Idealism and Christian Philosophy

Idealism and Christianity Volume 2

Steven B. Cowan, James S. Spiegel

• Publisher: Bloomsbury Academic
• Year: 2016
• Print ISBN: 9781501335860
• eBook ISBN: 9781628924077
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Philosophical Metaphysics

When it comes to contemporary philosophical problems, metaphysical idealism-or Berkeleyan immaterialism-is not taken seriously by most philosophers, not to mention the typical Christian layperson. This state of affairs deserves some attempt at rectification, since Idealism has considerable explanatory power as a metaphysical thesis and provides numerous practical and theoretical benefits. Such thinkers as George Berkeley and Jonathan Edwards believed that Idealism is especially amenable to a Christian perspective, both because it provides a plausible way of conceptualizing the world from a theistic standpoint and because it effectively addresses skeptical challenges to the Christian faith. The contributors to this volume explore a variety of ways in which the case can be made for this claim, including potential solutions to philosophical problems related to the nature of time, the ontology of physical objects, the mind-body problem, and the nature of science.

1

Idealism and the Reasonableness of Theistic Belief

James S. Spiegel

George Berkeley conceived his esse est percipi thesis as a way of inspiring his readers “with a pious sense of the presence of God”¹ and thus as a bulwark against atheism, agnosticism, and religious skepticism. Like many religious apologists, Berkeley defended an array of theistic proofs, but the strength of his case for theism hangs especially on the plausibility of his idealist thesis. This is because of the diverse ways that idealism enhances a theistic perspective, such as by expanding our sense of the evidence for God, enhancing our understanding of divine action in the world, offering a more parsimonious ontology, and providing a more compelling perspective on the laws of nature and the nature of miracles, vis-à-vis nonidealist brands of theism. In short, as I aim to show, an idealist perspective offers a number of conceptual benefits that enrich a theistic worldview.

The Berkeleyan thesis: Esse est percipi, aut percipere

Let’s recall exactly what the idealist thesis is, beginning with Berkeley’s argument in defense of it. For Berkeley, the key starting point is the observation that physical objects are nothing more than their perceivable qualities. Now perceivable qualities are essentially ideas, so a physical object is really just a collection of ideas. And since ideas are mind-dependent, it follows that physical objects—the entire physical world, in fact—is entirely mind-dependent. That is to say, when it comes to physical objects, esse est percipi—to be is to be perceived. But this is not the whole of Berkeley’s thesis, nor even the most important part. For in Berkeley’s ontology there are, centrally, the spirits who do the perceiving. Thus, the complete Berkeleyan idealist thesis is esse est percipi aut percipere: to be is to be perceived or to be a perceiver.²

The Berkeleyan idealist ontology, then, is very simple (a point I shall emphasize below). All that exists are minds and their ideas, with minds being the only true substance. Hence, the doctrine is essentially a spiritual monism. Among minds, there are two distinct kinds: finite minds (including humans) and one infinite Mind, which is God, who is the ultimate source of all other minds and their ideas. And among ideas, there are also two kinds: the real and the imaginary. “Real” ideas are those that are publicly accessible via our senses, and “imaginary” ideas are those that are merely private—entertained within a single mind and not accessed through the senses.

Implications of idealism regarding evidence for God

My purpose here is not to defend Berkeley’s thesis nor the ontology it implies (or is taken to imply). Rather, I want to consider how an idealist perspective might enhance a theistic approach to a variety of issues. What I hope to show is that belief in God turns out to be more plausible or reasonable given the adoption of an idealist perspective.

The ubiquity of evidence for God

One way in which idealism reinforces the rationality of theistic belief pertains to its implication regarding the ubiquity of sensory evidence for theism. Specifically, given the Berkeleyan thesis, all of our sense experience—every single percept we gather with each of our senses, is immediate evidence for God. Everything you see around you now as you follow these words on the page or cast your gaze around the room, every sound you hear, each smell, taste, and tactile sensation—all of it evidences the reality of God. To see why, consider again the Berkeleyan claim that esse est percipi.

Given this thesis, every aspect of sense experience is the product of some mind or other. So the first question to ask is whether the things you see, hear, smell, taste, and feel right now are the product of your mind. You can rule out this possibility easily enough, since it should be obvious to you that: (1) you are not consciously producing the images and other sensations you constantly encounter via your senses, and (2) you have no reason to believe that you produce all of your own experiences unconsciously, as you do when you are dreaming. So, if your mind is not producing your sense experience, then since some mind is doing so, it follows that the source must be some other mind. And such a mind would have to be so great as to be nothing less than divine. As Berkeley reasons:

To me it is evident . . . that sensible things cannot exist otherwise than in a mind or spirit. Whence I conclude, not that they have no real existence, but that, seeing they depend not only on my thought, and have an existence distinct from being perceived by me, there must be some other mind wherein they exist. As sure, therefore, as the sensible world really exists, so sure is there an infinite omnipresent Spirit, who contains and supports it.³

This is sometimes referred to as Berkeley’s passivity argument for the existence of God.⁴ Granting the idealist thesis that to be is to be perceived, need we grant the theistic conclusion? One might retort with the many minds objection, which notes that Berkeley hasn’t shown that the ideas you encounter in sense experience are caused by just one other mind. It is conceivable, after all, that your various ideas of sense are produced by a plurality of finite minds. Although Berkeley doesn’t address this objection per se, his assumption seems to be that this alternative cannot account for the tremendous unity and consistency of the ideas we encounter in experience. Jonathan Dancy comments accordingly:

We can suppose that if there were several minds involved, some trace of the differences between them would emerge in their effects. But a remarkable feature of the world of sense is its consistency . . . It does not reveal traces of the working of more than one mind; every realist must agree with Berkeley’s contention that, within his system, this is so.⁵

If the many minds objection won’t work, then perhaps a skeptical response in the manner of David Hume is appropriate. Thus, one might resist the theistic implication by suggesting that, although you might have no positive reason to believe that your own mind is producing your sense experience, it is nonetheless possible that this is so. For, Hume says,

By what argument can it be proved, that the perceptions of the mind must be caused by external objects, entirely different from them, though resembling them (if that be possible) and could not arise from the energy of the mind itself? . . . It is acknowledged, that, in fact, many of these perceptions arise not from any thing external, as in dreams, madness, and other diseases.⁶

So what are we to say to this? In responding to some philosophical arguments, resorting to skepticism may be appropriate and practically reasonable. But in this case, it is particularly problematic. For resisting the theistic implication of idealism in this way results in solipsism—the notion that the entirety of your experience is produced by your own mind. The standard response to solipsism is apropos here as in any context: Yes, it is logically possible that the entire world is your own mental projection, but it’s not a sane thing to believe, which probably explains why solipsism might be the only philosophical view that isn’t seriously defended by any philosopher. But then again—and more to the point—to whom would one really be defending the view, besides oneself!

So it seems that, if idealism is true, then one cannot doubt or reasonably question God’s existence so long as anything at all exists. That is, given Berkeley’s thesis, all of your sense experience counts as evidence for God. Thus, on idealism, doubts about God are completely undermined because, to the extent that one doubts God’s existence, one must at the same time seriously entertain the possibility of solipsism or, to opt for something along the lines of the “many minds” approach, embrace the notion that something like the Matrix scenario is correct—that all of human experience is generated by a computer or some other finite intelligence. But solipsism is existentially repugnant, and the Matrix-like theories seem silly and properly reserved for science fiction entertainment.⁷ For the idealist, then, the reality of God is immediately apparent. Far from needing an argument to prove or provide philosophical or scientific evidence for God’s existence, “we need only open our eyes to see the sovereign Lord of all things, with a more full and clear view than we do any one of our fellow creatures.”⁸

There are also implications here for the contemporary problem of divine hiddenness. This is the supposed problem created by the fact that God’s existence is not more clearly evident. If God were real, it is argued, then this is something he would want everyone to know, so God would ensure that there could be no nonculpable unbelief regarding his existence. But since there are honest, nonculpable unbelievers, this means God’s existence is not sufficiently clear, which therefore constitutes evidence that God does not exist.⁹ However, if idealism is correct, then, simply put, the notion that God is hidden is dubious. God is no more hidden than other people are hidden, Berkeley would say, since the cases are parallel:

God is known as certainly and immediately as any other mind or spirit whatsoever distinct from ourselves. We may even assert that the existence of God is far more evidently perceived than the existence of men; because the effects of nature are infinitely more numerous and considerable than those ascribed to human agents.¹⁰

This is so because we know both God and people via their perceptible effects: human bodily behaviors indicate the thoughts and intentions of the mind “behind” them, and the thoughts and intentions of the mind “behind” the physical world are similarly known through events in the physical world.

Lastly, the idealist thesis reinforces the notion that belief in God is, as Reformed epistemologists would say, “properly basic.” According to Reformed epistemologists, such as Alvin Plantinga, theistic belief is well within one’s epistemic rights even in the absence of an argument for God’s existence. Just as we all reasonably believe in other human minds despite the lack of a good argument for them, Plantinga argues that one does not need an argument to reasonably believe in a Mind behind the world. Belief in God is an appropriate epistemic starting place, a properly basic belief, as is belief in other human minds. By showing how the divine Mind is encountered just as much in sense experience as any human mind, and thus reinforcing the parity between belief in other finite minds and belief in the divine Mind, Berkeleyan idealism provides further grounds for affirming the Reformed epistemological claim that belief in God is properly basic.

Accounting for divine action

Another way in which idealism reinforces the reasonableness of theistic belief is by providing a plausible account of divine action in the world. According to many philosophers of science, the notion of divine intervention in the physical world presents a serious problem for science and, thus, for theistic belief. So to the extent that one can provide a coherent account of divine action in the world, while also respecting the integrity of science, theism will prove more reasonable.

Divine intervention in the physical world may be seen as problematic in at least two ways.¹¹ First, there is the ontological problem: How do we make sense of the notion that an immaterial divine spirit causally interacts with material objects? There seems to be an unbridgeable ontological gulf between soul or spirit, on the one hand, and the physical world on the other. This is, of course, just another version of the interaction problem that plagues mind-body dualists in the philosophy of mind. Just as Descartes struggled to make sense of any causal interaction between soul and body, the theistic philosopher of science will struggle as well to make sense of divine interaction with the physical world. Secondly, there is the methodological problem of divine intervention. Scientific inquiry is premised on the notion that the cosmos dis...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half-Title
• Series
• Title
• Dedication
• Contents
• Acknowledgments
• Introduction: Idealism and Christian Philosophy
• 1  Idealism and the Reasonableness of Theistic Belief
• 2  Idealism and the Nature of Truth
• 3  What Is that Stone? Idealism and Particulars
• 4  Idealism and Perception: Why Berkeleyan Idealism Is Not as Counterintuitive as It Seems
• 5  Idealism and the Mind-Body Problem
• 6  Idealism and the Nature of God
• 7  God, Idealism, and Time: A Berkeleyan Approach to Old Questions
• 8  Idealism and Science
• 9  Immaterialism, Miracles, and the Laws of Nature
• 10  What’s the Point? Idealism and the Moral Life
• Notes on Contributors
• Index
• Copyright