Abuse Of Power

Stanley Kutler

• Publisher: Free Press
• Year: 1999
• Print ISBN: 9780684851877
• eBook ISBN: 9780684864891
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: North American History
• Index: History

Using thousands of hours of previously concealed tapes, a stunning revelation into the infamous Nixon White House and how far the administration went to cover up the abuse of power. Richard Nixon said he wanted his administration to be "the best chronicled in history." But when Alexander Butterfield disclosed the existence of a voice-activated taping system to a Senate committee in July 1973, Nixon's White House and its recordings quickly became the most infamous in American history. But only sixty hours were actually made public in the 1970s. Thousands of hours remained secret and in Nixon's hands, and he fought fiercely to keep them that way right up to his death. Finally, thanks to a lawsuit brought by historian Stanley I. Kutler, the Nixon estate and the National Archives have brought over three thousand hours of tapes to light.The tapes reveal an extensive cover-up beyond what was previously understood. The recordings, ranging from campaign tactics to controversial discussions, redefine the meaning of power abuse within Nixon's administration and his ultimate demise. A spy planted in Ted Kennedy's Secret Service detail, Nixon's continual insistence on paying the burglars, and talks about a substantial campaign fund showcase the true depth of the cover-up efforts.Packed with revelations on almost every page, Abuse of Power offers a spellbinding portrait of raw power and a Shakespearean depiction of a king and his court. Never have the personalities of Haldeman, Ehrlichman, Colson, Haig, Kissinger, Dean, and Mitchell been so vividly captured. And never has an American President offered such a revealing record of his darkest self.

PART ONE

THE PENTAGON PAPERS
AND OTHER “WHITE
HOUSE HORRORS”

JUNE 1971 – JUNE 1972

The taping system was installed in the Oval Office in February 1971, and then in other parts of the White House, and the telephone system in April. We have a few “abuse of power” conversations for May, but after June, they significantly increase in number.

On Sunday morning, June 13, 1971, the New York Times featured front-page coverage of Tricia Nixon’s Rose Garden wedding of the day before. The front page also prominently displayed a first installment of the “Pentagon Papers,” a classified 7,000-page document commissioned by former Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara. Daniel Ellsberg, a disillusioned national security intellectual and official, now a prominent antiwar activist, had leaked the papers to the newspaper. The study traced the origins and progress of the Vietnam War, and threw considerable light on the difference between public knowledge of events and the government’s actual conduct of the war. By 1971, the papers offered not only historical lessons for the foreign policy and military establishments, but also political opportunities for future administrations. Melvin Laird, Nixon’s Defense Secretary, told the President that 98 percent of the documents could be declassified, but the President in a note insisted that “the era of negotiations can’t succeed w/o secrecy.”

The Pentagon Papers involved the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, and some Nixon aides have claimed that the President initially was inclined to let his opponents suffer embarrassment. According to this line, Henry Kissinger sparked Nixon’s anger and spurred him to various repressive actions, including a court test. Nixon, however, regarded unauthorized leaks of internal government papers as a personal affront to his notions of presidential authority; as the following conversations indicate, he did not need others to prod him into lashing out at his “enemies.” Leaks had upset the President quite a number of times, and have to be understood in the context of other incidents, including the Administration’s so-called “tilt” to Pakistan in late 1971, information about SALT negotiations, the bombing in Cambodia, and the Paris peace talks with North Vietnam. For his efforts, Ellsberg won a featured place in Nixon’s pantheon of demons, alongside such luminaries as the Kennedys and Lawrence O’Brien, as conversations over the next two years indicated.

The Pentagon Papers incident brought forth the creation of the Special Investigative Unit, more familiarly known as the “Plumbers.” This group engaged in numerous illegal activities for the Administration, the most notorious being the break-in at the offices of Daniel Ellsberg’s psychiatrist. Nixon and his aides to the end justified the action as a “national security” necessity when, in truth, the action was devised to secure unfavorable information about Ellsberg.

These conversations for the year preceding the Watergate break-in also include the President’s ongoing concern with using the Internal Revenue Service for his political and personal purposes. Other conversations show the President’s involvement in various schemes to advance his re-election bid and to undermine the candidacy of others, especially Senators Edmund Muskie and Edward Kennedy. At this time, the President already is familiar with E. Howard Hunt and John Dean, persons who will have important ties to him in the future.

JUNE 17, 1971: THE PRESIDENT, HALDEMAN, EHRLICHMAN, AND KISSINGER, 5:17–6:13 P.M., OVAL OFFICE

A few days after the publication of the Pentagon Papers, Nixon discusses how toexploit the situation for his advantage. He is interested in embarrassing the Johnson Administration on the bombing halt, for example. Here, he wants a break-in atthe Brookings Institution, a centrist Washington think tank, to find classified documents that might be in the Brookings safe.

HALDEMAN: You maybe can blackmail [Lyndon B.] Johnson on this stuff [Pentagon Papers].

PRESIDENT NIXON: What?

HALDEMAN: You can blackmail Johnson on this stuff and it might be worth doing. . . . The bombing halt stuff is all in that same file or in some of the same hands. . . .

PRESIDENT NIXON: Do we have it? I’ve asked for it. You said you didn’t have it.

HALDEMAN: We can’t find it.

KISSINGER: We have nothing here, Mr. President.

PRESIDENT NIXON: Well, damnit, I asked for that because I need it.

KISSINGER: But Bob and I have been trying to put the damn thing together.

HALDEMAN: We have a basic history in constructing our own, but there is a file on it.

PRESIDENT NIXON: Where?

HALDEMAN: [Presidential aide Tom Charles] Huston swears to God there’s a file on it and it’s at Brookings [Institution, a centrist Washington “think tank”].

PRESIDENT NIXON: . . . Bob? Bob? Now do you remember Huston’s plan [for White House–sponsored break-ins as part of domestic counter-intelligence operations]? Implement it.

KISSINGER: . . . Now Brookings has no right to have classified documents.

PRESIDENT NIXON: . . . I want it implemented. . . . Goddamnit, get in and get those files. Blow the safe and get it.

HALDEMAN: They may very well have cleaned them by now, but this thing, you need to—

KISSINGER: I wouldn’t be surprised if Brookings had the files.

HALDEMAN: My point is Johnson knows that those files are around. He doesn’t know for sure that we don’t have them around.

JUNE 23, 1971: THE PRESIDENT AND HALDEMAN, 11:39 A.M.–12:45 P.M., OVAL OFFICE

Nixon and Colson consider infiltrating one of the peace groups. Then, the President and his Chief of Staff discuss old-fashioned, but proven, fundraisingmethods.

SEGMENT 1

HALDEMAN: One of the best breaks is if this peace group or antiwar—can be infiltrated, can be shown to be a radical revolutionary group and they’re taking stolen top secret documents and peddling them around. That shifts the whole focus of the case.

PRESIDENT NIXON: Can you get at that?

HALDEMAN: Yes, sir. We’re working this—

SEGMENT 2

PRESIDENT NIXON: Oh, I’ve got to tell you one thing. Ambassador to Brussels, that hasn’t been promised to anybody, has it?

HALDEMAN: No.

PRESIDENT NIXON: Bebe [Charles Rebozo] says Winston Guest. He’s the former ambassador to Ireland with Kennedy. He says he believes—he says—

HALDEMAN: Raymond Guest.

PRESIDENT NIXON: Raymond, Ambassador Raymond Guest will give a half a million or what do you suppose he wants to hear about that? Well, anyway, I’m sure that he’s talking about a quarter of a million at least because he gave 100,000 last time out in ’65. . . . Now, he can be the ambassador to Brussels. Find out when [John] Eisenhower leaves. He’s fine. His wife speaks French. . . . [M]y point is that anybody that wants to be an ambassador, wants to pay at least $250,000.

HALDEMAN: I think any contributor under 100,000 we shouldn’t consider for any kind of thing except just some nice—

PRESIDENT NIXO...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Contents
• Editorial Note
• Cast of Characters
• INTRODUCTION
• PART ONE
• PART TWO
• PART THREE
• PART FOUR
• EPILOGUE
• Acknowledgments