Part I
A Theory of the WTO
Chapter 1
Triangulating the World Trade Organization*
One of the biggest challenges facing the World Trade Organization (WTO) is to determine its own mission.1 The failure to launch new trade talks at the WTOâs Ministerial Conference at Seattle in late 1999 was due, in large part, to disagreements between members about what ânewâ issues should be placed on the negotiating agenda.2 These problems continued to stymie the WTO in the runup to the Doha ministerial meeting in 2001.
Everyone agrees that the WTO ought to address proper issues, yet opinions diverge over what those issues are. For example, in April 2001, the WTO Director-General (D-G) (at the time) Mike Moore declared that governments âurgently need to broaden the agenda beyond the mandated negotiationsâ listed in the WTO Agreements. Nevertheless, he warned that while the âagenda has to be broad enough to have something in it for everyoneâ, it âmust exclude issues that are inappropriate or where compromise is impossibleâ.3 Yet Moore did not explain how to tell whether an issue is inappropriate. A few weeks later, the governments in the Group of Fifteen (now consisting of 17 countries that cooperate on economic development policy) issued a summit communiquĂ© stating that ânon-trade issues such as labour standards and environ mental conditionalities should not be included in the WTO agendaâ.4 This exclusion of labor and environment is specific, but the communiquĂ© did not explain why those issues are ânon-tradeâ. In early 2001, Mooreâs three predecessors circulated a public statement declaring that â[t]he WTO cannot be used as a Christmas tree on which to hang any and every good cause that might be secured by exercising trade powerâ.5 Yet these statesmen did not reveal how to ascertain the good causes that ought to be secured by trade power.
Civil society organizations have actively participated in the debate about the policy boundaries of the WTO. For instance, in March 2001, a worldwide coalition of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), organized by the Third World Network, circulated an open letter opposing the introduction of new issues into the WTO, particularly investment, competition policy (i.e., antitrust), and government procurement. According to the coalition, âThese issues, if located in the WTO, would lead to disastrous consequences socially, environmentally, economically, and for human rights, for people worldwideâ.6
The vigorous debate about the WTOâs purview demonstrates the vitality of the organization. Governments and private actors are not clamoring to broaden the charter of most other international institutions. The WTO has become a magnet for expansionist ideas because it is perceived as powerful and effective.7
The purpose of this chapter is to present an analytic method for considering proposals to expand the scope of the WTO. My approach will be to organize the contending ideas about the rationale for the WTO and to show how varying assumptions can lead to different conclusions on the proper content of international trade law. As illustrated above, proponents of any particular mission of the WTO base their advocacy on an implicit assumption about its purpose. Yet often these assumptions remain unstated. I want to unpeel the outer layers of the WTO to examine its institutional core. This chapter seeks to advance the debate by comparing these different assumptions and in so doing takes note of some of the key literature about trade linkage. I will also build on that literature by presenting a new framework.
What does it mean for a new issue to be incorporated into the WTO? It means that governments would amend the WTO Agreements to include new obligations as part of the overall single undertaking. Such governmental obligations could then be covered by the WTO dispute settlement system and would be enforced in the same way as other WTO rules. Adding an issue to the WTO does not necessarily make it a âconditionâ for international trade. WTO rules are disciplines on government policies, not positive requirements for economic actors that wish to engage in voluntary, cross-border commerce.
Of course, the WTO treaty system could be amended to prohibit a particular kind of trade. For example, WTO rules could require governments to prohibit trade in goods made with forced labor.8 The most analogous provision in the WTO is the one in the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) that requires governments to establish a process enabling the holder of an intellectual property right to ask customs authorities to detain counterfeit trademark or âpiratedâ copyright goods.9 Furthermore, TRIPS commits governments to cooperate with a view to âeliminatingâ international trade in goods infringing intellectual property rights.10 The success of adding intellectual property rights during the Uruguay Round (1986â1994) has led many analysts to view TRIPS as a template for incorporating other issues loosely linked to trade into the WTO.11
This chapter proceeds in three sections. Section I shows why the purpose of the WTO is not self-evident and how a framework can be useful for improving the debate about the organizationâs mission. Section II presents a three-category framework reflecting the different ambits in which the WTO operates: the relationship between states, the relationship between the state and individuals, and the relationship between intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). These three categories encompass eight distinct frames for conceptualizing the WTOâs role. Section III summarizes the analysis and explains how the frames can help triangulate the WTO within international law. This chapter, however, should not be taken as an instruction manual for deciding whether a new issue fits the WTO. Two readers using the methods suggested here could reach different conclusions about the same issue. My goal is more modest â to improve the quality of advocacy and analysis about the future mission of the WTO.
I. The Need for an Analytical Framework
If the benefits member governments derive from the WTO were obvious, then determining its appropriate mission would be relatively easy. Section I contends that they are not so obvious, and that this ambiguity makes it hard for governments to agree on the right mission.12 To sharpen the debate, I introduce the idea of âframesâ that explain the WTOâs purpose. By first calling attention to previous efforts to propose criteria for adding new issues to the WTO, I intend to show why the clarification of purpose is essential. The last section in part I briefly takes note of three frames that pervade discourse on trade policy but are not included in Part II because they fail to fit the WTO.
The debate about the proper mission of the WTO is political and prescriptive. Thus, it is not primarily a legal debate about clarifying the WTOâs existing mandate. For example, the argument against adding fundamental workersâ rights to the WTO is not that such an action would be ultra vires. No one has asserted that the parties to the WTO Agreement lack the authority to amend the treaty to add workersâ rights. Rather, the usual argument is that this issue does not fit the WTO or would be counterproductive to its purpose.
Besides workersâ rights, numerous candidate issues might be incorporated into the treaty as WTO obligations. They include investment, competition, environment, alleviation of poverty, harmful tax practices, corruption, and labor mobility. Other issues are pointed to as matters that should be exempt from WTO obligations. For example, WTO rules could specifically permit measures to preserve local culture, enhance food security, combat cigarette smoking, or fight terrorism.13
Deciding on the proper mission for the WTO and other agencies must be a continuing exercise. Even forty years ago, Georg Schwarzenberger foresaw that âthe need for international collaboration in matters as diverse as economic, financial, social, cultural, and educational relations is likely to call for an expansion in existing international institutions and the creation of new agenciesâ.14 Today, in the face of rapidly evolving globalization, the call to expand existing institutions and create new ones has become more sa...