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Introduction: Toward a Chicano Social Science
One of the consequences of the civil rights movement of the 1960s was a reevaluation of the role played by social science in the continued subordination and exploitation of racial/ethnic groups. Social science typically was written from the perspective, and reflected the values of, the dominant society and culture. Oppressed groups sought recognition of their own perspectives (Moore 1973, p. 65), arguing that both history and social science should be reexamined and evaluated from female, black, and Chicano1 perspectives, for example. Over the past decade major changes in social science paradigms have been proposed, changes so radical that they hold the potential for a scientific revolution which would incorporate the world view of the oppressed. But acceptance of these changes would mean a complete revamping of social science and a rejection of prevailing paradigms. In sociology Joyce Ladner (1973), Robert Staples (1973, 1976a and b), and others (Wilson 1974; Watson 1976) have sought to develop a black perspective. A distinctive female view of sociology has also emerged (Freeman 1975a and b; Firestone 1972; Ladner 1971; Smith 1977).2
While research on Mexican-Americans is extensive, to date a coherent framework or perspective on Chicano sociology has yet to be developed. A number of scholars including Octavio Romano (1968a and b), Nick Vaca (1970a and b), Miguel Montiel (1970), and Deluvina Hernández (1970) have written incisive critiques of historical and social-science depictions of Mexican-Americans, but their works have been published primarily in Chicano journals and have not been incorporated into mainstream academic circles, and their impact on social science as a whole has been minimal. These early works were typically revisionist and did not fully develop alternative frameworks or conceptualizations. While more sophisticated and sympathetic works on Chicanos have recently appeared (see for example, Murguía 1975; Barrera 1979; Moore 1978; Baca Zinn 1979b, 1981) such works tend to neither build on or extend Chicano perspectives nor attempt to revamp social science but, rather, simply apply existing paradigms to Chicanos. Although their orientation is clearly less pejorative than mainstream views, their ultimate frame of reference remains social science, not Chicanos; hence they are largely reformist.
This chapter proposes a Chicano perspective on sociology and social science, arguing that it is both badly needed and long overdue. A basic thesis advanced is that prevailing views, even if well intended, reflect the biases and misconceptions of the dominant society and perpetuate a mythical conception of Chicano culture.3 Specifically, the chapter attempts to (1) point out flaws and limitations in traditional frameworks, (2) demonstrate the need for a Chicano sociology that would call into question the more traditional sociology of Mexican-Americans, (3) show how the ethic of scientism may help keep Chicanos and other minorities in a subordinate and exploited condition, and (4) propose a new perspective which will not only serve as the underlying framework for this work but might also assist in guiding or directing future research and writing on Chicanos. Although tentative, this paradigm should provide a corrective for former views of Chicanos which now prevail and in contrast present a new depiction of Chicano culture, values, and characteristics which is not only more accurate but also more consistent with a Chicano world view.
The Need for Chicano Sociology
Much of the research and writing subsumed under the rubric “the sociology of Mexican-Americans” has simply taken existing perspectives and applied them to Mexican-Americans. A basic problem is that the sociology of Mexican-Americans has not developed new paradigms or theoretical frameworks that are consistent with a Chicano world view and responsive to the nuances of Chicano culture.
Traditional social-science depictions of Mexican-Americans have been extensively critiqued (see, Romano 1968a and b; Vaca 1970a and b; and Montiel 1970), so that only a brief overview of such characterizations is necessary.4 Suffice it to say that they have reinforced a negative conception of Mexican-Americans that sees them as (1) controlled and manipulated by traditional culture, (2) docile, passive, present oriented, fatalistic, and lacking in achievement, (3) victimized by faulty socialization which takes place in an authoritarian family system, dominated by the cult of machismo, and (4) violent and prone to antisocial and criminal behavior. The sociology of Mexican-Americans thus leads to the inevitable conclusion that most of the problems encountered by Chicanos are the result of deficiencies in their own culture and family system.
Even those social scientists who are sympathetic to the plight of the Chicano often reveal a lack of sensitivity to contemporary Chicano values and culture. The pervasive use of “Mexican-American,” for example, fails to recognize that “Chicano” is a word self-consciously selected by many persons as symbolic of positive identification with a unique cultural heritage. Many have not realized that Mexican-American is analogous to Negro or colored, whereas Chicano is analogous to black. Both terms denote persons of Mexican extraction living in the United States, but they have very different connotations. By using Mexican-American in lieu of Chicano one consciously or unconsciously makes a political choice. A label that connotes middle-class respectability and eschews ethnic consciousness and political awareness has been selected. Hispanic reflects a similar insensitivity in that it downplays our Indian heritage in favor of the European and fails to distinguish us from other Spanish-speaking groups.
A cornerstone of the Chicano movement has been a very positive identification, culturally and biologically, with our indio/mestizo roots and overt rejection of our Spanish or European heritage. Duran and Bernard (1982, p. 3) observe:
It is this emphasis on the physically conquered but spiritually vibrant Indian aspect of raza that is central to the Mexican and Chicano identity. For, like the Mexicans, Chicanos have chosen their Indian heritage as the symbolic force of their identity. The area where most Chicanos live is not called the Southwest or el Sudoeste, but Aztlan, after the mythical origin of the Aztecs perhaps in what is now Colorado or New Mexico. The name Chicano itself is derived from Mexicano, the word used in Mexico today to refer to the 1.5 million people who still speak Nahuatl (Aztec).
In 1969, at the National Youth Conference in Denver, Corky Gonzales resurrected the word Chicano and proclaimed the Southwest, Aztlán. The name Chicano captured the unique position of mexicanos living in the United States, who had opted to identify neither as American or Mexican.
. . . too often, “Mexican” became “meskin” in much the same way “negro” was slurred by Southerners as “nigra”; . . . But “Chicano”, like “black” for “negro”, cut through all the problems of tags and labels. “Chicano” was to become a badge of brown pride embraced by the activists while it was uncomfortably digested by the moderate and conservative Mexican-Americans. (Castro 1974, p. 130)
Mexican-American or Hispanic-American is often preferred over Chicano not only because they are devoid of radical or militant meaning but because they instantly transform Chicanos into “another” hyphenated ethnic group like Irish-Americans, Italian-Americans, or Polish-Americans. Such terms imply that we, too, are immigrants faced with problems of acculturation and assimilation not unlike those faced by white European immigrants and can therefore be studied with the same paradigms.
Chicanos strongly resist the notion that we are somehow transplanted or imported Americans. The Chicano has been in America for a long time. In fact, as Luis Valdez (1972, p. xxxiii) has pointed out, we did not come to the United States, but rather the United States came to us. However,
Now the gringo is trying to impose the immigrant complex on the Chicano, pretending that we “Mexican-Americans” are the most recent arrivals. It will not work. His melting pot concept is a sham. . . . the Anglo cannot conceive of the Chicano, the Mexican Mestizo, in all his ancient human fullness. He recognizes him as a Mexican, but only to the extent that he is “American”; and he accepts Mexican culture only to the extent that it has been Americanized, sanitized, sterilized, and made safe for democracy. (Ibid., pp. xxxii-xxxiii)
Chicano sociology can serve as a corrective for the many misconceptions and erroneous characterizations which have been perpetrated by the sociology of Mexican-Americans. Beginning with the premise that Chicanos are not a recent immigrant group but native to the Southwest and the American continent, the relationship between Chicanos and the dominant society becomes one, not of a voluntary, mobile, immigrant group and a host society, but of an indigenous people and an invading nation. The initial introduction of Chicanos into United States society was forced and involuntary, as in the case of blacks and native Americans, and came at the conclusion of the Mexican-American War in 1848. Domestic racial and ethnic minorities thus have much in common with Third World nations that were similarly colonized by European nations.
The birth of the Chicano, then, can be traced directly to the military conquest and forceful incorporation of Mexico’s northern territory and its inhabitants into the United States, ratified with the signing of the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo. Chicanos today are not colonized in the classic sense of the word, but they remain “internally colonized.” Internal colonialism differs from the classic variety in that it entails not the subordination of a distant land but the acquisition of contiguous territory. Once territory is acquired, local elites are deposed from power and indigenous institutions are completely destroyed. The “classic” colony is recognized formally and legally, while the “internal” colony has only an informal existence.
The informality of internal colonization makes it more insidious and oppressive, however, because the existence and legitimacy of native institutions and culture are not recognized. The culture, values, and language of Chicanos thus have had no formal or legitimate standing within American society. It has not been atypical, for example, for Chicanitos to be punished in school for speaking their native tongue or for expressing familial or cultural values that run counter to dominant societal values (Steiner 1970, p. 210; U.S. Commission on Civil Rights 1974, pp. 4–5). Although Chicanos may have formal and legal equality, they are informally excluded from full participation in the educational, economic, and political system.
Since Chicanos are a de facto colony, the process of colonization has generally gone undetected. Many would argue that while Chicanos were once conquered militarily, today they are a volunteer immigrant group. Few Chicanos, after all, trace their ancestry to the preconquest inhabitants of the Southwest—they are said to be immigrants or descendants of immigrants who came here of their own free will in the hope of improving their economic position. But to view Chicanos as an immigrant group is to miss the essence of internal colonialism. A person of Mexican ancestry living in the United States, whether a recent arrival or native to the Southwest, is subjected to the same colonial condition. An individual may be a “voluntary” immigrant, but he or she enters a colonial situation nonetheless. Colonization, after all, is a relationship between groups or nations, not among individuals.
Escape is possible for individual members of a subordinate group if one is more Caucasian in appearance or if the culture and values of the larger society are adopted. This, ironically, makes a person not a “noncolonized Chicano” but rather a “noncolonized non-Chicano.” “The apparent semi-permeability of the colonial barrier for Chicanos is illusory, since there is no escape from the colonial status for an individual as a Chicano” (Barrera, Muñoz, and Ornelas 1972, p. 485). Typically the cost of acceptance into mainstream society and upward mobility for colonized people has been rejection of both their cultural heritage and ethnic identity: a choice, in other words, between subordination and cultural genocide.5
The conception of Chicanos as immigrants reflects the world view of the dominant group. Such a conception ignores the fact that the border was established and imposed by the conquering nation and that our ancestors are indigenous to this continent. It is a historical and political rather than a cultural border, and for many who cross it “illegally” the boundary is, and has always been, arbitrary and capricious.
One can subscribe to the internal colonial model, however, without accepting the view of Chicanos as a conquered people. Mario Barrera has attempted a synthesis of internal-colonialism and class-segmentation approaches. He holds that “Colonialism historically has been established to serve the interests of merchants, industrialists, and would-be landowners, or of the state which ultimately safeguards the interests of the dominate classes” (1979, p. 212). Chicanos are found within all classes, but they constitute a subordinate segment within each. These different Chicanos segments share common interests bases on discrimination and a common culture (ibid., p. 216). It is interesting to note that although Barrera does not link internal colonialism to a conquest perspective, neither does he endorse the immigrant-group model.
It is clear, then, that a sociology of Mexican-Americans, which is based on an immigrant-group model of society, cannot adequately describe the Chicano people. Its emphasis on “acculturation” and “assimilation” makes the model inappropriate for Chicanos and other groups who first entered United States society involuntarily, and it should therefore be discarded (these models are discussed more fully in chapter nine).
Although the assimilationist model was severely criticized in the late 1960s and early 1970s (see Moore 1970; Memmi 1965; Almaguer 1971; Acuña 1972; Barrera et al. 1972; and Barrera 1979), many social scientists continued to adhere to an immigrant-group model in interpretating the Chicano experience.6 From the early work of Bogardus to the present, sociologist, in particular, have demonstrated an inordinate concern with acculturation, assimilation and integration. Much contemporary research on Chicanos still focuses on differential rates of social mobility, intermarriage, achievement, occupational and educational aspirations, and the like, and despite greater methodological sophistication its underlying thesis is still that the ultimate fate of ethnic minorities is assimilation into the melting pot.7
Scientism and Chicano Sociology
In its quest to gain recognition and legitimacy as an academic discipline, sociology has attempted to model itself after natural science. The cumulative effect of these efforts has been the emergence of “scientism,” or what has been termed “the pernicious exaggeration of both the status and function of science in relation to our values” (Kaplan 1964, p. 405). Scientism places undue emphasis on objectivity, standardized research instruments, universalistic generalizations, and value-free science. Accordingly, the social scientist is expected to be objective, detached, and void of all value positions, and his or her observations are to be unaffected by personal, social, or political considerations. The tenets of scientism not only discourage the emergence and incorporation of minority paradigms but neutralize attempts by Third World scholars to modify prevailing world views.
Objectivity has been extolled as a virtuous trademark of science. Since the scientist is to be objective and detached rather than subjective or partisan, commitment and emotional involvement introduce bias. Proponents of this ethic assume that observations are somehow more valid and accurate if one is affectively neutral toward the phenomenon under study and, conversely, that the expression of value preferences necessarily invalidates or prejudices observations. But this characterization of science is in conflict with the actual conduct of scientific inquiry. The fact “that a scientist has values does not of itself imply that he is therefore biased; it may mean just the contrary” (Kaplan 1964, p. 381). The pursuit of the scientific enterprise, after all, is based on deeply ingrained and cherished values such as the search for truth and the extension of knowledge.
Closely related to the cult of objectivity is a belief in value-free sociology. If sociologists are to attain a true state of objectivity, it is argued, they should refrain from making value judgments or moral pronouncements. Those who make such judgments or pronouncements are viewed as ideologues, not as pure scientists. The value-free position, like the belief in objectivity, is based on a dualistic separation of reason and faith, of knowledge and feeling, and the doctrine of value-free sociology is an attempt to reconcile the tension between these two conflicting conceptions of man (Gouldner 1962, p. 212).
The belief in value-free sociology has been criticized by a number of persons who reject this view of the relationship between sociology and science. Alvin Gouldner likens belief in value-free sociology to belief in minotaurs. The existence of minotaurs, creatures that are half man and half bull, cannot be disproved since “a belief in them is not so much untrue as it is absurd” (Gouldner 1962, p. 199). Given that one cannot avoid making value judgments and value decisions, the belief in value-free sociology is equally absurd. “Those who use ethical neutrality or similar arguments as an excuse for inaction, for not ‘choosing sides,’ are . . . adopting a philosophical stance that was undermined decades ago” (Hoult 1968, p. 6). Since not to decide is one kind of decision, those who adopt the stance of ethical neutrality opt to support the status quo. The value-free ethic is also in conflict with a basic premise of sociology and cultural anthropology, cultural determinism. “If behavior is strongly shaped by societal or cultural forces as we maintain, how can we escape the realization that our activities as anthropologists also are so controlled?” (Sorenson 1964, p. 8). Social scientists have thus resisted applying a sociocultural perspective to their own behavior.
A final characteristic of scientism is adherence to the norm of universalism or omniscience. Before sociology can hope to attain scientific status, it must be capable of making valid generalizations that apply to numerous individuals and groups across time and setting. Science is by definition universalistic rather than particularistic. The norm of universalism has led to an emphasis on the quantification of behavior and the development of a rigorous methodology. Sociologists have sought not only to quantify behavior but to standardize instruments and techniques—to develop scales and measures that are validated or standardized across different populations or groups. Universalism holds, moreover, that “the acceptance or rejection of claims entering the lists of science is not to depend on the personal or social attributes of their protagonist; his race, nationality, religion, class and personal qualities are as such irr...