Tales of Brexits Past and Present

Understanding the Choices, Threats and Opportunities In Our Separation from the EU

Nigel Culkin, Richard D Simmons

• Publisher: Emerald Publishing Limited
• Year: 2018
• Print ISBN: 9781787694385
• eBook ISBN: 9781787694378
• Topic: Business
• Subtopic: Business General
• Index: Business

Tales of Brexits Past and Present: Understanding the Choices, Threats and Opportunities In Our Separation from the EU provides a compelling insight into the Brexit process in a uniquely historical context. Looking at previous 'Brexits' under the lens of international risk, the book tackles five specific themes relating to the Brexit result - competition in the global innovation economy, the generational split, the 'left behind' aspirational working and middle classes, the impact on international relations, and popularism in the internet age. 

By looking to the past, this book will offer insights into what we might expect in the future, providing an engaging narrative that will open the minds of readers to the options, risks and opportunities that could be unmasked in the Brexit process.

1

MOTIVATION, MYTH AND REALITY

Whatever your views on the Brexit debate […] the monopoly of the EU membership model has now been shattered. The story behind this remarkable swerve now forms a part of our nation’s tale. It slots into a thread on sovereignty stretching back through the breaking of the line at Trafalgar or the fireships at Calais; or in less incendiary terms, via our founding role in EFTA, the volumes of Adam Smith and the Statute of Praemunire. Our country[’s] […] history is also that of an ancient nation state; one with a profound sense of the limitations of its institutions that was already considered shocking by its Capetian and Valois counterparts.

(Rotherham, 2018)

On 11 April 2018, a UK Museum of Sovereignty⁵ was announced to celebrate British Exceptionalism. In view of the geographic distribution of the ‘2016 UK Referendum’ with majorities to leave in both England and Wales, should we perhaps say ‘English and Welsh Exceptionalism’?⁶ This impression of ‘identity voting’ was underpinned by the 2016 Annual Social attitudes survey that interviewed Brexit Leavers and found that a sense of ‘national identity’ coupled with a firm set of social attitudes characterised the typical ‘Leave Voter’.⁷ Complementary analysis of the polling results found age and home ownership were especially important in determining a disposition to vote leave⁸ with older home owners (and social housing tenants) more likely to ‘vote leave’.

For some, when they think of an individual Brexiteer, it may conjure up one of two mental images. First, someone from England who is perhaps older, maybe a pensioner, and who has done well financially over the past 40 years. They own a property that has been appreciating in value and are secure in their mind that this nest egg will maintain its value. (S)he also feels the world has drifted away from some ‘core values’ of English civility, towards a bureaucratic state driven by European red tape. They are also deeply uncomfortable with the idea of unlimited immigration, sensing that ‘terrorist’ human rights are prioritised at the expense of the indigenous population. Secure in their mortgage-free home, with a defined benefit occupational pension, a triple locked state pension and free health care, it is very hard for them to see how any Brexit Shock could hurt them. Voters from social classes A, B and C1 amounted to 59% of the Leave vote suggesting almost two-thirds of our Leave voters fit our first mental picture.⁹

A second impression might be that some Leave Voters could be members of the ‘Left Behind’ who are often typified as white working class, maybe at the lower end of school academic attainment, lacking further education, and perhaps younger rather than retired. A member of the ‘Left Behind’ is someone who faces challenges in the labour market and, following the 2008 Global Crash has found it difficult to step on the housing ladder. This group often blames immigration for depriving them of their ‘natural rights’ to housing and employment. One core part of this group, representing some 12% of the overall population (and of which 95% voted ‘Leave’),¹⁰ is also likely to be fiercely nationalistic, often passionate followers of the England Football team, a reader of a ‘red top’ tabloid such as The Sun or, if aspiring, possibly the Daily Mail.¹¹ As a whole, the ‘Left Behind’ group is estimated at 21% of the overall Leave Vote.¹²

We are also told that the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) and by extension ‘Leave’ supporters are more likely to be older, working class, male and white. It has been argued that some pensioners might see UKIP as a political party offering a refuge from a society where social change is seen by some as undermining the key characteristics of traditional ‘Englishness’, a group rooted in a nostalgic idea of a ‘Great’ Britain with an Empire compounding feelings amongst poorly qualified members of the working class of being ‘Left Behind’.¹³

Eric Kaufmann penned a 2016 blog, ‘It’s NOT the economy, stupid: Brexit as a story of personal values’, in which he argues that voting Leave in the Referendum was all about expressing ‘national identity’, citing a preference for the death penalty and a fear of immigration as pointers towards having a predisposition to Vote Leave.¹⁴ As part of the Economic Social Research Council’s, ‘UK in a Changing Europe’ programme, a study on pre-referendum voter attitude data painted a picture of a nation regarding the European Union (EU) as bent on eroding sovereignty, enabling terrorism, destabilising peace in Europe and undermining local society.¹⁵ A total of 47% of prospective voters viewed the EU as encouraging terrorism, whilst 28% did not. The same number (28%) saw the EU as positive for sovereignty and 51% as negative. Could it be that Leave supporters feel they are protecting their country against foreign forces, giving them a clear, collective, historically rooted and determinate identity?

The ‘Englishness’ and to a lesser extent ‘Welshness’ (England and Wales both voted to Leave) contrast with Scotland and Northern Ireland’s majority vote to Remain (Electoral Commission, 2016). In this context, we suggest that for many in England, a vote to leave the EU was synonymous with a passion to ‘Save England’. Perhaps this ‘nationalistic sentiment’ helps explain how two surveys can contradict each other on the importance of immigration as a driver to vote ‘Leave’. In a British Social Attitudes Survey, Clery et al. (2016)¹⁶ found a clear relationship between a fear of immigration and a disposition to ‘Vote Leave’ whilst in a specific study of Referendum voter behaviour, immigration is nowhere near so distinct in its association with a vote to Leave.¹⁷

Could a desire for a distinct ‘English National’ identity have in some ways emerged in response to both the devolution of power to Scotland and Wales and, the receipt of EU laws from Brussels? In this narrative, the reassertion of an English National Identity for some becomes the dominant theme, notwithstanding previous primary identities that may have been associated primary and primarily in same sentence with economic capability or class status. Seemingly this ‘English National Identity’ aligns to the feeling of English Exceptionalism we mentioned earlier.¹⁸ There is anecdotal evidence that a Leave vote was felt by many as a patriotic imperative on a par with standing firm at Dunkirk, Waterloo and Trafalgar. In such circumstances, could a leave voter be seen as rooted in ‘English Exceptionalism’ as we describe in Box 1?

Box 1. English Exceptionalism Over the Ages

The concept of English Exceptionalism draws upon thinking that developed in late sixteenth century English post-Reformation Society. Starting in 1610 with the publication of William Camden’s Britannica, which focused almost entirely on England and Wales, there is an expression of the English nobility as the cultural heirs to the Roman Empire.

[Britain] is certainly the masterpiece of nature performed when she was in her best and gayest humour […] I need not enlarge upon its inhabitants nor extol the vigour and firmness of their constitution, the inoffensiveness of their humour, their civility to all men, and their courage and bravery, so often both at home and abroad, and not unknown to the remotest corner of the earth.¹⁹

Camden focused on links to Roman Britain, one deepened and extended by Antiquarian William Stuckley:

They are cursuses of the ancient Britons, long before the Romans came hither. I mean the first aborigines Brittons in heroic ages, when the Druids first began; before the Gaulish nations came over, somewhat above Ceaser’s time; those Brittons that made the mighty works of Abury, Stonehenge, &c. [etc.] (W Stuckley, 1 Sep 1736²⁰)

Stuckley mirrors Camden’s journeys through the counties of England unearthed as he finds and describes relics from Roman and earlier times; his narrative extends Camden as he suggests that the English noble man is the natural heir of Roman Civilisation, a transformation made possible through the subjugation of the children of English Chieftains’ (or more correctly the Chieftains of the tribes of Roman occupied Ancient Britain) to Roman Rule.

Well connected and a respected authority on English Antiquity, it is not difficult to see how the ideas of Stuckley (and others around him) became an undercurrent of English Tory and Whigg thought.

Neither is it difficult to find echoes of this ‘Heroic Englishman’ narrative in today’s Brexit pleas to recapture sovereignty.

The desire to affirm a separate ‘English’ identity seems to have increasingly replaced party loyalty as a motivational characteristic. There is evidence that Leavers may have been searching for a party that would represent their views. The UKIP tribe in 2015 may well have been Labour voters in 2005, migrating to the Conservatives in 2010, before arriving at the doors of UKIP in 2015. Such voters include a significant cohort of small business people and self-employed, and aspiring lower middle-class voters in junior supervisory positions. In all cases, there is some suggestion that the media or the ‘oxygen’ of publicity has had a significant impact.^21,i

So, our typical Leave Supporter, especially in England, is older, in stable accommodation, with a smaller subset younger and maybe from the one of the lower socio-economic groups. At the heart of their narrative is a sense that ‘English Exceptionalism’ – what made England great – is under threat from immigrants and foreign (alien) powers. In this narrative, immigrants act as a new and distinct tribe that facture communities by refusing to integrate, take jobs natives could otherwise have undertaken and drive down wage rates. Additionally immigrants seem for many Leavers to occupy what affordable housing exists, ‘sponge’ off welfare services and expatriate welfare support by for example, having child benefit paid for children in their home country or tying up the country’s health service.

How could a great nation that has within folk memory ruled a Global Empire, that won two world wars, be so reduced? To some, it must be the fault of unelected greedy remote non-UK bureaucrats who know nothing of austerity and use hard earned tax revenues from the English to subsidise their luxurious life styles and fund white elephant projects that are scattered around Europe. Examples of such foreign waste seem to flow into popular media and are substantiated and highlighted by the European Court of Auditors in its investigations that have unearthed apparent abuses such as the building of unwanted and unused airports in Estonia, Greece, Italy, Spain and Poland and using £666 million of EU grants in the process. No wonder that the EU deems such activities as poor value for money.²²

IMMIGRATION

We have already mentioned that conflicting opinions exist as to how important immigration was as an issue in the Referendum. Equally there is a paradox that areas where the immigrant population is highest, such as London were generally citadels of Remain, whilst areas with lower levels of immigrants were more worried about it. In a recent comparative study on assimilating immigrants in the UK and Netherlands, immigrants are seen to be more different when they fail to speak English as their first language at home, where they fail to have a community of English friends and where their points of socialisation differ from English social norms, for example, if they object to meeting in the pub.²³ Such opportunities to connect have not been helped in places where immigrant groups dominate specific urban areas. Geographic proximity reinforces human tendencies to focus on bonding with like people. For example, around 90% of people identified friendships as being within their own ethnicity.²⁴ Alike people tend to stick together thereby accentuating feelings of distinctness. Despite all the noise about immigrants threatening jobs, a recent study found little evidence of this for either of their sample occupations, a bricklayer or an IT worker. However, the importance of paying local tax was seen as important across the socio-economic spectrum with a slight bias towards lower socio-economic groups – suggesting some support that the more disadvantaged are more likely to brand immigrants as ‘welfare scroungers’.²⁵

The overall picture painted is rather surprising. Civic integration ranks over religion, which in turn ranks over economic considerations. A French immigrant is seen as preferable to a Chinese one who is preferable to a Polish one, but bottom of the pile sit African immigrants, followed by those from the Indian Subcontinent. Anti-Islam bias in a survey found 63% of respondents believe Arabs have not integrated into society, rising to 75% amongst the retired. Leave voters also felt migrant Arabs were not beneficial to the UK/Europe (61%) with less than 10% seeing them as a positive influence.²⁶ In contrast, 47% of Remain voters thought this group was beneficial to UK society. This impression is further reinforced when one compares the results of the European Social Survey in 2002 and 2014. The findings demonstrated a significant hardening of attitudes against non-EU immigration rather than immigration from poorer EU countries²⁷ although overall negative attitudes towards immigrants seem to have receded since 2017.²⁸

Whilst it is unclear how directly correlated the immigration narrative is to the Leave vote, there has been a discernible rise in race related hate crime since the Referendum. Such an increase can be conflated with some finger pointing (e.g. by the ‘left behind’ tribe) as they believe specific ethnic and racial groups are the reason why those born English cannot find good stable jobs and cannot afford secure housing.

Contrasting hate crime in London in the three months before the Referendum and the three months after, the Metropolitan Police²⁹ found a 30% increase in reported hate crimes with racist crimes showing the highest rise (34%). Concerns relating to this hate crime rise were later echoed by the United Nation’s Special Rapporteur on Racism.³⁰ Box 2 discusses how this rise in hate crime and the associated narrative reverberate from a previous dark age.

Box 2. Worrying Echoes from a Darker Age

English Exceptionalism is typified by feelings of greatness, a narrative that in extremis may assert that Great Britain is great because it is led by the English. Arguably in this paradigm the English are “Great” because they are the true inheritors of the Roman Empire. They are the children of the Chieftains of the Great Tribes that gave the world wonders such as Stonehenge who were subjugated to Roman customs that they then adopted and modified to grow a great ‘Anglosphere’ Civilisation.³¹ Notwithstanding, we are reminded that indigenous pre-Roman Britons contained a substantial group of people who did not share the classic white Anglo-Saxon genetic characteristics so often associated with being indigenous ‘English’.³²

This sense of ‘national exceptionalism’ has disturbing parallels in history. For example, the early Nazi obsession with castles and medieval ceremonies underpinned the Volksgemeinschaft or ‘people’s community’ of the Third Reich. In addition to much needed employment in a depressed country, the German castle and monument renovation programme of the early 1930s gave ‘icons of place’ a popular focus of expression of a ‘heroic Teutonic’ tradition.³³ These historic icons became inseparable with a symbolic bonding into a presumed heroic age of perceived ‘German Exceptionalism’.

Another parallel comes from some of the voting groups that supported the Nazi party. Analysis of pro-Nazi voting groups found that support was concentrated amongst the working poor (including self-employed and small shop keepers) and domestic workers and family members helping someone in the household together with middle class members with investment incomes and fixed salaries/pensions who had been especially impacted by the 1923 Weimar hyperinflation.³⁴ Explicitly, more than one study found that the unemployed and poor workers in Catholic areas where there was some form of social support were not in the main prime Nazi voters.

In summary, the Nazi regime came to power partly by legitimising itself in the context of historical greatness and partly through the support of those on fixed incomes or pensions, by the aspiring poor and those at home. How does this contrast with the UKIP and Leave support coming from the ‘at home’ and the aspiring lower middle class or left behind?

DO REMAIN SUPPORTERS HAVE A COLLECTIVE IDENTITY?

Remain supporters provide a striking contrast to Leave Voters. First, “Remainers” tend to be younger, better educated and working rather than retired. Surprisingly, a study of Labour Remain voter motivations, found that they held common views to Leave voters on issues such as immigration.³⁵ Arguably, “Remainers” are more persuaded by economic arguments, with data suggesting 95% of Remain voters were persuaded to vote Remain by the fear of economic damage.³⁶ The geographic distribution and demographics tell a story of younger people in more economically successful and cosmopolitan centres such as London and ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title Page
• Introduction
• 1 Motivation, Myth and Reality
• 2 Brexit Today: The Current State of Play
• 3 Brexit MK I AD 410
• 4 Brexit MK II The Road from Rome in the 1530’s
• 5 Brexit MK III Elizabeth I: The Pragmatic Problem Solver
• 6 The Global Innovation Economy
• 7 The Generational Divide
• 8 The Left Behind
• 9 International Dimensions
• 10 Popularism and the Internet
• 11 Which Brexit This Time?
• Appendix 1: The European Union Today
• Appendix 2: Could Subsidiarity Be ‘Praemunire’ in Sheep’s Clothing?
• Appendix 3: July 2018 Brexit White Paper
• Endnotes
• Glossary
• Bibliography
• Index