Future In Retrospect: China's Diplomatic History Revisited

China's Diplomatic History Revisited

Yaqing Qin, Zhirui Chen

• Publisher: WCPC
• Year: 2016
• eBook ISBN: 9781938134852
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Chinese History
• Index: Politics & International Relations

What were the new People's Republic of China's policies to the Universal Postal Union in its early years? How did they help China promote its national interests in the world stage? Why did China train Albanian interns in the Cold War? Was it out of "communist fraternity" or was it part of China's concerted public diplomacy efforts? And what role has China's medical assistance to developing countries, especially those in Africa, played in its foreign affairs?

Penned by well-known international relations scholars from China, the eight essays in this volume attempt to answer those questions and more. Based on rich literature, including some newly declassified files from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, this volume introduces some of the most interesting and significant, but lesser-known, episodes in the diplomatic history of the People's Republic of China, and tries to shed light on their implications and impact on China's diplomacy.

Contents:

• Revolutionary Patriotism: China's Policies to the UPU (1950–1951) (Han Changqing and Yao Baihui)
• A Relook at China's Policy to Assist Vietnam in Its Resistance War Against France (Niu Jun)
• The Sino-Albania Alliance Revisited: The Role of Ideology in Alliance Formation and Disintegration (Cheng Xiaohe)
• Diplomatic Commitment and Strategic Communication and Testing: Vance's Visit to China and the Normalization of China–US Diplomatic Relations (Han Changqing and Wu Wencheng)
• China's Economic Aid to the DPRK after the Sino-Soviet Split (1961–1965) (Dong Jie)
• Ideology and Public Diplomacy-Interpreting China's Training Program for Albanian Interns during the Cold War (Jiang Huajie)
• Ideological Output in Technical Assistance: China's Political and Ideological Education towards Vietnamese Interns in China in the Cold War Period (You Lan)
• Chinese Medical Team Abroad for Assistance: History, Achievement and Impact (Li Anshan)

Readership: Students, researchers, and academics who are interested in China's foreign affairs, diplomacy, and diplomatic history.

Revolutionary Patriotism: China's Policies to the UPU (1950–1951)

Han Changqing and Yao Baihui

Abstract

The Universal Postal Union (UPU) is one of the special agencies of the UN. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) made the decision to join the UPU in order to promote its postal industry’s development, enhance its international image, and facilitate Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the Eastern European countries’ struggle against the USA. The PRC successfully presented itself at the Monteiro Conference in May 1950. In addition, the PRC actively offered to pay the UPU membership dues, having ratified the Universal Convention of Post and the related agreements, which consolidated the victorious fruits of Monteiro Conference. The Chinese government’s practical and flexible attitude, together with the diplomatic support from the USSR and the Eastern European countries, enabled China to make “another” victory at the Cairo Conference in 1951. The New Republic’s policy to the UPU showed that ideology is more than just a motivational factor of policy-making; it can actually be the aim of that policy.

Keywords: The Universal Postal Union; The legitimate right of representing China; China’s diplomacy; Cairo Conference

The relationship between ideology and national interests has long been a concern of academics. Most scholars of the realist school in the international political studies hold the opinion that ideology is nothing but “the surface” of the problem; the fundamental motivation of foreign policymaking comes from the pursuit of national interests. Yet, other scholars hold the opposite opinion: that ideology plays an important role in foreign policy-making. Actually, ideology itself can be the motivational factor of foreign policy implementation, and sometimes even the actual aim of it.¹ This chapter endeavors to further explore the relationship between ideology and China’s foreign policy practice by analyzing the People’s Republic of China’s (the PRC) policies to the Universal Postal Union (the UPU) in the early years of its regime.

I. Set the Tone: China's Fundamental Policies to the UPU

The US and the former USSR transformed themselves from wartime allies to peacetime rivals during the short period of 1945–1947, which marks the beginning of the Cold War era. The two superpowers’ emphasis on ideology in the Cold War era brought about tense confrontations in Europe, which influenced the political development of China in a profound way. The Civil War pattern of Nationalists being in alliance with US vs. the Communists being in alliance with USSR was inherited. When the PRC was born, it adopted the policy of “Leaning to One Side” (to the USSR and the socialist camp’s side). The “Leaning to One Side” decision was made in reference to the common ideological ground of China and USSR. It is also the result of China’s calculation of its actual costs and gains in its national interests, both domestically and internationally. In other words, the “Leaning to One Side” policy is the announcement of the PRC’s implementation of socialist policies, which can ensure the PRC maximum economic, diplomatic and national defense aid from the socialist camp.² It is just as what Mao Zedong said in On People’s Democratic Dictatorship, “The forty years’ experience of Sun Yat-sen and the twenty-eight years’ experience of the Communist Party have taught us to lean to one side, and we are firmly convinced that in order to win victory and consolidate it we must lean to one side. In the light of the experiences accumulated in these forty years and these twenty-eight years, all Chinese without exception must lean either to the side of imperialism or to the side of socialism. Sitting on the fence will not do, nor is there a third road.”³

The “Leaning to One Side” policy clearly shows that the new Republic combined both the ideological concern and national interest calculation in its policy-making. This can also be clearly seen in its selective participation in international organizations. Entering international organizations enabled the PRC to integrate itself into international society, at the same time, overtaking Chiang Kai-shek Regime’s international roles. These steps were certainly beneficial to the newly-born Beijing regime, so the problem was not whether to enter international organizations or not, but how to enter. China worked out differential policies of entering international organizations based on the organization’s nature and function. “In principle, the People’s Republic of China will enter all international organizations which are established, organized or led by the governments or non-governmental organizations of the socialist and New Democratic countries.” However, if the international organization was organized by the imperialist countries, the PRC would take careful considerations before making a decision on whether to join or not. “In principle, we would not join international organizations which are established, organized or manipulated by those imperialist countries”; “for international organizations which are established, organized or led by the progressive groups or individuals of the imperialist countries, we would make a careful consideration before deciding to join or not”; “If these organizations are technical in nature, we would consider joining them; if these organizations are political or ideological in nature, we would not join them”; “if the organizations are concerned with international collective business (e.g., post, telecommunication) and will be beneficial to us, then, we would join them in principle”. Generally speaking, there were two principles behind China’s willingness to international organizations: whether the organization was judged to be “beneficial to us”; and whether it was beneficial to facilitate the actions of the socialist camp.⁴

The issue of joining the UPU emerged at that time. The UPU,⁵ whose headquarters is in Bern, Switzerland, was established in 1874. In 1947, the UPU became a special agency that endeavors to enhance, coordinate and improve the international postal business. China entered the UPU in 1914 and was elected Vice President of the Council of Administration of the Universal Postal Union (UPUCA) in 1947. After the PRC was established, it immediately launched an offensive to “driving the Kuomintang (the KMT) fake regime out” of the United Nations and the UN affiliations, and required that “representatives” of the “failing the KMT” who were not eligible to represent the Chinese people be driven out of the UN system.⁶ On the one hand, the PRC launched this offensive in order to assert its international status; on the other hand, this was also an act to help the USSR and the Eastern European bloc with their political struggle against the West on the international platform. The UPU is a “technical” international organization, which falls into the category of “can enter in principle”. Becoming a member of the UPU could promote the development of China’s postal industry, improve China’s international status, and nail the “the KMT-representing-China” lie to the counter. In addition, joining the UPU could also help the People’s Democratic States headed by the USSR to fight against the USA. Therefore, the Chinese People’s Post “should get prepared to join the UPU”.⁷

II. Keep the Status Quo: The PRC's Judgment and Response to the Monteiro Conference

The UPU planned to hold its fourth conference in Monteiro, Switzerland on 15 May 1950. Premier Zhou Enlai sent a telegram to both Trygve Lie, then Secretary General of the United Nations, and Hess, then Secretary General of the UPUCA, denying the KMT regime’s right to represent China in the UPU, and appointing Su Younong, Chief Director of China’s State Post Bureau, as the official representative of the PRC to the UPU’s Monteiro Conference. At the same time, Zhou asked “the UPU to help Chinese representatives to get visas to enter Switzerland”.⁸ On 15 May for the Monteiro Conference, there emerged a heated discussion about who should be China’s eligible representative, and a final resolution came out adopting the Swiss proposal — “take the representative of the People’s Republic of China as the only eligible representative of China, who will be attending conferences held by the Council of Administration (UPUCA) and contacting the committee of this conference.”⁹ Then, the English representative made another proposal that “the United Nations will discuss the issue of China’s representation this autumn during the sessions of the General Conference, and China’s representative in the UPU should be decided in reference to the UN’s decision.” He further proposed that, “The final resolution of China’s representation (in the UPU) should be made after the UN made its decision and all (UPU) member countries have been consulted on this matter. Anyway, consultations (with the UPU members) should be made no later than the next conference.” This proposal was passed without being discussed.¹⁰

The passing of the Swiss proposal was an unexpected victory for the PRC; for all the PRC’s previous attempts at “driving the KMT out” on the international arena ended in failure. The Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of Post and Telecommunication (the MPTC) of China both agreed that this was the first victory the PRC made on the matter of national representation in international society after the PRC’s founding. And the Monteiro Conference was “the first formal international conference the PRC has attended since its founding”¹¹ whose international significance is unusual. “This is the first time the KMT fake regime’s representative is driven out, and our representative can officially attend the conference, so this is a victorious achievement made in breaking the KMT and its allies’ blocking of the new China in international organizations.”¹² At the same time, this result was a big blow to the KMT regime. Ye Kongchao, “foreign minister” (of the KMT) said in his report to the “Administrative Department” (of the KMT): “Despite the attack from the USSR and its dependencies, our representation of China in international organizations remained unchanged as always. The failure of representation in the UPU is the first failure we had in history.”¹³ This demonstrates how significant this blow was to the KMT.

After the Monteiro Conference, the Foreign Ministry and the MPTC of China summarized the lesson they learned from Monteiro Conference. They said, passing the proposal of the PRC being the representative of China can be attributed to two factors — the rapid internal development of the PRC’s postal industry and the external support from the USSR and Eastern European countries. Yet, the two ministries both soberly maintained that the PRC’s success at this conference was just a limited one — when they quoted the words used in Switzerland’s proposal, “this conference” (not all conferences of the UPU) was highlighted for emphasis (which means the PRC’s representation of China was only valid in the Monteiro Conference). It was clear that the reason why some members of the UPUCA agreed to let the PRC’s representative attend the conference was to keep the conference from turning into a quarreling mess, which meant that this decision was just a pragmatic one and not necessarily an indication of willingness to really recognize the PRC. The PRC read this message out and was aware of its legal status, with internal correspondence at the time conceding, “Our position in the UPU is not yet decided for eternity.”¹⁴

The Monteiro Conference’s resolution produced both negative and positive results. USSR and the Eastern European countries paid more attention to the negative part and took an opposing stance to this conference. The representatives of the USSR and the Czech Republic left the conference to protest against the resolution, since this resolution only admitted the PRC’s representation of China on this particular conference, which meant that China’s representation was not settled once and for all in the UPU.¹⁵ However, the PRC placed more value on the then current and future positive influence this result could bring to China and therefore took an active and cooperative attitude towards its participation in this conference.

First, the PRC took an active attitude in attending the conference. Switzerland’s proposal was passed on 15 May 1950. Hess, General Secretary of the UPUCA told the PRC with this news. When the MPTC received the message, the Monteiro Conference was already about to close, which means that the PRC’s representatives could not be there on time (the conference lasted for about 15 days). Therefore the MPTC did not plan to send any representatives to the meeting at first. The MPTC drafted the reply telegraph to the Monteiro Conference, explaining the reasons why the PRC could not attend the conference and asking the UPU to send the copies and files of the conference documents to the PRC.¹⁶ However, the Foreign Ministry held an opposite opinion. The International Department of the Foreign Ministry held the opinion that despite the temporary nature of the Monteiro Conference, the fact was that the KMT representative was driven out of the conference. Therefore, as China was late, it should still be there to attend the conference. China’s attendance would also be a support to the USSR and the Eastern European countries in their struggles against the Western powers. Premier Zhou Enlai agreed with the Foreign Ministry’s opinion on the matter. He said, “although (we were) late, (our coming to the conference) could still have influence”, “(Our coming to the conference) could facilitate the USSR’s actions and help to shape the development of international situations”.¹⁷ On 20 May, the PRC sent a telegram back to Hess in the name of Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai said that China would send a delegation, headed by Su Younong, Director General of the State Post Bureau, to attend the Monteiro Conference.¹⁸ On 2...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Halftitle
• Series Editors
• Title
• Copyright
• Editorial Board
• Contents
• Preface
• Acknowledgments
• About the Editors
• About the Contributors
• Chapter 1 Revolutionary Patriotism: China’s Policies to the UPU (1950-1951)
• Chapter 2 A Relook at China’s Policy to Assist Vietnam in Its Resistance War Against France
• Chapter 3 The Sino-Albania Alliance Revisited: The Role of Ideology in Alliance Formation and Disintegration
• Chapter 4 Diplomatic Commitment and Strategic Communication and Testing: Vance’s Visit to China and the Normalization of China-US Diplomatic Relations
• Chapter 5 China’s Economic Aid to the DPRK after the Sino-Soviet Split (1961-1965)
• Chapter 6 Ideology and Public Diplomacy: Interpreting China’s Training Program for Albanian Interns during the Cold War
• Chapter 7 Ideological Output in Technical Assistance: China’s Political and Ideological Education towards Vietnamese Interns in China in the Cold War Period
• Chapter 8 Chinese Medical Team Abroad for Assistance: History, Achievement and Impact
• Index