The Theory of Science Advice2
The field in which research, policy and practice intersect makes a very important contribution to policy design. It is a field that everyone, in particular policymakers, enthusiastically refer to as an essential element of efficient policymaking. However, it remains a rather uncharted territory as it is shaped by very complex institutional and legal frameworks. Moreover, the wider cultural context, the institutions, the individuals involved, all strongly influence how the dialogue between these three fields develops.
This chapter will give insight into this âuncharted territoryâ by looking into European-level early childhood education and care (ECEC) policy formation in the context of education policy and in the wider context of the current scientific advice mechanism in the EU.
The ideas of evidence-based policy-making and scientific advice are attempts to explain and arrange structures around the interactions between research, policy and practice. The concept of evidence-based policymaking has been (re)invigorated since the beginning of the second millennium. The concept maintains that the decision-making element of the policy process should be based, at least in part, on sound and transparent evidence (Sutton, 1999). This concept of evidence-based policy attempts to reduce uncertainty and risk in policy decisions by basing them on âhard dataâ about whether the proposed course of action will bring about a desired effect (Bulmer, Coates & Dominian, 2007). Evidence-based policy has become a mantra ever since, seen as an attempt to reclaim policies and strategies from the impact of prejudice. However, an evidence-based approach to policymaking is never straightforward. Narrow interpretations which rely on a strictly linear relationship between evidence and policy have in turn been criticised. More nuanced understandings of evidence-based policy, such as âevidence-aware', âevidence-informedâ or even âevidence-inspiredâ policymaking, argue that in cases where the scientific base is uncertain or contested, there may be no clear ârightâ or âwrongâ path to follow (Holmes & Clark, 2008; Nutley, 2003; Owens, Petts & Bulkeley, 2006).
The concept of science advice goes a step further and delves more into the practice of evidence-based policymaking. It covers all processes and structures aimed at providing scientific knowledge and information to the attention of policy- and decision-makers (EPRS, 2016). Scientific advice in itself is a field of academic study, generating new theories and conceptual models to explain the complex relationship between science and policymaking in different situations and contexts. (OECD, 2015/1, p. 42).
Bridging the gap between researchers and policymakers to improve the decision-making process is a widely recognised challenge (for example, Nutley, Davies & Tilley, 2000). This is particularly the case when there is no clear and unambiguous evidence accepted by all actors. âThe boundaries between science and policy or politics are constantly being renegotiated as part of the political processâ (Sarewitz, 2004, p. 386). The policy-making process is not linear and âit must be understood as a political process as much as an analytical or problem solving oneâ (Sutton, 1999, p. 32). In these situations it is particularly important to know who produces knowledge, and how, and why they do so and, subsequently, how that knowledge interacts with the policy process. Knowledge means assimilated information and the understanding of how to use it. It also involves negotiation.
The complex relationship between research and policy is a two-way street: research feeds into policy but policy in turn shapes research agendas. Research is used to varying degrees in policymaking in different countries, dependent on different organisational dynamics, such as the quality and timeliness of the research, the background and attitudes of researchers and research users, the existing formal and informal links between researchers and research users, and the organisational culture (Fazekas & Burns, 2012, p. 13). The attempt to de-politicise, whereby important decisions are delegated to expert committees and thus removed from the political negotiation table, can prove problematic (p. 14). Policymakers have a huge role in both defining the policy questions and putting them onto the political agenda. However, they remain individuals who are âlimitedâ by their own beliefs, world-views and the parameters of their specific organisation. Therefore, the human and broader cultural factors are hugely important in the interaction between research and policy, and the political negotiation is an organic part of the process. Consequently, the ways in which policy learning and policy development happen, and the role of knowledge in this process varies across different systems (Burns, Köster & Fuster, 2016; Fazekas, 2010; Fazekas & Burns, 2012).
Expert knowledge is increasingly important in the agenda-setting process. Therefore, in certain contexts expertise moves over time beyond policy âinformingâ and leads to policy âformingâ (Neuman, 2012, p. 612). This fusion puts organisations and experts responsible for knowledge production in a far more powerful position. Here, certain organisations, such as the OECD, can gain the upper hand by both defining problems and suggesting solutions. In the field of education, for example, the international arena is becoming more influential in this respect, all the more so as international players now have access to cross-national data and have more room for experimentation.
In this regard, another aspect of policymaking that deserves greater attention is implementation and its associated dynamics. Taking greater account of the human factor, such as behavioural insights, in decision-making can help in this. Identifying psychological and social influences on behaviour, and accordingly constructing policies that work with them, require a more empirical and experimental approach to policy design (WDR, 2015, p. 5). The World Development Report distinguishes three principles of human decision-making: thinking automatically; thinking socially; and thinking with mental models (culture). âAchieving social change in a situation where mental models have been internalised may require influencing not only the cognitive decision making of particular individuals but also social practices and institutionsâ (WDR, 2015, p. 12). For example, building trust between disruptive children and non-disruptive ones changes the mental model and produces better outcomes for the disruptive ones, than the results of the disruptive ones who were in the control group (Algan, Beasley, Vitaro & Tremblay, 2013).
While there is increasing interest in using behavioural findings for policy design, there are still many shortcomings to the method, such as bias in projection to the future or the influence of the social environments in which people take decisions (Wilsdon & Doubleday, 2015, p. 154). We do not know much about the unintended consequences of ânudgesâ (i.e. choice architectures, designs of the environments in which people make choices) with which behavioural governance works. Whilst we can experiment with them in isolated settings, we might miss elements that could, however, prove influential in real settings (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008).
Science Advice in the European Union
The scientific advice mechanism within the EU is rather complex because it serves a very diverse community of 28 Member States, plus the EFTA countries (Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Switzerland) and it addresses very specific needs ranging from âproviding strong scientific advice in an accessible format; informing the development of long-term policies as well as providing advice during emergencies and crises; and providing advice proactively through foresight activities and reactively at the request of policy makersâ (EPRS, 2015, p. 1).
The European scientific advisory mechanism has worked over the years with a broad range of institutions: external (e.g. individual researchers, academic bodies), mandated permanently or temporarily (e.g. national or European agencies, or ad hoc expert groups) or internal (e.g. internal research centres, or internal expert bodies that analyse evidence). The latter often works through informal channels. During his second term of office (2009â14), JosĂ© Manuel Barroso, the President of the European Commission, appointed a Chief Scientific Advisor, Professor Ann Glover (2011â14). She was a member of the Bureau of European Policy Advisers (BEPA), an in-house think tank of the European Commission that was supposed to advise the President and the European Commission on political, societal and economic issues. The Chief Scientific Adviser was to provide scientific advice and foresight on the future concerning science, technology and innovation as well as to create networks with other scientific advisory bodies in Europe and beyond. This was an important attempt to...
