Individualism, Holism and the Central Dilemma of Sociological Theory

Jiří Šubrt

• Publisher: Emerald Publishing Limited
• Year: 2019
• ISBN:
  9781787690394
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Social Theory
• Index: Social Sciences

Individualismand holism, the concepts embedded in the title of this book, represent two keytheoretical perspectives that have for many decades steered and shapedsociological thought. For over a century these two interpretative perspectiveshave also divided sociological theory into two camps, accompanied by a band ofscholars trying to bridge this dualism.
According toAmerican sociologist Jeffrey C. Alexander, individualist theories derive theirappeal and strength from their underlying assumption that humans make decisionsas individual, free, autonomous, and rationally and morally consistent beings. A related belief is that they are able to express thesequalities in their actions regardless of the situation in society or whateconomic or moral conditions prevail.
Holistic, or collectivist, theories, unlikeindividualism, assign primacy to social entities.This perspective is important because itcreates the basic precondition through which entities can become the subject ofdeliberate sociological analysis. However, there is a price for fulfilling thisprecondition. The emphasis it places on the collective, and on larger entities, logically means that the individual will and free human decision-making tendsto be lost from the field of view.
This book argues that these twoperspectives, individualist and holistic, form the central dilemma ofsociological thought.It provides anextensive review and critique of contemporary sociological approaches to thisantinomy and examines attempts that have been made to overcome it and unite them.Moreover, the book proposes a new approach tosolving this dilemma via the concept of 'critical reconfigurationism', arguingthat the resolution of this dilemma is vital not just for sociological theorybut also for empirical social research.

Chapter 1

What is Sociological Theory?

In this book, individualism and holism represent two distinct perspectives typically applied in the process of the formation of theory in the social sciences, specifically in the field of sociology; therefore, it is sensible to make a brief excursion to view the complex way theory is structured in contemporary sociology.

The word theory is nowadays used in both scientific and everyday discourse, and in any given context, people usually have some idea what it means. Theory, especially but not only in lay terms, tends to be set in opposition to practice. As such it is associated with attempts at a rational interpretation of phenomena in a particular field (nature, society, human beings) based on very general, abstract forms of thought – such as concepts, opinions, hypotheses and laws. With the help of these, internally logical systems of understanding are developed that we can call theories in the broader sense of the word. Theory is not a direct, immediate description of really occurring phenomena, but rather an attempt to identify and interpret their basic features in an idealised and abstract way. Since every scientific study is by nature selective (never able to take into account every single aspect connected with a segment of reality), no theory can capture a studied phenomenon in its full complexity, but must in some way be reductive. Moreover, individual specific phenomena have characteristics of varying importance to different scientific fields of enquiry.

Here a preliminary guideline is provided by Austrian sociologist Max Haller’s assertion that social-scientific and sociological theory is ‘a system of general statements with a systematic link to empirically observable social phenomena’ (Haller, 1999, p. 39). As understood by British sociologist Anthony Giddens, social theory¹ functions like a bank from which individual social sciences draw the ‘money’ that they ‘work with’ to arrive at ‘outcomes’ which they can then ‘deposit’ in order to increase the ‘capital of the bank’. Thus there is a constant exchange going on between social theories and empirically oriented sciences: social theory should give direction to empirical research, which in turn should be an inspiration for its further development (Giddens, 1997 (1984), p. 227ff). Alexander (1987b, p. 3) notes that, from the perspective of science, theory is ‘crucial’; it is the heart of science. Theories are always born of the reality of facts, but in practice, in the social sciences, it is theories themselves that structure reality, and determine which facts scientists study and with what methods.

1.1. A Widely Used Concept

The question of what sociological theory is has been posed many times and in various contexts. Some years ago, Thomas Ward analysed almost three dozen definitions of sociological theory and synthesised them to create a new definition of sociological theory as:

a logical, deductive-inductive system of concepts, definitions, and propositions that articulate a relationship between two or more selected aspects of a phenomenon, from which it is possible to deduce testable hypotheses. (Ward, 1974, p. 39)

A somewhat more comprehensive description is offered by Calvin Larson (1973), who notes that the phrase sociological theory can be applied to some or all of the following:

• concepts, conceptual classifications and various conceptual constructs;²
• typologies, typological continua and ideal types;
• the structuring of relationships in the form of conceptual schemas;
• intelligent hunches in the form of hypotheses, assumptions, theorems and postulates;
• propositions, axioms, laws and generalisations; and
• models, logical-deductive schemas and mathematical formulations (Larson, 1973, p. 5).

Ward’s narrower and Larson’s broader description can both to some extent serve as starting points for further reflection, but do not on their own offer sufficient support to adequately tackle the matter of sociological theory. It is enough to open up a random handful of specialised publications for it to become clear that, in sociology, theory is a concept with many meanings.

This observation was made long ago by Robert K. Merton in his book Social Theory and Social Structure (1957 [1968]). Merton came to the conclusion that the term sociological theory is widely used to denote the results of six different types of activities carried out by those who call themselves sociologists. According to Merton, these activities are:

(1) methodology;

(2) general sociological orientation;

(3) analysis of sociological concepts;

(4) sociological interpretations post-factum;

(5) empirical generalisations; and

(6) sociological theory (in the narrow sense of the word) (Merton, 1968, pp. 139–155).

Another list of what constitutes sociological theory comes from one of the representatives of neopositivism, Karl-Dieter Opp. According to Opp (1977), in modern sociology, the word theory applies to several different approaches:

• The term sociological theory is used when propositions are formulated that write or speak about individual sociological theories. Opp believes that in this case it is often better to use the term theoretical sociology, because when someone speaks or writes about sociological theory, it does not necessarily mean that they are ‘doing’ sociological theory, but rather that they are concerned with ‘theoretical sociology’.
• The term theory is used to refer to a system of categories that captures those features of reality considered theoretically relevant; in essence a kind of theoretical description. Opp concludes that this method of constructing theory as a categorical system is characteristic of Talcott Parsons.³
• The term theory tends to be applied to the contributions of scholars who try to formulate what can be called ‘the laws of historical development’.
• According to Opp, most social scientists use the term theory to formulate empirically untestable propositions and evaluative judgements. This kind of quasi-theorising in reality does not meet the formal requirements for science to be conducted.
• For Opp himself, as a neopositivist, the only alternative to theory is the model applied in the natural sciences (Opp, 1977, pp. 797–799).⁴

American sociologist Hans L. Zetterberg (1965) speaks of two different interpretations of the concept of social theory in relation to two different sociological traditions:

(1) In the tradition of humanistic sociology, two interconnected but nonetheless distinct things are referred to as social theories: (1) classical works and enduring sociological writings that can rightly be called the ‘classics of sociology’; (2) sociological criticism or commentary focusing on these writings, tracing the historical continuity in the accumulation of knowledge which is the result of development and reinterpretation.

(2) Within the sociological tradition the term social theory is applied to two specific but interlinked things: (1) sociological taxonomies or systems of definitions organised as schemas, employing sociological terminology to define individual concepts and relations; (2) systematically classed statements that take the form of laws, that is, ‘nomological’ statements (statements about relations that take the form of general laws) about society that can be supported by evidence (the certainty of proof) (Zetterberg, 1965, pp. 1–29).

German sociologist Karl Otto Hondrich (1976) associates the following four dimensions of a sociological theory:

(1) content (a theory is a system of concepts and statements about a particular content, which is social reality);

(2) the methodological dimension (this represents the general starting point for research);

(3) the political dimension (often an instrument for controlling social reality); and⁵

(4) research orientation (as the stimulus for research on social reality) (Hondrich, 1976, p. 14).

Francis Abraham (1982, p. 1) defines theory as a ‘conceptual scheme designed to explain observed regularities, or relationships between two or more variables’. He follows this rather laconic definition with a list of further specific characteristics:

• A theory is expressed through properly defined concepts, logically interconnected to form propositions.
• A theory is a systemic symbolic construct that sheds light on facts which were previously unclear and murky. Constructing a theory is a creative exercise that requires a qualitative leap beyond the manifest.
• A theory is provisional, open to revision in response to new insights and facts. It is neither necessary nor desirable that a sociological theory be formulated definitively once and for all.
• It is possible to test whether a theory is supported by the sum of known facts and evident truths.
• A theory is a systematised formulation that tries to unite the demands of the humanistic tradition (e.g., speculation, creativity) with the demands of the scientific tradition (e.g., measurability, rigorousness, inductiveness, predictability) (Abraham, 1982, pp. 7–8).⁶

Abraham also defines eight functions a sociological theory should fulfil. It should:

(1) orientate science in the direction of its research problems;

(2) make it possible to predict facts;

(3) systematise the objects of research and the relations between them into corresponding conceptual schema;

(4) establish a tie between empirical findings and mainstream sociological perspectives, thereby increasing its informational value;

(5) be testable via the hypotheses it formulates, and amenable to facts;

(6) steer research and thereby define and, as it were, narrow down the scope of facts studied;

(7) provide instruments of research; and

(8) identify gaps in current knowledge and seek to fill them with intuitive, experiential and amplifying generalisations (Abraham, 1982, pp. 12–13).

A further list of criteria that a sociological theory should meet is provided in Modern Sociological Theory by Malcolm Waters (1994). According to Waters, a theory must be:

• abstract, that is, using general concepts abstracted from social life;
• thematised;
• logically consistent;
• explanatory in relation to the form, nature and existence of social phenomena;
• generally applicable to every case of the given phenomenon;
• independent, that is, providing explanations that do not depend on how social actors themselves explain their actions; and
• substantively valid, that is consistent with what is known about social life both by lay actors and sociologists (Waters, 1994, p. 3).

Waters in addition distinguishes three types of sociological theory: ‘formal’, ‘substantive’ and ‘positivist’. Formal theories put forth the general foundations of scientific knowledge to establish a basic scheme of concepts, theoretical judgements or principles to explain social life in its broadest and most general features. Substantive theories – unlike formal theories – seek not to capture social life in its entirety, but rather to offer a thorough explanation of specific types of social process. Positivist theories explain the empirical relations between variables by relating them to certain general, abstract statements and showing how they can be deductively explained on the basis of these statements (Waters, 1994, pp. 3–4).

In Sociological Theory since 1945, Jeffrey C. Alexander (Alexander, 1987b) argues it is necessary to distinguish between ‘general’ and ‘special’ theories. Overall he describes theory as generalisations derived from particulars, and abstraction derived from particular cases (Alexander, 1987b, p. 2). He notes that there are many ‘special’ theories in sociology, such as about stratification, socialisation, politics and administration, and these special theories are the concern of specialist disciplines (Alexander, 1987b, p. 3). Alexander writes that in his own work he wants to focus not on these special theories, but on general theory, and he considers it one of the basic functions of a general theory to connect or unite individual special theories. A characteristic feature of a general theory is that it is broad in scope, relating to society as a whole, or to modernity, rather than to individual subgroups; it deals with interactions in general, not specific types of interactions.⁷ Alexander points out that there are special theories about economic classes in society, about the middle- or the working class, but general theory, like Marxist theory, combines these special theories into one broader theory about economic development and class relations as such.

Alexander looks at the question of how theories are produced (Alexander, 1987b, pp. 5–6), including the conventional view that theories are induced from data, that is, from empirical facts where scientists study many specific cases and gradually formulate generalisations based on the features they are found to have in common. A theory generated in this way is a kind of ‘covering law’ that plays a major role in further empirical research.

Alexander notes that although it would be convenient to think that science is constructed inductively, it is inherently untrue. A theory cannot be constructed without facts, nor can it be built from facts alone. In this respect, he points out that many contemporary philosophers of science acknowledge that theory basically precedes generalisation. This means that we are always armed with theories when we enter the world of facts, and moreover we use facts to verify or falsify general theoretical conceptions. This approach is not fully valid, according to Alexander, where it concerns a general theory, which he concludes cannot be conclusively and decisively based on facts, even though references to facts are considered to be a vital test of any theory. He argues that while facts may constitute a kind of challenge to specific claims made within a theory, this challenge is nonetheless limited in two ways:

(1) The facts that we use to test our theory are ipso facto determined by the theory itself.

(2) Even when theoretical assertions are falsified, rarely do we wholly abandon the general theory of which the assertions formed just part. Instead, we revise our theory to deal with these new facts.

Alexander argues that the real world defines the boundaries in which our theorising takes place, simply because reality is where life occurs (the fact that we live in reality does not mean that we necessarily know exactly what it is). Apart from this primary link to reality, however, the production of theory is also influenced by what Alexander identifies as non-factorial or non-empirical practices. This refers to the mode of thinking that precedes scientific contact with the real world, which a priori structures the real world as we acquire knowledge of it. Alexander associates non-factorial approaches with dogmas taught in higher education, intellectual socialisation and scientists’ imaginative speculations (Alexander, 1987b, p. 6). As a scientific theory is constructed, non-factorial, non-empirical processes are modified by the real world, but are not done away with. In this respect, Alexander talks about a two-way relationship between theory and facts: theory influences how we view facts, and facts how we view theory.

Alexander calls the non-empirical part of science the ‘a priori element’ (Alexander, 1987b, p. 6). According to him, this a priori element is sustained not by observation but by tradition. He acknowledges that it may seem odd to speak of tradition, in that science is commonly regarded as the epitome of rationality and modernity and thus opposed to tradition; however, from his viewpoint it follows that science – especially when rational – is vi...