Al-Qaeda's Post-9/11 Devolution

The Failed Jihadist Struggle Against the Near and Far Enemy

Anthony Celso

• Publisher: Bloomsbury Academic
• Year: 2014
• Print ISBN: 9781501312441
• eBook ISBN: 9781441152893
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: National Security
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This examination of al-Qaeda's decline since the 9/11 attacks focuses on the terror organization's mutation and fragmentation. It looks at its partnership with the local and regional jihadist networks that played a pivotal role in the Madrid, London, and Fort Hood attacks, arguing that, although initially successful, such alliances actually unraveled following both anti-terror policies and a growing rejection of violent jihadism in the Muslim world. Challenging conventional theories about al-Qaeda and homegrown terrorism, the book claims that jihadist attacks are now organized by overlapping international and regional networks that have become frustrated in their inability to enforce regime change and their ideological goals. The discussion spans the war on terror, analyzing major post 9/11 attacks, the failed jihadist struggle in Iraq, al-Qaeda's affiliates, and the organization's future prospects after the death of Osama Bin Laden and the Arab Spring. This assessment of the future of the jihadist struggle against Muslim governments and homegrown Islamic terrorism in the West will be an invaluable resource to anyone studying terrorism and Islamic extremism.

1

Al-Qaeda’s Jihadist Worldview

Thus the plague that exists in the nations of Muslims has two causes: The first is the presence of American hegemony and the second is the presence of rulers that have abandoned Islamic law and who identify with this hegemony, serving its interests in exchange for securing their own interests. The only way for us to establish the religion and alleviate the plague which has befallen Muslims is to remove this hegemony which has beset upon the nations of worshipers and which transforms them, such that no regime that rules on the basis of Islamic law remains. The way to remove this hegemony is to continue our direct attrition against the American enemy until it is broken and is too weak to interfere in the matters of the Islamic world. After this phase comes the phase in which the second cause-rulers who have abandoned Islamic law are toppled, and this will be followed by the phase in which God’s religion is established and Islamic law rules.

Osama bin Laden¹

This book examines al-Qaeda’s jihadist worldview as expressed in its ideology and practice. It is a study of the group and its progressive devolution since 9/11. Movements are about ideas that compel their adherents into action. For the jihadist movement this involves war and martyrdom. Jihad compels violent action against apostates and foreign aggressors in the defense and expansion of Islam.

The jihadist worldview entails a set of beliefs that impel some purposeful violent action. The connection between Islam and Jihadism can be quite complex and thorny.² The centrality of jihad in Islam has inspired much controversy among scholars.³ Controversies are endemic to scholarly investigation of Radical Islam and Jihadism for it is a minefield beset by definitional quandaries and methodological problems. Scholars continue to debate over the meaning of Islamism, Radical Islam, and Salafism.⁴

This book deals with al-Qaeda’s reinterpretation of a variant of Radical Islamist thought known as Jihadism. It is not an effort to examine Islamism, Salafism, or Islam. Its central aim is to analyze al-Qaeda and how it has reconfigured the ideology and practice of jihad. Since al-Qaeda subscribes to jihadist ideology it is imperative to look at the tradition’s core precepts and its historic-philosophical origins. It is a fairly complex and varied ideology.

Al-Qaeda’s ideological and religious origins

Though Jihadism has roots in Islamism, Salafism, and Islam it is a conceptually distinct doctrine recognized by diverse theorists.⁵ Jihad’s meaning is a source of contention—classical Quranic interpretations view it as war in defense of Islam not as in later Sufi interpretations as personal struggle. Some view Jihadism as a perversion of Islam and Islamism because of its follower’s takfiri tendency to view Muslims not committed to their cause as “apostates.”⁶ Though most Muslims accept jihad as an important religious duty, they view it as a defensive doctrine and not as an affirmative obligation to violently spread Islam. Historically jihad has been a collective responsibility undertaken by state entities in the defense and expansion of Islam.

Jihadism is pronounced in its violent agitation against impious Muslims and foreigners. It is an ideology that espouses multiple confrontations. While Jihadism seeks the recreation of the “enlightened rule” of Mohammad and his four “righteous” successors, it is not purely a Salafist doctrine, and is influenced by Marxist and fascistic ideas that transport it far from the classical tenets of Islam.⁷

Many Salafists who share the jihadist desire to recreate an authentic pure Islam want to achieve it by nonviolent evolution. Many prescribe preaching as a principal mode to achieve their desired ends. Whether the Salafists can achieve their Sharia state without the use of coercion is questionable. But at least conceptually one can make a distinction.

The exhortation to violence in the jihadist worldview sets it apart from Islam, Salafism, and Islamism. It is an ideology inspired by Islam but carried forth by political events, personal ambitions, and a doctrinal obeisance to European fascistic-communist ideas that extol violence, the glory of war, and the cleansing of impurity to achieve social justice. Like its fascist and communist brethren, it feeds off real and imaginary social injustices and the transcendental need for the recreation of a mythical past.⁸ Frequently such beliefs lead to nihilistic behavior.

Jihadism’s propensity for violence knows no bounds and seeks to eviscerate that which lies in its immediate path. A fact underscored by the bloody history of Jihadism waged primarily against Muslims some of whom today are Islamists. The jihadist use of unrestrained violence predates the Crusades and is instead imbedded in the theological and political struggles of the Muslim community called the ummah.⁹

Jihadism desires the recreation of a mythic idealized past based on the seventh-century evolution of Islam through violent means. Its emotive and spiritual power is based upon the exaltation of a glorious past, its castigation of an ignominious present and its promise of a transcendent future that restores God’s sovereignty (Hakimiya) on Earth.

The ideology desires to purify the ummah of foreign influence for jihadists believe Westernization is responsible for Islam’s regression. Accordingly, the Ottoman Empire’s decline, its subsequent collapse and European colonization are vivid testimony to the ummah’s misguided acculturation of foreign influence. The West’s unnatural ascendance is interpreted by jihadists as an aberration that can be transcended by internal purification, violent agitation, and revolution.

Jihadism has been defined as a modern phenomenon anchored in fundamentalist reactions to Western dominance.¹⁰ While a correct interpretation is jihadist agitation has historical antecedents. Jihadism is also furthered by the Quran’s later passages that hail violent confrontation against apostates and exalt Islamic conquest.

The theological impulse for war contained in the Medina suras contributed to violent confrontations in Islam’s formative development.¹¹ Early Islam was beset by violent power struggles that contradict the jihadist conception of a mythic idealized past.¹² Internecine conflict over who should rule the ummah endures to this day and is a persistent theme of Islamic history.

The war within the Muslim world

The battle over Islam’s development begins with seventh-century struggle between Ali and Othman over succession to the caliphate. The death of Mohammad’s fourth successor left a leadership void with two claimants contending for power. Based on his status as the Prophet’s son-in-law Ali claimed rightful passage to rule, a right that Othman a Syrian governor contested.

The resulting civil war ended when Ali retired his candidacy and was murdered by outraged supporters disgusted by his capitulation. Ali’s conflict with Othman has enduring sectarian and ideological repercussions. Both the Shia-Sunni split and revolutionary jihadist traditions are anchored in this period.¹³ The extreme violence witnessed in contemporary Syria is indelibly shaped by both sectarian and jihadist passions.

Othman’s “victory” over Ali would never be accepted by Ali’s supporters who mounted fierce campaigns against Othman’s impious rule. Succession to the caliphate was plagued by multiple interpretations. Shiites centered on the genealogical connections to Mohammad’s family while Sunni radicals fixated on the piety of the ruler and his fidelity to traditional Islamic principles. As Efraim Karsh reminds us, caliphate succession issues involve politics and personal ambition that comarry with sectarian and ideological passions.¹⁴ Invariably these conflicts have frustrated the attainment of a unified ummah capable of achieving global dominance.

Efforts to control the ummah’s development have inspired fanatics who seek to recreate Mohammad’s rule and luxuriate in Allah’s divine radiance.¹⁵ They have used unrestrained violence justified by religious mandates. It has given rise to a culture of martyrdom and retribution that has inspired multitudes.

These historical rivalries contribute to conflict in the Muslim world that has profound significance for Western security. The intersection of intra-Muslim conflict and foreign conspiracy is a central narrative of Medieval and Modern Islamic radicals. Much of their discourse alludes to conspiratorial anti-Islamic plots and insidious plans.

Jihadism has a significant historical pedigree rooted in the rejection of apostate “Muslim” rulers. According to this narrative, Greek and Persian influences under the Umayyad and Abbasid caliphates had corrupted Muslim rulers and created internal atrophy. This sets the stage for the collapse of the Ottomans and European conquests of the Middle East and North Africa.

Jihadists believe this occurred early in Islam’s development. The eighth-century Kharajite rebellions against impious Sunni leaders exacerbated the sectarian divide and gave legitimacy to Shi’ite populist revolts against corrupt Sunni rulers whose foreign influence, inadequate genealogical lineage, and worldly ambitions disqualified their rule.¹⁶

The Kharajites would be followed by their eleventh- and twelfth-century ideological heirs the Assassins whose fierce terror campaigns struck fear in Sunni apostate rulers and European crusaders.¹⁷ Such fanaticism remains a central characteristic of Shi’ite radicalism represented by elite formations like Hezbollah and the Revolutionary Guards.

Outrage over impious rulers reoccurs throughout Islamic history and explains the inability of Muslim leaders to achieve hegemonic dominance.¹⁸ The desire to recreate a mythic past is reflected in the role of the Mahdi in Islamic philosophy.¹⁹ He represents a quasi-divine figure capable of morally cleansing society, rectifying past injustice, and restoring past glory.

The Islamist response to foreign domination

Resistance to foreign corruption and Islamic revisionism is contained in the work of medieval Turkish-Syrian scholar Ibn Taymiyya who urged rebellion against Mongol rulers whose conversion to Islam was seen as unauthentic.²⁰ Modern Islamist theorists like Abul Ala Maududi and Sayyid Qutb make reference to Taymiyya in their philosophical works. Both see themselves in his tradition of radical violent agitation.²¹

Hostility to the non-Arab Muslims corrupted by Western or Asiatic influence may reflect Arab Islamic chauvinism that, despite Islam’s international aspiration, seeks to recreate the early successes of Islamic Arab rulers. Ephraim Karsh argues this sentiment propelled the development of Pan-Arab nationalism that despite its secular orientation took great pride in past Arab caliphates.²² The Pan-Arabists looked to Islam as an important factor in building a coalition against Israel.

The impulse toward rebellion against impiety and its concomitant desire to recreate a mythic utopian past has inspired many modern Islamist thinkers amenable to but not reflexive in their violent activism. Jihadist movements are inspired by foreign aggression and corrupting internal influence. While the Crusades and Colonialism had catalyzed jihadist movements, external aggression is an important but not necessary condition. Many Western analysts mistakenly believe that jihadists have no inherent violent tendencies.²³ This position is contradicted by radical Islamist theorist defenses for jihad and global conquest. Jihadist struggles predate Western ascendance.

Muslim assimilation of Western influences, however, does play a vital role in jihadist development. Within the context of the Ottoman Empires atrophy, Napoleon’s expeditionary forces in Egypt invited an intense debate in the Muslim World.²⁴ Most Muslim intellectuals sought to incorporate Western influence and some promoted cultural adjustment to facilitate modernization. With its close juxtaposition to Europe, the Turks were leaders in this regard. Acculturation to Western values increased during the final stages of the Ottoman Empire and accelerated dramatically under Kemal Ataturk post-WWI secularization campaign and abolition of the caliphate. Jihadists consider Ataturk’s abolition of the caliphate in 1924 as the epitome of evil.

Assimilation and incorporation of Western influence was not universal. The nineteenth-century Mahdist revolt in Sudan expressed jihadist rage against the Colonial period. Sudanese Sufi mystic Mohammad Ahmad launched a rebellion against the British supported Ottoman-Egyptian occupation. Proclaiming himself Mahdi, he sought to liberate the Sudan of apostates and foreigners.

Driven by Messianic desires to create an authentic Islamic community, the Mahdi achieved some success with th...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half-title
• Introduction: Al-Qaeda’s Post-9/11 Devolution and Its Diffuse Network of “Associates,” “Affiliates,” Insurgents, and “Homegrown” Terrorists
• 1 Al-Qaeda’s Jihadist Worldview
• 2 Al-Qaeda’s Formation and Its Far Enemy Strategy
• 3 Al-Qaeda’s Post-9/11 Strategy and Organizational Devolution
• 4 Al-Qaeda’s Role in the Madrid and London Bombings
• 5 Zarqawi: Al-Qaeda’s Tragic Antihero and the Destructive Role of the Iraqi Jihad
• 6 Al-Qaeda’s Affiliates and Insurgent Groups in Somalia, Yemen, and the Maghreb
• 7 West Africa: The Latest Jihadist War
• 8 Al-Qaeda Plots and Attacks against the United States after 9/11
• 9 Is Al-Qaeda on the Brink of Defeat? Bin Laden’s Death and the Impact of the Arab Spring
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index