Globalization And Localization: The Chinese Perspective

The Chinese Perspective

Zhenglai Deng

• Publisher: WSPC
• Year: 2011
• Print ISBN: 9789814374408
• eBook ISBN: 9789814397155
• Topic: Biological Sciences
• Subtopic: Science General
• Index: Biological Sciences

The aim of this book is to provide the international readership a collection of articles authored by Chinese scholars on the subject of globalization and localization. In a world where no country is an island isolated from others, globalization is bound to be contested, debated, and de- and re-constructed at different levels across the international community. For this very reason, it is important to present this concept as developed, interpreted and discussed by the Chinese community.

The scope of book is broad, ranging from theoretical reflection to more concrete opinions given by the Chinese academic community, and finally to case studies on globalization and localization. It includes eleven articles by leading Chinese scholars in the past decades.

Contents:

• Theoretical Reflections:
  • Universalism and Critique of Ideology in Global Politics (Tong Shijun)
  • Toward the True World Culture: The Multiple Universalities in the Era of Globalization (Chen Lai)
  • Economic Globalization and Cultural Pluralism (Wan Junren)
• Chinese Perspectives on Globalization:
  • Premise Analysis of the Fundamental Tasks of China's Contemporary Legal Philosophy — “The World Structure” as a Historic Condition (Deng Zhenglai)
  • China's Perspective on the Globalization Research (Yu Keping)
  • Chinese World Outlook: All-under-Heaven System (Zhao Tingyang)
  • The Dialectic and Historical Determination of Cultural Subjectivity (Zhang Xudong)
• Globalization and Localization: Case Study:
  • China: A Society of Intra-Systems (Wang Hui)
  • The Chinese Model of Development: An International Perspective (Cheng Yung-nien)
  • Globalization: Production of Culture and Cultural Identity — Ethnic Group, Local Society and Transnational Cultural Circle (Ma Guoqing)
  • Globalization and Regional Income Inequality Empirical Evidence from within China (Guanghua Wan, Ming Lu and Zhao Chen)

Readership: Students, professional, general public who are interested in the topics of globalization and localization, such as universalism, cosmopolitanism, critique of ideology, and cultural subjectivity.

Part I

Theoretical Reflections

Chapter 1

Universalism and Critique of Ideology in Global Politics^*

Tong Shijun^*

Abstract

Jürgen Habermas's criticism of the so-called liberal nationalism, behind the global strategy of the Bush Administration of USA, is significantly parallel to his criticism of the basic theoretical design of John Rawls's theory of justice, although the latter is supposed to belong to the same Kantian tradition as Habermas's own theory. This chapter argues that there are three types of “universalism” involved here: the dialogue “universalism” advocated by Habermas, the monologue “universalism” by the American neo-conservatism, and the virtual dialogue “universalism” by John Rawls, which stands in between the former two. The chapter then argues that unlike the classical Critical Theory, the Habermasian version of Critical Theory seems to be engaged in a kind of critique of ideology which aims not to expose the false consciousness or reverted consciousness covering particularistic interests of particular groups, but to expose the one-sided consciousness or fragmented consciousness whose influence reaches across different groups. It is because of this that Habermas's attitude towards the Kosovo War of 1999, though seen to be an apology for it, is actually critical somehow, and his attitude towards the Iraq War of 2003, though seem to be a condemn of it, could also be regarded as a kind of justification. Habermas criticized the decision-makers in the American and British governments for their inability to understand the true meaning of the universalistic principle that they claim to be advocating. Habermas's criticism is towards this self-contradictory thinking which according to him is much more condemnable than their supposedly evil motives and imprudent strategies.

A significant divergence exists between the neo-conservatism theory that dominates the modern American politics and the liberalism theory represented by John Rawls that dominates the modern American political circle. But important similarity exists between the critique of the former and the latter, which were made by German philosopher Jürgen Habermas. On the other hand, Habermas justified the Kosovo War launched by NATO in 1999 but criticized the Iraq War launched by America and Britain in 2003, though both were launched with America as the leader and were directed at a sovereign state without authorization of the UN. The chapter tries to analyze the above phenomena so as to expose three types of “universalisms” in modern international politics and two types of critique of ideologies.

1.

Contrary to the Atlanticism, proposed in “The West: Unique, not Universal” published by Samuel Huntington in 1996, the Bush Administration after taking office in 2001, pursued the foreign policy of Globalism and Unilateralism clearly opposed by Huntington. The core of Globalism is to promote the American Values considered to have universal appeal. On the other hand, Unilateralism throws light on belief of the American neo-conservative which is upholding this foreign policy that America shall unilaterally carry out the policy since these values cannot get the support of other countries including the primary NATO. The Atlanticism, held by Huntington, is replaced by a special kind of Americanism in the national security strategy of the Bush Administration. The Americanism is characterized by the fact that its crucial point is not to expand and maintain American national interests around the world (though this point is actually the constituent part of American foreign policy today), but to expand and maintain American national values — the constitutors of American foreign policy deem that such American values as freedom, democracy, and rule of law have universal validity throughout the world.

In his recently published articles and interviews, Habermas sharply criticized this type of “universalism,” and pointed out that its root has a view such as “a subject trying to objectify both itself and the world around it” and “trying to bring everything under control.”¹ From the view of the single subject, values — even the values possibly winning the worldwide general acceptance — are taken as the things owned by the private persons and distributed and exported around the world; this view does not realize that the meaning and validity of these values depends on the understanding and approval made by all people concerned from their own views. In an article entitled “Interpreting the Fall of a Monument,” Habermas writes:

“It is precisely the universalistic core of democracy and human rights that forbids their unilateral realization at gunpoint. The universal validity claim that commits the West to its ‘basic political values’, that is, to the procedure of democratic self-determination and the vocabulary of human rights, must [not] be confused with the imperialist claim that the political form of life and the culture of a particular democracy — even the oldest one — is exemplary for all societies. The ‘universalism’ of the old empires was of this sort, perceiving the world beyond the distant horizon of its borders, only from the centralizing perspective of its own worldview. Modern self-understanding, by contrast, has been shaped by an egalitarian ‘universalism’ that requires a decentralization of one's own perspective.”²

The “universalism” advocated by Habermas is different from that of the American neo-conservatism, and it can be summarized as the opposition between a cosmopolitan “universalism” and a nationalist “universalism” because its purpose is to pursue what Kant refers to as “a civil society, which can administer justice universally,”³ not a society where hegemony imposes laws all over the world. This society defines in advance, equal relations among all sides; therefore, the “universalism” of cosmopolitanism advocated by Habermas is also a type of “Universalism of Equalitarianism,” and is different from the universalism of hierarchism advocated by American neo-conservative — deeming that a few people and countries have rights to force such “universalism” values as democracy and freedom on other people and countries.⁴ Whereas, the equality discussed here is not the validity or legitimacy of substantial contents of any culture, but refers to the equal status of actors — including actors beyond boundaries of national states — in discussing, dialoguing, or negotiating the meaning and validity of standards and values which they involve. In this way, the “universalism” advocated by Habermas in his discourse theory can be called dialogical “universalism,” opposing the monological “universalism” advocated by American neo-conservatism. The dialogue includes not only the virtual adoption of others' roles and views when each actor chooses the action plan relating to others, but the actual discussion and negotiation between all parties and their representatives. With regard to the “universalism” of American neo-conservatism, Habermas wrote:

“…that non-Western cultures must appropriate the universalistic content of human rights from their own resources and in their own interpretation, one that will construct a convincing connection to local experiences and interests.”

“And this is why multilateral will-formation in interstate relations is not simply one option among others. From its self-chosen isolation, even the good hegemon, having appointed itself as the trustee of general interests, cannot know whether what it maintains is in the interest of others to do is, in fact, equally good for all. There is no sensible alternative to the ongoing development of international law into a cosmopolitan order that offers an equal and reciprocal hearing for the voices of all those affected.”⁵

2.

To sum up, there are two main points about the above critique of Liberal Nationalism⁶ as shown in American–British foreign policy by Habermas: one is to say that it starts from the monological view of the lonely subject; the other is to say that it takes values of universal validity as things which can be owned and distributed. It's worth noting that the two critiques of the liberal nationalism by Habermas have the apparent similarity with his critique of the basic theoretical design of John Rawls's theory of justice.

The starting point of John Rawls's theory of justice is the so-called Original Position: the reasonable representative person rationally chooses after filtering through the veil of ignorance, anything related to his special position. Habermas puts forward three questions about the theoretical design:

“(1) Can the parties in the original position comprehend the highestorder interests of their clients solely on the basis of rational egoism? (2) Can basic rights be assimilated to the primary goods? (3) Does the veil of ignorance guarantee the impartiality of judgment?”⁷

The first two questions basically correspond to the two critiques of the liberal nationalism brought up by Habermas: regarding the monologist's view as the starting point, and confusing universal values (standards) with goods.

As for the first point, Habermas thinks that the rational design of the Original Position gives all parties a kind of the first person view like the rational egoist, not a kind of moral point of view, considering the moral question — what is equally good for everyone — the necessary of adopting the perspectives of others or the opposite sides: “At any rate, the parties are incapable of achieving, within the bounds set by their rational egoism, the reciprocal perspective taking that the citizens they represent must undertake when they orient themselves in a just manner to what is equally good for all.”⁸

As for the second point, Habermas criticizes Rawls for not distinguishing the Rechte or rights, applicable to all the people, from the Gueter or goods which are only applicable to a single person or a group of people: in the original position, rights are just chosen by all parties as one category of “goods” among others: “For them, the issue of principle of justice can only arise in the guise of the question of the just distribution of primary goods.”⁹ It is especially notable about the following explanation of rights by Habermas:

“Rights can be ‘enjoyed’ only by being excercised. They cannot be assimilated to distributive goods without forfeiting their deontological meaning. An equal distribution of rights results only if those who enjoy rights recognize one another as free and equal. Of course, there exist rights to a fair share of goods or opportunities, but rights in the first instance regulate relations between actors: they cannot be ‘possessed’ like things.”¹⁰

Here, Habermas distinguishes not only rights from Güter or Goods, but rights from Dinge or Things. He opposes “Werten” and “Güter” in the article entitled as “Was bedeutet der Denkmalsturz?” Though “Werten” can be translated as “Value,” while viewed from the context and the adjective “universal” before it, it actually refers to the standard or rights in the deontological sense, not the value in the teleological sense or the utilitarian sense. Accordingly, although Güter means what is generally referred to as Value, it is close to the value in the market which means — close to things instead of value in the axiological sense.

At any rate, the problems we have here are: on one hand, Habermas calls the divergence between his political thought (and that of the European tradition represented by him) and the American–British political thought as the dispute between Kantian cosmopolitanism and Mill's liberal nationalism, while he calls the dispute between Rawls and him as the dispute within a family¹¹ under the common premise of Kantian concept of autonomy; on the other hand, though belonged to same Kantian tradition, Habermas criticizes Rawls in a way which he criticizes “liberal nationalism.” How shall we understand the contradiction between the two sides?

In order to answer this question, I am going to compare Rawls's political theory with liberal nationalism. In Habermas's opinion, both have the theoretical premises of (what we might call) a monologue-oriented theory and a goods-oriented theory, but can these two shared-theoretical premises lead to the same conclusions in the field of international politics — the file where Habermas criticizes liberal nationalism?

3.

Rawls's theory of international politics is the result of the second and the third application of the theoretical design of original position. The first application of the original position is in the domestic context, or context of the domestic politics of the liberal democracies. The second application of the original position is among liberal people, which is to extend the concept of liberalism to the law of peoples. The fundamental interests of liberal people include political independence, free culture, safety, territory, their citizens' well-being and most importantly, respecting oneself. But inequalities of certain kinds still exist among people in various cooperative institutions. Just like Kant, Rawls does not agree with the unified world-government, because he believes this would be either a worldwide absolutism or a fragile empire that can easily fall apart. Many different types of organizations will obey the people, regulate the cooperation among people, and perform some recognized responsibilities.

The third application of the original position is to extend its application from liberal people to non-liberal (hierarchical) but decent people, and together they are called well-ordered people. A decent hierarchical society accords with two standards. Externally, although it has comprehensive world views, it does not have aggressive aims, and at most seeks to influence others by peaceful means. Internally, it respects human rights of its members according to its common good idea of justice: the right to life, property, freedom of religion and thought, and formal equality expressed by the rules of natural justice; its legal system assigns bona fide moral duties and obligations to all persons within its territory; a sincere and not unreasonable belief exists among their judges and other officials who administer the legal system that the law is indeed guided by a common good idea of justice.

A major concern implicit throughout Rawl's idea of the law of peoples is what are “the ideals and principles of the foreign policy for liberal people.”¹² The reason why the viewpoint of decent people is taken into account is not to formulate the just principles for them, but to “assure ourselves that the ideals and principles of the foreign policy are also reasonable from a decent non-liberal point of view.”¹³ According to him, the foreign policy of a society with predominantly liberal people should consider the essential issue of tolerance towards its non-liberal people. Rawls's understanding is that the true meaning of tolerance is to refrain from using political sanctions to force people to change their ways, and to treat non-liberal societies equally. If every society is made up of liberal people, political liberalism in the international level would be meaningless. Someone asserted that the guideline of liberal foreign policy should be framed in such a manner to change all non-liberal societies into liberal ones. But Rawls did not agree with this point, and gave his reason that had two sides. First was in procedural terms — this view commits the logical mistake of begging the question — the formulation of the foreign policy and the decision of sanctioning a particular society shall be taken in accordance with law of peoples, at the same time, people's representatives should be given the opportunity to participate in the formulation of the law of peoples. Since no nation will choose to harm itself, the utilitarian principle is not to be put forward as an alternative principle, so the different interpretations of those eight principles that he listed could be of interest. Political liberalism does not favor any comprehensive theory in both domestic context as well as international context. That is to say, it should not exclude any society with a particular background of world view that respects basic human rights. The procedure of expanding the domestic condition, which is based on the concept of liberalistic political justice to the law of peoples requires tolerating the non-liberal decent people. Secondly, in substantial terms, even if we want to change the non-liberal society to the liberal, we should not adopt the means of political sanction. For one thing, sanction means to refuse to respect people and its members, and this refusal needs convincing reasons, but since such people neither deny human rights and the right to be consulted or a substantial political role in decision-makings nor deprive the dissident's basic rights, there is no reason to sanction them. On the other hand, members of a non-liberal people are capable of changing their society by themselves from inside, so there is no reason deny them a chance. On the contrary, not respecting them will strangle this possibility. If liberal and constitutional democracy is advantageous, then it should be confident that proper respect of decent people will be conducive in turning them to a liberal one. The contempt on the one side and resentment on the other can only cause damage, and will not help to encourage changes towards liberalism. In other words, Rawls argues for the presence of mutual respect among people without endorsing cultural relativism at the same time.

Someone thinks that equality and inequality among people inside a hierarchical society is inconsistent and unjust, but Rawls clearly disagrees with this. He takes church and college for example, to illustrate that both can adopt various forms — internal members of some are equal, and those in ...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• Chief Editor
• List of Contributors
• Series on Developing China — Translated Research from China
• Preface: Paying Attention to Chinese Interpretations
• Introduction: Academic Inquiries into the “Chinese Success Story”
• Part I: Theoretical Reflections
• Part II: Chinese Perspectives on Globalization
• Part III: Globalization and Localization: Case Study
• Index