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Part 1
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Chapter 1
Singapore’s Conception of Security
Ang Cheng Guan
But some things are not negotiable. My survival and how I design my security is not negotiable. This is something fundamental. We may be small but we are sovereign, and we decide how we ensure our own security — Lee Kuan Yew.1
This is a purely physical security … There are other aspects of security which are equally pertinent in the long run: your economic viability, the capacity of your political structure to withstand pressures of a social, cultural or whatever nature. It is a multi-coloured question — Lee Kuan Yew.2
This chapter attempts to describe and contextualise Singapore’s conception of security as articulated by its political leadership from 1965 to the present based on a number of key speeches, parliamentary debates and writings over the last 50 years which, in the view of this author, are worth revisiting and remembering. It shows that Singapore’s security as conceived by its political leaders has been consistent throughout the last 50 years. From very early on, their understanding of the concept of security has been comprehensive and not narrowly conceived as just physical or territorial security and the use of force, although in Singapore’s formative years, that was the immediate concern.
Singapore’s national security practice has historically been directed by a small elite group. For the last 50 years, the general public, by and large, has not questioned the assumptions held by their elected leaders and decision-makers. Space does not permit me here to indulge in a lengthy discussion of the ever-broadening definition of “security” which has been a subject of much debate, particularly since the end of the Cold War,3 except to highlight two points both borrowed from Muthiah Alagappah. The first is that security continues to rank highly on national agendas worldwide and in most countries, enormous amounts of resources continue to be devoted to defence.4 Singapore is no exception. And, second, security is “situational” or “context-sensitive”.5 In the case of Singapore, its history, location and size are important determinants.
The Foundation Years
The 50th anniversary of Singapore’s independence is a fitting occasion to revisit and reflect on this very important subject. And there is no more appropriate place to begin this than the Yang Di-Pertuan Negara’s opening speech at the first session of the first parliament of independent Singapore on 8 December 1965 when he said that “our survival as a people, distinct and separate from our neighbours in South-East Asia depends upon our patience and resolution in dealing with physically bigger and hence difficult neighbours and upon our perseverance in seeking long-term solutions to the problems of finding a new balance of forces in this part of the world …” .6 Scholars have often described that the conception of security during the Cold War years was “state-centric and political-military-power oriented” and focused principally on the use of “force”.7 In the case of Singapore, this was not completely true as the Yang Di-Pertuan Negara went on in his speech to state that “the best guarantee of our future as a distinct and separate people” in the region “is the creation of a tolerant multi-racial society” and warned against both “communalists” and “communists”. They are not unconnected. The communists were assessed to be the “more potent of the two groups as they were supported by external sponsors” and “play on communal heart strings, if only more skilfully and cynically”.8 There was particular concern about the intentions of Indonesia and Malaysia, which is not surprising given that Confrontation hostilities only ceased on 11 August 1966 with the signing of the Bangkok Accord; and Singapore and Malaysia separated just a few months ago due to irreconcilable differences. Thus, Singapore “must anticipate and prepare for all contingency”.9
Finally, the Yang Di-Pertuan Negara spoke of the “two new responsibilities” Singapore had to now shoulder as an independent Republic — Defence and Foreign Affairs — “two closely inter-related subjects” which were closely related to the country’s survival. Foreign policy choices determine defence commitments which in turn limit the range of options of Singapore’s foreign policy. Singapore’s security depended upon having the minimum number of unfriendly countries and the maximum number of friendly ones “for no other reason than that we wish to be as independent of foreign defence assistance as possible”. Singapore had to “accept British bases for some time to come” because it was then unable to defend itself. The creation of a “hard, well-trained, if small, regular army supported by a large people’s volunteer force” would form a significant item in Singapore’s annual budget. As the Minister of Defence Goh Keng Swee pointed out during the second reading of the Singapore Army Bill on 23 December 1965, the army is meant to defend Singapore and its people against external aggression. However, at present “we are unable to do this task ourselves” and “it is no use pretending that without the British military forces in Singapore today, the island cannot be easily overrun within a matter of hours by any neighbouring country within a radius of 1,000 miles, if any of these countries care to do so”. But Singapore cannot always depend on Britain. As early as December 1965, Goh was already laying plans for an eventual British withdrawal. In his words:
British military protection today had made quite a number of our citizens complacent about the need to conduct our own defence preparations. These people assume that this protection will be permanent. I regard it as the height of folly to plan our future on this assumption. And if there is any basis on which we, as an independent country can plan our future, it will be on the opposite assumption, that is, the removal of the British military presence at some time in the future. Nobody — neither we nor the British — can say when this will be. It may be 5, 10 or 15 years — maybe longer, maybe shorter. Whatever the time may be, it will be useless then to think of building up our defence forces. The time to do so is now …10
In his speech, the Minister of Foreign Affair S. Rajaratnam also addressed the issue of the security of Singapore and the British bases. Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew had in August 1965 said that he would not allow the British bases to be used as “jumping points for aggression, not even aggression of Indonesia”. The bases were to protect the two million Singaporeans and nine million Malaysians.11 S. Rajaratnam reiterated that the bases were “not for any aggressive or imperialistic purposes but for the defence of Singapore and Singapore’s national interests” as the new nation’s capacity to defend itself against external threats was limited. Singapore would of course build its own defence forces “to the fullest extent” it is capable of but “we are interested in the defence of Singapore in the context of a major conflict in regard to major and more powerful neighbours. We are in no position to build or finance an army capable of defending Singapore in a conflict of this kind. Even big powers with far greater resources of money, men and material plan their defence on the basis of friends and allies,” he explained.12
As it happened, due to fiscal pressures, the British announced in 1967 that it planned to withdraw from East of Suez, which it eventually did from Singapore (and Malaysia) in 1971. When National Service (NS) was introduced in 1967, it was based on the assumption that the British military presence would remain in Singapore till at least 1975. The rate of military build-up was thus paced accordingly. But when the British in early 1968 announced they were speeding up their withdrawal to be completed by the end of 1971, the build-up had to be accelerated. Today, the capability of the SAF is well-recognised. Looking back to the 1960s, Lee Kuan Yew recalled that “such an outcome was far from my thoughts in April 1966 when I flew to London hoping for assurance from Prime Minister Harold Wilson that British forces would remain in Singapore for some years”.13 Lee described the years from independence to the British withdrawal in 1971 as “the most difficult years” and that only when the main units of the British forces had left and Singapore did not suffer severe unemployment did he feel a lesser sense of vulnerability.14
On the subject of Foreign Affairs, S. Rajaratnam gave the following guidance to insure Singapore’s security: (1) in the hard world of international realities, there are bound to be degrees of friendship between countries and those closest to us will naturally be those whose foreign policy principles and deeds coincide with our national interests and our basic aspirations. There may be differences and disagreements on occasions on specific issues, but so long as the fundamentals of their foreign policy and their deeds coincide with Singapore’s, then they should remain close friends and allies. Singapore should not allow “temporary irritations and minor disagreements” to affect its foreign relations; (2) in international politics, it is not wise to formulate policies on the basis of permanent enemies; (3) it is necessary for Singapore to adhere to a policy of non-alignment “because to be aligned to any big country would eventually have meant the loss of our freedom of action even in domestic fields, because foreign policies are in fact an extension of domestic policies into the international field”. Non-alignment, however, did not mean indifference “to the real issues of peace and war” or “even feigning blindness as to what is right and wrong”. On the contrary, a non-alignment policy gives Singapore greater freedom of manoeuvrability on specific international issues based on its national interests. An aligned position, on the other hand, would automatically oblige Singapore to adopt the stand of the major ally; and (4) the pursuit of national interests is not absolute as national independences need to be balanced against the reality of interdependence between nations. There will arise occasions when Singapore may have to make some sacrifice of our interests for the long-term interests of the nation. This echoed what Lee Kuan Yew said on the 100th day of Singapore’s independence, that “a foreign policy must be designed to bring the surest guarantee of Singapore’s survival and our prosperity”, in short, “trade and industry” is as important as “defence and security”.15
Unlike the Foreign Minister, the fullest and most detailed exposition on the defence of Singapore by the Minister of Defence was not delivered in December 1965 but on 13 March 1967 at the reading of the National Service (Amendment) Bill. This speech deserves recounting. Goh began by making the point that in thinking of the elements that should be taken into consideration in framing a meaningful defen...
