Knowledge in Ancient Philosophy

Nicholas D. Smith

• Publisher: Bloomsbury Academic
• Year: 2021
• Print ISBN: 9781350446601
• eBook ISBN: 9781474258289
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Ancient & Classical Philosophy

The Philosophy of Knowledge: A History presents the history of one of Western philosophy's greatest challenges: understanding the nature of knowledge. Divided chronologically into four volumes, it follows conceptions of knowledge that have been proposed, defended, replaced, and proposed anew by ancient, medieval, modern and contemporary philosophers. This volume covers the Presocratics, Sophists, and treatments of knowledge offered by Socrates and Plato. With original insights into the vast sweep of ways in which philosophers have sought to understand knowledge, The Philosophy of Knowledge: A History embraces what is vital and evolving within contemporary epistemology. Overseen by an international team of leading philosophers and featuring 50 specially-commissioned chapters, this is a major collection on one of philosophy's defining topics.

1

‘Sophia’ and ‘Epistēmē’ in the Archaic and Classical Periods

David Wolfsdorf

1.Introduction

My aim here is to discuss the philosophical use of the terms ‘sophia’ and ‘epistēmē’ in relation to one another from their earliest occurrences through Aristotle. I begin with pre-philosophical use for this will help to explain the philosophers’ employment and adaptation of the terms.

2.Pre-philosophical uses of ‘sophiē’

In philosophical contexts the originally Ionic noun ‘sophiē’, later Attic ‘sophia’, is standardly translated as ‘wisdom’, the adjective ‘sophos’ as ‘wise’. But this will not do for the earliest, pre-philosophical use (cf. Snell 1924: 1–20; Gauthier and Jolif 1959: 479–89; Gladigow 1965; Meier 1970). In eighth- and seventh-century poetry ‘sophiē’ means ‘skill’, ‘sophos’ ‘skilled’ or ‘skilful’.¹ As we will see, wisdom is skill; but in the early poets the skills denoted by these terms are not forms of wisdom.

Formal semanticists have noted that ‘skill’, ‘skilful’, and ‘skilled’ are semantically incomplete terms in the sense that a person who has skill or is skilful isn’t skilful simpliciter, but in a particular domain. Compare ‘citizen’, which is semantically incomplete in a distinct, but related way: one is not a citizen simpliciter, but of a particular political body.

There are various theories of such semantic incompleteness. In the case of ‘skilful’ one view is that in its so-called logical, as opposed to surface grammatical, form the predicate contains a domain variable whose value is supplied by context (be it linguistic or extralinguistic). So the logical form of ‘x is skilful’ may be represented as:

SKILFUL(s)(x) where the variable s stands for a domain of skill.

For example, a father may say of his artistic son and musical daughter: ‘He is skilful and she is too.’ Here the first instance of ‘skilful’ takes art for the domain of s, the second music.

In its earliest uses ‘sophiē’ and ‘sophos’ range over such domains of skill as carpentry, navigation, and charioteering. Consider the following examples from Homer, Archilochos, and Alcman:

Just as a carpenter’s line makes ship’s timber straight

when the hand of a craftsman applies it, one who, inspired by Athena,

knows well all facets of the skill (sophiē) –

just so tensely poised the fighting in that battle stood. (Homer, Iliad 15.410–13)²

[G]‌ood with a trident and a skilful pilot (kubernētēs sophos). (Archilochos, fr. 211 West)

Castor and illustrious Polydeuces, skilful charioteers (hippotai sophoi), tamers of swift colts. (Alcman, fr. 2A.3–4 Snell)

From about the sixth century, we find instances of ‘sophiē’ that denote poetic skill, for instance, in the following verses of Solon (640–558): ‘One man earns his living by his hands in the works of Athena and the master of many crafts Hephaestus; another, through his learning in the gifts of the Olympian Muses, knows the measure of the lovely skill (himertēs sophiēs)’ (fr. 13.49–52). A number of editors have suggested that the noun is so used in the following fragment of Sappho (c. 630–570): ‘I do not imagine that any girl who has looked on the sun’s light will have such skill (sophia) at any future time’ (fr. 60 Snell). Certainly by the fifth century ‘sophiē’ is frequently used to denote poetic skill (cf. Barmeyer 1968: 155–62), for example, in Pindar: ‘May you may plant your feet on high so long as you live, and may I may consort with victors for all my days and be foremost in skill (sophiē) among the Hellenes in every land’ (Olympic Ode 1.115–17).

Also in the sixth century we first find ‘sophiē’ used to denote personal or social skills. Particularly fascinating examples occur in the Theognidea. For instance, the following two passages liken quality of character to coins and accordingly the skills required to discern and control character and quality:

Deception of gold or silver, Cyrnus, is easily endured;

and it is easy for a skilful (sophos) man to disclose.

But if it has escaped notice that the mind of a friend is false

and that his heart holds deceit,

god has made this most deceptive for mortals. (1.120)

Cunning men know gold and silver in the fire.

And wine has exposed the mind of a man,

when he has drunk too much, when he has taken drink beyond measure,

so that it puts to shame one who before was sophos. (1.502)

To my ear ‘skilful’ sounds slightly awkward as a rendition of ‘sophos’ in the second passage. ‘Self-controlled’ or ‘discerning’ is more natural. Nonetheless the author is evidently conceptualizing self-control or discernment as a skill, an ability to govern one’s social conduct.

It may be questioned whether the sixth-century use of ‘sophiē’ to denote personal or social skill is in fact a semantic development. An alternative view is that ‘sophiē’ always included these domains, but that the extant record merely happens to lack evidence of such employment.

The following considerations encourage the thesis that the use of ‘sophiē’ to denote personal and social skill is a genuine semantic development. One is a sort of argument from silence. In the earliest Archaic poetry, which is replete with references to personal and social skills, ‘sophiē’ and ‘sophos’ are never so used. For instance, Homer never describes Nestor, Odysseus, or Aeneas as ‘sophos’.

A second consideration relates to the passages of the Theognidea just cited: there ‘sophiē’ appears to be deliberately transposed from a non-social to a social domain. Compare the following use of ‘sophos’ from a late-sixth- or early-fifth-century Boeotian grave stele:

The children created this memorial for their deceased father Gathon,

a man sophos in guest-friendship (xsenian) and horsemanship (hiposunan). (SEG XV.316)

Here the conjunction of a non-social skill horsemanship and guest-friendship a social skill appears deliberately and poetically zeugmatic. Loosely related are the following sixth-century verses in which Anacreon employs equestrian skill as a metaphor for sexual skill:

Thracian filly, why so sharply shy away?

Do you think I know nothing sophon?

Be assured, I’d put your bit on smartly,

hold the reins and run you round the limits of the course.

But for now you graze the meadows, frisk and play,

for want of any experienced riding man. (fr. 88 Snell)³

Assume, then, that the semantic development did occur. Possibly, one factor contributing to the development was the increasingly common use of ‘sophiē’ to denote poetic skill. Some aspects of ancient poetry are relatively technical; others, particularly those pertaining to the content of poetry, involve personal and social thought. Given the prevalent use of ‘sophiē’ to denote poetic skill, the ubiquitous coincidence of these two aspects may have contributed to the semantic shift precisely through their association.

Phrases such as ‘wise carpenter’ and ‘wise charioteer’ are odd or nonsensical. Not so ‘wise poet’. The reason is that poetry can express personal or social thought that satisfies the following two conditions:

G The thought is ethical or moral or at least constitutes or promotes human goodness;

H The thought consists in a deep understanding of humanity.

I am suggesting then that wisdom is precisely this: personal or social skill that satisfies conditions G and H.

A word on the disjunction in G. Consider the peculiarity of: ‘He is wise, but unethical’ or ‘She is wise, but immoral’. So wisdom is ethical or moral. However, what we call ‘ethics’ as it relates to ancient Greek philosophy is eudaimonistic. Eudaimonia is a life that goes well for the agent. It is an open question whether or to what extent such a life is good for others. For instance, consider Thrasymachus’ question in Republic I: Is justness an excellence (aretē)? Again it is an open question whether, in case such a life is in some way good for others, it more precisely involves respect for the autonomy of others and recognition of their equal worth. But if for character or action to be ethical or moral it must be concerned with the welfare of, respect the autonomy of, or recognize the equal worth of others, and if ‘wisdom’ is an ethical or moral term, then it is doubtful that Greek eudaimonism is ethical or moral and so whether ‘sophiē’ can ever strictly be rendered as ‘wisdom’.

Granted this, I will conveniently and stipulatively employ the terms ‘wisdom’ and ‘wise’ in what I will call a ‘relativistic’ sense. By ‘relativistic’ I mean to acknowledge the variety of conceptions of human goodness and good human lives among philosophers and across cultures and to admit a sense of ‘wisdom’ as the skill that, in addition to satisfying condition H, constitutes human goodness or promotes good human life, however such goodness is conceived. According to this relativistic sense a self-regarding and self-benefitting skill may be constitutive of wisdom. For example, if, as some have argued, Epicureanism is psychologically egoistic, then the skill required to pursue and maintain Epicurus’ hedonistic eudaimonia is a case in point.

Regarding condition H, the following inference does not appear to be valid: ‘She is ethical or moral or is a good person or aims to promotes good human life, therefore she is wise.’ The reason the inference fails, ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Series Information
• Title Page
• Contents
• List of Contributors
• General Editor’s Preface
• Ancient Epistemology: Introduction
• 1 ‘Sophia’ and ‘Epistēmē’ in the Archaic and Classical Periods
• 2 Presocratic Epistemology
• 3 Epistemology in the Sophists
• 4 Socratic Epistemology
• 5 Epistemology in Plato’s Middle Dialogues
• 6 Plato’s Later Epistemology
• 7 Aristotle on Understanding and Practical Wisdom
• 8 Aristotle: From Perception to Understanding
• 9 Epicurean Epistemology
• 10 Stoic Epistemology
• 11 Ancient Scepticism
• 12 Epistemologies in Neoplatonism
• 13 Roman Epistemology
• Index
• Copyright Page