Arms Control

The New Guide to Negotiations and Agreements with New CD-ROM Supplement

Jozef Goldblat

• Publisher: SAGE Publications Ltd
• Year: 2002
• Print ISBN: 9780761940166, 9780761940159
• eBook ISBN: 9781446228906
• Edition: 2
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: International Relations
• Index: Politics & International Relations

`A unique and indispensible work that serves both as a basic introduction to the disarmament scene and a reference book for experts? - Disarmament Times

`This compendium of the history and achievements of arms control and disarmament efforts is unique in its kind and is likely to remain so. This for three reasons: first, because of its unparalleled comprehensiveness; second, because of the outstanding quality of its presentation, and, third, because of its author, Jozef Goldblat, one of the world?s leading experts in the field. This triad makes the updated Second Edition of Arms Control: The New Guide to Negotiations and Agreements a must for all concerned with international security in general and arms control in particular? - Curt Gasteyger, Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva

`The thesaurus of arms regulation and disarmament...a precious tool for negotiators and treaty makers? - Ambassador V Petrovsky, Former Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament

`Being the most comprehensive and authoritative compilation and analysis of arms control agreements available, this is an indispensable reference volume for students and practitioners of arms control and international security. The author has spent a lifetime in the study and practice of international security affairs: where international law and arms control agreements are concerned, there is no one better qualified than him? - Sverre Lodgaard, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Oslo

The revised and updated edition of Arms Control: The New Guide to Negotiations and Agreements contains the most authoritative and comprehensive survey ever published of the documents related to arms control. All major agreements reached since the second half of the nineteenth century through to mid-2002 are critically analysed and assessed. The assessment is made in the light of the international security environment, the developments in the field of weapon technology, the threat of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons proliferation, and the efforts to strengthen the humanitarian law of armed conflict.

The accompanying CD-ROM reproduces full text and carefully selected excerpts of treaties, conventions, common understandings, statutes, charters, binding decisions of international bodies, final acts of international conferences, exchanges of letters and diplomatic notes. Multilateral agreements are followed by a list of parties.

Enriched with new maps, tables and figures, as well as an expanded glossary and bibliography, the book will remain the definitive resource for students of international relations, journalists, diplomats and military strategists.

Jozef Goldblat, the author, is Vice-President of the Geneva International Peace Research Institute (GIPRI), Resident Senior Fellow of the UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) and Associate Editor of Security Dialogue, published by SAGE for the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO). He has studied the problems of arms control since the 1950s and has been involved in arms control negotiations. From 1969 to 1989 he directed the arms control and disarmament programme of studies at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). He has lectured at various universities and has written reports, articles and books on the arms race and disarmament. His latest publications include The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime: Assessment and Prospects, The Hague Academy of International Law, 1997, and Nuclear Disarmament: Obstacles to Banishing the Bomb, I. B. Tauris, 2000.

Part 1. Analytical Survey

1

Basic Concepts

Over the years, proposals have been made in various forums for the universal and complete elimination of armed forces and armaments. However, for several reasons, the idea of total and general disarmament has proved unacceptable to many nations. So far, only arms control measures have been agreed on.

Originally, ‘arms control’ was meant to denote rules for limiting arms competition (mainly nuclear) rather than reversing it. This term had a connotation distinct from ‘regulation of armaments’ or ‘disarmament’, the terms used in the United Nations Charter. Subsequently, however, a wide range of measures have come to be included under the rubric of arms control, in particular those intended to: (a) freeze, limit, reduce or abolish certain categories of weapons; (b) ban the testing of certain weapons; (c) prevent certain military activities; (d) regulate the deployment of armed forces; (e) proscribe transfers of some militarily important items; (f) reduce the risk of accidental war; (g) constrain or prohibit the use of certain weapons or methods of war; and (h) build up confidence among states through greater openness in military matters. Today, ‘arms control’ is often used interchangeably with ‘arms regulation’, ‘arms limitation’, ‘arms reduction’ or even ‘disarmament’.

1.1 Arms Control Agreements

Arms control can take various forms. It can be part of interstate ceasefire or armistice arrangements, as was the case after the 1950–53 war in Korea and the 1946–54 war in Indo-China. It can be imposed upon defeated countries by peace treaties, such as those concluded after World War I and World War II. It can follow the termination of intra-state conflicts, as in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995 and Kosovo in 1999. Finally, it can take the form of sanctions applied in accordance with the UN Charter against aggressor states, as in the case of Iraq after the 1991 Gulf War. However, an ‘arms control agreement’ is an agreement among sovereign states, freely arrived at in time of peace through a process of formal intergovernmental negotiation.

Arms control agreements may be bilateral or multilateral. In the latter category, many agreements are of a regional nature, valid for a specific geographical zone or continent. Agreements vary in form – from treaties, conventions, protocols and documents, to guidelines, memoranda, declarations or common understandings, to statutes, charters and final acts of international conferences, to joint or simultaneous statements by governments or exchanges of letters or notes among the states concerned.

In recent years the conclusion of so-called framework agreements has become an acceptable practice. Their characteristic is that the basic instrument, ‘the framework’, sets out the objective pursued but specifies few substantive obligations of the parties. However, a mechanism included in the framework agreement provides for the adoption of protocols which contain substantive obligations and to which the parties to the agreement are expected, but not obliged, to adhere.

Succession

The documents reproduced on the CD-ROM with this book cover a long period of time during which some parties have ceased to exist as independent states because of voluntary or forced mergers with other states, while others, such as the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) and Czechoslovakia, have broken up into several sovereign states. These developments, as well as the disintegration of the colonial empires, have given rise to new political entities (under old or new names) whose status vis-à-vis the existing treaties is uncertain because the international law dealing with the succession of states in respect of international treaties is somewhat vague.

According to the 1978 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties (not yet widely adhered to but regarded by many as stating customary law), states emerging from colonial domination are entitled to a clean slate enabling them to choose freely whether or not to succeed to the treaties by which they were formerly bound. Other new states may be subject to certain restraints in this respect. Thus, in respect of a state that splits off from another state, any treaty in force for its territory at the time of separation generally continues in force after independence. (The 1978 Vienna Convention as such did not apply to the Soviet Union or Yugoslavia because it entered into force only in 1996, after the dissolution of both states.) Consideration must also be given to the nature of the treaty. With arms control treaties, a specific declaration of succession may be required. Regarding some other treaties, such as human rights or humanitarian law treaties, succession is almost automatic, and a general declaration by the new state of a wish to succeed to all such treaties may suffice.

In 1992, consequent on the decision of the UN Security Council (UNSC), endorsed by the UN General Assembly (UNGA), that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) was not the successor of the SFRY, which the UNSC said had ceased to exist, the status of the FRY in the United Nations became ambiguous. The FRY was barred from participation in the UNGA and the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and in their subsidiary organs. However, its name remained on membership lists, and its messages to UN organs were published in the same way as those of a UN member. In November 2000, after a change of government, the FRY gave up its claim to be the successor of the SFRY, applied for membership of the United Nations and was admitted as a ‘new’ state. It then began to notify the depositaries of its succession or accession to the arms control and other treaties to which the SFRY had been a party, treating each treaty individually. (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Slovenia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia chose to make a general statement of succession to the treaties to which the SFRY had been a party.)

Normally, it is the depositary or depositaries of a treaty that have the authority to determine which states are parties to it. Sometimes such determination is complicated. The Russian Federation declared itself, as from 24 December 1991, the legal successor of the Soviet Union as regards the fulfilment of obligations under all arms control agreements. Although the world community took note of this declaration and it went unchallenged by the non-Russian republics at the time it was made, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine were in 1992 recognized by the United States as successor states of the Soviet Union – on terms of equality with Russia – with regard to the US-Soviet 1991 START I Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. This decision reflected the fact that a significant portion of the total Soviet inventory of strategic nuclear weapons, subject to reduction or limitation under the above treaty, was stationed on the territories of these three non-Russian republics. Subsequently, in 1997, a memorandum of understanding was signed establishing that Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine are to be considered as successor states of the Soviet Union with regard to the US-Soviet 1972 ABM Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, as a number of former Soviet early-warning radars and a former Soviet ABM test range were located on the territories of these states. Another case in which the continuity rule was applied to non-Russian republics was the multilateral 1990 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty); there was no other way to render this treaty effective. As regards other multilateral arms control agreements, the former Soviet republics follow the procedure of accession. In any event, the continuity rule was inapplicable to the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) because, if the former Soviet republics inherited the Soviet Union’s nuclear-weapon-state status, the fundamental purpose of this treaty – to prevent the number of nuclear-weapon states from increasing – would be defeated.

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) declared that, as regards the multilateral treaties to which China was a party before the establishment of the People’s Republic, its government would decide in light of the circumstances whether it should recognize them. As to the treaties concluded by the Republic of China (Taiwan) after I October 1949, the PRC stated that it considered Taiwan’s actions as null and void. However, as Taiwan is still recognized by several states (although it is excluded from the United Nations), it is listed in Part II of this book as a party to the arms control agreements which it joined after World War II.

Parties

As a rule, multilateral arms control agreements, with the exception of regional agreements, are open for participation by all states. This is an acknowledgement of the principle that, by its very nature, arms control ought to have universal application. The question has arisen whether, by subscribing to a treaty, a political entity or a regime can gain recognition as a state or a government by other parties which do not formally recognize it. To guard against such implications, some countries have found it expedient to issue special declarations. Most of these declarations relate to Israel or Taiwan. (Until the unification of Germany, many also related to the German Democratic Republic or to West Berlin.)

It is, however, generally understood that neither the signature of nor the deposit of any instrument in relation to a multilateral treaty brings about recognition between parties to the treaty that do not recognize each other. Indeed, within the framework of multilateral treaties open for general adherence, states could even have dealings with a non-recognized regime without thereby recognizing it. Nevertheless, Taiwan has been barred from participating in conferences that review the treaties it has signed and ratified. Yugoslavia, a party to the NPT, was not invited to participate in the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference; it formally protested against this exclusion.

Another anomaly arose with regard to Cambodia, when for several years two governments claiming to represent the country were listed as parties to the NPT under two different names: Democratic Kampuchea and the People’s Republic of Kampuchea. The situation became normalized in 1993 with the establishment of a Cambodian Government of National Unity.

Depositaries

For bilateral and some very restricted multilateral treaties, all the parties sign copies of the treaty for every other party and submit instruments of ratification to each of them. This is hardly practical for most multilateral treaties. Therefore, a depositary is designated whose duties include accepting signatures; receiving instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession; informing the signatories of the date of each signature, of the deposit of each instrument and of the entry into force of the treaty; as well as receiving and circulating other notices, which may include notifications of succession to the treaty, denunciation or withdrawal and proposals for amendment. The depositary makes arrangements for registering treaties with the United Nations pursuant to Article 102 of the UN Charter.

Formerly, when treaty-making conferences were convened by states, the host state normally acted as depositary for the treaty that was concluded. However, for some time now, many treaties have been formulated under the aegis of international organizations – especially the United Nations – which then normally serve as depositaries of these treaties and even of those produced at some state-convened conferences. At the height of the Cold War, it was necessary to make an exception for certain arms control agreements where universal participation was considered desirable, so as to include states (such as the German Democratic Republic, North Korea, North Viet Nam, and originally the People’s Republic of China and later Taiwan) which were not recognized by most states and with which international intergovernmental organizations maintained no formal contacts. The practice was then developed of naming the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States as co-depositaries. (The Russian Federation now performs the depositary functions formerly performed by the Soviet Union.) This was done for the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, the 1968 NPT, the 1971 Seabed Treaty and the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BW Convention). It is sufficient for a state to sign a treaty or to deposit its instrument of ratification or accession in the capital of one of the three depositaries to become formally committed. If a state takes the same action in different capitals on different dates, the earliest date is considered to be the effective one. This device facilitated wider adherence to agreements without embarrassing any of the depositaries. As states do not present signatures or instruments of ratification to depositaries with which they have no diplomatic relations, the records of signatories and parties kept by the depositary governments differ. Since the number of countries not universally recognized is rather small today, the cumbersome practice of dealing with three depositaries has lost its justification. The task of depositary is now often assigned to the UN Secretary-General or – for agreements related to nuclear arms control – to the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The 1992 Treaty on Open Skies, signed within the framework of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, has two depositaries – Canada and Hungary.

Entry into Force

The way in which a treaty enters into force is usually specified in its final clauses. Some agreements enter into force on signature. More frequently, depending on the constitutional requirements of the potential parties, what is required is ratification. This may involve securing the approval of a national legislative body. After such approval has been secured, an instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval is deposited with the depositary in respect of a treaty that has been signed. For a treaty that has not been signed, it is the instrument of accession (or succession) that is deposited. All these procedures are equivalent to and are normally referred to as ‘ratification’.

The conditions for entry into force are normally specified in terms of a certain minimum number of ratifications, and it is sometimes required that particular states participate. For example, the BW Convention entered into force after the deposit of the instruments of ratification by 22 signatory governments, but this number was to include the governments of the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union. Still more restrictive is the provision for entry into force of the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which requires the deposit of the instruments of ratification by 44 states – those which were members of the Conference on Disarmament as at 18 June 1996 and participated in the work of the 1996 session of the Conference, and which possessed nuclear power or research reactors.

When signatures may be affixed is also specified: sometimes a treaty is open for signature during a limited period of time, sometimes until the treaty’s entry into force, and sometimes indefinitely. Accession – which is resorted to by states that either prefer not to sign or are unable to do so because the deadline for signing has passed or for other reasons – may be possible from the date a treaty is opened for signature, as allowed for the 1997 Convention Prohibiting Anti-Personnel Mines (APM Convention), or only after it is no longer open for signature. Having signed but not yet exchanged or deposited the instruments of ratification, acceptance or approval of a treaty requiring such action, a state is considered obligated to refrain from acts which would defeat the object or purpose of the treaty until such time as it has made its intention clear not to become party to it.

The 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco, which established a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America and the Caribbean, contains an unusual clause: it may enter into force among states that have ratified it only when several conditions, specified in the treaty, have been met. However, these conditions may be waived at the time of ratification or later.

Certain agreements, whether signed or not signed, are not intended to be legally binding; they cannot be registered with the United Nations. This is true of many of the documents of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), since 1995 called the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). These are only politically binding.

After the required number of ratifications has been deposited, a period of delay may be specified before entry into force. When a treaty formally enters into force, it does so only for those states that have ratified it. For states whose instruments of ratification are deposited after entry into force of the treaty, the treaty enters into force either immediately or after a specified period of time, which varies depending on the type of the treaty.

Arms control treaties may be modified by various procedures. Agreed amendments often enter into force in accordance with the procedures that govern the entry into force of the treaty concerned. In certain cases, a subsidiary agreement must be concluded, within defined time limits, after the treaty comes into force. One example is the NPT, which requires that non-nuclear-weapon parties conclude ‘safeguards agreements’ with the IAEA. Another is the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CW Convention), which requires that all parties conclude ‘facility agreements’ with the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW).

Once an agreement has entered into force in respect of a state, the state must comply with it in good faith. No party may invoke a provision of its internal law (including its constitution) as justification for failure to observe an agreement. A treaty or a part of it may also be applied provisionally, pending its entry into force, if the treaty itself so provides or if the negotiating states have in some other manner so agreed, as was the case with the implementation of the CFE Treaty.

Duration and Denunciation

Arms control agreements may remain in force indefinitely or for a limited period of time. Many agreements contain a clause permitting unilateral withdrawal in cases when extraordina...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• Foreword
• Preface
• Acronyms
• Glossary
• PART I. ANALYTICAL SURVEY
• 1 Basic Concepts
• 2 Historical Overview
• 3 The United Nations
• 4 Nuclear-Weapon Explosions
• 5 Nuclear Arms Limitation
• 6 Nuclear-Weapon Proliferation
• 7 Proposals for the Abolition of Nuclear Weapons
• 8 Chemical and Biological Weapons
• 9 Environmental and Radiological Weapons
• 10  Outer Space and Celestial Bodies
• 11 The Sea Environment
• 12 Demilitarized Areas
• 13 Denuclearized Zones
• 14 Conventional Arms Control
• 15 Constraints on Conventional Arms and Technology Transfers
• 16 Confidence Building in Europe, Asia and the Americas
• 17 Restrictions on the Methods of Warfare
• 18 Prevention of Accidental War
• 19 Verification and Compliance
• 20 Concluding Remarks
• Appendix
• Select Bibliography
• About the Author
• Index