A History of Medieval Philosophy
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A History of Medieval Philosophy

Frederick C. Copleston

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eBook - ePub

A History of Medieval Philosophy

Frederick C. Copleston

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In this classic work, Frederick C. Copleston, S.J., outlines the development of philosophical reflection in Christian, Islamic, and Jewish thought from the ancient world to the late medieval period. A History of Medieval Philosophy is an invaluable general introduction that also includes longer treatments of such leading thinkers as Aquinas, Scotus, and Ockham.

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1
Introduction
1
AT one time there was a widespread impression that the student of the development of philosophy could profitably jump straight from Plato and Aristotle to Francis Bacon and Descartes, omitting consideration both of post-Aristotelian Greek thought and of medieval philosophy. The philosophy of the Middle Ages was thought to be dependent on Christian theology in such a way and to such a degree as to exclude any genuine philosophical reflection. There was also a tendency to think of it as pretty well equivalent to a debased Aristotelianism which lacked the original and creative spirit of Aristotle himself and concentrated on trivial and tiresome questions. Again, it was a common enough idea that no logical developments of any value had taken place in the Middle Ages. If, therefore, one were interested in free metaphysical speculation or in the creation of striking world views, one would be well advised to dismiss medieval speculation as hag-ridden by theology and turn to Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz. If one mistrusted metaphysical speculation and wished to find a tradition of philosophical reflection which was firmly grounded in experience, one had better study the development of British empiricism. If it were logic to which one proposed to devote one’s attention, the profitable procedure would be to go straight from the logic of Aristotle (and possibly that of the Stoics) to the logical developments of modern times. In all these areas medieval thought could be profitably passed over as a dark and barren interlude, as far at any rate as philosophy and logic were concerned.
Nowadays we have a better understanding of the continuity between ancient, medieval, Renaissance and modern philosophy. It is unnecessary to dwell here on the connections between ancient and medieval thought, for they will be illustrated in later chapters. It is sufficient to point out that in the Roman empire Christian thought coexisted for some time with non-Christian Greek philosophy, and that a thinker such as St Augustine, who died in 430 and who exercised a great influence in the Middle Ages, belonged to the ancient world. In later chapters we shall see how Greco-Roman philosophy provided material for philosophical reflection in the Middle Ages and for incorporation, in varying degrees, in medieval systems of thought.
If we turn to the other end, so to speak, we can see the difficulty in fixing definite limits to the medieval, Renaissance and modern periods. Let us suppose, for example, that in describing the Renaissance we emphasize both the increased knowledge of classical literature and the increasing literary use of the national vernacular languages, as distinct from Latin. We have to remember that a large number of writings were translated from the Greek (directly or indirectly) into Latin in the last part of the twelfth century and in the early decades of the thirteenth century. We have also to remember that one of the greatest creations of Italian literature, namely Dante’s Divine Comedy, was composed in the thirteenth century, while in the following century Petrarch and Boccaccio wrote poems in Italian and Chaucer developed the literary use of English. At the same time the use of Latin was continued, as by Descartes and Spinoza, into the early period of what is generally described as modern philosophy. Again, if we emphasize the scientific achievements of the Renaissance, we have at any rate to consider the claim that there was more in common, so far as their spirit was concerned, between certain embryonic scientists of the late Middle Ages and the great scientists of the Renaissance than there was between some of the Renaissance philosophers of Nature and the great figures of the scientific Renaissance.
In regard to the transition between medieval and modern philosophy, it is easy to be misled by the polemical attitudes adopted by early modern philosophers. Francis Bacon and Descartes may have inveighed against scholastic Aristotelianism; but philosophers continued for many years to use categories of thought and philosophical principles which had been used by medieval thinkers. It would be a mistake to attribute what we might describe as the scholastic elements in philosophies such as those of Descartes, Malebranche and Leibniz to the interest in classical literature which was shown during the Renaissance. Descartes’s first philosophical studies were in the scholastic tradition, going back to the Middle Ages. And though his mind came to move in other directions, the influence of his early studies was permanent. Malebranche was deeply influenced by Augustine, while Leibniz had a fairly extensive knowledge of philosophical literature belonging to or stemming from the medieval tradition. Moreover, its influence upon him is apparent in his writings. Again, we can trace a connection between medieval philosophy of law and that of John Locke. For the matter of that, Locke’s empiricism is not so completely alien to all aspects of medieval thought as has been sometimes supposed.
The philosophers of the French Enlightenment in the eighteenth century tended to think that with themselves reason had at last come into its own, and that ‘Middle Ages’ and ‘Dark Ages’ were synonymous terms. The growth of the sense of historical development in the nineteenth century and serious historical study have obviously changed this outlook. Except for people who have no use for historical studies, nobody would seriously suppose that a coherent and adequate account of the development of European culture and society could be given if the medieval period were simply omitted. And it is commonly recognized, even by those who have little sympathy with the religious beliefs of the Middle Ages, that no adequate account of the development of European thought and philosophy could be given unless medieval philosophy were taken into account. But though an emphasis on the continuity of European philosophy can be and has been of use, this emphasis needs to be counterbalanced by a recognition of discontinuity, of differences.
For example, those historians who emphasized the scholastic elements, deriving from the Middle Ages, in the philosophy of Descartes doubtless performed a useful service. They showed the absurdity of supposing that philosophy, having suffered a demise when the emperor Justinian closed the philosophical schools at Athens in 529, was suddenly reborn with Descartes in France and Francis Bacon in England. At the same time, when Descartes uses a term taken from medieval philosophy, it by no means necessarily follows that he is using it in the same sense in which it was used by his medieval predecessors. Indeed Descartes himself drew attention to this point. Again, when Spinoza employs terms such as ‘substance’ and ‘cause’, we would be seriously mistaken if we blithely assumed that he means precisely the same as was meant by St Thomas Aquinas in the thirteenth century.
Talk about historical periods has sometimes been attacked. And it is true of course not only that it is very difficult to assign clear and definite boundary lines to periods such as the Middle Ages or the Renaissance but also that, if we try to do so, we tend to obscure important facts. For instance, there are historical facts which make it possible at any rate to extend the Renaissance backwards, so to speak. And there may well be grounds for hesitation in regard to the classification of, say, Nicholas of Cusa (1401–64) as a late medieval or as a Renaissance figure. One can find arguments in favour of either classification. And it is understandable if the validity of such classifications is called in question.
Though, however, division into historical periods may express the tyranny of general ideas over the mind and obscure any clear perception of overlappings and of elements of continuity, it is an exaggeration to claim that a division of this kind is useless or that it has no foundation in historical fact. To be sure, we cannot assign rigidly delimited boundaries. But it seems idle to deny that there are any roughly distinguishable periods with characteristics of their own. Medieval social structures, for example, had characteristics which were clearly different from those of Greek society and which are not found in our modern industrial society. And the set of beliefs which constituted a common mental background in medieval Christendom and which influenced the selection of philosophical problems for consideration were not present during most of the history of the ancient world1 and can hardly be said to exercise in our contemporary society the synthesizing and coordinating influence which they exercised in the Middle Ages. Again, whereas in medieval Christendom theology was regarded as the highest science available to man, in the modern world theology has obviously lost its dominating position, and today the word ‘science’ generally suggests the natural sciences which have developed since the Middle Ages and which have had profound and far-reaching effects on human life, society and thought.
In any study of medieval philosophy, therefore, account must be taken of elements both of continuity and discontinuity. If for the sake of convenience we reckon the period of medieval thought from about 800, the year of the coronation of Charlemagne, the historian has to exhibit the connections between early medieval philosophy and what preceded it. At the same time it is his business to illustrate the peculiar characteristics not only of medieval philosophy in general but also of the leading thinkers and currents of thought. Ideally, philosophical ideas should be related, when it is relevant to do so, to extra-philosophical factors, inasmuch as philosophy does not pursue a purely isolated life of its own, without connection with other cultural elements and with social structures. But to realize this ideal in a short work would be impracticable, even if the writer were competent to do so.
2
It might very well be objected that though what has been said is substantially true, it does very little to show that medieval philosophy is worth studying, except perhaps by historians. If medieval philosophy constitutes, as it does, an integral phase in the total development of European thought up to date, anyone who wishes to study this process of development as a whole should obviously acquire some knowledge of the philosophy of the Middle Ages. Further, some specialists in medieval thought are obviously required. But the legitimacy of historical studies in this area certainly does not prove that a student who is interested in philosophical problems as they present themselves today needs to bother his head about the philosophy of the Middle Ages. The tendency to omit medieval thought and to jump straight from Aristotle to Francis Bacon and Descartes may well be objectionable from the historian’s point of view. At the same time it may be perfectly justified in regard to the content of medieval thought. After all, the rather obvious point has already been noted, that emphasis on continuity should be balanced by a recognition of discontinuity and of peculiar characteristics. One of the peculiar characteristics of medieval thought was surely the dominant position of Christian theology. To a considerable extent selection of themes for philosophical discussion was governed by theological presuppositions. And even if religious beliefs did not dictate the conclusions at which philosophers had to arrive, they at any rate dictated, in certain areas at least, the conclusions at which philosophers must not arrive. For this reason alone autonomous philosophical reflection was severely restricted. Further, medieval philosophy belonged to a pre-critical age. Some of its basic assumptions have been called in question and can no longer be taken for granted. In general, medieval philosophy is part and parcel of a world which has passed away. To be sure, there was such a world. And it is open to anyone who wishes to study it and to endeavour to understand it. But it is not our world. Indeed, the modern student of philosophy who does not share the presuppositions of the medieval thinkers has probably more to learn from Plato or Aristotle than from Bonaventure or Aquinas or Duns Scotus.
Let us consider first the relation between philosophy on the one hand and religious and theological convictions on the other in the Middle Ages. Whatever people’s conduct may have been, it is obviously true that in medieval Europe there was a much greater homogeneity of religious beliefs than there is in the contemporary western world.1 And it is only natural that religious belief should influence philosophy. Philosophical thought is influenced not only by its past but also by the historical context and by extra-philosophical factors. In recent centuries the rise and development of the particular sciences have influenced philosophical thought in a variety of ways. In the Middle Ages the principal extra-philosophical factor which influenced philosophy was religious belief. Moreover, the leading medieval thinkers were mostly theologians.2 Hence it was only natural that religious and theological convictions should exercise a certain degree of influence on the selection and treatment of topics. Just as in recent centuries the sciences have suggested problems and points of view, so did religious belief and theology in the medieval period.3
It by no means necessarily follows, however, that the influence of religious and theological beliefs was simply detrimental to philosophy. In the first place antecedent religious belief could and did widen the scope of philosophical problematics. As will be seen later, in the Faculty of Arts at Paris in the middle of the thirteenth century, there was a marked tendency to identify philosophy with the thought of Aristotle. The theologian-philosophers, however, were much less addicted to thinking that the Greek philosopher was the culmination of human wisdom. And Professor Étienne Gilson in particular has argued that the Jewish—Christian tradition acted as a powerful fertilizing and stimulating influence, suggesting fresh problems and points of view.
In the second place it is a mistake to think that during the Middle Ages theology dominated philosophy in the sense that the philosopher’s job was simply that of finding arguments to prove the truth of propositions asserted by the Church. Obviously, if a man believed, on religious grounds, that a certain proposition was true, he could not at the same time maintain that the falsity of the proposition could be proved by human reason, unless indeed he was prepared to adopt a double-truth theory, namely that a proposition could at the same time be true in theology and false in philosophy.1 Hence if a philosopher, who was also a Christian believer, thought that he had demonstrated the truth of a proposition which contradicted an article of Christian faith, he would either have to assume that there was a flaw in his reasoning or abandon his faith or conclude that what he had taken to be a truth of faith was not really what he had supposed it to be. But it by no means follows that if a philosopher believed, as a Christian, in the truth of a certain proposition, he would also have to hold that its truth could be proved by philosophical reasoning. For example, William of Ockham believed in human immortality. But he did not believe that the philosopher could prove that man possesses a spiritual and immortal soul. He did not claim that philosophy could prove the opposite. When he criticized the arguments of his predecessors, he was simply extending the area of truths of faith which lie beyond the range of philosophy. To put the matter in another way, he was narrowing the philosophical field.
As for the statement that medieval philosophy was pre-critical, we have to make a distinction. If by critical philosophy we mean the philosophy of Immanuel Kant, it is obviously true that the medieval thinkers belonged to a pre-critical age. But if by describing the philosophy of the Middle Ages as pre-critical we mean that the medieval thinkers were naive and incapable of questioning presuppositions, the description constitutes a caricature. They certainly did not believe that human knowledge is simply knowledge of ideas, in the sense of subjective modifications, or that human thinking creates reality. They did not look on the range of human knowledge as unlimited; but realism was a common presupposition. To the subjective idealist or to a man who doubts whether there can be such a thing as knowledge of a reality external to the mind, this may appear a naive assumption. But it is not one which is likely to alienate the sympathies of modern British philosophers. In any case the medieval thinker was as capable, or as incapable, as anyone else of criticizing the assumptions or presuppositions of other philosophers. To become explicitly aware of one’s own basic presuppositions and to subject them to critical examination is no easy task. Criticizing other thinkers’ ideas, arguments and assumptions is, however, a common enough pastime of philosophers. And the medievals were as much given to it as their successors. Obviously, the fact that there was, generally speaking, a common background of religious belief means that we cannot find in the Middle Ages as clearly different and sharply contrasting world-views as we can find in more recent times. But this does not alter the fact that in the fourteenth century some of the premises and arguments advanced by leading metaphysicians of the preceding century were subjected to radical criticism. The notion that the medieval philosophers were uncritical, as distinct from pre-critical in the sense of pre-Kantian, is largely due to an identification of medieval philosophy with the thought of one or two venerable figures whose arguments are considered, whether rightly or wrongly, to rest on unexamined assumptions.
As for the judgement that philosophers of the Middle Ages devoted themselves to discussion of trivial and tiresome questions, we can dispose easily enough of the notion that they were given to heated arguments about the number of angels who could dance on the point of a pin. This notion is a caricature. For angels were conceived as spiritual beings, whereas dancing requires a body. Hence the question how many angels could dance on the point of a pin would be for a medieval theologian or philosopher a good example of a pseudo-question. At the same time the impression that the philosophers of the Middle Ages were preoccupied with tiresome and outmoded questions need not be based on a caricature of medieval philosophy. It can have other grounds.
Suppose that a man is convinced that there is no God to talk about, and even that such talk is nonsensical. He will obviously find medieval discussion of arguments for God’s existence and Aquinas’s discussion of the meaning of the terms predicated of God tiresome and unprofitable. But a positivist rejection of metaphysics applies to a much wider field than medieval metaphysics. And there is no need to discuss the matter here, though it is worth remarking that the positivist is likely to have more respect for the medieval metaphysicians, who did their best to give precise and clear statement to what they wished to say, than for some much later metaphysicians, whose obscurity and vagueness of expression is notorious.
One reason why a modern reader may form an unfavourable impression of philosophical discussion in the Middle Ages is the feeling that it is predominantly an academic affair, a discussion which is carried on by teachers in universities as a kind of in-game, and that passionate concern with the fundamental problems of human existence is conspicuous by its absence. It may be recognized, of course, that, given a more or less common background of religious belief, this state of affairs is understandabl...

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