PART I
Frameworks and Theories
Since the introduction of a market-oriented economy by the communist party-state, the influence of the official political ideology of Marxism–Maoism has been on the decline. This has led to a lack of belief in Marxism–Maoism by the Chinese public. This lack of belief has the potential to jeopardise the legitimacy of the party-state, and has become one of the biggest concerns of the communist party.
It seems that since the 1978 economic reforms, however, the party-state has found a new ideological approach to remedy the decreasing influence of the official ideology. This approach is not something new to China but something embedded in Chinese history and society. It is China’s tradition.
The following chapter attempts to lay the theoretical foundation for this book, looking first at the source of China’s traditions. It argues that there is a narrow definition and a broad definition of China’s traditions. According to the narrow one, “China’s tradition” refers to Confucianism alone. According to the broad one, “China’s traditions” refers to all the refined traditions that manifest in Chinese history, including Daoism and Chinese Buddhism in addition to Confucianism.
The second part of the chapter examines the topic of China’s traditions and Chinese modernity. It starts with an examination of the background to the political use of China’s traditions. It then looks at three modernist features of the political use of China’s traditions. It is argued that the political use of China’s traditions is part of China’s modernisation project. The topic on China’s traditions and Chinese modernity highlights the political use of China’s traditions.
The third part of the chapter examines the relationship between two competing modernist ideologies and China’s traditions. The two competing ideologies are Marxism–Maoism and Western liberalism. It is argued that since the introduction of a market-oriented economy by the party-state the official ideology of Marxism–Maoism has been challenged by Western liberalism, and that the influence of Marxism–Maoism has been declining. It is also argued that the party-state has shown an interest in using China’s traditions to fill the void left by a dying Marxism–Maoism.
This part proceeds by examining two approaches to the political use of China’s traditions — a neo-traditionalist and a modernist one. Two sub-groups can further be distinguished within the modernist camp. They are those of the Marxist–Maoists and the liberalists. Arguments and debates with regard to the use of Chinese traditions by neo-traditionalists and modernists (both Marxist–Maoist and liberalist) are examined.
The third part of the chapter looks at the Marxist–Maoist use of Chinese traditions. This can be understood through two theoretical lenses: nationalism and the invention of tradition. In the discourse regarding China’s traditions, cultural nationalism is used by Marxist–Maoists to unify the Chinese nation. It promotes the idea of a shared Chinese culture, history and identity. The invention of tradition is used by Marxist–Maoists to promote the idea that they are the only legitimate heirs to China’s traditions.
Chapter 1
China’s Traditions and Chinese Modernity: The Political Use of China’s Traditions
The Source of China’s Traditions
Tradition, as a concept, has played an important role in studies of political science. There is a significant difference between the Western and Chinese definitions of tradition, however. The Western definition emphasises transferring or delivering, while the Chinese definition emphasises the objects that are transferred and delivered.
In the Western literature, the word tradition derives from the Latin word tradere, which means to transfer or to deliver. Plato may be the first recorded political philosopher to talk about the political use of tradition in his examination of nomos. In the Seventh Letter, Plato expresses his concern over the deterioration of the old order and calls for nomos to restore it. According to him nomos are the sacred beliefs, rituals and thoughts of the ancestors. Rulers who comply with nomos understand the wisdom of the universe, practice good teachings and obey the good will within their souls. Rulers who do not act in accordance with nomos alter laws for their personal ends, show no respect for the ultimate being or for the sacred, and cultivate evil deeds among the people (Plato, 360 B.C.). Additionally, in The New Rhetoric, Aristotle acknowledges the role and influence of tradition in integrating the political community (Aristotle, 1926). From the perspective of these Western philosophers, the understanding of tradition begins with the action of transferring or delivering rather than the objects that are being transferred or delivered. Additionally, traditions have metaphysical and spiritual connotations: the action of transferring or delivering, where justified, is one that is sacred and decent in the eyes of God. This belief is very widespread from the ancient Greeks to the later Romans.
For the Chinese, tradition means the transmitted beliefs, ethics, customs, arts, systems and habits of the ancestors (Zhu, 2010). Since the Chinese definition of tradition refers to the objects that are transferred, it is natural to ask what the source of China’s traditions is. It is not an easy question to answer, however, given that China is a country with a recorded history of more than 3000 years encompassing the cultures, values, customs and arts of 56 ethnic groups. The question needs to be answered, though, before any serious examination of the political use of China’s traditions can take place.
Although it is hard to define China’s traditions, there is a body of literature on this topic by noted scholars specialising in China. According to these works, there is a broad definition of the source of China’s traditions and a narrow one.
According to the broad definition, the source of China’s traditions includes all of the beliefs, ideologies and values that manifest in Chinese history. The main sources of China’s traditions are therefore Confucianism, Daoism and Chinese Buddhism. This broad definition is supported by most scholars specialising in China. The two most notable books on the broad definition are those by Wm. Theodore de Bary and Feng Youlan (
).
Wm. Theodore de Bary’s book, entitled Sources of Chinese Tradition, is seen to be the most comprehensive sourcebook of Chinese civilisation ever published in a Western language. The contents of the book show what the editor’s perspective on the source of China’s traditions is. The first part of the book, The Chinese Tradition in Antiquity, considers the early development of Chinese civilisation and includes selections from Confucius, the texts of Mencius and Laozi, as well as other key texts from the Confucian, Daoist and Legalist schools. The second part, The Imperial Age: Ch’in and Han, focuses on Han China with readings from the major Han syntheses, and the great historians of the Han dynasty. Part three, New-Taoism and Buddhism, ranges from the earliest translations from Sanskrit to the central texts of the Chan School (which became Zen in J apan). This part also covers the teachings of Wang Bi, Daoist religion and texts of the major schools of Buddhist doctrine and practice. The fourth part, The Confucian Revival, details the revival of Confucian thought in the Tang, Song, and Ming periods, with historical documents that link philosophical thought to political, social, and educational developments in late imperial China. The final part, China and the New World, covers the period from the late Qin Dynasty until the establishment of the communist party-state. This part examines the topics of the opening of China to the West, the heavenly kingdom of the Taipings, the nationalist revolution, the New Culture Movement and Chinese communism.
Another book, entitled A History of Chinese Philosophy, was written by the distinguished Chinese scholar Feng Youlan. Since its original publication in Chinese in the 1930s, this work has been accepted by Chinese scholars as the most important single contribution to the study of the country’s philosophy. In 1937 the book was translated into English by Derk Bodde. Volume I of the book covers the period of the philosophers, from the beginnings to around 100 B.C., a philosophical period as remarkable as that of ancient Greece. Volume II discusses a period lesser known in the West — the period of classical learning from the second century B.C. to the 20th century.
After examining the contents of the books by De Bary and by Feng Youlan, it is clear that the main source of China’s traditions is Confucianism, Daoism and Chinese Buddhism. Chinese traditions are also influenced by other ideologies, such as Legalism, Western liberalism and communism. The influence on Chinese traditions of these ideologies is limited, however, when compared with that of the three major ideologies, Confucianism, Daoism and Chinese Buddhism.
As to the narrow definition of the source of China’s traditions, the usual reference is Confucianism. This argument is put forward by New Confucian scholars such as Tu Weiming, Jiang Qing, Kang Xiaoguang and Tang Yijie. From their point of view, the role of Confucianism for China is like the role of Christianity for the West. They argue that China’s Confucianism is the sole root of China’s civilisation and East Asian civilisations ( Jiang, 1989b; Tu, 1988).
This argument is attacked by scholars who subscribe to a broad definition of China’s traditions. They criticise this argument for being too narrow, and for excluding any other influence on China’s philosophies of politics and society. For example, in the late 19
th century bureaucratic intellectuals under the Qing Empire argued that Confucianism was the orthodox ideology of China and that Confucianism was superior to any other ideology in China. This argument was criticised by reformists such as Kang Youwei (
), Liang Qichao and Tan Sitong (
). Kang Youwei argued that Confucius himself was a reformer and that orthodox Confucianism needed to be reformed. Criticism of this argument by Liang Qichao and Tan Sitong went further than that by Kang. They regarded Confucianism as being inferior to Western ideologies. They said China should adopt the valuable parts of Western learning (Chang, 1971).
During the nationalist revolution the argument that Confucianism was the essence of China’s traditions was harshly criticised by modernists — Marxist modernists and liberalist modernists. Chen Duxiu and Hu Shi were the representative intellectuals of the early Marxist and liberalist approaches respectively. Chen Duxiu, in an article entitled The Way of Confucius and Modern Life, harshly condemned Confucianism and the influence of Confucianism on Chinese politics and society. Chen argued that Confucianism was feudal dross, and that it would prevent Chinese modernisation (Chen, 1916a). Hu Shi saw Western liberalism as being superior to Chinese Confucianism. He argued that Confucianism should be replaced by Western liberalism to further the project of Chinese modernisation (Grieder, 1970).
After the establishment of the party-state in China, Confucianism and other Chinese traditions were criticised by the communist party-state. This criticism was based on Chinese communism. According to Chinese communism, Chinese traditions had their essence and their dross. The dross of China’s traditions needs to be abandoned, and the essence needs to be selectively used for the purpose of constructing a Chinese-style communism (Mao, 1940).
Though criticised harshly by modernists, the narrow definition of the source of China’s traditions has been embraced by Chinese Confucians. This is because Chinese Confucians see Confucianism as the moral and spiritual root of Chinese civilisation. This argument is not based on reasoning. It is more like a genuine belief. When Confucianism is believed rather than known, it is hard to convince Confucians not to treat Confucianism as the root of China’s traditions.
This argument has been made in the works of China’s leading scholars of Confucianism. For example, Kang Xiaoguang, a leading New Confucian in mainland China, advocates the establishment of a Chinese “Confucian authoritarian regime” which would be under the rule of “Confucians with virtue”. Kang claims that due to differences in people’s virtue and ability, it would be rational to empower Confucians of virtue with the right to elect and be elected. Thus the ruling class in society would be nominated from among “Confucians of virtue”, and elected by “Confucians with virtue instead of all the people of the nation”. Although other people do not have the right to elect or be elected, they do “have the right to be ruled properly” (Kang, 2005). Kang’s “Confucian authoritarian regime” is an authoritarian utopia in which priority is given to such ideas as a rigid social hierarchy, good governance, and rule by men. This ideal regime seems to be the antithesis of both Western liberal democracy and Marxism. Another leading Confucian, Luo Yijun, holds that Confucianism should be studied according to the principles of traditional Chinese culture rather than those of Marxism or liberalism. The practice of examining Confucianism in any other way could lead to a distortion of the essential meaning of Confucianism. In
Lixing yu shengming (
Rationality and life), a work which is clearly more activist than academic, Luo Yijun invokes the New Confucian Manifesto of 1958, revealing beyond doubt the Confucians’ identification with their counterparts in Hong Kong and Taiwan. In fact, Luo makes no secret of their intention to bring this “more authentic brand of Confucianism” back to the mainland to nurture its people. Luo calls for the revival of Confucianism, so that it will replace Marxism–Maoism and become the orthodox ideology, nourishing the Chinese national spirit and guiding the nation in the 21
st century (Luo and Chen, 1994).
Chinese Traditions and Chinese Modernity
The Political Use of China’s Traditions: A Background
The contemporary political use of traditions by states is not something new. Using traditions politically is common throughout the modern history of human beings. States have a habit of using their traditions. Alexis De Tocqueville argued that the growth of a nation bears the “marks” of its origins. These marks are the “historical embeddedness” and the traditions of the nation (De Tocqueville, 1835: 39). Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger’s edited book The Invention of Tradition is an examination of the political use of tradition in several nations or imagined communities during various historical times. These cases include the political use of tradition in Scotland, in 1820–1977 Britain, in Victorian India, in colonial African countries and in 1870–1914 Europe (Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983).
Traditions ar...