Chapter 1
âFilms Lead Policyâ: Marvelâs Industrial (R)evolution and the Birth of a Studio
Introduction
In June 2015, sweeping changes were coming to the comics of the MU, designed to hit over the summer. To prepare fans, Marvel released a free preview detailing several of the âAll-New, All-Differentâ titles that would establish the charactersâ new status quo. EIC Axel Alonso welcomed readers to this new phase with a message:
What was your first encounter with the Marvel Universe? Did you pull a comic book off a spinner rack at the five and dime like I did, or did you float out of a movie theater, your mind blown by what you saw on the Silver Screen [?] ⌠If you liked that feeling, youâre going to love whatâs in store for you in All-New, All-Different Marvel.
(Alonso, 2015a: 4)
Statements from the management of MS intimate that the masterplan controlling all of Marvelâs joined-up entertainment activity radiates from its filmic output (according to former executive Justin Lambros, speaking about the relationship between the videogames outlying Marvelâs convergence circle, and the film releases at its heart, associated products were meant to âtake the lead from the filmsâ, and even material sourced in comics would be âfilteredâ through this matrix â Lambros, cited in Johnson, 2013: 97â8). If the direction of the MCU is creatively led by films, Alonsoâs statement seemed to do more than offer helpful contextualization; it seemed to admit something new. This was the fact that from this point, new Marvel comics would similarly take a lead from the needs of, and the character iterations appearing in, the MCU. Implicitly accepted in the statement was the idea that quarters of comic-reading fandom â the spinner rack-lurkers who may see themselves as having stood by Marvel Comics through long, frequently lean times â might not be happy, but Alonso attempted to remind them of the bond they shared with recent converts (What difference where a âtrue believerâ discovers their interest?).
This indivisibility of publishing and filmic aims would now, it seemed, dictate events within the pages of comics that, prior to this âsubordinationâ (Johnson, 2013: 98), had seemed to represent the purest level of Marvel charactersâ authenticity and existence. After all, Alonso had presided over a year in comics where Phil Coulson, an MCU invention, had materialized leading a S.H.I.E.L.D. team and linking with the already resident Quake/Daisy Johnson/Skye (familiar to television viewers from Marvelâs Agents of S.H.I.E.L.D. â see Chapters 5 and 8); a half-century before (calibrated to the passing of time in mainstream Marvel continuity), Agent Peggy Carter, another TV star, had been shown to have adventured alongside the father of Tony Stark/Iron Man in the 1950s.1 Characters were converging and completing a âfeedback loopâ â from comics to films, back to comics. The versions played by Hayley Atwell (Carter) and Chloe Bennet (Daisy/Skye), with which millions of cinema and TV viewers were familiar, were the new yardstick for how those characters should appear in the MU. The implication was that things happening in Marvel comics should not contradict what is going on in the MCU, and the shape that the new status quo was taking would precisely accommodate this.
Around eight months before Alonsoâs introduction to âAll-Newâ Marvel Comics, Kevin Feige announced the âPhase Threeâ MCU titles at a pumped-up press event in a Hollywood theatre. This event laid out two decadesâ worth of connected production: the MS slate stretching on towards 2028, comprising a total run of twenty-one features. The day confirmed the completion of a remarkable turnaround of Marvel, the business.2 A troubled comic publishing company had not only âplanted [its] flagsâ, as Feige put it, into the new billion-dollar territory of filmed entertainment â it had shown, via the currency of success, that it belonged there. It is the right time to reconsider the meaning of certain steps of this transition in detail. As this work proceeds, the motives and mechanics of Marvelâs history of attempts to become a film and television industry player, and the recipe for its recent success and stability, will be given their due. In the present chapter, we view the pattern as a whole. Our assessment will be framed via a few key questions:
â What is a studio? How does one operate? Can periods in the history of American cinema be differentiated by distinct ways of operating?
â Can the models of past Hollywood production cultures put forward by Film Studies tell us anything about Marvelâs status and position in global film entertainment today?
â When it acquired its capital and struck out into production, was Marvel Studios âindependentâ? What do we mean by saying that it was?
â What is the place held by Marvel Studios and its plans within the Disney empire?
Before we do this, it would help to highlight the roles and identities of key personnel that currently give, or in the past have given MS its shape and structure. We will discuss the concept of âstudio authorshipâ later on, but clearly, individuals and management structures above and around creative personnel, casts and crews, constitute a large part of the studioâs business, and help to foster its values and identity.
MS grew out of Marvel Films in 1996, but owes its current status and shape to significant changes in the mid-2000s. Prior to this, headed by Avi Arad, the company was a pre-production hub, exposing Marvel characters through licensing deals with studios such as Fox, Sony and Lionsgate. One such deal brought Feige into the fold (working with Arad as executive producer on Foxâs X-Men); he officially took the position of Aradâs second-in-command in 2000 (Anon., 2009a). As will be detailed in Chapter 2, both Feige and Arad took a creative producing approach, but the appointment â that of David Maisel â that changed the MS trajectory was, tellingly, more commercial in nature (closer to the heart of Aradâs business partner â and Marvel purse-string holder â Ike Perlmutter, who has presided over the organization since it emerged from bankruptcy). Maisel joined as MS President and Chief Operating Officer in 2004 (Anon., 2004a) and is credited with pushing the organization into the arena of (then) independent production for which it is now recognized (Maisel it was, who secured the $525 million required to sponsor this production). As a result, in 2005, Maisel was promoted to MS Vice Chairman, and Executive Vice President â Corporate Development in the wider Marvel Entertainment. Installed in this role, with film production on a continuous footing, he is credited with brokering the 2009 deal between Marvel and Disney, following which he left the company (Anon., 2009b). Amid Maiselâs rise within the company, Arad departed in 2006, reportedly over creative differences between the two (Leonard, 2007), an account later disputed by Arad (Busch, 2014).
Since Maiselâs exit, still under the oversight of the (by reputation) austere Perlmutter, studio business revolves around three individuals, each with some creative urgency and identity: President of Production, Kevin Feige; Co-President (since 2009), Louis DâEsposito, who was formerly President of Physical Effects; and Executive VP of Visual Effects and Post-Production, Victoria Alonso (DeMott, 2009). The three executives, around whom a core team is often maintained from production to production (Masters, 2014), imbue the governance of MS with a front that stresses a creative interest and leadership kept in balance with executive responsibility (see Chapter 2). Alonso, for instance, expounds a collaboratively creative approach encapsulated in the âMarvel Processâ â the subject of a keynote she delivered at 2014âs Visual Effects Society Production Summit (Giardina, 2014) â but maintains the fiscal discipline instilled in the company by Perlmutter by ensuring that production is undertaken efficiently (Cohen, 2015). Placing a constant and stable team, with a shared background in various elements of creative producing,3 at the heart of how productions are assembled on the studio side mirrors, but also enables, the more directly influential combinations of directors, writers and crew (although here we should take care to not always take the filmmakersâ and studioâs word at face value, as is explored later). Significant to the expansion of Marvelâs game-changing MCU, Marvel Television was established in 2010, following the Disney sale, after which its operation was moved to the Disney-owned ABC studios (Andreeva, 2012). Here, Jeph Loeb takes a Feige-like position in overseeing television content, which increasingly features in the world-building transmedia enterprise of the MCU (see Chapter 8). The direction of both divisions, still under the auspices of Marvel Entertainment and the control of Perlmutter, is monitored by the MCC.4 Up to late 2015, the MCCâs remit appeared to have straddled both film and television operations, but Tilly (2015) as well as Masters and Belloni (2015) provide accounts that suggest more fluidity to this situation.
What do we talk about when we talk about Marvel Studios?
The period when the âStudio Systemâ â a specific organizational way of structuring business that drew together the largest, most successful and recognizable entities of Hollywood cinema â held sway varies according to the observer.5 Most accounts will extend as early as the late 1920s and as late as 1960. The Studio System is a device for describing how economic arrangements were laid out; the product that resulted, and its particular aesthetics, is better described with reference to notions of âclassical cinemaâ. Taken together, they capture the idea of a factory-like system geared up to make a standardized, effective product to the pleasure of audiences. Aspects including script, mise-en-scène (the meaningful contents of the film frame), casting and so on had principles of formula applied to them (the genre system; the star system) so that what worked could be repeated. The parts of the company selling the film knew how to sell: stars and genre (and even, more rarely, the director or producer) would be used so that audiences could relate new films to previous successes, often coalescing around a notion that identified the releasing studio with preferred genres or the striving for a particular atmosphere (glamour, realism, classiness, etc.). Control over the most crucial parts of the process â producing the film, distributing into theatres, and making sure the end result had the best chance to sell tickets â was kept within the company in the case of the largest studios like Paramount, Fox and Warner Bros., which owned theatre chains; the coordination of these three stages was known as âvertical integrationâ. The model was one of mass production, informed by principles of âFordismâ, and it addressed audiences as an âundifferentiated mass marketâ which was âserved ⌠[with] a limited array of standardized mass-produced commoditiesâ (Smith, 1998: 6).6
Film Studies looks beyond the pure economic description to approach the âStudio Systemâ era in terms of a particular relation between system and creativity (the classical cinema). The eraâs values and how the studios functioned is delineated in fascinating detail in studies such as those of Bordwell, Staiger and Thompson (1991), and Schatz (1998), and every subsequent study of Hollywood â even ones taking up the story decades after the apparent end of this phase â build on such works. What does Film Studies identify as the typical features of a company that extends, in relevance, from the classical into the contemporary (âpost-classicalâ) era?7 Looking a little more deeply, how has the notion of the studio been broken down?
We might take the case of Disney, Marvelâs current corporate parent, as elucidated by Janet Wasko (2001). Over a brief few pages, Wasko underscores various points of importance in the process by which Disney eventually became the most emulatable of all those media brands still retaining a core interest in theatrical film (Grainge, 2008: 49). Wasko follows the studio from its unlikely start in 1923, beginning as a privately owned production outfit releasing through a de facto âBig Fiveâ studio in RKO8 (until RKOâs financial instability in the early 1950s persuaded Disney to form its own subsidiary for distribution), and into the modern era of conglomeration. Wasko notes the features and policies that made it so fit for this era, among which are its capacity to ride waves of âtechnological changeâ; its adaptation to the potential of merchandising at home and outside the US; and, its commitment to âsynergistic ⌠global expansionâ, including the hugely important ownership of a television network (2001: 17). Alongside such features of business strategy designed to return profit to investors in the publicly traded (since 1957) company, Wasko isolates aspects of what we might crudely call âcontentâ: IP; the âproliferation of Disney images and charactersâ, some of which were eventually âmodernizedâ as the company adapted to new times (2001: 17â8).9 Waskoâs profile sets out the deployment of this IP within the various strategies planned and driven by individuals whose management influence centred on successfully building the company first of all into a rival for its former distribution partners Columbia, UA and RKO (under Walt and Roy Disney), and later â under CEO Michael Eisner â rebuilding it in the corporate image of connected entertainment behemoth that would fix it as the envy of 1990s Hollywood; and more widely, allow it to epitomize the dream of situating that IP production, protection and exploitation far beyond theatrical film within international âleisure markets, ⌠television, tourism, theme parks and consumer merchandiseâ (Grainge, 2008: 44).
Elsewhere, Wasko categorizes this overview as within the remit of the political economy tradition, which she points out has been fruitfully applied in communications research since the late 1950s (2001: 28â9). The study of ownership and control is the crucial element informing the approach; although not obviously textual in the way of other preoccupations of media research, this focus keeps together political and economic dimensions, thereby rendering a type of analysis that can serve as the ground for ideological analysis. However, Grainge raises a key limitation of political economy approaches to those global media brands that trade in populist image production, this being the âgeneralizing impulseâ that assumes âimpoverishmentâ of cultural life as an automatic by-product of the imposition of brand marketing (2008: 7). This book does not embrace political economic methods to an extent which could con...