Japan's Strategic Challenges In A Changing Regional Environment

Purnendra Jain, Peng Er Lam

• Publisher: WSPC
• Year: 2012
• Print ISBN: 9789814368735
• eBook ISBN: 9789814440011
• Topic: Biological Sciences
• Subtopic: Science General
• Index: Biological Sciences

Japan faces significant challenges in both traditional and non-traditional areas of national security policy as the economic resurgence of China and the loss of US hegemonic clout significantly transform the strategic landscape of the Asia-Pacific region. How is Japan coping with this new global and regional politico-security environment? What strategic moves has it taken to best position itself for the future to maximize its global and regional influence? More importantly, how is Japan perceived within the region by traditionally close regional partners such as the US and Australia, by supporters in Southeast Asia, and by new competitors — most prominently China and India? What international role do these nations wish Japan to play? In this comprehensive volume, these crucial questions are explored in-depth by a group of scholars both distinguished and diverse.

Contents:

• Traditional Security:
• • Japan's Strategic Options? (Katahara Eiichi)
  • The US–Japan Alliance in the 21 st Century: A Chinese Perspective (Wang Jian Wei)
  • China and Japan: Hot Economics, Cold Politics? (Li Mingjiang)
  • Japan's Strategic Response to North Korea: Activistic Security Policy, Eroding Pacifism (Kim Sung Chull)
  • A 'United' Community in a Divided Region: Southeast Asia, Japan, China, and East Asian Community (Pavin Chachavalpongpun)
  • India and Japan: Sharing Strategic Interests? (Arpita Mathur)
  • Australia and Japan: Toward a Full Security Partnership? (David Walton)
• Non-Traditional Security:
• • Japan's Human Security and Peace-building: Between Aspirations and Limitations (Lam Peng Er)
  • Piracy and Maritime Security: Japan's Strategic Challenges (Sam Bateman)
  • Japan and the G8/G20: A Global/Regional Strategy in Financial Governance (Joel Rathus)
  • The Triple Disaster and Japan's Energy and Climate Change Policies (Purnendra Jain)
  • Rethinking Security in Japan: In Search of a Post-'Postwar' Narrative (Satoh Haruko)

Readership: Advanced undergraduate and graduate students of Japanese foreign relations and East Asian security; researchers interested in comparative security perspectives.

PART I: TRADITIONAL SECURITY

CHAPTER 1

JAPAN’S STRATEGIC OPTIONS?

Katahara Eiichi

Introduction

For the last 60 years or so since the end of World War II, it has been a taboo in Japan to discuss strategic options for Japan; to put it differently, Japan has arguably had no viable options other than one which can be considered strategically realistic and politically affordable, and that is the Japan–US alliance combined with Japan’s limited self-defence capability. Even today, almost two decades since the end of the Cold War, the Japan–US alliance remains the linchpin of Tokyo’s foreign and security strategy. Whenever Japan is confronted by international crises affecting its national security, say North Korea’s testing of a nuclear bomb and ballistic missiles or the 2010 collision between a Chinese trawler and Japanese Coast Guard vessels near the Senkaku islands in the East China Sea, many Japanese commentators as well as the mainstream media say, first and foremost, ‘What should we do? Yes, we’ve got to strengthen the Japan–US alliance.’ Japan’s psychological and material dependence on its Big Brother has been deeply etched in the minds of the majority of Japanese people. And Japan’s strategy has worked well in the postwar years, because it has obviated the need for the development of an autonomous military capability, and the need for larger financial cost of the country’s defence requirements. Japan’s alliance-first strategy has also been accepted not only by the United States, which underpinned the US-centred security order in the region, but also by almost all the countries in the region.

Indeed, the history of the Japan–US alliance has been a great success story not just in the modern history of Japan but in the broader international history of the Asia-Pacific region. With the economically strong and politically stable Japan allied with the US, no country felt threatened by Japan, thus allowing East Asian countries to devote their energies to economic and social development, without feeling the need to answer a Japanese defence buildup. One could argue further that the Japan–US alliance that ensures US military presence in the region has decisively contributed to the peace, stability, and economic prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region.

The triple disaster that hit Japan in March 2011 would have profound and far-reaching implications for Japan’s strategic policy in the decades ahead. Japan was struck by a massive earthquake and the ensuing tsunami that devastated many cities and villages along the Pacific coast of the Tohoku region. The horrific nuclear crisis that occurred in the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant, as a result, forced over 200,000 people residing within 20 km of the plant to evacuate, and contaminated a wide-spread area, air, water, soil, and food in an unprecedented way. While the remarkable resilience of the Japanese people in general, and the prompt and effective response of more than 100,000 Self-Defense Force troops for search and rescue missions in collaboration with US troops in particular deserve much credit, the disaster revealed serious weaknesses in leadership and governance of the central government. One of the major lessons that can be drawn from the experience of the 11 March triple disaster would be that Tokyo will require strong political leadership, transparent governance, and comprehensive national strategies for effective crisis management.

In this chapter, I argue that the first decade of the 21^st Century, Japan finds itself at a major historic turning point. What Japan does or does not over the next few years will likely determine its place in the region and in the world over the next few decades, if not much of the 21^st Century. I argue further that given the need for Japan’s recovery from the aftermath of the triple disaster and for its robust rebirth, and perhaps more consequentially, the power shift that has been underway in the region with rising China and India, the time has come for Japan to rethink its postwar strategic policy and think through its strategic options for the future.

First, I will briefly discuss some of the most critical security challenges confronting Japan, the region and the world at large, thus putting my argument in a proper strategic context. Second, I will offer an overview of Japan’s security policy during the last two decades. Third, I will consider three strategic options for Japan. These are 1) the continuation of the status quo — the policy of keeping the US as the foundation of Japan’s security strategy while taking a low profile defence posture; 2) a global civilian power option with proactive participation in international peace-building and security cooperation especially in areas of non-traditional security issues; and 3) a normal state option — the policy of self-reliant military posture with matured allied relations with the US and security partnerships with major powers in the world.

The Strategic Context

The evolving strategic environment presents many difficult security challenges, both regional and global. First, a nuclear-armed and dictatorial North Korea with ballistic missiles would pose direct military threats to Japan and the region. It would seriously destabilise the regional balance of power. It would also test the validity of multilateral diplomacy centring on the Six-party Talks, and the credibility of the Japan–US alliance. International efforts in pursuing de-nuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula have not shown any positive results. Indeed, the situation seems to be deteriorating since North Korean submarine’s alleged torpedo attack on the ROK’s warship Cheonan on 26 March 2010, claiming 46 lives of Korean sailors and Pyongyang’s shelling of Yeonpyeong island on 23 November 2010. We are confronted with an increasingly belligerent, unpredictable, and inherently unstable Pyongyang that appears to be determined to accelerate its nuclear and ballistic missile program. Multilateral diplomacy of the Six-party Talks perhaps augmented with an effective dissuasion strategy should be pursued before Pyongyang succeeds in developing and deploying intermediate or even intercontinental ballistic missiles loaded with nuclear weapons.¹

Second, the re-emergence of China as a global actor presents a far-reaching challenge especially for policymakers in the region, given the ongoing power shift driven by China’s growing comprehensive national power and influence not just in the region but in the world at large, including Africa, outer space and cyberspace. China’s increasing military spending, its relentless build-up of air and space power, submarine and aircraft carrier capabilities, ballistic missiles, anti-satellite and cyber-warfare capabilities, and nuclear forces have aroused widespread concerns throughout the countries of East Asia. As Andrew Krepinevich argues in his Foreign Affairs article, Chinese efforts at developing and fielding what strategists refer to as ‘antiaccess/area denial’ capabilities would mean that ‘China has the means to put at risk the forward bases from which most US strike aircraft must operate.’ In his words, ‘East Asian waters are slowly but surely becoming a potential no-go zone for US ships, particularly for aircraft carriers,’ thus risking the forward deployment of US military forces becoming ‘wasting assets’.² Admiral Robert Willard, commander of the U.S. Pacific Command, noted in December 2010 that China’s anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) ‘has achieved initial operational capability (IOC),’ adding that ‘they (the Chinese) have aspirations to eventually become a global military power.’³

Yet China has progressively integrated into a multi-layered system of regional and global institutions, including Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and the World Trade Organization (WTO). In particular, China has been keen to deepen economic and political cooperation with neighbouring countries, and it is clear that China’s approaches to Taiwan have become significantly less belligerent since Ma Yingjeou and his Kuomingtang (KMT) returned to power in 2008. Managing the growing Chinese power and influence and shaping China’s strategic posture and policies would be critical if a new security order in the region is to be open, safe, and stable. Indeed this represents one of the greatest challenges facing Japan and the region at large. The accelerating integration of regional economies into that of China and the fact that China has become a central economic and political player not only in the region but in the global arena present profound strategic and possibly game-changing implications for a new international order in the 21^st century world.

Third, the situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan presents a difficult challenge not only for America, and its allies, but for the international community, given the danger of international terrorists acquiring nuclear weapons thus representing a serious threat to the world today. Al Qaeda and its extremist allies are operating actively in an increasingly unstable Pakistan which is armed with ‘the mid-90s to more than 110’ nuclear weapons.⁴ The US, along with the international community, has so far failed to build good governance in Afghanistan and Pakistan. It is a regional security problem yet requires a global response.

Finally, there are a host of the so-called non-traditional security challenges facing the world today, including cyber-attacks, climate change, nuclear proliferation, international terrorism, energy problems, natural disasters, piracy, and problems associated with failed states.

Japan’s Evolving Security Strategy Towards East Asia

Japan’s security policy has been significantly transformed since the 1990s. Consequently, the country’s security roles and missions have been expanded and its defence capabilities enhanced so as to meet emerging threats and diverse contingencies of the 21^st century world. Indeed, the last two decades saw the emergence of a national consensus that Japan should play a prominent role in international peace-building and humanitarian relief operations.⁵

The successes of the Japanese contribution to peace cooperation activities in Cambodia and East Timor helped consolidate public support for Japan’s international endeavours in these fields. The Self Defense Forces’ (SDF) non-combat logistical and reconstruction support for the US-led coalitions in Afghanistan and Iraq was also highly appreciated by the US and its allies. The SDF has also been actively participating in multilateral security cooperation activities, including disaster relief and humanitarian operation in response to the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, the ongoing peace cooperation activities in Haiti, the ongoing anti-piracy operation in the Gulf of Aden, and the Proliferation Security Initiatives (PSI) exercises. However, the question of how far Japan can go in peace-building, particularly with respect to the use of force, remains highly contested. Indeed, Japan’s past record has shown that Japan’s role has been a distinctly civilian one, engaging in administration, construction, logistics, humanitarian relief, and refugee matters. The scope of the SDF’s participation in international peace-building remains limited due to Japan’s restrictive interpretation of the constitution in relation to the use of force and domestic political reasons.⁶ Yet given the significant changes that have been taking place in Japan’s peace cooperation activities in recent years, and the ongoing review of Japan’s international role, there is a prospect that Japan will progressively become a more proactive player engaged in non-combatant missions.

The new National Defence Program Guidelines (2010 NDPG) adopted on 17 December 2010, represents the defence strategy of the Japanese government for the next 10 years, which lays out security objectives and means of Japan’s defence policy and its force structure.⁷ The fundamentals of Japan’s security policy such as the exclusively defensive defence policy and the three non-nuclear principles remain intact, yet there are six notable features in the new NDPG reflecting Tokyo’s changing perceptions of the strategic environment and new defence requirements. First, the NDPG calls for ‘a body at the Prime Minister’s Office dedicated to security policy coordination among relevant ministers and advisory to the Prime Minister,’ perhaps Japan’s equivalent of US National Security Council (NSC). Second, the time-honoured concept of the ‘Basic Defense Force Concept’ — a concept focused on static existence of defence capability so as to prevent a security vacuum arising — is superseded by ‘Dynamic Defense Force,’ a new concept which aims to enhance the credibility of Japan’s deterrent capability by promoting timely and active ‘operations.’ It should be noted, however, that Dynamic Defense Force cannot be interpreted as involving offensive, counter-force strike capability; the emphasis of Dynamic Defense Force is placed on readiness, mobility, ...

Table of contents

• Front Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• About the Contributors
• Japan’s 21st Century Strategic Challenges: Introduction
• Part I: Traditional Security
• Part II: Non-Traditional Security
• Index