryans’ from their posts, did not initially apply to the armed forces. Blomberg, however, took the initiative and voluntarily adopted the legislation, dismissing Jews (with exceptions made for veterans of the First World War) and giving Nazi racial ideology official status within the military.³⁴ (However, as Brian Rigg has pointed out, some Jews and many Mischlinge managed to serve in the German army during the Third Reich.)³⁵ In another unprompted display of political loyalty, Blomberg incorporated the swastika into the military’s crest.³⁶ When Hitler merged the offices of President and...