Buddhist Ethics

Hammalawa Saddhatissa

• Publisher: Wisdom Publications
• Year: 2016
• ISBN:
  9780861718078
• Topic: Theologie & Religion
• Subtopic: Buddhismus

"For more than a quarter of a century, those in search of an introduction to Buddhist moral thought have turned and returned to this little volume..." Thus notes Charles Hallisey of Harvard University in his introduction. Starting with an examination of classical Greek notions of ethics, Venerable Saddhatissa goes on to explain the development of Buddhist moral codes and their practical application. In this work, Venerable Saddhatissa starts with an examination of Western notions of ethics, beginning with the early Greek philosophers and moving on to show us how the study of morality is crucial to a clear understanding of the Buddhist tradition. Drawing on a vast array of Buddhist scriptures, Venerable Saddhatissa explains the development and position of Buddhist precepts from a traditional perspective, while simultaneously offering clear and practical advice on how best to live the moral life of a lay Buddhist practitioner. Throughout Buddhist Ethics, Venerable Saddhatissa always keeps us in touch with the pragmatic uses of Buddhist moral practices, not only as a way to live in harmony with the world, but as an indispensable aspect of the path to the Buddhist's highest spiritual goal.

1

DEFINITIONS AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

SCOPE OF THE STUDY OF ETHICS

THE TERM ETHICS derives from the Greek ethikos, that which pertains to ethos, or character. It is also called “moral philosophy” from the Latin custom. Popularly, ethics is described as “the science treating of morals”⁵ but since precise definition of the term is lacking it is necessary to state the ground that a consideration of ethics is intended to cover. G. E. Moore, in his Principia Ethica, refusing to take as adequate a definition of ethics as dealing with “the question of what is good or bad in human conduct,” declares: “I may say that I intend to use ‘ethics’ to cover more than this — a usage for which there is, I think, quite sufficient authority. I am using it to cover the general inquiry into what is good.”⁶

A more detailed description is given by Rev. H. H. Williams: “In its widest sense, the term ‘ethics’ would imply an examination into the general character and habits of mankind, and would even involve a description or history of the habits of men in particular societies living at different periods of time.” Observing the exceptionally wide field that would be so covered, the author concludes: “Ethics then is usually confined to the particular field of human character and conduct so far as they depend upon or exhibit certain general principles commonly known as moral principles. Men in general characterize their own conduct and character and that of other men by such general adjectives as good, bad, right, and wrong, and it is the meaning and scope of these adjectives, primarily in their relation to human conduct, and ultimately in their final and absolute sense, that ethics investigates.”⁷

We are therefore concerned with certain terms as they are used in a particular connection and also with their meaning in the absolute sense. In conjunction with these aspects the opinion of Professor Muirhead may also be borne in mind: “We have two kinds of sciences . . . those concerning themselves with the description of things as they are, and those which concern themselves with our judgments upon them. The former class have sometimes been called ‘natural,’ the latter ‘normative,’ or, as is better, ‘critical’ sciences. Ethics is critical in the sense explained. Its subject-matter is human conduct and character, not as natural facts with a history and causal connections with other facts, but as possessing value in view of a standard or idea.”⁸

The various ethical systems are therefore more likely to show divergence when one comes to consider the standard or ideal that furnishes the value of human conduct rather than the prescriptions for the conduct itself. For example, killing, thieving, and lying are in general considered to be evils, though whether they are at any time justifiable will depend on the terms of the ideal; on the other hand, happiness is invariably associated with good.

The study of ethics as a particular discipline contributing to philosophical inquiry as a whole was due originally to Aristotle, since he distinguished between “first principles,” or the investigation of the ultimate nature of existence as such, and the subsidiary disciplines which, though having the same purpose, themselves dealt with only a particular approach to it. Ethics constituted one such approach and, of the many hundreds of Aristotelian writings, three major works on ethics have come down to us. Aristotle maintained throughout the fundamental doctrine of Socrates and Plato that “virtue is happiness,” a doctrine with which Buddhist thought would, in general, be in agreement,⁹ and on two occasions was inspired to poetry concerning this tenet. In the Elegy to Eudemus of Cyprus he praised the man who first showed clearly that a good man and a happy man are the same, and in the Hymn in memory of Hermias he begins: “Virtue, difficult to the human race, noblest pursuit in life.”¹⁰ Two of Plato’s successors at the Academy showed the same belief in the necessity of virtue, division of opinion occurring only with the view as to what good is.

Some two centuries earlier, a learned and eminent brahman expounded his teaching that morality and wisdom are essential to the character of a true brahman — the “true brahman” here representing the ideal. The Buddha then asked the man what morality and wisdom are. The brahman answered: “That is the farthest we have advanced, Gotama. It would indeed be well if the esteemed Gotama would clarify with regard to these words.”¹¹ The lengthy exposition with which the Buddha replied¹² constituted a standard basis for the development of his teaching and will be referred to in detail in the course of the present text.

Returning to Aristotle, the theory that happiness is activity is contained in two of his most authoritative works, the Metaphysica and the De Anima, as well as in the three ethical treatises, the Nicomachean Ethics, the Eudemian Ethics, and the Magna Moralia, these three proceeding on similar lines up to this point. The Nicomachean then continues to the theory “that the highest happiness is the speculative life of the intellect. . . but that happiness as a human also includes the practical life of combining prudence and moral virtue; and that, while both lives need external goods as necessaries, the practical life also requires them as instruments of moral action.” The treatise concludes with the means of making men virtuous; contending that virtue requires habituation, habituation law, law legislative art, and legislative art politics. Ethics thus passes into politics.¹³ The EudemianEthics and Magna Moralia continue to considerations of good fortune and gentlemanliness, the latter being regarded as perfect virtue, containing all particular virtues.

Herein lie no indications of an ultimate or transcendental state, and for these one must look to later developments of the science of ethics, whether they arise in logical continuity or exist merely as arbitrary attachments introduced for the sake of convenience. Only the former condition would provide justification for considering ethics as a genuine contribution to the science of philosophy proper. In his article on ethics in EncyclopaediaBritannica, Professor Wolf has this to say of the study: “Ethics is not a positive science but a normative science — it is not primarily occupied with the actual character of human conduct but with the ideal. Many moral philosophers, indeed, have stated explicitly that the business of ethics merely consists in clearing up current moral conceptions and unfolding the ultimate presuppositions involved in them, and that it is not its function to discover any new moral ideas. It may be remarked that even the ethics of Aristotle attempted no more, although he was not bound by anything like this authority, and the traditions of the Christian Church.”¹⁴Professor Wolf then states that the main problems of ethics “turn chiefly on the following conceptions: (i) The highest good of human conduct, or its ultimate ideal aim, which may serve as the ultimate standard of right conduct; (ii) the origin or source of our knowledge of the highest good or of right or wrong; (iii) the sanctions of moral conduct; (iv) the motives which prompt right conduct. Another problem discussed by moral philosophers is that of Freedom of the Will.”

In a consideration of Buddhist ethics these problems may be rearranged with advantage for two reasons. In the first place, according to Buddhist and other Indian thought, the highest state is one that lies beyond good and evil. In the second place, according to Buddhism there is no break between the moral teaching and that which pertains directly to the ideal state. Humanity, sufficiently advanced in the practice of the moralities, rises and continues to rise above the common limitations of time and space, whether these terms are interpreted from the point of view of the physical sciences or with reference to historical and geographical location. The first of the main problems set forth by Professor Wolf, namely, the ultimate ideal aim which may serve as the ultimate standard of right conduct, relates, according to Buddhist thought, to the supramundane or lokuttara state. The connection between the moralities of everyday life and this lokuttara state is entirely covered by the Buddha’s teaching. This connection is, in fact, known to Buddhists as m›rga or magga, the Path or the Road, along which each person must travel for himself, beginning with the practice of the common moralities up to the supramundane state beyond good and evil. From this point of view Buddhism can be said to provide the complete ethical study.

After certain introductory remarks to clarify the position taken up by Buddhist thought, the present consideration will be made...