Local Politics in Jordan and Morocco

Strategies of Centralization and Decentralization

Janine A. Clark

• Publisher: Columbia University Press
• Year: 2018
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• eBook ISBN:
  9780231545013
• Subtopic: Comparative Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

In recent years, authoritarian states in the Middle East and North Africa have faced increasing international pressure to decentralize political power. Decentralization is presented as a panacea that will foster good governance and civil society, helping citizens procure basic services and fight corruption. Two of these states, Jordan and Morocco, are monarchies with elected parliaments and recent experiences of liberalization. Morocco began devolving certain responsibilities to municipal councils decades ago, while Jordan has consistently followed a path of greater centralization. Their experiences test such assumptions about the benefits of localism.

Janine A. Clark examines why Morocco decentralized while Jordan did not and evaluates the impact of their divergent paths, ultimately explaining how authoritarian regimes can use decentralization reforms to consolidate power. Local Politics in Jordan and Morocco argues that decentralization is a tactic authoritarian regimes employ based on their coalition strategies to expand their base of support and strengthen patron-client ties. Clark analyzes the opportunities that decentralization presents to local actors to pursue their interests and lays out how municipal-level figures find ways to use reforms to their advantage. In Morocco, decentralization has resulted not in greater political inclusivity or improved services, but rather in the entrenchment of pro-regime elites in power. The main Islamist political party has also taken advantage of these reforms. In Jordan, decentralization would undermine the networks that benefit elites and their supporters. Based on extensive fieldwork, Local Politics in Jordan and Morocco is an important contribution to Middle East studies and political science that challenges our understanding of authoritarian regimes' survival strategies and resilience.

Index

Page numbers refer to the print edition but are hyperlinked to the appropriate location in the e-book.

1976 Municipal Charter (Morocco): change needed, 138, 145; and electoral participation by nationalist parties, 59, 71–72, 76; and elite capture, 19–20, 38, 59, 132–33, 217–18, 279–80; intended to co-opt opposition parties, 20, 123, 130–31; municipal budgets expanded, 122; and municipal powers, 131, 147, 217; political parties’ response to, 130–33; presidents’ role and authority, 122. See also municipal charters (Morocco)

2002 Municipal Charter (Morocco), 122–23, 145; and civil society actors/CSOs, 76, 122–24, 147–48; and elite capture, 20, 25, 38; and municipal council makeup and operating rules, 234–35; and municipal responsibilities/authority, 151–53, 200, 202, 215; PJD and, 135–36, 152, 239, 241–42, 261–62 (see also PJD); revision of (2003), 21, 145; shortcomings of, 151–53, 198, 234, 303n20, 310n27. See also municipal charters (Morocco)

2009 Municipal Charter (Morocco): and civil society actors, 21, 76, 123–24, 153–54, 269–70, 274; council support of NGOs required, 232; and elite capture, 20–21, 38, 229–33; and equity and equal opportunities committees, 153, 202–4, 230, 232, 266, 269; impact on Chefchaouen, 269–70; and jurisdictional confusion, 209, 210; king’s image as reformer cemented by, 146; motivation and intention, 149, 154–55, 238; and municipal council stability, 235; and municipal responsibilities/authority, 153–55, 200, 202, 269; and PCDs (civic planning), 203, 231–32; PJD and, 135–36, 239, 241–42, 251, 261–62, 269–70, 273–75 (see also PJD); and presidents’ powers/authority, 215, 218; regional workshops in preparation for, 151–52, 310n27; secretary-general role strengthened, 312n77; shortcomings of, 154–55, 198–99, 207; and walis, 209. See also municipal charters (Morocco)

AACID (Agence Andalouse pour la Coopération Internationale et Développement), 265

Ababsa, Myriam, 78, 98–99, 103, 107, 298n34

Abdullah bin Husayn, king of Jordan, 41–44, 46, 48, 291n2. See also Jordanian monarchy

Abdullah II, king of Jordan: and decentralization reforms, 85–86, 286; economic reforms, 86–88 (see also Jordan: SAP and privatization); Jordan First campaign, 85–86, 300n54; National Agenda announced, 78, 86, 115, 300n54; patronage of, 185–91, 285, 287; and the “regions” plan, 115–17. See also Jordani...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Series List
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• Acknowledgments
• Introduction
• I. Coalition Building and the Social Relations That Support Authoritarian Regimes
• II. Centralization and “Decentralization” in Jordan
• III. Decentralization, Co-optation, and Regime Legitimation in Morocco
• IV. The Destabilizing Effects of Centralization
• V. Elite Capture and Regime Stabilization in Morocco
• VI. Morocco’s Opposition Party, the PJD
• Conclusion
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index