Cities of Affluence and Anger
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Cities of Affluence and Anger

A Literary Geography of Modern Englishness

Peter Kalliney

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Cities of Affluence and Anger

A Literary Geography of Modern Englishness

Peter Kalliney

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Providing a compact literary history of the twentieth century in England, Cities of Affluence and Anger studies the problematic terms of national identity during England's transition from an imperial power to its integration in the global cultural marketplace. While the countryside had been the dominant symbol of Englishness throughout the previous century, modern literature began to turn more and more to the city to redraw the boundaries of a contemporary cultural polity. The urban class system, paradoxically, still functioned as a marker of wealth, status, and hierarchy throughout this long period of self-examination, but it also became a way to project a common culture and mitigate other forms of difference. Local class politics were transformed in such a way that enabled the English to reframe a highly provisional national unity in the context of imperial disintegration, postcolonial immigration, and, later, globalization.

Kalliney plots the decline of the country-house novel through an analysis of Forster's Howards End and Waugh's Brideshead Revisited, each ruthless in its sabotage of the trope of bucolic harmony. The traditionally pastoral focus of English fiction gives way to a high-modernist urban narrative, exemplified by Woolf's Mrs. Dalloway, and, later, to realists such as Osborne and Sillitoe, through whose work Kalliney explores postwar urban expansion and the cultural politics of the welfare state. Offering fresh new readings of Lessing's The Golden Notebook and Rushdie's The Satanic Verses, the author considers the postwar appropriation of domesticity, the emergence of postcolonial literature, and the renovation of travel narratives in the context of globalization. Kalliney suggests that it is largely one city--London--through which national identity has been reframed. How and why this transition came about is a process that Cities of Affluence and Anger depicts with exceptional insight and originality.

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1.ENGLISH, ALL TOO ENGLISH
NATIONAL EXCEPTIONALISM AND THE URBAN CLASS SYSTEM
In 1936 Victor Gollancz asked George Orwell to take a tour of England’s northern industrial cities and write a documentary about his experiences among working-class people. The results of that journey were published a year later as The Road to Wigan Pier, carrying the imprint of Gollancz’s Left Book Club. Although the subscription book society boasted some 38,000 regular members before the outbreak of World War II, Orwell’s contribution is one of the few offerings to remain in continuous circulation, owing its durability partly to the fame of its author and partly to the text’s searching, desperately funny critiques of English society. The book itself is a curious combination of autoethnography and autobiography: the first half offers an anthropological sketch of England’s northern, working-class communities, documenting the effects of poverty on the country’s millions of unemployed and underemployed families, while the second half, ostensibly explaining why socialism has not yet won the day in England, attacks the attitudes and mores of the middle classes, of which the author deems himself a “sufficiently typical” example (121). Written during the height of the Depression and on the eve of World War II, the book sits, uncomfortably, on the precipice of radical cultural change. During the next twenty-five years or so, England would participate in a world war and the cold war, elect its first majority Labour government, establish the basic foundations of a welfare state, and concede statehood and self-determination to most of its colonial territories. This conjunction of major political crises, both domestic and global, forced the English to perform a thorough self-examination in a relatively short period of time. Internally, the threat of unmitigated class conflict endangered already tenuous political stability. Internationally, the loss of an extensive overseas empire demanded a substantial reconsideration of English national identity: a discourse of intrinsic cultural particularity gradually replaced symbolic dependence on extrinsic colonial mastery. The Road to Wigan Pier clearly demonstrates its anxieties about this impending process—excited by the promise of widespread change but also nervous about the shape it might assume.
Orwell begins part 2, the book’s autobiographical assessment of socialism in England, with his famous declaration that he “was born into what you might describe as the lower-upper-middle class.” As a whole, the upper-middle class was a relic of sorts, well past its “heyday in the ’eighties and ’nineties.” Late Victorian prosperity had long since given way to Georgian pessimism and nostalgia, with only Rudyard Kipling, whom Orwell calls the great “poet laureate” of the upper-middle class, reminding them of past glory. Orwell glosses the upper-middle class in terms of their approximate annual income, “the layer of society lying between £2000 and £300 a year.” His own family, he mentions, was “not far from the bottom,” hence his position in the lower-upper-middle class. These monetary figures, he hastens to add, are the most expedient way to convey his general meaning, but he insists that relying too much on income to determine one’s class position can be a treacherous exercise:
Nevertheless, the essential point about the English class-system is that it is not entirely explicable in terms of money. Roughly speaking it is a money-stratification, but it is also interpenetrated by a sort of shadowy caste-system; rather like a jerry-built modern bungalow haunted by medieval ghosts. . . . Probably there are countries where you can predict a man’s opinions from his income, but it is never quite safe to do so in England; you have always got to take his traditions into consideration as well. (121–22)
While an individual’s annual salary may give a rough indication of that person’s relative position in the world, it can never adequately capture the intricacies of class politics and its relation to English national traditions. Orwell argues that unlike in other countries, where the size of a man’s bank account might allow one to accurately guess his political orientation, England’s convoluted social networks demand a more nuanced, culturally sensitive approach to the problem of class.
Cities of Affluence and Anger is an attempt to unpack Orwell’s surprisingly rich metaphor of England’s class system—and by implication, English national culture—as “rather like a jerry-built modern bungalow haunted by medieval ghosts.” There is a vague but concrete feeling among contemporary scholars and political pundits that class politics is, or should be, in sharp decline. When John Major, throughout the early 1990s, unironically insisted that the goal of the Conservative Party was to create a “classless society,” and when Tony Blair, during his address to the Labour Party conference of 1999, declared the class war “over,” they were both echoing a refrain that prominent leftist academics had been arguing for years (to say nothing of more conservative politicians). For many scholars, the “old” rallying cry of class exploitation has been (or should be) replaced by a more inclusive, flexible, and heterogeneous coalition of social justice movements. Progressive intellectuals and activists have emphasized the need to create popular alliances among feminists, environmentalists, minority rights workers, gay rights advocates, and other progressive groups. But there is a latent anxiety, even as this new political landscape has emerged in the postwar period, that class politics still has some relevance. Rather like the ghost that seems so out of place in Orwell’s modern bungalow—a spectral presence no one cares to acknowledge much less address by name—class politics haunts contemporary analyses of English culture. Dead but not buried, class lingers mostly as a “shadowy caste-system” of sorts in scholarly treatments of modern England, neglected by scholars who have probably grown weary of the subject after decades of debate.1 As Peter Hitchcock argues, class is frequently mentioned alongside race, gender, and sexuality in contemporary academic discourse, but it remains radically undertheorized in comparison.2 Contemporary academic studies of class politics are consistently apologetic, as if expressing an interest in class reflects an impoverished, antiquated sense of the field.3 Most progressive scholars mention the class system as a form of exploitation, if only to cover their bases, but rarely does it feature as an object of heightened analytic or theoretical scrutiny.
My point is not that a class system still exists in some form, or simply that class politics still matters. What may most surprise readers of this book is how often twentieth-century texts, especially novels, take the articulation of class difference as a manifestly symbolic consideration, a contested site on which aesthetic objects perform substantive cultural work. In many respects, this book is less concerned with defining class politics as a social and political reality and more interested in thinking about it as a symbolic condition, as a contentious, unstable point around which cultural texts are structured.4 Unlike much contemporary scholarship, which treats class as a relatively stable, known quantity, twentieth-century English fiction consistently mobilizes class politics as a way of theorizing social difference and imagining political agency in a rapidly changing cultural context. An acute sense of class consciousness, moreover, features not just in putatively working-class novels but in a wide variety of texts. The novels considered in this book, for instance, have a broad social and aesthetic range: I have included chapters on the high modernist Mrs. Dalloway, middlebrow country-house fiction such as Howards End and Brideshead Revisited, popular, working-class novels from the 1950s, and two experimental postcolonial texts, The Golden Notebook and The Satanic Verses. The novels themselves represent a cross section of twentieth-century English fiction; what they share, curiously, is their deployment of class difference as a site of fierce symbolic contestation.
Orwell’s metaphor of the haunted house economically captures the slipperiness of class as a theoretical concept. England’s class system, paradoxically, is both the house and its haunting, at once a tangible, material object and a spectral, ethereal presence, a thing belonging more properly to the spiritual plane. The foundations of the class system have a rough equivalent in the world of hard economics, but understanding the true significance of class demands an account of its intangible, shadowy, affective properties. In Marxist terms, we might say that Orwell’s analogy articulates a tension between the material and ideological axes of class politics: class refers to the objective material conditions under which people live and struggle, yet it is also a way to project group solidarity (or difference) in a stratified society. The idea of class can describe the social circumstances through which capital organizes production and distributes resources, but it can also be used to enunciate political sympathies and help galvanize people who may not occupy exactly the same social position. This book uses a variety of literary and cultural texts to help theorize the messiness of class politics in twentieth-century England. I suggest that this tension between class as a material condition and class as an ideological disposition becomes manifest through symbolic apparatuses, such as literary texts. Class as an objective relation and class as an ideological tool are relatively autonomous yet intimately related. Like the haunted house, these two axes of class politics are necessarily imbricated with one another, the tension between them exerting a determining influence on complex symbolic structures, such as the novel.
The house in Orwell’s metaphor is not an ordinary habitation but a modern bungalow, significant because it is not an indigenous architectural form. Originally, the bungalow came to England from India, where it was used first by Bengali peasants, then modified to accommodate British administrators. During the nineteenth century, it flourished in the English countryside—where many colonial officers retired—and from England was reexported to other colonies, particularly to Africa, where it was thought a suitable residence for Europeans living in the tropics.5 For the purposes of this project, Orwell’s metaphor is instructive because it underscores the deep, structural connection between the class system in England and the changing fortunes of British imperialism. In an economic sense, of course, British capitalism was fully integrated in and dependent on a vast network of colonial possessions. The metropolitan class system, as such, should be seen as a very specialized, localized division of labor that was contingent on a much broader set of economic and political arrangements, of which colonial space was an equally important component. Politically, the empire functioned as a kind of social safety net for all classes of English society, in which a discourse of material scarcity dominated long stretches of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. When the cyclical labor market contracted, for instance, many of the poverty-stricken working class made their way to the settler colonies, relieving the burden on the domestic economy. For Orwell’s lower-upper-middle class, securing a job in the civil service or the military was the easiest way to maintain a lifestyle that would have been financially impossible in the metropole: lots of land for hunting and riding, inexpensive servants, and palatial homes were feasible in the colonies but not at home. By the late nineteenth century, the concept of Englishness had become so dependent on imperialism that it had become difficult to articulate a form of national identity without referring to it. As Orwell himself argues, abandoning the imperial project would “reduce England to a cold and unimportant little island where we should all have to work very hard and live mainly on herrings and potatoes” (159–60). Decolonization would have dire material and ideological consequences for England, threatening its material security and mortally wounding its national self-esteem. England’s economic viability and political authority were dependent on an extrinsic imperial geography, without which it would be reduced to a meager diet, bad weather, and global insignificance.
During the longue durĂ©e of imperial contraction that was the twentieth century, domestic class politics became increasingly more important to the discourse of national identity because it offered a way to articulate a version of English cultural exceptionalism or “insiderism.”6 The threat, and later the reality, of imperial decline forced the English to turn inward, to perform a thorough inventory of Englishness in the absence of an expansive imperial imaginary. Strangely enough, it was a domestic class system—which was itself in the process of a major reconfiguration due, in part, to the waning of empire—that allowed the English to reframe the discourse of national identity through a social system that was intrinsically and mysteriously unique to England. There may be some countries, as Orwell opines, “where you can predict a man’s opinions from his income, but it is never quite safe to do so in England.” In the twentieth century, England’s murky, unpredictable class politics, basically economic but also “interpenetrated” with a “shadowy caste-system” embedded in tradition and affect, was transformed into a kind of national patrimony, a social and ideological marker of intrinsic cultural peculiarity. Throughout this long period of national self-examination, England’s class system continued to function as a discourse of wealth, status, and hierarchy, but, paradoxically, it also became a way to project a shared culture and a common social vocabulary. Although class as a set of social practices was by no means insulated from the nation’s program of overseas conquest—domestic class politics was intertwined in the rise and fall of empire—it was ideologically transformed into an eccentric, highly localized system that differentiated England from both its European neighbors and the colonial periphery. Anthropological examinations and thick descriptions of the domestic class system, which began with late nineteenth-century antipoverty campaigns, continuing with Mass Observation (and The Road to Wigan Pier) between the wars, and again resurfacing with the New Left in the 1950s, provided the country with a sophisticated discourse of national distinctiveness.7 Despite the continuing existence of class difference and the lingering threat of class war throughout the century, class also became a discursive site on which the English could reframe a highly provisional national unity in the face of imperial collapse.
My argument on the discursive connection between English cultural exceptionalism and class politics presupposes and builds upon recent scholarly work on national identity in Britain and the postcolonial world.8 My first premise is that the historical, material, and cultural realities of Britain and England can be considered only in the context of imperialism. Whatever Britishness and Englishness may be, their construction is necessarily relational and comparative. In Maps of Englishness: Writing Identity in the Culture of Colonialism, Simon Gikandi makes exactly this point when he insists that “Britain can only be comprehended in relation to its colonial others” (33). As Linda Colley has argued, this construction of national consciousness effectively predates the material reality of conquest, beginning when imperial expansion was little more than a fantasy. England’s relationship with its colonial others, especially with its closest neighbors, the Celtic nations, has been variable and problematic.9 The idea of Britain—as opposed to England, whose physical boundaries have remained fairly constant—is itself inherently flexible, expanding and contracting to meet the changing demands of imperial rule. Legal definitions of who is and who is not a British subject have changed as often as the coordinates of imperial sovereignty. Whereas the idea of Britain has been reworked politically and legally over a period of centuries, the idea of a restrictive English culture became increasingly more important as imperialism lost its teeth in the past hundred years.
The difference between Britishness and Englishness has always been difficult to define and maintain, primarily because they are relational categories in a state of perpetual flux. Ian Baucom has recently attempted, quite persuasively, to disentangle Englishness from Britishness by considering England’s connection to empire; he argues that Englishness is a contradictory structure, emerging “at once as an embrace and a repudiation of the imperial beyond” (7). In the twentieth century, the idea of a bounded, exclusive Englishness came to be thought and rethought, sometimes competing with and replacing the idea of Britain, which had an expansive geographic frame supported by an extensible set of legal and cultural institutions. Jed Esty, in A Shrinking Island: Modernism and National Culture in England, has documented this change during the modernist period, illustrating how cultural objects functioned as a crucial discursive arena in which this transition has been imagined and implemented. My project refines and extends this line of argumentation, exploring how class became a particularly important site through which to articulate a more geographically and culturally restrictive sense of Englishness over the course of the twentieth century. By situating an emerging discourse of English exceptionalism in the context of imperial disintegration, I hope to demonstrate how the idea of a provisional, relational national unity became a culturally productive, and fiercely contested, narrative during the twentieth century. New definitions of class politics—and a domestic geography of class—became vital spaces in which to imagine English national coherence.
Postcolonial immigration was the decisive occurrence and post-colonial literature an important imaginative project with which this discourse of English exceptionalism was both aligned and contested. As many scholars of postwar Britain have discussed, the idea of a restrictive English culture has been used to defend the national geography against the “invasion” of alien, nonwhite subjects.10 Rather than focus on such reactionary efforts, which have been exhaustively treated by other scholars, I emphasize the ways that postcolonial literature has challenged the logic of cultural exclusivity by participating in, rather than rejecting, the discourse of national exceptionalism. Many immigrant narratives, instead of renouncing the idea of English culture altogether, have reformulated Englishness as a more complicated and inclusive narrative process. Recognizing and participating in an indigenous field of social difference—often glossed as the urban class system—is one of the ways that postcolonial writers have contested ethnically restrictive definitions of English culture. Postcolonial literature has been instrumental in “reviving” a national cultural scene in the postwar period; it would be impossible to analyze contemporary English literary culture without accounting for the rise of postcolonial fiction. The increasing symbolic importance of the city in the discourse of cultural distinctiveness has been at the heart of this transition, for postcolonial texts have been able to make a claim on Englishness by marking urban space as ethnically diverse. As I shall argue, both modernist and postcolonial literature have engaged in debates about national iden...

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