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sonic thinkingâAn Introduction
Bernd Herzogenrath
I would like to start with a set of resonances. First of all, a resonance on the word âresonanceââon the one hand it means something like âecho,â or âreverberation,â on the other hand, the word âreasonâ is somehow hidden in âresonance.â The French verb rĂ©sonner makes this resonance even strongerâone might even be tempted to invent the word re[a]sonance here.
Thus, a kind of knowledge is involved here. A kind of thinkingâmaybe not what we would call rational thinking, but a kind of thinking nonetheless. As the Polish philosopher and mathematician JĂłzef HoĂ«nĂ©-Wronski has it, as quoted by Edgar VarĂšse: âMusic is the corporealization of the intelligence that is in soundâ (VarĂšse 1966: 17). Music as the becoming-body of the knowledge of soundâsound thinking.
Again, also this knowledge that sound is, has a highly interesting resonance in its âwordhoodâ in French: connaĂźtreâknowledge as a process of âbeing-born-withââthis could mean that this knowledge, this thinking, this re[a]sonance, that sound is not a knowledge about the world, coming to you only in retrospective reflection, but a thinking of and in the world, a part of the world we live in, intervening in the world directly.
Friedrich Nietzsche, in his unpublished early notebooks, dating from the period of his Unfashionable Observations (1872â3), relates the true philosopher to the scientist and the artist as listener: âThe concept of the philosopher ⊠: he tries to let all the sounds of the world reverberate in him and to place this comprehensive sound outside himself into conceptsâ (19[71], 115); whereas the artist lets the tones of the world resonate within him and projects them by means of percepts and affects. So, here, sound-art practice becomes research and philosophy, and vice versa.
Rainer Maria Rilke, in his 1919 essay âPrimal Soundâ (UrgerĂ€usch in the German original) described an experience he had as a young boy, when introduced to a phonograph for the first time, seeing how the needle produced sounds out of grooves in a wax cylinder, grooves that the recording of actual sounds had put there in the first place. Years later, while attending anatomical lectures in Paris, Rilke connected the lines of coronal suture of the human skull to his childhood observationsââI knew at once what it reminded me of: one of those unforgotten grooves, which had been scratched in a little wax cylinder by the point of a bristle!â (2001: 22). From this incident, Rilke derives the following âexperimental set-upâ: âThe coronal suture of the skull (this would first have to be investigated) hasâlet us assumeâa certain similarity to the closely wavy line which the needle of a phonograph engraves on the receiving, rotating cylinder of the apparatus. What if one changed the needle and directed it on its return journey along a tracing which was not derived from the graphic translation of a sound, but existed of itself naturallyâwell: to put it plainly, along the coronal suture, for example. What would happen?â (23). Rilkeâs obvious answer, is, of course, noise, musicâsound! Probing further, Rilke asks himself, âWhat variety of lines then, occurring anywhere, could one not put under the needle and try out? Is there any contour that one could not, in a sense, complete in this way and then experience it, as it makes itself felt, thus transformed, in another field of sense?â (23).
In a letter, Rilke specifies this idea. Writing to Dieter Bassermann, Rilke speculates on âset[ting] to sound the countless signatures of Creation which in the skeleton, in minerals ⊠in a thousand places persist in their remarkable versions and variations. The grain in wood, the gait of an insect: our eye is practiced in following and ascertaining them. What a gift to our hearing were we to succeed in transmuting this zigzag ⊠into auditory events!â (2007: 391â2).
The project âsonic thinkingâ aims to serve two interconnected purposes: on the one hand it wants to develop an alternative philosophy of music that takes music seriously as a âform of thinkingâ (and that might revise our notion of what âthinkingâ means). On the other hand, it aims to bring this approach into a fertile symbiosis with the concepts and practices of âartistic researchâ: art, philosophy, and science as heterogeneous, yet co-equal forms of thinking and researching (and let me point out that we are using the concept of âartistic researchâ not in the meaning of art being a handmaiden subordinate to [and evaluated by] parameters of the sciences [a highly debatable practice], but more as a mediaphilosophical praxeologyâartists [in this case: sound artists] thinking with and through their medium [in this case: sound]).
The debate about the sphere of sound is presently fought with high intensity. The emerging field of research âSound Studiesâ is primarily discussed in the humanities and social sciencesâthe âAcoustic Turnâ is tackled with the means of cultural sciences and semiotics. These disciplines are however based on foundations that could not be more alien to music (or sound, noiseâthe âsonic fieldâ). Deeply rooted in one of the major strands of western philosophy, the concepts of cultural studies and especially semiotics are based on what Gilles Deleuze calls âimage of thought,â dependent on the metaphysics of being, representation, and identity. Accordingly, a (passive) nature, matter, etc., is âinformedâ extrinsically, a substance affects existence, the subject organizes (the objects of) experience, progress determines the course of history, etc.
On the other hand, how Hans Jonas, among others, has demonstrated in his groundbreaking essay, âThe Nobility of Sightâ (1954) these foundations of western existential philosophy are in turn rooted in the ubiquity of a âvisual regimeâ: a hierarchy of senses was established, in which the eye almost inevitably was declared the origin and foundation of all philosophyâcentral categories like â[in]finity,â âdistance,â âabstraction,â and âobjectivity,â are indebted to the intrinsic sensory qualities of visual perception. Since the twilight of the nineteenth century the consequences of this hierarchization of the senses (and the âsupremacyâ of the eye) are discussed with increasing intensity. In his treatise about the origin of tragedy, Friedrich Nietzsche tried to regain the âaural cultureâ of the old, pre-platonic Greeks, and in a later note he hinted at the revolutionary implications for our culture, which a reorientation away from the eye towards the ear would trigger: âImages in the human eye! This governs the entire nature of the human being: from the eye! Subject! The ear hears sound! An entirely different, marvelous conception of the same world!â (19[66]: 25). Here Nietzsche is congruent with the bigger part of twentieth-century theoretical reflection, that deems the prioritization of the visual sense as the original sin of western thinking.
As Jonas further explains, the concept of âsimultaneityââand eventually of âidentityââis an effect of the visual regime: visual perception constitutes a âco-temporaneous manifold ⊠at restâ (1954: 507), the sense of hearing however âconstruct[s its] perceptual unities out of a temporal sequence of sensationsâ (ibid.). Thus the eye suggests the notion of a permanent existence we would not have, if we could merely resort to âtime-sensesâ (like hearing and feeling).
Music and sound, however, can also be considered the âotherâ of this ontology of being and the visual regimeâephemeral, a time-art, non-visual. So what could be the nature of a âsound thinkingâ? Initially one would have to oppose (or accompany) the predominant discourses in sound studies to a philosophy that is process-orientated: an ontology of becoming, not of being, which recognizes entities as events and contingent actualizations of virtual potentiality, as a flow consisting of âvariously formed matters, and very different dates and speeds ⊠phenomena of relative slowness and viscosity, or ⊠of acceleration and ruptureâ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 3â4); an âalternativeâ philosophical lineage, which relies on thinkers like Spinoza, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Bergson, Whitehead and Deleuze. This perspective transforms âgivensâ with a preset and stable taxonomy of particular functions and agencies into âa construction site of exploration and connectionâ (Cox 2003: 3).
From this vantage point, the rigorous division between aesthetics and research (and the likewise rigorous division between the various related [academic] disciplines, e.g., âartâ and âscienceâ) can no longer be seriously upheld.
Deleuze is also interested in âthe relations between the arts, science, and philosophy. There is no order of priority among those disciplinesâ (1995: 123) for Deleuze. Whereas science involves the creation of functions, of a propositional mapping of the world, and art involves the creation of blocs of sensation (or affects and percepts), philosophy involves the invention of concepts. According to Deleuze|Guattari, philosophy, art, and science are defined by their relation to chaos. Whereas science ârelinquishes the infinite in order to gain referenceâ (1994: 197), by creating definitions, functions and propositions, art, on the other hand, âwants to create the finite that restores the infiniteâ (197). In contrast, âphilosophy wants to save the infinite by giving it consistencyâ (197).
Yet, since âsciences, arts, and philosophies are equally creativeâ (5), it might be fruitful, as Deleuze proposes, âto pose the question of echoes and resonances between themâ (1995: 123)âthat is, to pose the question of their ecology.
As Deleuze specified in one of his seminars, âBetween a philosophical concept, a painted line and a musical sonorous bloc, resonances emerge, very, very strange correspondences that one shouldnât even theorize, I think, and which I would prefer to call âaffectiveâ ⊠these are privileged momentsâ (âImage Mouvement Image Tempsâ).1 These moments privilege an affect where thought and sensation merge into a very specific way of âdoing thinkingâ beyond representation and categorization.
The hiatus of art and research is the result of the idea of a linear process ranging from invention|concept (mental) to design (material realization). This however does not do justice to the complexity of the matter: mental and corporeal processes and interactions as well as âimplicit/tacit/practical knowledgeâ become relevant on all levels, for all decisions. As Martin Tröndle has pointed out, conceptual cognitive and manual affective activities go hand in hand, the sensual examination of the material and emotional reactivity is also of highest importance. As Deleuze and Guattari put it in their idea of the âartisanâ (rather than the âartistâ): âIt is a question of surrendering to the [materiality], then following where it leads by connecting operations to a materiality, instead of imposing a form on matter: what one addresses is less a matter submitted to laws than a materiality possessing a nomosâ (1987: 408).
The mind is tightly embedded into the interplay between body, environment, and matter. This is the quintessence of Embodied Mind Philosophy. Alva Noë, one of its originators, even takes it...