PART ONE
SRP â TRP
Revising Pannenbergâs Trinitarian Conception of Eternity and Omnipresence and Its Role in Eschatology in Light of Mathematics, Physics, and Cosmology
CHAPTER 1
The Trinitarian Conception of Eternity and Omnipresence in the Theology of Wolfhart Pannenberg
The relation between time and eternity is the crucial problem in eschatology, and its solution has implications for all parts of Christian doctrine.
âWolfhart Pannenberg, Systematic Theology
In this first chapter I provide in detail what can be broadly called Wolfhart Pannenbergâs Trinitarian conception of eternity and omnipresence. This chapter serves as a basis for the developments of the rest of this volume, all of which follow and exemplify my interdisciplinary method, Creative Mutual Interaction, or CMI. Given its culminating role in his lifetime of theological research, Wolfhart Pannenbergâs massive three-volume Systematic Theology is my primary focus here.1 However, I also use material from Pannenbergâs Metaphysics, from his early work Theology and the Kingdom of God, from a chapter in his recently published The Historicity of Nature, and articles from various journal sources.2 These sources are in no way meant to be exhaustive of Pannenbergâs writings on the topic of eternity and omnipresence, but I do see them as representing his main position and as offering fertile grounds for new directions of inquiry. Hopefully the clear limitations on the scope of this present volume can be superseded in future research, using this work as a point of departure. Again, my approach is an effort to give a careful, detailed, and âfriendly readâ of Pannenbergâs work in order to discover the profound insights that can be gleaned from this âpearl of great priceâ (Matt. 13:45â46) and to place them within and reformulate them in light of the ongoing interdisciplinary conversations between theology and natural science.
A. PANNENBERGâS TRINITARIAN CONCEPTION OF ETERNITY IN RELATION TO THE TIME OF CREATION
1. Godâs Eternity as the Source of Time
According to Pannenberg, the Old Testament depicts the eternity of God through a series of four claims.3 First, God endures forever, âfrom everlasting to everlasting.â Second, as opposed to all created things, God is incorruptible and unchangeable. Third, God is âthe source of all life and thus has unrestricted life in himself.â Fourth, God is eternal in that all of time, past and future, is present to God. That which fades into the past for us, or that which lies in our remote future, is present in the limitless duration of Godâs eternity.4 In the New Testament, Godâs eternity includes all of creaturely time. In the Gospel of Mark, Jesus affirms Godâs eternity as including all of the past and the future. The book of Revelation asserts that Jesus Christ shares in the eternal life of the Father.5 I summarize Pannenbergâs understanding of the biblical concept of the eternity of God as follows: the eternity of God is duration as unlimited and unending time, and the eternal God is unchangeably the same God throughout the unlimited and unending duration of eternity.
Turning to early Christian theology, Pannenberg first describes how Greek Platonism offered crucial conceptual resources for interpreting the biblical conception of eternity. âPlatonic teaching about the eternity of the ideas and the deity . . . seemed to be closely akin to Christian beliefs.â6 While Plato derived time in part from the motion of the planets and described time as the âmoving image of eternity,â his basic view was that eternity is timeless and unchanging, the antithesis of all that is temporal and changeable.7 The result was consistency between the changelessness of Platonic eternity and the biblical idea of the changelessness of God, but inconsistency between Platonic eternity as timeless and the biblical insistence that all moments in time are present to God.
Plotinus and Boethius are even more pivotal sources for Pannenbergâs view of time and eternity.8 Plotinus understood eternity not as timeless but as âthe source of timeâ and âthe presence of the totality of life.â9 Eternity is not Platoâs antithesis of time; instead, eternity is âthe whole of lifeâ and âthe presupposition of understanding it.â10 Because eternity includes temporality, the moments of our life, which we experience as separate and transitory, can be related to each other and become part of the whole of time âif we refer them to the totality of eternity.â Unlike our experience of time, in which the momentary present divides time into a vanished past and a not-yet future, the eternal present is a present that âcomprehends all time, that has no future outside itself. . . . A present can be eternal only if it is not separate from the future and if nothing sinks from it into the past.â11 It is a present that includes all that is past and all that is future, and it is this temporal unity which provides the linkage for what is separated in time. In short, the sequence of events we experience in time proceeds from eternity and is âconstantly comprehended by it.â12
What, then, caused the difference between the temporal unity of eternity and the temporal fragmentation of ordinary experience? According to Pannenbergâs reading of Plotinus, the World-Soul could, in principle, mediate the temporal unity of eternity to us.13 However, because of the fall of the World-Soul from eternity, the unity and totality of life is dissolved into the separate moments (diastasis), which we experience as the passage of time.14 As a consequence, the totality of time is only a future goal of life and âthe path to this goal is time.â15 As Pannenberg writes, âthe future thus became constitutive of the nature of time because only in terms of the future could the totality be given to time which makes possible the unity and continuity of timeâs processes.â16 This, in turn, leads to one of Pannenbergâs trademark theses: âwhen the theory of time is oriented toward the eternal totality, the consequence is a primacy of the future for the understanding of time.â17
Pannenberg then points out the influence of these philosophical views of time on the theologies of Augustine and Boethius. In developing the doctrine of creation, Augustine rejected Plotinusâs idea of the World-Soul, its role in Christian Gnosticism, the fall of the World-Soul, and the basis the fall offered for the distinction between moments of time. Instead, âif God positively willed the world and all its creatures, the same applies to the temporal form of their existence.â18 Augustine then incorporated the Platonic antithesis between time and eternity into his doctrine of creation. Hence time is created along with the finite world out of Godâs timeless eternity. âFor Augustine, there was no time before bodily movement in the world of creatures. There was thus no time in Godâs eternity.â19
Boethius, however, worked with Plotinusâs concept of eternity as âthe simultaneous and perfect presence of unlimited life.â20 It is Boethiusâs view of eternity that has been of enormous consequence for some sectors in twentieth-century theology. Pannenberg tells us that there is now âwidespread agreement . . . that eternity does not mean timelessness or the endlessness of time.â Following Boethiusâs view, the divine eternity must instead be such that all created things are present to God âat one and the same timeâ and in a way that preserves their intrinsic temporal differences. He then makes a crucial claim: âThis is possible only if the reality of God is not understood as undifferentiated identity but as intrinsically differentiated unity. But this demands the doctrine of the Trinity.â21 Pannenberg particularly applauds Karl Barth for supporting Boethiusâs understanding of eternity not as the antithesis of time but instead âas authentic duration and therefore as the source, epitome, and basis of time.â22 Barth âbewailedâ the way Boethiusâs view was overlooked by earlier theologians. He criticized Schleiermacher in particular for viewing eternity as completely timeless in order to free God from every aspect of temporality. Instead Barth argued for an âorder and successionâ within the divine life and with it a âbeforeâ and an âafter.â23 Pannenberg then breaks into his commentary on Barth to make a second crucial point: The claim that there is order and succession, or before and after, within the divine eternity âcan only be made with reference to the manifestation of the Trinity in the economy of salvation. It corresponds to the realization that the immanent Trinity is identical with the economic Trinity.â24
Returning to Barth, Pannenberg states that Godâs eternity can then be understood to include the entire span of creaturely time from creation to eschatological consummation, and he coins the terms âpre-, super-, and post-temporalityâ to refer to the differentiated temporality of Godâs eternity in relation to creation. Our creaturely temporality is based on Godâs eternal temporality, and creaturely temporality moves toward the future which is God, the âsource, epitome, and basisâ of all time.25 Barth even says that our time is âembeddedâ in Godâs eternal present.26 Because of this, the past does not dissolve away but remains in the eternal present of God.27 Pannenberg claims that underlying Barthâs use of Boethius is Plotinusâs understanding of eternity as the âsimultaneous presence of the whole of time.â Our experience of time is that of a succession of moments. Because of this, âwe can understand the nature of time only in relation to [Plotinusâs view of] eternity, since otherwise transitions from one moment of time to another make no sense.â28
As I read him, Pannenberg makes the case, drawing primarily on his reading of Plotinus and Boethius, that eternity is the source of the temporality of creation while also overcoming the loss of the present into the past and the unavailability of the future to the present that characterizes the temporality of creation. Pannenberg begins with the straightforward assumption that every present moment has a unique past and a unique future, a past and future that we could say define, to a large extent, the distinctive meaning of this present moment and distinguish it from all others. But on a deeper level, the present not only distinguishes but radically separates and divides time into a set of past events that once were present but will never again be experienced as present and a set of future events that one day may be present but that are never experienced in this present as present. The key point is this: it is this latter separation and division of time by the present into past moments and future moments that is overcome in eternity, but not the fact that each present moment has associated with it a distinct past and future.29 In eternity, the present, along with its distinctive past and future, is brought into a differentiated temporal unity with all other present moments, each with their own unique pasts and futures, and this differentiated temporal unity provides the reconnection for what is separated and divided in our ordinary experience of time. Finally, it is the Trinitarian character of God that provides the basis for the intrinsically differentiated unity of eternity (more about this below). In short, the passing and irreversible sequence of separated events that we experience in time is constantly comprehended by eternity as an attribute of the differentiated unity that is Trinity.
In closing this section I should note that these key conceptsâthe present as having a distinctive past and future, the present as separating time into a past of once present moments and a future of one day to be present moments, and eternity as overcoming this temporal separation while retaining the unique past and future for each moment in timeâwi...