1A preliminary definition of Thomism and its varieties
Thomas Aquinas (ca.1225-1274) was the most prominent philosopher and theologian of the thirteenth century. During his 50-year-long life he produced an enormous body of work showing the broad scope of his interests in both speculative and practical fields, moving from metaphysics and theology to ethics and politics. Aristotelianism as he understood it served as the foundation of his philosophy, even though Aristotle’s views were considered incompatible with Christian teaching by many in his time. Therefore, to understand Thomas’ thought, it is necessary to go back to Aristotle. But doing so raises some doubts as to whether Thomism should be defined on the basis of the views of Thomas Aquinas or Aristotle, and, consequently, if it was more theoretically appropriate to refer to Thomas’ form of Aristotelianism. Resolving this question is important because before recognising analytically oriented Thomism as a version of Thomism, there should be clarity as to the actual meaning of Thomism. However, it would be well beyond the scope of this paper to determine to what degree Thomas Aquinas is a faithful interpreter of Aristotle, and to what degree his doctrine incorporates new, original elements and refinements. Going forward, we will assume that although Aquinas adopted many ideas of Aristotle, his thought is entirely autonomous and not derivative.
J. Haldane has given us a good conventional definition of the term ‘Thomism’:
Thomism, conceived of as the set of broad doctrines and style of thought expressed in the works of St. Thomas Aquinas and of those who follow him, first emerged in the thirteenth century. (Haldane (1997a), p. 485)
This definition comprises three significant aspects: the first embodies the corpus of the thinking of Thomas Aquinas, the second embodies the style of his thinking, and the third the thinking of his followers in the thirteenth and following centuries. It seems to me that the second element of the definition is rather hard to assess. On the one hand, it is hard to specify the style of philosophy characteristic of Thomas Aquinas. On the other hand, provided that the corpus of any philosophical doctrine is accepted, its followers should have some degree of latitude in interpreting and applying different research methods to it.
What is the corpus of thought of Thomas Aquinas? Only its crucial tenents will concern us in this paper. The answer to this question is neither simple nor uncontroversial. Those who treat Thomas Aquinas as an interpreter of Aristotle claim that Aquinas expanded and applied the Aristotelian doctrines of actus and potentia in a consistent and logical manner, and this is the key to his doctrinal innovations (cf., Swartz (2009), pp. 120–121). Pope Pius X’s Postquam Sanctissimus of 27 July 1914 – extended this very narrow characterization of Thomas Aquinas’ thought. The 24 theses advanced in the document provide believers with the canon of Thomas’ doctrine. And the acceptance or rejection of all these claims is an indicator of being a Thomist or not. In Section 2, we quote these 24 theses.
Clearly, if the term ‘Thomism’ refers not only to the original Thomas’ doctrine but also to its variants, then – consistently – the term ‘Analytically Oriented’ in the phrase ‘Analytically Oriented Thomism’ may also refer to these variants. In Section 3, we present an overview of the different variants that Thomas Aquinas’ doctrine has given rise to, which are other than analytic in the philosophical sense.
In general, the difficulty here is to determine when a philosophical doctrine is analytically oriented and when it is not. An analytically oriented doctrine may be said to impose itself when it takes its method or approach from analytic philosophy. Again, it is not easy to determine all the elements that would signify that one is working in the analytic mode, as there is no agreed upon canon of characteristics that definitively determine if an approach is analytic or not, or whether it can be translated into other philosophical idioms. Despite this ambiguity, in Section 4 we will try to answer the question: What is analytic philosophy? We characterize analytic philosophy, on the one hand, from the perspective of philosophers classified as analytic and, on the other hand, from a theoretical perspective (the nature and program of a school of philosophy qualify it as analytic). After clarifying these issues an attempt to answer the question: What is analytical Thomism? is made in Section 5.
Finally, in Section 6, we present opinions critical of analytical philosophy, and, consequently, of analytical Thomism, and take a critical stance towards these opinions.
2The twenty-four fundamental thomistic theses
In the decree Postquam Sanctissimus, Pope St. Pius X declared that the following 24 theses contain the principles and more important aspects of Thomas’ doctrine. Though the list does not give the exact wording of St. Thomas, the ideas are certainly those of St. Thomas. Consequently, a philosopher who intellectually accepts all these theses is a Thomist.
Ontology
1.Potency and Act divide being in such a way that whatever is, is either pure act, or of necessity it is composed of potency and act as primary and intrinsic principles. (St Th. Ia. Q.77, a.1; Metaph. VII, 1 and IX, 1 and 9)
2.Since act is perfection, it is not limited except through a potency which itself is a capacity for perfection. Hence in any order in which an act is pure act, it will only exist, in that order, as a unique and unlimited act. But whenever it is finite and manifold, it has entered into a true composition with potency. (St Th. Ia. Q.7, a.1-2; Cont. Gent. I, c.43; I Sent. Dist. 43, Q.2
3.Consequently, the one God, unique and simple, alone subsists in absolute being. All other things that participate in being have a nature whereby their being is restricted; they are constituted of essence and being, as really distinct principles. (St Th. Ia. Q.50, a.2, ad 3; Cont. Gent. I, c.38,52,53,54; I Sent. Dist.19, Q.2, a.2; De Ent. et Ess. c.5; De Spir. Creat. a.1 ; De Verit. Q.27, a.1, ad 8)
4.A thing is called a being because of being (“esse”). God and creature are not called beings univocally, nor wholly equivocally, but analogically, by an analogy both of attribution and of proportionality. (St Th. Ia. Q.13, a.5; Cont. Gent. I, c.32,33,34; De Pot. Q.7, a.7)
5.In every creature there is also a real composition of the subsisting subject and of added secondary forms, i.e., accidental forms. Such composition cannot be understood unless being is really received in an essence distinct from it. (St Th. Ia. Q.3, a.6 ; Cont. Gent. I, c.23; Cont. Gent. II, c.52; De Ent. et Ess. c.5)
6.Besides the absolute accidents there is also the relative accident, relation. Although by reason of its own character relation does not signify anything inhering in another, it nevertheless often has a cause in things, and hence a real entity distinct from the subject. (St Th. Ia. Q.28, mainly a.1)
7.A spiritual creature is wholly simple in its essence. Yet there is still a twofold composition in the spiritual creature, namely, that of the essence with being, and that of the substance with accidents. (St Th. Ia. Q.50 and ff; De Spirit. Creat. a.1)
8.However, the corporeal creature is composed of act and potency even in its very essence. These act and potency in the order of essence are designated by the names form and matter respectively. (St Th. De Spirit. Creat. a.1)
Cosmology
9.Neither the matter nor the form have being of themselves, nor are they produced or corrupted of themselves, nor are they included in any category otherwise than reductively, as substantial principles. (St Th. Ia. Q.45, a.4; De Pot. Q.3, a.5, ad 3)
10.Although extension in quantitative parts follows upon a corporeal nature, nevertheless it is not the same for a body to be a substance and for it to be quantified. For of itself substance is indivisible, not indeed as a point is indivisible, but as that which falls outside the order of dimensions is indivisible. But quantity, which gives the substance extension, really differs from the substance and is truly an accident. (St Th. Cont. Gent. IV, c.65; I Sent. Dist. 37, Q.2, a.1, ad 3; II Sent. Dist. 30, Q.2, a.1)
11.The principle of individuation, i.e., of numerical distinction of one individual from another with the same specific nature, is matter designated by quantity. Thus in pure spirits there cannot be more than individual in the same specific nature. (St Th. Cont. Gent. II, c.92-93 ; Ia. Q.50, a.4; De Ent. et Ess. c.2)
12.By virtue of a body’s quantity itself, the body is circumscriptively in a place, and in one place alone circumscriptively, no matter what power might be brought to bear. (St Th. IIIa. Q.75; IV Sent. Dist. 10, a.3)
13.Bodies are divided into two groups; for some are living and others are devoid of life. In the case of the living things, in order that there be in the same subject an essentially moving part and an essentially moved part, the substantial form, which is designated by the name soul, requires an organic disposition, i.e., heterogeneous parts. (St Th. Ia. Q.18, a.1-2 and Q.75, a.1; Cont. Gent. I, c.97; De Anima everywhere)
Psychology
14.Souls in the vegetative and sensitive orders cannot subsist of themselves, nor are they produced of themselves. Rather, they are no more than principles whereby the living thing exists and lives; and since they are wholly dependent upon matter, they are incidentally corrupted through the corruption of the composite. (St Th. Ia. Q.75, a.3 and Q.90, a.2; Cont. Gent. II, c.80 and 82)
15.On the other hand, the human soul subsists of itself. When it can be infused into a sufficiently disposed subject, it is created by God. By its very nature, it is incorruptible and immortal. (St Th. Ia. Q.75, a.2 and Q.90 and 118; Cont. Gent. II, c.83 and ff.; De Pot. Q.3, a.2 ; De Anim. a.14)
16.This rational soul is united to the body in such a manner that it is the only substantial form of the body. By virtue of his soul a man is a man, an animal, a living thing, a body, a substance and a being. Therefore the soul gives man every essential degree of perfection; moreover, it gives the body a share in the act of being whereby it itself exists. (St Th. Ia. Q.76; Cont. Gent. II, c.56, 68-71; De Anim. a.1 ; De Spirit. Creat. a.3)
17.From the human soul there naturally issue forth powers pertaining to two orders, the organic and the non-organic. The organic powers, among which are the senses, have the composite as their subject. The non-organic powers have the soul alone as their subject. Hence, the intellect is a power intrinsically independent of any bodily organ. (St Th. Ia. Q.77-79; Cont. Gent. II, c.72; De Anim. a.12 and ff.; De Spirit. Creat. a.11)
18.Intellectuality necessarily follows upon immateriality, and furthermore, in such manner that the father the distance from matter, the higher the degree of intellectuality. Any being is the adequate object of understanding in general. But in the present state of union of soul and body, quiddities abstracted from the material conditions of individuality are the proper object of the human intellect. (St Th. Ia. Q.14, a.1 and Q.74, a.7 and Q.89, a.1-2; Cont. Gent. I, c.59 and 72, and IV, c.2)
19.Therefore, we receive knowledge from sensible things. But since sensible things are not actually intelligible, in addition to the intellect, which formally understands, an active power must b...
