Environmental Ethics, Ecological Theology, and Natural Selection

Suffering and Responsibility

Lisa Sideris

• Publisher: Columbia University Press
• Year: 2003
• eBook ISBN: 9780231529495
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Ecology

In the last few decades, religious and secular thinkers have tackled the world's escalating environmental crisis by attempting to develop an ecological ethic that is both scientifically accurate and free of human-centered preconceptions. This groundbreaking study shows that many of these environmental ethicists continue to model their positions on romantic, pre-Darwinian concepts that disregard the predatory and cruelly competitive realities of the natural world. Examining the work of such influential thinkers as James Gustafson, Sallie McFague, Rosemary Radford Ruether, John Cobb, Peter Singer, and Holmes Rolston, Sideris proposes a more realistic ethic that combines evolutionary theory with theological insight, advocates a minimally interventionist stance toward nature, and values the processes over the products of the natural world.

CHAPTER 1

This View of Life

The Significance of Evolutionary Theory for Environmental Ethics

Nothing is easier to admit in words than the truth of the universal struggle for life, or more difficult—at least I have found it so—than constantly to bear this conclusion in mind. Yet unless it be thoroughly engrained in the mind, the whole economy of nature, with every fact on distribution, rarity, abundance, extinction, and variation, will be dimly seen or quite misunderstood.

—Charles Darwin, The Origin of Species

Evolutionary biologist Stephen Jay Gould has written that the “stumbling block” to widespread acceptance of Darwinism lies less in comprehending the scientific details of the theory than it does in the radical message of Darwinian science, namely, “its challenge to a set of entrenched Western attitudes that we are not yet ready to abandon.”¹ What exactly is this message? A significant part of it consists in the revelation that humans are not the center of creation—a message that is as simple as it is difficult to grasp. Another disturbing feature of the Darwinian message is that nature operates according to processes that seem wasteful and cruel, mechanisms that cannot easily be attributed to a benevolent creator, that defy explanation in terms of intelligent design.² Struggle and suffering are integral to evolution by natural selection—a point that even Darwin found difficult to keep firmly in mind.

The lack of design in nature is a favorite theme of some evolutionary biologists: the best evidence for evolution is not the perfectly formed eye or wing but the parts that are useless, odd, clumsy, and incongruous, such as rudimentary organs that serve no present function. Perfect adaptation is a better argument for creationism than evolution, which takes the circuitous route to adaptation, imperfectly modifying the existing parts and leaving in its path the “senseless signs of history” that are the hallmark of natural selection.³

Darwin’s theory suggests a distinctive perspective on the world. There are elements of Darwinism that many people have perceived to be disconcerting, both today and in Darwin’s time. Yet his theory also laid the groundwork for a number of positive contributions to our view of life and, especially, to our understanding and appreciation of nature and animals. Both the positive and negative dimensions of Darwinism are important for environmental ethics, yet both have been largely ignored or misunderstood by many ecological theologians.

The neglect of evolution appears to be unintentional; ecological theology has attempted, at least since the late 1960s and seventies, to find common ground between evolutionary perspectives and Christian theology. Nevertheless, much of ecological theology holds to an understanding of nature that resembles pre- and non-Darwinian views: often, what I will describe as the darker side of Darwin’s theory is downplayed or omitted, and the resulting environmental ethic is inconsistent with well-established knowledge about the natural world. As we will see, ecological theology tends to give priority to the concept of ecology—and a particular interpretation of ecology—rather than evolution. The ecological model frequently shuts out important elements of evolutionary processes, especially those that seem to contradict or otherwise detract from the ethic ecotheologians seek to derive from nature. This neglect of evolution, and the preference for the term ecology, is common in environmental ethics as a whole.

Before turning to a discussion of these two competing paradigms of evolution and ecology, some preliminary points must first be clarified: first, what sorts of ethical considerations are included within the scope of environmental ethics? How broadly is this term to be understood? Second, how do contemporary biologists define “Darwinian” evolution and what are some of the points of disagreement among prominent evolutionary biologists?

“ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS”

The category environmental ethics suggests a more coherent and systematic set of issues than is actually the case within the field. In reality, the term covers a wide range of issues that may or may not deserve to be treated as a whole, depending on whom you ask. Environmental ethics usually includes such topics as wildlife management, concerns over deforestation, global warming, loss of biodiversity, overpopulation, and, in some cases, the treatment of farm and laboratory animals (i.e., “nonwild” animals). Humans are often depicted as both perpetrators and the victims of environmental degradation. Many environmental ethicists believe that certain sectors of the human population—especially minorities and women—suffer, along with nature, at the hands of traditionally powerful and privileged classes of people. Thus calls for social justice and environmental healing are issued in tandem by ecofeminists and others who seek to eradicate deeply entrenched structures of oppression and environmental discrimination.

Moreover, many authors address environmental problems from the standpoint of religion; indeed, the environmental crisis is to some essentially a religious issue. Many ecological theologians fall within this category. Others, most notably Lynn White, have placed the blame for environmental destruction squarely on the shoulders of religion. Whether or not White’s characterization of Christianity as the most anthropocentric and environmentally destructive religion in the world is accurate, it is true that his criticisms forced many Christians to take a closer look at their assumptions about nature.⁴

Probably one of the clearest lines of disagreement within environmental ethics is drawn between those who include the moral status and suffering of individual, nonwild (domesticated, farm, and laboratory) animals within the province of environmental ethics and those who favor a more holistic and ecocentric perspective.⁵ For instance, there is often a sharp division between animal activists who focus on the rights or liberation of individual animals and the more ecologically oriented approaches that aim at the preservation of a larger whole, such as a species or an ecosystem. In wildlife management the integrity of an ecosystem may be given priority over the welfare of individual animals. Indeed, overrepresented animals are sometimes killed for the perceived greater good of the ecosystem, or in order to sustain the remaining members of a threatened species. To many animal activists such action may appear cruel and senseless, while to holistic environmentalists the focus of some animal advocates on the suffering of individual animals seems misguided and sentimental. The tensions between some animal activists and holistic environmentalists are heightened by the almost exclusive focus of the former on the issue of animal pain and oppression. Holistic environmentalists point out that pain is not only necessary but even beneficial to the continuing survival and evolution of animal species. Due to their skepticism that a neo-Benthamite ethic revolving around the eradication of animal pain can be extended to wild animals, some environmentalists have denied that the animal rights agenda should in any way be considered a topic for environmental ethics.⁶ The split between an ecological ethic and an animal rights position has yet to be completely bridged.

Despite what I think are good arguments for the exclusion of animal rights and liberation from an environmentalist agenda, I will for the sake of argument assume that both holistic and individualist approaches legitimately fall under the heading of environmental ethics.⁷ As I will argue in detail at a later point, it is generally inappropriate to extend the same ethic to both wild and nonwild animals. Furthermore, I believe there is considerable confusion in the environmental literature—both secular and religious—surrounding the issue of animal pain as an evil to be eradicated, wherever and however it occurs. However, for now, I will assume that the plight of domesticated animals makes up one subset of environmental issues. In short, in the arguments that follow I will use the term environmental ethics to denote ethical arguments regarding sentient beings—both wild and nonwild animals—as well as the ethics for nonsentient nature such as “land ethics.”

Amid the diversity of opinions surrounding the definition of environmental ethics, we encounter a set of recurring themes and perennial debates. Chief among these: To what extent are humans really part of nature? Should environmental ethics be ecocentric or anthropocentric (or both at once)? Does an environmental ethic that elevates the moral status of animals dislodge traditional morality and, if so, does it threaten to devalue human life? Or are there already resources within inherited theological and ethical perspectives from which we can fashion an environmental ethic? Many of the fundamental challenges posed by the enterprise of environmental ethics—questions about the role of humans in nature and the limitations of traditional religion and morality—intersect those raised by an evolutionary perspective. We will return to this cluster of complex issues frequently in the arguments that follow. But first we must consider the question of what constitutes an “evolutionary perspective” and examine some of the issues about which “Darwinists” disagree.

EVOLUTION WARS

Throughout this work I often refer to Darwinism or evolutionary theory as the dominant paradigm for understanding the natural world and human-animal relationships. In reality, however, there is no single, undisputed definition of these terms; many who consider themselves Darwinists disagree about the details of evolutionary processes. In order to understand current debates among biologists regarding these details, it is important to keep in mind that Darwin himself had no viable account of the mechanisms of inheritance. Only relatively recently, when the theory of natural selection was synthesized with Mendel’s research on genes (in the 1940s), did the bigger picture of evolution by natural selection begin to take shape. By the mid-twentieth century the “modern synthesis” in biology had successfully incorporated Mendelian genetics and Darwinian natural selection; the resulting theory became known as neo-Darwinism. Debates continue to this day regarding such topics as the role of genes in evolution, the rate at which evolution occurs, the significance of the selection process in producing new forms, and the moral implications of evolutionary theory for human society. Much of this discussion has taken place among several prominent biologists, many of them affiliated with Harvard University, including Stephen Jay Gould, Richard Lewontin, Richard Levins, Edward O. Wilson, and British biologist Richard Dawkins.

Let us look first at the issue of rates and patterns in evolutionary processes. Stephen Jay Gould notes that the “gradualist” account (evolution by slow, steady change), which has been the conventional interpretation, may not be entirely accurate. Much of Gould’s work is critical of what he calls “extrapolationism” in evolutionary biology.⁸ Extrapolationism, in Gould’s view, is the fallacy of making assumptions about the overall history of life (that is, evolution on a very large scale) based on shorter-term, local changes within species. Gould argues that biologists erroneously assume that large-scale evolutionary change is simply the cumulative result of local, minor changes. In place of gradualism Gould (along with Niles Eldredge) has proposed a theory of “punctuated equilibrium” that posits evolution by fits and starts, periods of rapid speciation followed by times of relative stasis. Evolutionary stasis does not mean that no change whatsoever takes place between one generation and the next. Rather, these small changes are expressed as minor deviations from and fluctuations around a “phenotypic mean.”⁹ For example, climatic changes may increase selection pressure for a particular beak size or shape, but ultimately, over long stretches of time, the change is transient and nondirectional (not leading to a new species, for instance). These small-scale, local deviations can be extrapolated (within reason) to large-scale relative stasis that is reflected in the fossil record. But while the explanatory move from local to large-scale seems valid enough with regard to static periods, such extrapolation is questionable for the process of speciation (evolution during periods of nonstasis). Gould denies that microevolutionary Darwinism operating at the level of individuals within populations can account for the more dramatic, macroevolutionary changes that have occurred in the history of life.¹⁰

Apparent gaps in the fossil record may be more consistent with Gould’s theory of evolution than they are with gradualism, which has more difficulty accounting for intermediate, “transitional” forms. Owing to Gould’s attention to such gaps, he has often been an unwitting tool in creationist attempts to dismantle evolutionary theory. Because Gould appears to be “admitting” that evolutionary biology is in trouble—that the gaps in the fossil record are real, prevalent, and problematic for the dominant paradigm of gradual Darwinian evolution—his work is (mistakenly) interpreted by some as bolstering an antievolutionary agenda. Of course, in Gould’s view the gaps are not necessarily gaps or missing links at all; rather, they reflect the reality of periods of relative inactivity in evolution. Moreover, the “rapid” changes that Gould attempts to explain are rapid in geological terms. His views support neither a young earth account of life nor a belief in the sudden creation of distinct, fully formed species.

Other contemporary debates have to do with currents in sociobiology and disagreements regarding the unit of natural selection. While Gould understands natural selection as a process taking place among whole organisms or groups of organisms such as species (a process known as “species selection” or “species sorting”), some biologists, including Richard Dawkins (The Selfish Gene) argue that genes and gene lineages are themselves engaged in evolutionary competition. In Dawkins’s account, genes, rather than organisms, are fit or unfit; strong selection pressures are exerted on genes primarily and on their bearers secondarily. Of course, Dawkins and Gould agree that evolutionary change and genetic change are related. What they disagree about is how simple and straightforward that relationship is. Some biologists understand Dawkins to endorse an overly simplistic, direct, deterministic relationship between genes and traits; genes, and gene expression, they insist, are multifaceted and thus the relationship is far more complex than Dawkins concedes. But from the standpoint of gene-centered evolutionists such as Dawkins and E. O. Wilson (discussed in more detail below), the critics have both exaggerated the amount of complexity in the gene-trait relationship, and misrepresented their views as overly deterministic.¹¹

In light of disagreements about the role of the gene as the unit of selection, it is clear why biologists also debate the importance or unimportance of ...

Table of contents

• Cover 
• Half title
• Series Page
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents 
• Acknowledgments
• Introduction
• Chapter 1. This View of Life: The Significance of Evolutionary Theory for Environmental Ethics
• Chapter 2. The Best of All Possible Worlds: Ecofeminist Views of Nature and Ethics
• Chapter 3. The Ecological Model and the Reanimation of Nature
• Chapter 4. Darwinian Equality for All: Secular Views of Animal Rights and Liberation
• Chapter 5. Philosophical and Theological Critiques of Ecological Theology: Broadening Environmental Ethics from Ecocentric and Theocentric Perspectives
• Chapter 6. A Comprehensive Naturalized Ethic
• Conclusion: Finitude and Responsibility
• Notes
• Works Cited
• Index