Independence without Freedom

Iran's Foreign Policy

R. K. Ramazani, Rouhollah K. Ramazani

• Publisher: University of Virginia Press
• Year: 2013
• Print ISBN: 9780813934983
• eBook ISBN: 9780813934990
• Topic: Politique et relations internationales
• Subtopic: Histoire et théorie politique

Ruhi Ramazani is widely considered the dean of Iranian foreign policy study, having spent the past sixty years studying and writing about the country's international relations. In Independence without Freedom, Ramazani draws together twenty of his most insightful and important articles and book chapters, with a new introduction and afterword, which taken together offer compelling evidence that the United States and Iran will not go to war.

The volume's introduction outlines the origins of Ramazani's early interest in Iran's international role, which can be traced to the crushing effects of World War II on the country and Iran's historic decision to free its oil industry from the British Empire. In the afterword, he discusses the reasons behind America's poor understanding of Iranian foreign policy, articulates the fundamentals of his own approach to the study of Iran—including the nuclear dispute—and describes the major instruments behind Iran's foreign efforts. Independence without Freedom will serve as a crucial resource for anyone interested in the factors and forces that drive Iranian behavior in world politics.

I

THE SHAH AND KHOMEINI REVOLUTIONS

“CHURCH” AND STATE IN MODERNIZING SOCIETY

The Case of Iran

After nearly ten years of political quietism and apparent political stability, antigovernment riots broke out in Iran early in June 1963. The riots were not incited by the supporters of Dr. Mohammad Mosaddegh, whose government had been overthrown by the “Royalists” nearly ten years before. Rather, the government charged, they were instigated by “the elements of Black Reaction.” In retaliation, therefore, the religious figures who led the riots, Ayatollah Khomeini of Qom, Ayatollah Qumi of Meshed, and Ayatollah Mahallati of Shiraz, were thrown into prison and were subsequently released upon having given their word not to interfere in the affairs of the state. An apparent lull returned to the Iranian political scene after much bloodshed and the destruction of millions of dollars’ worth of public and private property. But the fundamental problem that lay at the heart of the riots continues to haunt Iranian society and politics.

This is the problem of the role of the ulama, the Islamic clergy, in Iranian society and its relations with the state. While the problem is as old as the modern Iranian state, which rose to power at the turn of the sixteenth century, the developments that led to its reappearance in early June 1963 differed significantly from those of any previous time. The Shah’s revolutionary land reforms were the immediate cause of the riots supported by the religious figures mentioned. But the significance of the Iranian experience is that it points out a fundamental problem encountered by most if not all modernizing societies.

Modernization is a multifaceted and complex process, involving every aspect of human life and the relations of the individual to society and the state. It is well known that profound socioeconomic transformation tends to incur opposition from traditional groups, and the ulama in the Middle East have faced challenges to their positions of wealth, prestige, and power similar to those faced by the Church in Latin America. The Shii ulama in Iran, like the Church in Latin America, have learned from experience that, in practice, official recognition is not quite the sine qua non that it is in theory.

“ ‘Church’ and State in Modernizing Society: The Case of Iran” was originally published by SAGE Publications Inc. (http://online.sagepub.com) in American Behavioral Scientist 7, no. 5 (January 1964): 26–28.

A theory of comparative politics requires much research on the relation of “church” to state in modernizing societies. In the Middle East, the relation of the ulama to the state in various countries needs to be studied in the context of the unending quest for effective socioeconomic change. To prove fruitful, such research must avoid confusing the role of religion in society with the relation of the ulama, as an interest group or institution, to the state. This distinction is analytically necessary not only for the differences obtaining in the subject matter but also for the different methodological problems that each presents. I hope that these preliminary remarks on the relation of the Shii ulama to the state of Iran will stimulate interest in research on the impact of revolutionary change on the fortunes and the waning power of the ulama and of comparable traditional religious systems in other societies.

THE TRADITIONAL PATTERN

The very establishment of the Iranian state at the turn of the sixteenth century was made possible as the result of the adoption of Shiism as the official creed of Iran and the forcible imposition of the Shii ideology on the population by the monarch in alliance with the ulama. Shah Ismail, the founder of the Safavid dynasty, posed as the “Absolute Agent of God” and demanded sajdah—that is, prostration before God—from his newly converted subjects. But this basically theocratic characteristic of the state and its close relation with the ulama changed gradually during the following century. During the reign of Shah Abbas the Great (1588–1629) the millennial institution of the absolute monarchy at last clearly overshadowed the role of the ulama in the affairs of the state, and for the first time since its rise to power Iran concluded a peace treaty with the Ottoman Empire, which in essence embodied something like the principle of cuius regio eius religio.

The close identification of the monarch with the state, and the concomitant eclipse of the role of the ulama in the affairs of the state, continued in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. It is true that during the reign of ineffectual rulers such as Shah Sultan Hussein (1694–1722) the ulama played a disproportionately large role. It is also true that in certain policy decisions, such as Fath Ali Shah’s second war with Russia (1826–1928), the influence of the ulama manifested itself. But these were, in the main, exceptions to the primacy of the role of the absolute monarch in Iranian politics and policymaking. The monarch was the “Sole Executive.” His ends and means were those of the state. The Qajar monarchs (1796–1924) not only showed the pomp of their ancient counterparts but surpassed them in their unbridled exercise of power in making both domestic- and foreign-policy decisions in the nineteenth century.

Ever since the last quarter of that century, however, the relations of the ulama with the state have fluctuated with the vicissitudes of Iranian politics. These relations have ranged from complete subordination to the monarch to open control of the affairs of the state. Except for a relatively brief period at the beginning of the reign of the present shah, when the ulama were allied with rather than subordinate to the monarch because of his faltering control, the ulama either have been dominated by the Shah or have defied him in alliance with other groups in Iranian society.

THE ULAMA’S DEFIANCE OF THE MONARCH

The ulama, in their struggle for power, have often allied themselves with the nationalists. One of the earliest and most successful examples was the tobacco-monopoly incident that signaled the beginning of the events leading to the Constitutional Revolution (1905–11). Haj Mirza Mohammad Hassan of Shiraz, a religious leader, wrote to the Shah that the grant of the monopoly was contrary to Sharia (Islamic law) and issued a fatwa (a religious decree) requiring the people to abandon smoking until the monopoly had been cancelled. The cancellation of the concession emboldened the ulama, whose role in the affairs of the state had been decreasing. In the Constitutional Revolution itself many of them cast their lot with the moderns, who demanded a constitutional monarchy in which limitations would be placed upon the powers of the absolute monarch. But some of the ulama confused constitutionalism (Mashrotiat) with the reestablishment of the Sharia (Mashro‘iat). The Constitution made Shii Islam the official religion of the state, required the Shah to protect and propagate Islam, and provided for the representation of religious leaders. In practice, however, the “legislative review” powers of the ulama have never been put into force, and the role of the Shah as the protector and propagator of Islam has been overshadowed by his overriding concern with the more mundane affairs of the state. Nevertheless, at least in theory, the ulama reasserted their power in alliance with the nationalists.

Another example of the ulama’s attempt to control the affairs of the state was the ever-growing influence of the clergy in the years of the Mosaddegh regime. A distinction may be made between the activities of such fundamentalist groups as the Fedayan Islam (Devotees of Islam) and the Mujahadeen Islam (Fighters of Islam) and the ulama. Yet in practice this distinction is of little significance because the actions of the fundamentalists tended to increase the influence of the ulama in the affairs of state. The Fedayan Islam terrorized the Shah-supported government of Razmara, and one of the members of the group assassinated the Prime Minister in the Shah Mosque. They demanded strict application of Shii law and the restoration of Shii rule under the Imam. Their terrorist tactics were matched by slanderous campaigns against the ruling elite. Like the nationalists, their main target was the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, but their ultimate goal surpassed that of the moderate nationalists. The Fedayan demanded elimination of all ties with all foreign countries.

However, a rival group, the Mujahadeen Islam, exercised for a time an unprecedented influence in the affairs of the state in alliance with the supporters of the National Front of Dr. Mosaddegh. Sayyid Abolghassem Kashani, the leader of this group, was made Speaker of the Majlis, which immediately voted to pardon Khalil Tahmassebi, the assassin of Razmara. Throughout this period of alliance with the nationalists at least some of the ulama were defying the Shah to the extent that they succeeded in enlarging the rift between the Court and Dr. Mosaddegh. This defiance came into the open most graphically in July 1952, when the Shah selected Ahmad Qavam to replace Dr. Mosaddegh as prime minister. A momentous dialogue between Qavam and Kashani took place in which the age-old problem of “church” and state was openly discussed. In his controversial declaration, which is believed to have contributed to his dramatic downfall, Qavam stated in unequivocal terms:

Just as I hate demagoguery in political affairs I detest hypocrisy in religious matters. Those who on the pretext of fighting Red extremists reinforce black reaction strike at freedom and undermine the efforts of the founders of the Constitution. While respecting the sacred tenets of Islam, I divorce religion from politics and will prevent the dissemination of superstitious and retrogressive ideas.

In equally strong terms Kashani rejected Qavam’s dictum for separation of religion and politics, alluded to the possibility of declaring a jihad (holy war) on Qavam, and proclaimed:

The separation between religion and politics has been for centuries the program of the British. It is by this means that they have kept the Islamic peoples ignorant of their interests. Traitors who have followed British policy for centuries have now, however, overthrown the barrier of the Mosadeq government. They have replaced Mosadeq by a person who was reared in the arms of monarchy and despotism, and whose political life is full of treason, as has been demonstrated on a number of occasions.

But the alliance between the ulama and the nationalists was short-lived, as evidenced by the Mosaddegh-Kashani rift, which was probably influenced by the August 1953 overthrow of the government of Dr. Mosaddegh by supporters of the Shah. This triumph of the Royalists marked the beginning of nearly ten years of clerical impotence, which was momentarily interrupted by the riots of June 1963. Before dealing with the events leading up to the riots, we must discuss the other primary form that the relation of the ulama to the state has taken.

THE ULAMA’S SUBORDINATION TO THE MONARCHY

For the most part the ulama have been impotent during the reign of the Pahlavi dynasty, that is, since 1925. The successful show of strength made by the ulama in 1924 was followed by nearly two decades of complete subordination to the Shah. In that year they triumphantly opposed Reza Khan’s bid for a republican form of government. But beginning in 1925, when he ascended the throne of Iran, the Shah, like his Turkish counterpart, Mustafa Kemal, made secularism a cornerstone of his public policy. Until 1941, when he abdicated the throne in favor of his eldest son, he relentlessly pursued an unprecedented program of modernization, which significantly reduced the power of the clergy. But, unlike those of his Turkish counterpart, the Shah’s modernization efforts tended to be more apparent than real. Principally for this reason, when his repressive anti-clerical measures were removed as the result of his abdication, the ulama reasserted their power and influence in the affairs of the state with relative ease.

But the renascent role of the ulama in Iranian politics, which reached its peak during the government of Dr. Mosaddegh, was almost completely reversed as the result of the Royalist victory and the subsequent increasing role of the present shah in the affairs of the state. The millennial institution of the monarchy once again overshadowed the institution of the ulama, whose members were suppressed jointly with the nationalists. Nevertheless, it was not until November 1961 that the Shah’s revolutionary measures posed a serious challenge to the ulama as well as to the landed aristocracy, the forces in favor of the status quo. The land reform measures seemed to challenge one of the most fundamental bases of clerical power in Iran. Reza Shah’s suppressive measures as well as his modernization efforts had made a dent in the power of the ulama, but the land reform measures of his son would seem to have deprived them of most, if not all, of what was left of their waning power.

Before November 1961 the Shah had assumed that his own efforts in land distribution would provide an example to be followed by other owners of large tracts of land. The failure of this approach, together with both internal and external pressures, finally prompted the promulgation of the Farman Sheshganeh (Six-Point Royal Decree), which directed the government of Dr. Ali Amini to enforce laws limiting landholdings, to form agricultural cooperative societies, to set up youth work battalions, and to utilize the Army to build feeder roads and irrigation canals and to instruct farmers. The bill of the Minister of Agriculture stipulated that landowners could hold one village, that they would repay them in ten installments, and that the government would resell these to the peasants, who would have to pay the government in fifteen installments. The bill also provided for the establishment of cooperatives for the purpose of development and distribution of seeds and husbandry, extension of credits and services, maintenance and improvement of waterways, utilization of agricultural mechanization, and so on.

Although these revolutionary measures are not directed exclusively or even primarily against the ulama, the June 1963 riots revealed that they have begun to shake the very fabric of Iranian traditional society. In this society the ulama have attempted with varying degrees of success to influence public policy. Even the Shah in the past has relied, at times, on the ulama as well as on the army and the bureaucracy. But at present the Shah appears to be taking the risk of ignoring these traditional sources of his support in the hope of luring to his side the hitherto neglected peasantry and the workers. He is simultaneously seeking to gain influence in another traditionally neglected segment of the society, the women of Iran.

In spite of these breaks with tradition, it is interesting to note that the Shah has rather consistently utilized religious symbols in rationalizing, popularizing, and legitimizing his socioeconomic reforms. He has on many occasions invoked the concept of barakah (divine blessing), posing as the monarch who has since childhood been mysteriously spared many catastrophes, including a serious attempt against his life. Before the riots of June 1963 he recalled these miraculous escapes when making a major statement concerning land reform at the holy city of Qom. More important was the way in which he tried to justify the revolutionary measures in Islamic terms. He stated:

If the Muslim community adapts itself to the requirements of modern times in the glorious spirit of Islam, it will find new power and victory. Our society continues to be in need of religious and moral principles, and those Ulama who have either cooperated with, or remained unopposed to, the land reform program are indubitably our religious leaders. But those others who have expressed opposition to it would seem to be preoccupied with the appearance rather than the substance of the religion. The land reform put into effect today in this sacred place should be a great lesson to the followers of such Ulama. The Shia as well as the entire Islamic community can no longer drag behind the times. We trust that Allah will guide those in positions of leadership to the Right Path, and that by the blessings of this sacred shrine they will serve Islam, the Shah and their country.

AN UNSOLVED PROBLEM

In spite of the June 1963 riots, the land reform program has been pushed with speed. Meanwhile, after a suspension of about two and a half years the Iranian Parliament was opened by the Shah on October 6, 1963. For the first time in Iran’s history women voted and ran for the Parliament. In his inaugural address to Parliament the Shah noted that “from now on public policy decisions will truly reflect the interests of the majority of the Iranian people because they have for the first time elected...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title Page
• Dedication
• Copyright
• Contents
• Acknowledgments
• Introduction
• Part I. The Shah and Khomeini Revolutions
• Part II. Revolutionary Foreign Policies
• Part III. Security in the Persian Gulf
• Part IV. International Law and Diplomacy
• Part V. The Shah and Israel, Khatami and Bush
• Afterword
• Appendix: The Role of Iran in the New Millennium—A View from the Outside
• Index