The European Union and North Africa

Prospects and Challenges

Adel Abdel Ghafar

• Publisher: Brookings Institution Press
• Year: 2019
• Print ISBN: 9780815736950
• eBook ISBN: 9780815736967
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: African Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

How Europe can hit the "reset" button after years of failed responses to North African turmoil
The ongoing upheaval in North Africa has presented many challenges to Europe, which previously had been comfortable with the status quo of authoritarian leadership in much of the region. Now in its ninth year, the turmoil has forced European leaders to rethink their approaches to the region, based on the now-obvious reality that the brief hopes of early 2011 for the spread of democracy and economic progress will not be fulfilled anytime soon.
In this book, experts from Europe, the United States, and the Middle East discuss what has happened since the so-called "Arab Spring" emerged and how those often-bewildering events have affected both North Africa and the European states across the Mediterranean. The book is based on papers presented at a March 2018 conference sponsored by the South Mediterranean Regional Program of the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung. Chapters focus on events in Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia—and offer ideas for how the European Union can adopt fresh approaches to the region, moving beyond its frequently uncertain and shifting responses of recent years.

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INTRODUCTION

EU–North Africa Relations in an Age of Turbulence

ADEL ABDEL GHAFAR
ANNA JACOBS

The 2010–11 uprisings in North Africa have challenged the European Union’s traditional stability-driven approach to the region. EU policymakers have been attempting to deal with the changes and turmoil that have been unfolding on the other side of the Mediterranean since mass protests began in late 2010. After years of supporting incumbent authoritarian leaders, notably Zine El Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia, Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, and Muammar Qaddafi in Libya, the EU reassessed its approach and began supporting the nascent transition unfolding in each of the countries. In Morocco, the EU welcomed the constitutional reforms instituted by King Mohammed VI, which culminated in that country’s 2011 constitution, ostensibly offering more shared power between the monarchy and the head of government. The 2011 uprisings did not fully materialize in Algeria, which had gone through its own political opening and series of protests in 1988, leading to the election of Islamist factions, a military coup to regain control, and a subsequent civil war. While the EU’s approach to Algeria did not significantly change after 2011, the large protest movements in the other four countries—Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt—pushed the EU to support civil society, democratization, and the rule of law.

Eight years after the uprisings shook North Africa, much of the region remains in flux. A combination of economic and security challenges has meant that much of the aspirations of the millions of people who took to the streets have not been realized. While each protest movement had its unique set of demands, depending on the national context, they all shared common themes. These included ensuring greater job opportunities and inclusive economic growth, an end to high-level corruption, and the implementation of democratic reforms. The ongoing civil war in Libya has created a multitude of security challenges, including irregular migration and the Islamic State establishing a foothold in the country. The uprising in Libya was met with Qaddafi’s iron fist, and some of the opposition turned violent. The presence of various armed factions and the subsequent power vacuum that ensued after Qaddafi’s death opened the door to radical groups. In Egypt, the 2013 coup by the military set the country’s politics back to pre-2011 conditions, and the country has seen a resurgence in authoritarianism.

On the economic front, substantial challenges remain. As the World Bank has highlighted, although North African countries have made macroeconomic progress since 2011, people in the region continue to feel frustrated over falling standards of living, the lack of government accountability, corruption, and increasingly higher rates of unemployment.1 The lack of inclusive economic growth, combined with demographic pressures and the lack of formal avenues for political participation, is expected to have a continued impact on the security and stability of North African states.

In light of ongoing challenges in the region, the EU has been forced to rethink its approach to North Africa. According to the 2015 review of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) conducted by the EU Commission and the European External Action Service, “Differentiation and greater mutual ownership will be the hallmark of the new ENP, recognizing that not all partners aspire to EU rules and standards, and reflecting the wishes of each country concerning the nature and focus of its partnership with the EU.” This differentiation will be key to the EU–North African relationship in coming years as the EU seeks to recalibrate its approach to countries bordering the southern Mediterranean and North African leaders seek to continue to develop their relationship with Europe.

THE EVOLUTION OF EU FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD NORTH AFRICA

EU foreign policy with respect to the states of the southern Mediterranean in the last quarter century has gone through three major phases, shaped in turn by the end of the Cold War era, the transformation of certain neighboring countries into democracies, and the transition from the European Economic Community to the European Union in the 1990s. The EU exhibited unprecedented levels of economic integration and political cooperation, but one of the key challenges facing this regional bloc was the formation of a comprehensive foreign policy and security strategy. This is especially true with respect to the EU’s immediate neighborhood, to the east and to the south.

Regarding the countries of North Africa, key EU member states such as France, Spain, and Italy maintained enormous influence in the postcolonial period, but the EU as an institution had difficulty developing a comprehensive policy toward the southern Mediterranean region. Steady migration flows between Europe and North Africa were a major feature of the Mediterranean region throughout the twentieth century, and the two regions have maintained political, economic, social, and cultural connections for centuries.

Phase I: Pre-2011

The first major multilateral framework that governed relations between the EU and North Africa began in 1995 in what became known as the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Initiative (EMPI), or the Barcelona Process. Trade relations were the backbone of this strategy, even though the Barcelona Process additionally highlighted “partnerships in political and security affairs; economic and financial affairs; and social, cultural, and human affairs.”2 The North African states signed association agreements under this framework to secure aid and implement free trade agreements, even though these free trade agreements suffered from blatant imbalances, and countries such as Algeria remained hesitant for several years to sign them because of the privileging of European industry over North African agriculture and the political conditions attached to the agreements.3

As the EU was attempting to formalize and harmonize its political and economic strategy in the Mediterranean region in the 1990s, a bloody civil war raged on in Algeria and threatened to spread to neighboring countries. This decadelong battle against a violent insurgency of Islamic militants, as well as the attacks that occurred in Europe before 2001, heightened fears about terrorism both in Europe and on its borders. The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States increased the intensity of these concerns. Other issues, such as promoting democratic reforms, began to take a back seat to security in EU–North Africa relations. Europe increasingly saw the authoritarian regimes of North Africa as allies in the fight against global terrorism, and the autocratic leaders of Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Libya, and Egypt were quick to embrace this role, as it meant less overt criticism of human rights violations and less talk of democratic reforms.

The EU’s 2003 European Security Strategy, the principal document laying out the EU’s foreign policy approach, further outlined the priorities of the new union with respect to its regional neighbors. Overall, the strategy reveals a focus on the EU’s normative power, engagement, and enlargement. Increasing security in the Mediterranean region was listed as one of the principal strategic objectives, along with addressing threats and supporting a global order based on multilateral action:

The Mediterranean area generally continues to undergo serious problems of economic stagnation, social unrest and unresolved conflicts. The European Union’s interests require a continued engagement with Mediterranean partners, through more effective economic, security and cultural cooperation in the framework of the Barcelona Process. A broader engagement with the Arab World should also be considered.4

The 2003 EU Security Strategy laid out an ambitious, normative agenda that encompassed “spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, [and] establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights,” and the policy highlighted the necessity of a “more active, more capable, and more coherent” European Union.5 This emphasis on normative engagement and more active cooperation with neighboring regions was coupled with the largely economic nature of engagement conducted through the Barcelona Process. Furthermore, as Gerrard Quille describes in his comparative study of the 2003 EU Security Strategy and the U.S. National Security Strategy, the former espoused a multilateral framework for addressing security concerns, a strategy rooted in international law. In contrast, the U.S. National Security Strategy emphasized the concepts of preemptive action and unilateralism.6 Altogether, Europe’s foreign policy vision in 2003 stressed a strong commitment to normative engagement based on democratic values and human rights, a heavy emphasis on trade, and an increasingly crucial focus on security threats from terrorist groups.

In 2004, ten new member states joined the EU, and two more were granted membership in 2007.7 The continuing enlargement of this regional bloc, coupled with the failures of the 1995 Barcelona Process, a foreign policy framework that was heavy on rhetoric and weak on action, led to a new initiative that would govern Europe’s relations with North African countries.8 Known as the European Neighborhood Policy, the new policy was proposed in a communiqué in 2003. Its aim was to “create a ring of friendly, stable and prosperous countries around the European Union in order to guarantee stability along the outer borders of the EU.”9 However, rather than replace the Barcelona Process, the ENP framework would be added to the policies already in place until 2006. The new framework would start in the 2007–13 period but would still include “previous policies.”10

The creation of “Action Plans,” or reform packages negotiated between the European Commission and each individual state, was a major aspect of the new ENP. The idea was that if the Action Plans were met, the EU would offer remuneration in the form of closer engagement, economic deals, and aid packages. The plans included such elements as greater foreign investment, free trade agreements, more migration mobility, counterterrorism measures, governance and human rights reforms, education and poverty alleviation programs, and others.11 However, they suffered from a lack of consistency, organization, and implementation.

Furthermore, the EU was keen to maintain the notion of complementary frameworks, rather than replacing an older and perhaps less efficacious framework with a new one. Nonetheless, as Michael Willis has pointed out, there were two significant differences between the Barcelona Process and the ENP:

Firstly, the multilateral approach of the Barcelona Process was replaced by a much more bilateral approach, with every country able to negotiate its own set of relations with the EU. Secondly, the “positive conditionality” of the Action Plans meant that progress would be rewarded with closer cooperation, but there would be no sanction for states that did not make progress or which undid reforms.12

In the years leading up to the 2011 uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region,13 EU policy toward the countries of North Africa increasingly focused on migration and terrorism concerns, with less emphasis on democratization, human rights, and the rule of law. In the post-9/11 world, as concerns over global terrorism grew, counterterrorism allies in the MENA region become ever more valuable. EU and U.S. policy began to coalesce around similar priorities, which became more and more amenable to working with authoritarian regimes and tamping down criticism of human rights violations.

The logic underlying this strategy was a belief that authoritari...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• Acknowledgments
• Foreword
• 1. Introduction: EU–North Africa Relations in an Age of Turbulence
• 2. Algeria: The EU’s Real Partner or a “Tough Suburb of a Prosperous EU Metropolis”?
• 3. EU-Morocco Relations: Finding a New Balance
• 4. Tunisia and the EU: Too Close, Too Far
• 5. Libya-EU Relations: Prospects and Challenges
• 6. EU-Egypt Relations: The Delicate Balance of Economic, Security, and Political Interests
• 7. Conclusion
• Contributors
• Index