Origins Of Japanese-chinese Territorial Dispute, The: Using Historical Records To Study The Diaoyu/senkaku Islands Issue

Using Historical Records to Study the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands Issue

Tadayoshi Murata

• Publisher: WSPC
• Year: 2016
• eBook ISBN: 9789814749121
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Asian History
• Index: History

Most books on the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute between China and Japan are authored by either Chinese who argue that the islands belong to China or by Japanese who contend that the islands are rightfully Japan's. This book is the first of its kind — by a Japanese who supports China's claim or vice versa.

Written by one of the foremost historians on Sino–Japanese relations, Tadayoshi Murata, Professor Emeritus from Japan's Yokohama National University, delves into the Japanese archives and uncovers evidence that shows Japan's ownership of the disputed islands is historically untenable. Given the current impasse surrounding the islands, Professor Murata suggests, as a way out, the two sides jointly manage the disputed territories based on mutual understanding.

It is a must-read for those interested in Sino–Japanese relations, especially the history of the disputed islands, and the future of the two countries.

Contents:

• About the Author
• Introduction: The Importance of a Calm, Objective Standpoint
• The Tripartite Relationship between the Ryukyus, China, and Japan
• The 36 Islands of Ryukyu
• East Asian Upheavals and the Ryukyu Kingdom
• From Tokugawa Shogunate to Meiji Restoration
• Nishimura Sutezo, 1885
• Victory in the First Sino–Japanese War and Clandestine Occupation
• Framework for the Treaty of Shimonoseki Drafted in January
• Assessing the Japanese Government's Basic Viewpoints
• Appendix
• Afterword

Readership: Readers who are interested in the Japanese–Chinese territorial dispute on Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and Sino–Japan relations.

Chapter One

Introduction: The Importance of a Calm, Objective Standpoint

In order to familiarize readers with my objectives for writing this book, I would like to share with you an e-mail I wrote to friends and acquaintances on September 20, 2012. The formatting has been slightly adjusted, but I made no changes whatsoever to the contents, which are as follows.

I am Murata Tadayoshi. I retired from Yokohama National University at the end of March this year. I am very sorry for not updating everybody on that status change.

In April, I visited Fuzhou and Wuyi Mountain in Fujian Province. In June, I visited Dalian and Beijing. From August 5 to August 11, I visited Beijing and Xinjiang (Shihezi and Urumqi). From August 24 to August 29, I visited Inner Mongolia (Hohhot) and Beijing.

On September 9, I escorted 30 students of the Chinese language from Yokohama National University to visit Dalian. I returned to Japan on September 17, and then went back to Dalian from the September 24 to September 28.

Those students are still at Dalian University of Technology studying Chinese and making exchanges with other students at that university. Dalian is extremely calm, and the students are very happily pursuing their studies and exchanges. Unfortunately, the media would never report on such news.

I went to Beijing on September 14, 2012 and stayed in the 21st Century Hotel across from the Japanese embassy. The reason for my visit was to attend the international academic symposium “Asia’s Future and Sino-Japanese Relations,” jointly hosted by the Sino-Japanese Relations Society [Chinese] and the Nichu Kankei — Japan–China Relations Society [Japanese], which was held in this hotel. The symposium ended on the 16, and I returned to Japan on September 17, 2012.

There were no problems with my arrival to Beijing on the evening of the 14, but beginning on the 15 with the opening ceremony of the symposium, parades of protesters filed past the Japanese embassy for days, loudly shouting their displeasure. Their voices carried into the hall where the symposium was going on. The activities of both the protesters and the police were visible from my room on the 13th floor. We were unable to use the hotel’s Internet beginning on the 16. The reason cited was “equipment failure.” However, we could regularly access the Internet in the early morning, so it was clear that this “failure” had a specific purpose.

The parading protesters walked in tightly arranged lines. Although some threw plastic bottles at the Japanese embassy’s main gate, most simply carried banners and shouted slogans.

It was, however, noteworthy that some banners and shouted slogans included the phrase “Down with the xiaoriben”¹ (a derogatory in the same vein as Ishihara Shintarō’s calling China “shina”).² There is a vast difference between such means of expression and rational protest activities. If it had been a rational activity, the protesters would have opted to oppose the erroneous decisions of the Japanese government, and not chosen to oppose the people of Japan. I did not see such a banner. This is the result of traditional education’s ignoring the “difference between Japanese militarism and the Japanese people.”

Among the Chinese participants of the symposium, I did not observe any judgment or concern toward the spreading emotions of narrow-minded opposition to Japan. Everybody was emotional. The only difference was the extent of the emotions. This was my impression.

From another perspective, Ambassador Niwa sent an alert to the Japanese government upon witnessing the situation. Although his judgment was accurate, he was condemned for this action and relieved from his duty. It is those who condemned him who should have been condemned.

There were many people on either side of the road maintaining order. They were ushering along observers, preventing them from stopping to gape and from assembling into a larger crowd. This indicates that somebody had applied for permission for this parade, and had been approved. Officials were concerned that something might go awry, and so made such preparations.

The unfortunate victims of the demonstrations were Japanese restaurants in the vicinity of the Japanese embassy. Afraid of damage the crowds might do to their businesses, owners displayed Chinese flags and banners proclaiming “The Diaoyu Islands Are Chinese Territory” on their doorfronts and other conspicuous places, but the restaurants themselves went out of business. At least in Beijing I did not see any glass windows of restaurants shattered. This was different from what I personally observed in May 2005 in Shanghai, following the anti-Japan parades that had taken place there in April. Standing in front of a Japanese restaurant, I heard somebody say, “Actually the owner is from Taiwan.” This demonstrates that whether one is from Taiwan, the mainland, or Japan, one has to conceal the fact that one operates a Japanese restaurant. This is a dreadful affair.

However, this kind of situation in which businesses went under took place only in a small area confined to the vicinity of the Japanese embassy. In other places, such as the night market area around the Wangfujing metro station, Yoshinoya and revolving sushi belt restaurants operated normally, with no difference to their patronage from normal. There were no changes on Tian’anmen Square either.

However, even Chinese television reports gave tacit consent to the movement to boycott Japanese goods. China Central Television (CCTV) opted to interview common citizens. They broadcast clips of people unwilling to buy Japanese cars and electronics and a university professor specializing in the study of Japan’s economy discussing at great length the effectiveness of potential sanctions on the Japanese economy. It would be hard to classify these expressions as calm and rational. However, this manner of reporting the news is commonplace in Japan as well. So I think we cannot overlook the reality that we often are quick to point out the shortcomings of the other side while giving the shortcomings of one’s own country an easy pass.

On September 11, the CCTV show Jiaodian fangtan

Focus Report] discussed me. I was in Dalian at the time and was unaware of the report. I only watched the show after a Chinese friend had informed me.

They aired a video of an interview CCTV reporters recorded with me in late July, but their broadcast included only excerpts of my comments. I cannot commend this exploitative method of quoting my words out of context, and so when reporters from CCTV and Hong Kong’s Phoenix Television approached me for interviews during my visit to Dalian and Beijing, I refused them.

I told them that we were conducting a symposium on the 15, that they should attend and hear my speech, and only then decide whether to interview me, but no reporters came. This made me unhappy. My guess is that they wanted me to enact a script they had already written for me, so as to further exploit me.

Researchers of Japanese–Chinese relations conducting a symposium in a hotel across from the Japanese embassy should have been a news-worthy affair. Although Japanese reports on the symposium were not much different, and although admittedly it is unfair to criticize only the Chinese reports, this affair gave me the undeniable impression that their field of vision was too narrow.

The protests in Beijing were orderly, but in other places there were instances of vandalism, which CCTV did not report. I learned from Nikkei Online and from Phoneix Television that there had been vandalism in Shenzhen and Guangzhou. Chinese people also became aware of what had happened in places like Xi’an, Qingdao, and Shenzhen through various channels. Despite CCTV’s lack of coverage, people were able to read about or hear about those incidents. Prior to my return to Japan on the 17, I met with Mme. Lin Liyun, who told me that one can watch NHK and TBS programs not only in hotels, but in private homes as well.

Here I would like to first describe the overall circumstances of the symposium.

The symposium was jointly hosted by the Association of the History of Sino-Japanese Relations (of which Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Deputy Director Wu Yin serves as president) and the Nichū-kankei Japan–China Relations Society (of which former ambassador to China Miyamoto Yūji serves as president). I am not a member of the Nichū-kankei Gakkai, but I did give a report at the Society on a visit to Beijing in June, at which time I accepted the Society’s invitation to participate in this symposium.

In addition to former Ambassador Miyamoto, the Japanese side was represented by such gentlemen as Society vice presidents Professor Fujimura Takayoshi of the Takushoku University international relations department and Egoe Shin, as well as representatives of the Nishimura & Asahi law firm. Also in attendance was Mr. Katsuo Shū, director of the Tokyo Stock Exchange’s public relations department and member of the Yokohama Japan–China Friendship Association, as well as Mr. Minamimura Shirō, who, like me, serves as deputy director of the Kanagawa Prefecture Japan–China Friendship Association.

The Chinese side was represented by several renowned experts in both Japan–China relations and Chinese diplomatic affairs, as well as researchers from universities and research organizations around the country. A few examples are Mr. Wu Xuewen, Honorary Director of the China Foreign Relations History Society, Mr. Ding Min, Deputy Director Wang Taiping, and others.

I presented a thesis entitled “Japan–China Relations: A Look Back to 40 Years Ago and Considerations of the Future” and read a research report at the political sub-meeting.

As the Chinese were rather heated over territorial issues at the time, I intentionally used my speech to toss cold water on them. Is the fight over these tiny uninhabited islands really a major affair for the nation and the world? As far as governments are concerned, everybody wanted to conceal facts unfavorable to their own countries. However, concealing facts is dangerous and is the root cause of misunderstanding and stand-offs. It is for precisely this reason that the ongoing stand-off is becoming increasingly intense. We cannot let ourselves be misled by narrow-minded false patriotism.

The Senkaku Islands, or the Diaoyu Islands, are a symbol of peace, friendship, and cooperation between Japan and China. The implementation of joint ownership and joint administration would be a proper solution. As compared to the long-term stand-off surrounding the islands, the first step toward joint ownership would require courage and effort.

To this end, I proposed that both sides jointly own facts, present to one another historical materials translated into the other’s language, and publish those materials or post them on the Internet. The idea that Japan and China should conduct joint research is not mine solely; some on the Chinese side have suggested it as well. If we can put aside the “state” and conduct scientific, objective research, the results of which we then tell the people of both nations, then we will naturally find a solution to the problem. I am attaching my paper and a draft of the report I presented for you to peruse.

I presented a report to Japanese and Chinese students and teachers for an hour and a half at the Dalian University of Technology. The symposium limited speeches to 15 minutes, and some presenters did not follow this rule, so I was able to present only the second half of my report there.

The thinking of those on the Chinese side is overly concentrated on problems of “nationalization,” and so I think my proposal was not immediately understood. I do believe, however, that the matter will eventually proceed in this direction. There is no peaceful means of resolution oth...

Table of contents

• Cover page
• Title page
• Copyright page
• Contents
• About the Author
• Chapter One Introduction: The Importance of a Calm, Objective Standpoint
• Chapter Two The Tripartite Relationship between the Ryukyus, China, and Japan
• Chapter Three The 36 Islands of Ryukyu
• Chapter Four East Asian Upheavals and the Ryukyu Kingdom
• Chapter Five From Tokugawa Shogunate to Meiji Restoration
• Chapter Six Nishimura Sutezo, 1885
• Chapter Seven Victory in the First Sino-Japanese War and Clandestine Occupation
• Chapter Eight Framework for the Treaty of Shimonoseki Drafted in January
• Chapter Nine Assessing the Japanese Government’s Basic Viewpoints
• Appendix
• Afterword