1 The Modern Age and
the âWorkâ of Literature
The essays collected in Blanchotâs works of literary criticism must surely count as one of the most significant studies of literature in the Romantic and post-Romantic period. Few other works offer a comparative study of modern literature of such extent, able to bring together Hölderlin, Baudelaire, MallarmĂ©, Rilke, Kafka, Proust, ValĂ©ry, Mann, Musil, Artaud and many others. The emphasis on poetry and on works from the twentieth century, in particular, is exceptional â there is perhaps no other major work of comparative literature in which these textual areas provide the main frame of reference. This concentration reflects something more than an empirical area of specialization: the studies are guided and informed by a theoretical and historical reflection on what is distinctive about the situation and the characteristics of modern literature. Although it is not always emphasized, the historical theme is subtly present in many of the studies of individual writers, and it can serve as a means of approach to the properly critical dimension of Blanchotâs writings on literature.
The primary concern with modern writers is marked at all periods in Blanchotâs work, but it is only with a group of texts written in close proximity, in the period immediately after the publication of La Part du feu in 1949, that the historical dimension is directly addressed. In âThe Museum, Art and Timeâ, a long essay in response to Malrauxâs Les Voix du silence, first published in 1950â1951 (and collected in the later volume, LâAmitiĂ©), Blanchot reflects on the emancipation of modern art from religious and political imperatives and its devotion to purely plastic and formal values, and considers the link between this moment in the history of art and the emergence of the museum. Similar themes, developed now with reference to literature as well as art â above all with reference to modern poetry â reappear in âLiterature and the Original Experienceâ, first published as an article in two parts in Les Temps modernes in 1952, and then placed as the conclusion of LâEspace littĂ©raire (1955) Comparison of the two versions shows that the essay has been extensively revised for its republication in the context of the book (the revisions between the journal and the book publication of Blanchotâs essays are often quite significant, and can sometimes lend valuable assistance in interpreting difficult texts). Moreover, much of its argument is restated in an essay entitled âWhere Is Literature Going?â, published in two parts the following year, during the period in which most of the essays that now make up LâEspace littĂ©raire were being composed. The first part of this text, again somewhat revised, appeared as âThe Disappearance of Literatureâ in Le Livre Ă venir (1959). The second part of the essay was never collected in book form by Blanchot, although parts of it were re-distributed into several texts of LâEspace littĂ©raire, including âLiterature and the Original Experienceâ in its final form.1
The restatements, revisions and re-distributions of text that all these pieces go through in their definitive appearance reflect the working out of a historical dimension that was not present or at least not very marked in Blanchotâs work up to this point. Modern art and literature now appears as traversed and gathered together by a consistent intentional movement, visible through a multiplicity of its forms. This understanding becomes possible through an interpretation of the modern epoch more generally. In its language and its structures, this interpretation often recalls (explicitly or implicitly) the thought of Hegel. In the preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel writes:
To a remarkable extent, Blanchot not only assumes Hegelâs affirmation that modernity represents a new and original historical situation, but also takes over much of his interpretation of the basic character of âour timeâ.3 Hegelâs thought, it is true, is mediated here by French commentators such as KojĂšve and Hyppolite whose interpretations, especially with regard to religion and politics, are closer to the left Hegelians and to Marx than to the later Hegel of The Philosophy of Right. But in this modified form, Hegelian thought serves to conceptualize the essential decisions that make the modern period what it is. In two of the texts, Blanchot refers to Hegelâs often discussed thesis that art is a âthing of the pastâ. It is worth citing both versions, since the slight variations help in understanding Blanchotâs construction of the modern (which is our only concern here). In âThe Future and the Question of Artâ (EL VII.i), Blanchot, glossing Hegelâs thesis, writes:
And in âThe Disappearance of Literatureâ:
Hegelâs judgement on the fate of art is the expression of an historical evidence, of a new sense of âwhat counts absolutelyâ. The absolute, the unconditioned point from which the understanding of the self and the world proceeds, has shifted position. In the past, it was located in a transcendent principle such as God or the metaphysical principles of the cosmos; now it is identified with free human reason in its real and historically determined situation. The modern epoch is that in which the human takes possession of itself and responsibility for itself, recognizing its own rationality as the immanent truth of all reality. In his account of this process, Hegel emphasizes that human reason, unlike preceding absolute instances (the divine, the sovereign), is not given as absolute by its nature or essence. As it comes to know itself, it discovers also that it is conditioned and limited by natural, physical realities, by the diversity and the constraints of existing laws and institutions, by the contradictions it finds both within itself and between its representatives. Humanity â or free rationality (Spirit, Geist in Hegel) â is only in principle an absolute: its vocation is to make itself in reality into what it is already by its principle.
The mode of being whose emergence is described by Hegel is active, engaged in a process of becoming, transforming (or ânegatingâ) itself in order to realize itself. In the Philosophy of History, Hegel writes: âSpirit (Geist) essentially acts: it makes itself into what it is at first only potentially (an sich), into its deed, its work; in this way it becomes an object for itself, and is present to itselfâ.4 One finds the same trait underlined in Blanchot: present-day man is âgiven over . . . to the decision to realize himself, to become free of nature and of being through work and through effective actionâ (EL 311, 233). The threshold of modernity is attained at the moment that this decision has been assumed. The world has now to become the human world, a world submitted to the dictates of the free and rational human will. Henceforth, âwhat counts absolutely is the accomplishment of the world, the seriousness of action and the task of real freedomâ (LV 265, 195 cited above).
In âThe Future and the Question of Artâ (EL VII.i), this understanding of the modern ethos provides the horizon for a critical assessment of modern aesthetics. The section is useful for a consideration of Blanchotâs work as criticism, since it indicates how his work would situate itself in relation to the conflicts that shape the critical field. The discussion begins with the alternative between those for whom the literary or artistic work is âan object of contemplation rather than usage, sufficient in itself, resting in itselfâ, and those for whom it only has its meaning when considered within the wider context of human action and history.5 The conflict is well known in literary criticism, where critical positions have often defined themselves in relation to the polarity between a view of the work as a self-contained aesthetic form, on the one hand, and a view of the work as a particular mode of historical and cultural discourse, on the other. For Blanchot, this debate takes for granted the terms of the modern self-understanding.
To the extent that interaction with art is primarily the production and the evaluation of âworksâ, it has its measure in accomplishment, it is suggested. The claim for the aesthetic is thus ultimately a claim for a distinct sphere of work, albeit one with its own conditions and procedures. Whatever distinctions and privileges this sphere may be allowed, it remains subject to the evidence and the criteria of work.6 Even if it moves according to its âown little lawsâ, the artistic domain â inasmuch as it is a kind of work â falls within and will contribute to âthe total human work and the affirmation of the universal lightâ (281, 213).
Once art and literature are produced within a horizon that is commanded by the criteria of work and historical action, however, artists and writers are compelled to recognize that their work is a relatively marginal and not very effective form of activity:
In Blanchotâs writings, there is a consistent, if not always explicit sense that what is here called âthe universal demandâ is one that is difficult to accept, as well as the decision that it should be accepted. This is present in the text we have been examining in the implication that the claim for aesthetic autonomy (the work with âits own little lawsâ) lacks something in transparency and even sincerity â that it seeks to gain recognition by the criteria of work and action, while at the same time withdrawing from their full implications.7 In contrast with the various accommodations through which nineteenth-century culture in fact maintains a very elevated conception of the value of art, Hegelâs thesis of the âend of artâ is credited for the stringency with which it draws the consequences for art of a free historical mode of existence
The same ethicalâpolitical tendency appears in the next section of the essay, dealing with the Romantic affirmation that links art to the inner sovereignty of the self, and thus frees it from the demand of effective realization.8 The treatment of this phenomenon is phased in two separate developments. In the first of these, it is suggested that, contrary to appearances, the revolt in the name of subjective passion against the criteria of work and effectivity does not express a fundamentally different motivation from the modern assertion of historical freedom, but that it constitutes rather an integral moment within its emergence. At the same time that modern humanity makes the external world into a field of objectivity, present for the subject and under its power, it also tends to intensify the uniqueness and the irreducibility of the subject as self. The two moments support and promote each other. The more the self gains in depth and autonomy, the more it reinforces the realizing will that has its foundation within the subject; likewise, the greater the mastery over the world, the greater the possibility for the human subject to develop its consciousness of its own inner freedom (cf. 287â288, 217). In a second development, Blanchot proceeds to assign this dialectic to a specific historical situation, that which Blanchot refers to as âhumanismâ. This claim depends upon a schema of the different historical meanings assigned to art, which Blanchot, acknowledging its âHegelianâ style, terms âthe dialectic of the workâ (EL 305, 229).9 Art and poetry, it is here suggested, first acquires their meaning from the function they serve in cult and religion: in its most original form, with the hymn and the temple, art makes present the divinity; later, in a slightly more secular age, it represents the gods, and gives them form (the reference is no doubt to Greek art). In the âhumanistâ moment, which for Blanchot embraces the period between the Renaissance and Romanticism, the artistic possibility becomes one of the means by which the human subject discovers itself and claims its rights against the divine order announced in myth and religion. Art does not only then represent the human individual in its subject matter: the artistic activity understands (and sometimes represents) itself as the expression of human freedom and mastery. It is at this moment, then, that the artistic possibility is particularly identified with concepts and figures that underline the elevated power of the artist â the idea of genius, the figure of the artist as the great individual, the understanding of art as the medium of the subjective vision. The historical scheme serves to limit the validity of this set of concepts by assigning their legitimacy to a particular historical phase. For in the more recent modern period â in the ânew eraâ that Hegel announces â human rationality and autonomy no longer need to be discovered, but only to be accomplished; henceforth it is rather âin the development of technical forms of conquest that it finds the dialectical vitality which assure it of its goalâ (EL 288, 217). When art continues to be given its meaning by the reverence for the artist as the exceptional individual, what is actually taking place, Blanchot suggests, is a reaction against the demands of modernity. Art becomes the preserve of the individual subjectivity, and as such, it represents a point of resistance to the demands of modern science, politics and dialectical reason, which are essentially collective and impersonal. The notion of âcreativityâ takes on its full meaning in relation to this historical tension; if this term has found such resonance, to the point that it is still co-terminous with the artistic sphere in the popular imagination, it is because it is able to effect a delicate conceptual negotiation between two antagonistic demands. On the one hand, the appeal of creativity reflects the value of power and realization. But at the same time, this creation does not fall under the jurisdiction of rational purpose and method; it remains bound to the spontaneity of the artist, thus âprotecting him against the ano...