Communication and Media Ethics

Patrick Lee Plaisance

• Publisher: De Gruyter Mouton
• Year: 2018
• Print ISBN: 9783110463736
• eBook ISBN: 9783110463804
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Languages & Linguistics
• Subtopic: Communication Studies
• Index: Languages & Linguistics

Ethics in communication and media has arguably reached a pivotal stage of maturity in the last decade, moving from disparate lines of inquiry to a theory-driven, interdisciplinary field presenting normative frameworks and philosophical explications for communicative practices. The intent of this volume is to present this maturation, to reflect the vibrant state of ethics theorizing and to illuminate promising pathways for future research.

Patrick Lee Plaisance

1Defining the Field

Abstract: This chapter describes the parameters of scholarship in communication and media ethics and provides a brief primer on the three predominant branches of ethics theory: virtue, deontology, and consequentialism. Communication ethics and media ethics each address distinct concerns; the former has focused on rhetoric, theories of interpersonal communication, and dynamics of discourse, while the latter has focused on philosophical and psychological approaches to studying media workers and their content. We see how each branch of ethics theory has shaped media and communication research in a discussion of specific types of ethical controversies, such as conflict of interest, questions of harm, privacy, and use of graphic images.

Keywords: ethics theory, virtue ethics, deontology, consequentalism

Communication is by its very nature relational, regardless of its various forms – mass, mediated, digital, interpersonal. It is contact, conveyance, appraisal, dissemination, exchange. That is, communication is an inherently morality-related endeavor. As communicators of all stripes, we function as moral agents by continuously negotiating notions of respect, fairness, harm and autonomy. The enterprise of ethics is the deliberation of conflicting values and competing interests as we talk to each other, broadcast to the masses, and write or stream to selected audiences. So, communicating ethically is to communicate with thought and care, ever mindful of the relational web through which we move and of our potential effects, positive and negative, on others.

But of course it is not so simple. The postmodernist nature of truth, the utility of misdirection and disengagement, the dynamic of power and the value of secrets all shape our communicative motivations. As they should. We have long recognized the reality of multiple truths. Saving face and the artful demurring of harsh honesty are essential social lubricants worldwide. Disparate systems of hierarchy, authority and responsibility necessarily shape our dialogue and our information exchange. And as Thomas Nagel has pointed out, our commitment to honesty notwithstanding, if we were unable to withhold information, to deflect queries, to shield parts of our lives from public scrutiny, we would surely embark on the road to madness, or at least dysfunction. All of which is why the ethics of communication remains such a vital and vexing topic. While we understand the perils of relativistic thinking for the most part, we also can easily see the situational nature of most ethical claims in communication, how our judgments are contingent on a host of factors that vary in their perceived importance and relevance.

This volume illustrates the breadth of scholarship in communication and media ethics and attempts to capture the latest theorizing that brings ethics frameworks to bear on the many types of communication in our daily lives – interpersonal exchange, journalism, media marketing, entertainment content, and much more. Drawing on classic and contemporary works in moral philosophy, theorists regularly examine perceptions and manifestations of harm, of autonomous agency, of moral and professional obligations, of social justice, and of virtue, just to name a few. Sophisticated ethics-based theorizing on these and other topics is arguably more critical in communication and media research than ever. Media business and organizational models long relied upon are being challenged by unprecedented economic and social shifts, resulting in bold and often ethically questionable experiments in the search for viability. Media technology is transforming our notions of privacy, community engagement – even the nature of self-identity and how we interact. And in an increasingly networked communication system that is global in nature, theorists are struggling to articulate what a universalized ethical framework for media practices might look like – and whether such a framework is even possible. As this volume indicates, the field of communication and media ethics scholarship covers communication in its broadest sense and draws on increasingly sophisticated qualitative and quantitative methodologies. Its theorizing is descriptive, normative, explicative and hermeneutic in nature. And it is increasingly interdisciplinary, drawing as it does from rhetoric, moral philosophy, psychology, sociology, and various other of the social sciences.

Some would argue that when we speak of “communication ethics,” we are actually speaking of two distinct fields. One is composed of “communication” scholars, grounded in rhetoric, linguistics and theories of interpersonal and organizational communication, who tend to examine the dynamics of discourse and elements of the communicative act. The other is composed of “media” scholars, often hailing from social science frameworks, who are drawn to the sociological and psychological dynamics of media workers and media organizations, as well as to empirical questions involving the effects of media content. The two have generally developed into distinct scholarly communities with their own research venues and organizations (though a trend in some parts of the world has seen them merge into unified academic departments and colleges). Their common denominator, of course, is the harnessing of the philosophy of ethics onto questions of communication and media practices. And we are increasingly seeing a blurring of bright distinctions between the two groups. This volume simultaneously recognizes the distinct thrust of each camp while emphasizing the philosophical kinship of the two.

A few words about the nature of ethics itself. The philosophy of ethics provides important tools that help us clarify the nature of key concepts and to think about situational factors in constructive ways. Contrary to our everyday use of the word ethical, the philosophy of ethics has less to do with the nature of goodness than with the process of deliberating our way through dilemmas that don’t offer a single “right” solution. Black-and-white cases in which there is a clear single solution or course of action rarely poses a true question of ethics; instead, ethics is focused on the difficult gray areas that force us to articulate why a decision might be the most defensible one. We do so in various ways by drawing on ethics theory: by pointing out why one consideration is more “virtuous” than another, by thinking about our duties and obligations in certain social roles, by weighing the potential harms and other consequences of a decision. Each of these approaches rely on different branches of ethical theory – virtue ethics, deontology or duty ethics, and consequentialism, respectively. Each branch has a rich literature and emphasizes a distinct approach to understanding moral values, obligations and potential harms. Virtue ethics, rooted primarily in the work of Aristotle, argues that ethical deliberation centers neither on external moral law nor outcomes, but on the question of what constitutes good character. Classical and contemporary virtue theorists are concerned with how we understand what we refer to as the virtues and their links to Aristotle’s emphasis on human flourishing. Deontology, or the philosophy of duty, is rooted in Enlightenment rationalism and emphasizes what Immanuel Kant referred to as the moral obligations were are all obliged to recognize and embody as moral agents in the world. Consequentialism is the umbrella term used to refer to the range of utilitarian-based theories that argue for the link between morality and our actions. Our actions, argued John Stuart Mill and others, are best judged on the extent to which they produce beneficent outcomes. More recently, some theorists have advocated an entirely different approach by articulating how the notion of “care” serves as a normative guide in ethics, often coming from a feminist perspective. The cultivation and maintenance of relationships, rather than abstract notions such as duty or justice, should form the basis for ethical deliberation.

1Virtue ethics

Virtue ethics was originally articulated in the works of Socrates and Plato, and later was refined by Aristotle. Rather than being concerned with how we know “goodness,” Aristotle’s writings are focused on identifying and articulating the highest good, which he says has specific characteristics: it is innately valuable; that is, we desire it for its own sake and not for what it allows us to accomplish, and all other goods are desirable because they help us attain this highest good. Aristotle argues that highest good is the state of “living well,” translated from the Greek word eudaimonia. Thus, virtue ethics frames moral questions in this way: What would someone with a proper understanding of honorable behavior do in a given situation, and how might one cultivate a character that predisposes one to embrace virtuous behavior as a lifestyle? The cultivation of individual character to become models of virtue, rather than the rightness or wrongness of specific actions, is the focus of virtue ethics. Pursuit of virtue is part of what constitutes a “good” human life. Many contemporary virtue ethicists have expanded and refined Aristotle’s ideas, arguing that virtue theory compellingly corresponds to lived life rather than to some notion of an idealized rational being. Rosalind Hursthouse, for example, wrote, “[b]uilt into the theory is the claim that part of the virtuous person’s practical wisdom is her knowledge, her correct appreciation, of what is truly good, and, indeed, of what is truly pleasant, truly advantageous, truly worthwhile, truly important, truly serious (and, correspondingly, of what is truly bad, unpleasant, or painful, disadvantageous, worthless, unimportant, and trivial)” (2012, p. 73). Rather than getting tangled up in philosophical debates over our motives and duties, virtue ethicists who have followed Aristotle urge us instead to focus on the rules and behaviors that contribute to our “flourishing.” They use this term in a broad sense to accommodate the diversity of society and our wide range of interests. By flourishing, most philosophers mean that we all need to enjoy the fruits of our labor, to reap the benefits of collaboration and community engagement, and to have the means and resources to enable us to strive toward and reach our individual potential. So, for us to flourish, we would need, among other things, a social system that is just and that maximizes liberties, that encourages engagement, cooperation and generosity. “Men and women need to be industrious and tenacious of purpose not only so as to be able to house, clothe, and feed themselves,” philosopher Philippa Foot argued, “but also to pursue human needs having to do with love and friendship. They need the ability to form family ties, friendships, and special relations with neighbors. They also need codes of conduct. And how could they have all these things without virtues such as loyalty, fairness, kindness, and in certain circumstances obedience?” (2001, p. 44–45).

2Duty ethics

Duty ethics is concerned with setting out what we ought to do if we take our status of moral agents seriously. Also known as deontology (from the Greek word deon, meaning duty), duty ethics argues that there are moral obligations that we are all bound by, and that these obligations must motivate our behavior. Since these obligations, or moral “duties,” define what action is right, our moral judgments cannot rest solely on the consequences of those acts. Some choices, deontologists argue, simply cannot be justified by their effects: no matter how much they might result in some “benefit,” some choices are simply morally wrong because they fail to reflect our duty to behave in a certain way. While bringing about some benefit, or good, through one’s actions is obviously desirable, our success at doing so cannot be the basis of our moral judgments, because that would imply that any sort of underhanded or evil “means” can be justified by a good outcome. Rather, the “right” must come first: knowing our moral duties to properly treat others, to avoid harm, to respect certain values, is the surest guide to making the best decisions. It is our intended ends and our intended means that define our moral selves. Immanuel Kant’s duty-based moral system is the classic example of a deontological approach: an act cannot be judged as right or wrong based on its consequences, but only on whether the person performing the act understood her obligations as a moral agent. Performing a certain act may have negative consequences for some people, but such results are not what makes that a bad or immoral act; its “rightness” exists independently of any resulting outcome.

As much as duty-ethics philosophers emphasize the role of our motivation in making moral judgments, they also are concerned with the rights of individuals whose fates are determined by what we do. As moral agents, we all have the right, they say, not to be used only as a means for bringing about good consequences without our consent. People cannot use our bodies, our labor or our abilities without our say-so. Yet our intents and our rights are not always compatible, and thus duty-ethicists continue to debate about the exact nature of our moral duties. However, the wide range of plausible solutions is subordinate to our paramount obligation to respect everyone’s capacity for reason. Kant argues that this is what makes us special as beings, and with the proper use of that reason, we can fully discern ways in which we are morally obligated to respect and honor that reasoning capacity – in every case, for everyone. Thus, the fundamental principle of our moral duties, he says, is the “categorical imperative”: We are to “act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law.” It is an imperative in that it commands us to do something – Kant does not order that we perform specific actions to be “moral”; instead, he commands us to exercise our wills in a particular way. And it is categorical – that is, it applies to all of us unconditionally, simply because we possess rational wills, without reference to any of our personal goals or interests. For Kant, this categorical imperative calls on all of us to think more deeply about doing or not doing something. Philosopher Robert Johnson summarizes how the categorical imperative calls on us to consider the morality of an action:

First, formulate a maxim that enshrines your reason for acting as you propose. Second, recast that maxim as a universal law of nature governing all rational agents, and so as holding that all must, by natural law, act as you yourself propose to act in these circumstances. Third, consider whether your maxim is even conceivable in a world governed by this law of nature. If it is, then, fourth, ask yourself whether you would, or could, rationally will to act on your maxim in such a world. If you could, then your action is morally permissible (2016).

Kant’s formula helps us think more deeply about our behavior, but modern philosophers have noted that a little flexibility here can go a long way in balancing duties with consequences in our daily lives. By saying we all must act only if the action can be defended as a universal standard of action for everyone does not mean duty ethicists think we all must act in lock-step, with no consideration for the unique differences in our lives. For many, context matters. So in many cases, the moral obligations we have can be “agent-relative” – that is, they may apply just to us because of our relation to the individuals impacted by our actions. For example, one person may feel obligated to act a certain way with family members to avoid moral failure, but that feeling of duty may not apply in the company of strangers.

3Consequentialist ethics

We certainly have obligations to act morally and to uphold certain duties, but we also need to think about, and defend, the consequences of actions to the extent possible. As its name suggests, consequentialist ethics argues for shifting the moral weight in decision making from character and intent to how much “good” our decisions might produce. Whether an act is morally justified depends only on the results of that act. The most common phrase associated with consequentialist ethics is “providing the greatest benefit for the greatest number of people.” And the most common form of this framework is utilitarianism – an act is judged based on how much “utility,” or good outcome, it provides. The early proponents of utilitarianism in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries argued for a hedonistic definition of utility: physical pleasure is the only intrinsic good, and maximizing it was the sole basis for judging acts. Later, others refined and expanded what constituted the good beyond mere physical pleasure, to include broader, higher-order goods su...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Preface to Handbooks of Communication Science series
• Dedication
• Acknowledgements
• Contents
• 1 Defining the Field
• 2 A History of Media Ethics: From Application to Theory and Back Again
• 3 Communication Ethics: Origins and Trajectories
• 4 Cultural Pluralism and Media Ethics: Theorizing in a Globalized World of Difference
• 5 Contractualism for Media Ethics
• 6 Moral Psychology
• 7 Theorizing the Ambitions, Opportunities, and Limitations of Democratic Dialogue
• 8 Deontology
• 9 Consequentialism
• 10 Virtue Ethics & Media
• 11 Care Ethics: A Different Voice for Communication and Media Ethics
• 12 Harm in Journalism
• 13 Harm in Media Marketing: the Branding of Values
• 14 Harm and Entertainment
• 15 Harm in Public Relations
• 16 Justice and Media Ethics
• 17 Principled Advocacy
• 18 Morality in Entertainment
• 19 Popular Culture and Media
• 20 Communication Ethics and Globalization
• 21 Communication Ethics Research: Evolution and Thoughtful Response
• 22 No Greater Than Who I Actually Am: Virtue Ethics in Digital Life Narratives
• 23 Web Architecture and Values in the Stack: Exploring the Relationship between Internet Infrastructure and Human Values
• 24 Communication Technology and Perception
• 25 Research Directions
• 26 Theorizing over the Horizon: Ontology in the Global Imaginary
• 27 Toward an Interpretive Framework: Neuroethical Considerations for Media Ethics
• 28 Searching for Universals without Making Problematic Imperialistic Assumptions
• Biographical notes on the contributors
• Index