Joseph Conrad and the Fiction of Autobiography

Edward W. Said

• Publisher: Columbia University Press
• Year: 2008
• eBook ISBN: 9780231511544
• Topic: Literature
• Subtopic: European Literary Collections
• Index: Literature

Edward W. Said locates Joseph Conrad's fear of personal disintegration in his constant re-narration of the past. Using the author's personal letters as a guide to understanding his fiction, Said draws an important parallel between Conrad's view of his own life and the manner and form of his stories. The critic also argues that the author, who set his fiction in exotic locations like East Asia and Africa, projects political dimensions in his work that mirror a colonialist preoccupation with "civilizing" native peoples. Said then suggests that this dimension should be considered when reading all of Western literature. First published in 1966, Said's critique of the Western self's struggle with modernity signaled the beginnings of his groundbreaking work, Orientalism, and remains a cornerstone of postcolonial studies today.

Part One

Conrad’s Letters

Language surrounds each speaking subject, like an instrument with its own inertia, its own demands, constraints, and internal logic, and nevertheless remains open to the initiatives of the subject (as well as to the brute contributions of invasions, fashions, and historical events).

Merleau-Ponty, “The Metaphysical in Man”

I

The Claims of Individuality

ON November 1, 1906, having received an affectionately inscribed copy of The Mirror of the Sea from Conrad, Henry James wrote to his odd Anglo-Polish colleague: “No one has known—for intellectual use—the things you know, and you have as artist of the whole matter, an authority that no one has approached.”¹ Conrad could scarcely have wished for more eloquent tribute to the mastery with which, in the little book of sea sketches, he had consciously mediated claims of memory and artifice. The Mirror of the Sea, however, was an agreeable item fashioned by Conrad out of what James called “the prodigy of your past experience.” To the casual observer—which James was not—Conrad’s experience was largely a matter of ships and foreign ports, seas and storms: that, anyway, was what The Mirror of the Sea seemed to be about. Yet to Conrad, and to his fellow expatriate James speaking from a shared community of “afflicted existence,” experience was a spiritual struggle filling what Flaubert had called the long patience of artistic life. When in The Mirror Conrad covered his deeply felt experience with a surface that showed very little of what his life had really cost him, he was acting like Almayer, one of his characters, who in erasing his daughter’s footsteps in the sand was denying the pain she had caused him.

Even in the best of Conrad’s fiction there is very often a distracting surface of overrhetorical, melodramatic prose that critics like F. R. Leavis, sensitive to the precise and most efficient use of language, have severely disparaged. Yet it is not enough, I think, to criticize these imprecisions as the effusions of a writer calling attention to himself. On the contrary, Conrad was hiding himself within rhetoric, using it for his personal needs without considering the niceties of tone and style that later writers have wished he had had. He was a self-conscious foreigner writing of obscure experiences in an alien language, and he was only too aware of this. Thus his extravagant or chatty prose—when it is most noticeable—is the groping of an uncertain Anglo-Pole for the least awkward, most “stylistic” mode of expression. It is also the easiest way to conceal the embarrassments and the difficulties of an overwhelmingly untidy existence as a French-speaking, self-exiled, extremely articulate Pole, who had been a sailor and was now, for reasons not quite clear to him, a writer of so-called adventure stories. Conrad’s prose is not the unearned prolixity of a careless writer, but rather the concrete and particular result of his immense struggle with himself. If at times he is too adjectival, it is because he failed to find a better way of making his experience clear. That failure is, in his earliest works, the true theme of his fiction. He had failed, in the putting down of words, to rescue meaning from his undisciplined experience. Nor had he rescued himself from the difficulties of his life: this is why his letters, where all of these problems are explicitly treated, are necessary to a full understanding of his fiction.

Pain and intense effort are the profound keynotes of Conrad’s spiritual history, and his letters attest to this. There is good reason for recalling Newman’s impassioned reminder in the Apologia that any autobiographical document (and a letter is certainly that) is not only a chronicle of states of mind, but also an attempt to render the individual energy of one’s life. That energy has been urgently apparent, and pressing for attention ever since the publication in 1927 of Jean-Aubry’s Joseph Conrad, Life and Letters.

The abundant difficulties with which the letters teem are, nevertheless, the difficulties of Conrad’s spiritual life, so that critics are almost forced to associate the problems of his life with the problems of his fiction; the task here, different but related, is to see how the letters relate first to the man and then to his work. Each letter is an exercise of Conrad’s individuality as it connects his present with his past by forging a new link of self-awareness. Taken in their available entirety, Conrad’s letters present a slowly unfolding discovery of his mind, his temperament, his character—a discovery, in short, that is Conrad’s spiritual history as written by Conrad himself.

The accurate grasp of someone else’s deepest concerns is never an easy matter. But even in the case of a writer like Conrad, whose self-concern was so intense, it is possible to view his letters in the essential, even simple, terms of their internal disposition. To cite “pain” and “effort” as hallmarks of Conrad’s experience, for example, reveals little specifically of the man other than that he allowed himself repeated encounters with what caused pain and required effort. Yet there is a way of picturing Conrad in a characteristic and consistent stance or attitude of being, which enables us to perceive just what it was he was struggling against, and this way is to apply Richard Curle’s wise observation that Conrad “was absorbed … in the whole mechanism of existence.”² In these terms not only is it possible to apprehend the degree and kind of Conrad’s pain and effort, but one can also discover the immediate reasons for them. Granted, of course, that Curle’s phrase is perhaps unintentionally wise, and granted that the letters are informal and personal rather than formal or systematic, a peculiar kind of “absorption” is everywhere apparent in Conrad’s letters, particularly since the existence to which he was committed was so manifestly enduring in its trials. For Conrad’s absorption, as I understand it, was that he consciously felt a large measure of unrestful submission to the complexities of life, on the one hand and, on the other, that he remained interested in the submission not as a fait accompli but as a constantly renewed act of living, as a condition humanisée and not as a condition humaine. “The whole mechanism of existence” further explains Conrad’s preoccupations by allowing him the assumption that life itself was the total of a series of particular occurrences. Certain of these occurrences, and especially those concerning his own welfare, were connected and informed by a mechanical and perverse inevitability; nothing like cosmic optimism could be attributed to the structures of such events. He was, he felt, simply a man tortured by a finite number of intolerably fixed situations to which he seemed to return everlastingly, and this very fact had a curious pull on him. The dynamics of these persisting situations are what gripped Conrad almost from the beginning of his recorded writings to their end. And it is both the situations themselves and the way they unfold (their metaphorical expression) that the letters record in prodigious detail.

There is more to be said about this haunting phrase, “the whole mechanism of existence.” From Conrad’s point of view—for the phrase has sympathetic echoes in the letters—it is a statement about a certain kind of conscious psychology. At first sight it is reminiscent of eighteenth-century mechanistic psychology, say of Hartley’s theory of association and elementary determinism. To the contemporary mind, however, the phrase appeals easily to the commonplaces of the Freudian or Jungian psychologies, to the “mechanism” of the unconscious, to the complexes, myths, archetypes, and rituals in which each individual is somehow implicated. Yet, in his remarkable study, The Emotions: Outline of a Theory, Jean-Paul Sartre points up the inherent contradiction in a psychology confined to the unconscious. He writes there: “It is the profound contradiction of all psychoanalysis to introduce both a bond of causality and a bond of comprehension between the phenomena which it studies. These two types of connection are incompatible.”³ Sartre’s distinction between causality and comprehension is a useful way of remarking that an analysis of a hypothetical cause does not logically make the effect comprehensible. If the unconscious can be said ultimately to determine the conscious—and this point is not at issue—we are hardly closer to comprehending the conscious as it presents itself to us. The literary critic is, I think, most interested in comprehension, because the critical act is first of all an act of comprehension: a particular comprehension of the written work, and not of its origins in a general theory of the unconscious. Comprehension, furthermore, is a phenomenon of consciousness, and it is in the openness of the conscious mind that critic and writer meet to engage in the act of knowing and being aware of an experience. Only that engagement, made in the interests of literary and historical fidelity, can prevent Conrad’s remark “I am living a nightmare” from being accepted (or dismissed) as a hyperbolic effusion, instead of as an authentic and intense fact of experience.

As a writer, Conrad’s job was to make intellectual use of what he had known, and “use,” in this Jamesian employment of the term, means rendering, making overt. It would not, furthermore, be overinterpreting James’s compliment if I emphasize that Conrad recognized the difference between the rendering of personal experience for public consumption on one side and, on the other, for the eyes of a few close friends. Now it is precisely with this process of making experience overt and intelligible for the benefit of his intimates that Conrad’s letters, and consequently my discussion, are concerned. First of all we should investigate the idiom of Conrad’s rendering of his experience: the words and the images he chose to express himself. In philosophical terms, this study attempts a phenomenological exploration of Conrad’s consciousness, so that the kind of mind he had, both in its distinction and energy, will become apparent. The great value of the letters, therefore, is that they make such a study possible by disclosing the background of speculation and insight that strengthens the fiction.⁴

When “knowing” and “knowing for intellectual use” are spoken of in the same breath, when what is being described and the idiom of that description are taken together as an indissoluble unity, Conrad himself emerges from the letters as a significantly developing intellectual and spiritual reality. The mechanisms of existence he describes and his way of describing them are Conrad’s very own. At his most rhetorical (and surely in this the letters often surpass the works) there is a discoverable mind working habitually, though perhaps with less energy than usual. Far more often the flurries of “big” words he uses—such as life, the incomprehensible, the soul—carry with them the proud muscularity of the European tradition of empirical morality, for the important recurring touchstone here is Conrad’s sense of vécu: he has lived what he describes. Often he will bring the ceaseless activity of his mind to a kind of brief nervous stop, in much the same way that a man presenting a detailed argument stops because he needs to reflect, to take stock of what he has said. Then the movement of his thought resumes. Conrad saw in certain fiction, for example, the quality of an understated simplicity whose deeper recesses, like his own during those summary stops that fill the letters, cover a vital mechanism of lived knowledge. Yet he was bothered by the elegance of a rich narrative that went forward so smoothly and at the same time withheld its inner workings. No wonder that Maupassant was a discouraging master: “I am afraid I am too much under the influence of Maupassant. I have studied Pierre et Jean—thought, method, and everything—with the deepest discouragement. It seems to be nothing at all, but the mechanics are so complex that they make me tear out my hair. You want to weep with rage in reading it. That’s a fact!” (Poradowska, 84).

Despite the rhetoric, however, and the pauses it creates, to speak of Conrad’s spiritual and intellectual reality is also to recognize a long, remarkable continuity in his abiding concerns. For this continuity, eminently Conrad’s own, is precisely his emerging individuality, and this is the measure of his absorption in, and knowledge of, the mechanisms of existence. Conrad’s individuality resides in a continuous exposure of his sense of himself to a sense of what is not himself: he set himself, lumpish and problematic, against the dynamic, fluid processes of life. Because of this, then, the great human appeal and distinction of Conrad’s life is the dramatic spirit of partnership, however uneasy or indecorous, his life exemplifies, a partnership between himself and the external world. I am speaking of the full exposition of his soul to the vast panorama of existence it has discerned outside itself. He had the courage to risk a full confrontation with what, most of the time, seemed to him to be a threatening and unpleasant world. Moreover, the outcome of this dialectic is an experiencing of existential reality at that deepest level of alternative and potentiality which is the true life of the mind. Now the vocabulary and rhetoric of this experience (which I have called its idiom) is what the letters provide us with to such a degree that we are able to discover the contours of Conrad’s mind as it engages itself in a partnership with existence. For “exposure” of the mind and soul has its literary paradigm: it is a habitual verbal exercise (hence, idiom) whose purpose is to arbitrate the relations between a problematic subject and a dynamic object. The more distinguished a mind, the greater need there is that this habitual exercise be disciplined, regulated by serious and satisfying moral norms that derive from one’s personal experience. Basically, of course, I am equating distinction of mind with individuality of mind. There can be little doubt that Conrad had such a mind, and the problem of discipline is one that caused him deep concern as both man and artist.

All of this is, I think, as it should be. Because Conrad could, in his finest essay, praise James as the “historian of fine consciences” (VI.17) and acknowledge him as his master, Conrad himself had to know what it meant to write the history of conscience, to record the growth of the faculty that grants one a moral awareness of conduct. And where but in his own mind could his apprenticeship have taken place? For, he wrote in the James essay,

action in its essence, the creative art of a writer of fiction may be compared to rescue work carried out in darkness against cross gusts of wind swaying the action of a great multitude. It is rescue work, this snatching of vanishing phases of turbulence, disguised in fair words, out of the native obscurity into a light where the struggling forms may be seen, seized upon, endowed with the only possible form of permanence in this world of relative values—the permanence of memory. And the multitude feels it obscurely too; since the demand of the individual to the artist is, in effect, the cry, “Take me out of myself!” meaning really, out of my perishable activity … But everything is relative, and the light of consciousness is only enduring, merely the most enduring of the things of this earth, imperishable only as against the short-lived work of our industrious hands. (III.13)

It was the winning of a “sense of truth, of necessity—before all, of conduct,” for the characters of his fiction that the writer literally possessed his subject—the history of conscience. The task was even more difficult when the writer’s values themselves had to be rescued from a “native obscurity” too dark and confused for easy acceptance. The real adventure of Conrad’s life is the effort to rescue significance and value in their “struggling forms” from within his own existence. Just as he had to rescue his experience for the satisfaction of his consciousness, to believe that he had put down the important parts of the truth as he saw it, so also his critic has to relive that rescue, without heroism, alas, but with equal determination.

Conrad does not make the task easy, of course. His combination of evasion with a seemingly artless candor in his autobiographical pronouncements poses intricate problems for the student of his fiction. His bent for the revisional, sometimes petulant interpretation of his life needs, for the moment, only the briefest recall. There is one story told by R. L. Megroz concerning an interchange between Conrad and his wife: “On one of his naughty days he said that the Black Mate was his first work, and when I [Jessie] said ‘No, Almayer’s Folly was the first thing you ever did,’ he burst out: ‘If I like to say The Black Mate was my first work, I shall say so.’” ⁵ The often willful inaccuracy of Conrad’s memory about his works and life—of which this is almost certainly an example—is too persistent a habit to be glossed over. He chose to consider the facts of his life as an historian, according to Huizinga, considers his subject, as if the actual facts are not yet determined. Huizinga writes:

The historian … must always maintain towards his subject an indeterminist point of view. He must constantly put himself at a point in the past at which the known factors still seem to permit different outcomes. If he speaks of Salamis, then it must be as if the Persians might still win; if he speaks of the coup d’état of Brumaire, then it must remain to be seen if Bonaparte will be ignominiously repulsed. Only by continually recognizing that possibilities are unlimited can the historian do justice to the fulness of life.⁶

The link of self-awareness forged by Conrad in each letter (of which I spoke earlier) in reality describes the spiritual act of compre...

Table of contents

• Cover 
• Half title
• Title
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents 
• Foreword
• Preface
• List of Abbreviations
• Part One: Conrad’s Letters
• Part Two: Conrad’s Shorter Fiction
• Chronology, 1889–1924
• Letter to R. B. Cunninghame Graham, February 8, 1899
• Selected Bibliography
• Notes
• Index