Organizations in Depth

The Psychoanalysis of Organizations

Yiannis Gabriel, Author

• Publisher: SAGE Publications Ltd
• Year: 1999
• Print ISBN: 9780761952619, 9780761952602
• eBook ISBN: 9781473946101
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Betriebswirtschaft
• Subtopic: Organizational Behavior

`The book is a good read. Gabriel has an engaging writing style, liberally interspersed with vignettes, cases, and quotes…. While the reader may not agree with some of what Gabriel is espousing, the author presents his material in a non-judgemental manner…. And who knows ? Maybe Gabriel is foreshadowing some new directions in organizational theory and even new research methodology? - Journal of Occupational and Organizational Psychology

This book is a comprehensive and systematic examination of the insights psychoanalysis can offer to the study of organizations and organizational behaviour.

Richly illustrated with examples, Yiannis Gabriel?s exhaustive study provides fresh understandings of the role of creativity, control mechanisms, leadership, culture, and emotions in organizations.

Core theories are explained at length and there is a chapter on research strategies. Extensive reference is made to practical cases, and there is a review of the key debates.

1	CORE PSYCHOANALYTIC IDEAS AND THEORIES

In the Introduction, we emphasized the importance of interpretation in unravelling the deeper meanings of organizational events. In later chapters we shall explore different psychoanalytic interpretations of organizational phenomena, including myths, fantasies and jokes. A large and important part of the psychoanalytic task is interpretative. Interpretation, however, is not an end in itself in depth psychology; rather, it is a technique leading towards an understanding of deeper psychic, organizational and cultural realities.

In The Interpretation of Dreams (1900), Freud provided the prototype for most types of psychoanalytic interpretations; in this work, he moved from interpretations of individual dreams to a study of the transformations of ideas and desires in the unconscious and the nature of unconscious processes. The interpretation of dreams was for Freud not an exercise in literary criticism, but the ‘royal road’ to the unconscious, the privileged but not exclusive path to the secrets of the human psyche. The final chapter of The Interpretation of Dreams is not a synthesis of all the interpretations which have been offered earlier, but a presentation of the theoretical yield of his interpretations, a metapsychology. This is a complex of concepts, principles, theories and models of the mind, the philosophical underpinning of a psychology of the unconscious, which, like metaphysics, lies once removed from empirical reality. This chapter presents most of the important elements of this metapsychology, including the emergence of the different agencies of the mind through each individual’s early childhood experiences, the functions and dynamics of these mental agencies. Readers who are familiar with the core ideas of depth psychology will wish to skip this chapter. Those, however, with only a sketchy understanding of these ideas will find in this chapter a systematic presentation of concepts and theories sometimes used in a casual and imprecise way, which denies them their vitality and explanatory power.

METAPSYCHOLOGY: THE THREE POINTS OF VIEW

Freud’s metapsychological investigations continued throughout his life; they are organized around three general ‘points of view’ or three distinct levels of analysis. These three points of view are seldom incompatible; at times they support each other and at times they proceed independently of each other, making use of different assumptions and imageries. The object of metapsychology is to provide complementary accounts from all three points of view.

The topographic point of view is essentially descriptive, a kind of mental map displaying different areas of the mind. The fundamental qualities and properties of ideas and processes in different areas are different. This point of view lacks a causal imagery: it does not seek to explain why an idea crosses a boundary; why, for example, a conscious idea becomes repressed in the unconscious; or why an unconscious one re-surfaces in consciousness at some particular point of an individual’s life. It does, however, yield valuable information about the itinerary of different ideas as they travel into different mental locations being processed by different mental agencies, as well as their properties at different stages in their journeys.

The economic point of view deals in the currency of energies. Ideas and desires become charged with energy which is, essentially, in limited supply. Different events may be accompanied by the discharge or binding of energy, its investment (‘cathexis’) into different objects or ideas, its transformation or sublimation into different aims or its dissipation in different mental activities. The economic point of view becomes very important in explaining outcomes of mental conflicts or mental events in which different factors are pitched against each other, or in accounting for sudden surges of overpowering emotions or desires.

The dynamic point of view examines how and when different wishes and desires manifest themselves, how they are acted upon or are defended against. It focuses on mental conflict, its origins, which may lie in clashing desires or in the demands made by external reality, and its resolutions, which may lead to fresh conflicts, symptoms and inhibitions. This is the point of view which directly deals with different currents within the individual psyche and examines how and when unconscious material surfaces into consciousness.

Freud argued that ‘when we have succeeded in describing a psychical process in its dynamic, topographical and economic aspects, we shall speak of it as a metapsychological presentation’ (1915b: 184). This way of looking at mental processes from three different points of view may puzzle some; it is not, however, so unusual. It is a procedure that empirical scientists employ regularly in accounting for natural or historical phenomena. The discovery of a new set of historical artefacts, such as human remains, weapons or cooking implements, would lead to different examinations and hypotheses, draw-ing from the resources of different disciplines, including biology, chemistry, archaeology, geology, palaeontology and so on. Different scientists may bring their knowledge to bear in analysing such findings. Only when the hypotheses provided by different disciplines point in the same direction can we say that we have an understanding of the nature and meaning of the findings, their origins and their functions. In a similar way, a psychological process, such as the repression of a particular idea, may be approached from different points of view, each furnishing its own explanatory insights, each testing, qualifying or modifying the insights of the others.

A TORN SELF: THE DYNAMICS OF INNER CONFLICT

Undoubtedly, the dynamic point of view is the driving one in most psychoanalytic investigations, becoming over the past hundred years increasingly dominant. It is the one that builds most directly on to interpretation, and yields some of the most interesting insights, by addressing conflict – a fundamental feature of the psychoanalytic conception of the individual, culture and society. As Rieff has argued, Freud

conceives of the self not as an abstract entity, uniting experience and cognition, but as the subject of a struggle between two objective forces – unregenerate instincts and overbearing culture. Between these two forces there may be compromise but no resolution. Since the individual can neither extirpate his instincts nor wholly reject the demands of society, his character expresses the way in which he organizes and appeases the conflict between the two. (Rieff, 1959: 29)

The unity of the self in the face of such conflicts is problematic. Individuals may at times experience themselves as wholesome, unified and centred; in reality, however, such unity is the result of psychological work in the presence of forces which seek to break the self apart, to decentre it. Freud’s image of the self as something achieved rather than as something given has had a profound influence on twentieth-century culture, becoming one of the core features of postmodern theorizing. The individual psyche, the psychical apparatus as Freud often referred to it, is composed of different mental agencies, each one of which draws the individual in different directions. Between these mental agencies, there can be compromise, accommodation or strife, but no permanent harmony.

The id, the instincts and the pleasure principle

The oldest and least accessible mental agency is referred to as the id. The id is substantially unconscious, containing

everything that is inherited, that is present at birth, that is laid down in the constitution – above all, therefore, the instincts, which originate from the somatic organization and which find a first psychical expression here in the id in forms unknown to us. This oldest portion of the psychical apparatus remains the most important throughout life; moreover, the investigations of psychoanalysis started with it. (1940: 376)

The id, then, is this large area of the psyche which is inaccessible to consciousness, untainted by culture or civilization, with no sense of time and no sense of reason, whose influence on our mental lives can only be studied indirectly, through its manifestations in conscious activity. The id, that ‘cauldron full of seething excitations’ (1933: 106), is the source of internal stimuli, which, unlike external ones, may not be avoided by running away from them, through flight. ‘It is filled with energy reaching from the instincts, but it has no organization, produces no collective will, but only a striving to bring about the satisfaction of the instinctual needs subject to the observance of the pleasure principle’ (1933: 106).

The concept of instinct or drive whose province is the id is one of the richest, but also one of the most problematic in depth psychology. It has been rejected or disregarded by many depth psychologists, who view it as a remnant of nineteenth-century biological thinking. Freud, for his part, was adamant that it is an indispensable concept for explaining stimuli originating from within. Much of his psychology was dedicated to an exploration of one major instinct, sexuality. Throughout his life, however, he argued for an instinctual dualism. In his early writings, he argued for a dualism of sexuality and self-preservation; later, he modified this view, arguing that self-preservation is itself a modification of the sexual instinct. He finally proposed a dualism of life instincts, which include sexuality, and death instincts, which include destructiveness and a tendency towards inertia and ultimately death.

While he viewed these instinctual forces as characteristic of all organic life, instincts in human beings have some totally unique properties. They are almost infinitely complex, malleable and changing, developing throughout an individual’s life and manifesting themselves in a hugely diverse array of wishes and desires. Sexuality, for instance, develops from a simple force in early life into an increasingly complex force, which may be manifested in sexual desires, social bonding and solidarity, artistic creativity, scientific enquiry or spiritual longings. What is constant behind such different manifestations is libido, the life energy which drives them, an energy which becomes easily deflected, re-oriented or modified. Libido is the force that converts a mere idea into a vital urge, something that demands satisfaction or at least action. A satisfied desire is, at least temporarily, drained of its energy, reverting to its status as an idea. In this sense, Freud identified the pleasure principle as the principle of mental functioning which dominates desires in the id, a principle under which pleasure is the result of a fulfilled desire, a desire which, when left unfulfilled generates an unpleasant excitation. The importance of the pleasure principle in mental functioning cannot be exaggerated. No amount of civilization, morality or constraint can alter this. ‘In the theory of psychoanalysis we have no hesitation in assuming that the course taken by mental events is automatically regulated by the pleasure principle’ (1920: 275). The pleasure, according to this view, is no abstract ethical principle of how to achieve a good and happy life, but rather a lived experience associated with the fulfilment of our most basic strivings:

The feeling of happiness derived from the satisfaction of a wild instinctual impulse untamed by the ego is incomparably more intense than that derived from sating an instinct that has been tamed. The irresistibility of perverse instincts, and perhaps the attraction in general of forbidden things finds an economic explanation here. (1930: 267)

Yet, the programme of the pleasure principle is ‘at loggerheads with the whole world, with the microcosm as much as the macrocosm. There is no possibility at all of its being carried through; all regulations of the universe run counter to it’ (1930: 263).

The ego, the reality principle and the mechanisms of defence

The life of an organism ruled exclusively by the pleasure principle would undoubtedly be colourful; it would also be extremely short. From a very early age, each one of us learns that some pleasures are out of bounds, forbidden or unattainable. The pursuit of such pleasures is bound to produce disappointment or damage, physical or psychological. Hence it is postponed, modified or relinquished, in exchange for what is attainable. This is described as the reality principle, the principle of mental functioning served by the ego, the second major mental agency.

Under the influence of the real external world around us, one portion of the id has undergone a special development. From what was originally a cortical layer, equipped with the organs for receiving stimuli and with arrangements for acting as a protective shield against stimuli, a special organization has arisen which henceforward acts as an intermediary between the id and the external world. To this region of the mind we have given the name of ego. (1940: 376)

The ego performs a number of vital functions for an individual. It is responsible for receiving stimuli both from inside and outside and for establishing whether things are real or imaginary through reality testing. It interjects thought between the experience of a need and its fulfilment, frequently postponing or qualifying the gratification of instinctual impulses. It is responsible for motility and action; above all, the ego is the seat of consciousness and controls the movement of ideas from the preconscious to consciousness. It is also the mental agency responsible for keeping the individual together.

What distinguishes the ego from the id quite especially is a tendency for synthesis in its contents, to a combination and unification in its mental processes which are totally lacking . . . To adopt a popular mode of speaking, we might say that the ego stands for reason and good sense while the id stands for the untamed passions. (1933: 108)

The ego, then, is the mental agency specifically responsible for the sense of unity and integrity, which we each experience as ‘self. This is something that is accomplished at considerable cost and constant vigilance. How does the ego seek to maintain the integrity of the self in the face of inner and outer threats? In the first place, as we saw in the Introduction, it does so through the defence mechanisms, i.e. by initiating a set of psychological processes aimed at averting the danger. The process of repression, as a form of psychological defence against pain, embarrassment or disappointment, has already been examined in some detail. Freud came to regard repression as being triggered by a ‘signal of anxiety’, a very unpleasant feeling accompanying the recognition of a danger, inner or outer. Repression, however, is not the only type of defence available to the ego. Other defensive mechanisms, to use the term proposed by Anna Freud (1936), include the following:

1	Regression: the wholesale replacement of a set of instinctual impulses and desires by one which characterized an earlier stage of development; for example, reversion to childhood or adolescent configurations.
2	Reaction-formation: the obliteration of powerful impulses (especially hostile ones) through a transformation into their opposites; for example, an angry person manifests exaggerated care, a hateful person exaggerated love.
3	Projection: the attribution of one’s own desires (especially destructive ones) to another person.
4	Introjection or identification: whereby one identifies with another person either as an object of admiration or as an object of persecution.
5	Denial: the refusal to acknowledge external reality or stimuli, however threatening.
6	Isolation: whereby an idea or memory is acknowledged in consciousness, but the accompanying emotion is rejected; alternatively, an idea or a memory, however painful, may be acknowledged but only if it is dissociated from other related ideas.

Subsequent theorists have added other defensive mechanisms against anxiety, some of which are deployed at an individual level, while others may be deployed in groups or larger social collectivities. Some of these will be examined in future chapters, but we should note now the following two:

1	Splitting: an object or indeed the ego is split into two, each part possessing qualities at odds with those of the other; for example, one is totally good and one is totally bad.
2	Rationalization: plausible or rational reasons are provided for explaining one’s actions or feelings, but which in reality conceal the real reasons.

All of these mechanisms may involve the repression of partic...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• Contributors
• Preface
• Introduction: Psychoanalysis and Organization
• 1 Core Psychoanalytic Ideas and Theories
• 2 Psychoanalysis, Clinical Practice and the Human Sciences
• 3 Individual and Organization
• 4 Organization and Individual
• 5 Work Groups
• 6 Leaders and Followers
• 7 Psychoanalysis and Culture
• 8 Organizational Culture
• 9 The Emotional Life of Organizations
• 10 Psychoanalysis and Ethics in Organizations
• 11 Psychoanalytic Research into Organizations
• 12 Concluding Thoughts: Towards a New Conception of Management
• Glossary
• References
• Index