1 The Concept of the Person: Vulnerable, yet Fundamentally Trustworthy
The person-centred approach is often criticised for being somewhat lacking in theoretical complexity. Carl Rogers, the founder of person-centred (originally âclient-centredâ) therapy, is dismissed by many as being too simplistic or just plain naive in his attempts to describe and explain the psychological development of the person (for example, Masson, 1989). Indeed, the person-centred approach has sometimes been caricatured as being at the âtea and sympathyâ end of the psychotherapy spectrum. Such caricature is somewhat surprising given that Rogers, particularly in his earlier work, writes in an exact and scientific language. People are âorganismsâ; terminology is painstakingly categorised and described; complex diagrams meticulously delineate psychological relationships. Rogersâ use of language did change as he grew older, with a decrease in the use of terms common to scientific psychology, perhaps reflecting the fading of the influences he experienced early on in his life and career (Thorne, 1992). But despite this change he remained consistent with his original statements of theory regarding the person and their development, seemingly not feeling the need for any major revisions.
His exposition of relatively simple ideas is not necessarily one that is insubstantial and he would no doubt agree with the statement that âsimplicity is not a goal, but one arrives at simplicity in spite of oneself, as one approaches the real meaning of thingsâ (Lewis, 1974: 20). Any suggestion that his theory is lightweight, however, would seem misplaced; his theory of psychological maladjustment has at its centre a simple hypothesis but this does not mean it is lacking in substance and rigorous analysis. Indeed, Rogers describes his ideas in quite some detail and many other writers have commented on and revised his work as well (see the Further Reading sections at the end of each chapter). A lengthy investigation of his theoretical framework, therefore, is not required here, although a summary of the fundamental principles of his theory is essential to the consideration of how change occurs as a result of the counselling process.
The actualising tendency
At the centre of Rogersâ theory is the notion of an actualising tendency. He postulates that âthere is a formative directional tendency in the universe, which can be traced and observed in stellar space, in crystals, in micro-organisms, in more complex organic life, and in human beingsâ (Rogers, 1980: 133). The actualising tendency, the term most often used when referring to this formative tendency in human beings, is âthe inherent tendency of the organism to develop all its capacities in ways which serve to maintain or enhance the organismâ (Rogers, 1959: 198). It is absolutely fundamental to life, to the extent that Rogers remarks, âonly the presence or absence of this total directional process enables us to tell whether a given organism is alive or deadâ (Rogers, 1980: 118). Crucially it is the only motive that Rogers presents in his understanding of human life; it incorporates all other motivational concepts such as tension or drive-reductions that are often differentiated in other theories. The actualising tendency is, however, concerned with increasing tension, as the organism is in a constant state of enhancement (Bozarth and Brodley, 1991); in any case, all directional motives are incorporated in this one tendency.
For Rogers, this inherent and unceasing tendency for all organisms to fulfil and enhance their potential is encapsulated in a memory he has about potatoes. Potatoes would not seem to be the most dynamic example to elucidate the central thesis of a theory on human development but these potatoes proved to Rogers that the actualising tendency would remain present even under the most adverse of circumstances. Interestingly, he observed, it would not be extinguished but it could be distorted:
I remember that in my boyhood, the bin in which we stored our winterâs supply of potatoes was in the basement, several feet below a small window. The conditions were unfavorable, but the potatoes would begin to sprout â pale white sprouts, so unlike the healthy green shoots they sent up when planted in the soil in the spring. But these sad, spindly sprouts would grow 2 or 3 feet in length as they reached toward the distant light of the window. The sprouts were, in their bizarre, futile growth, a sort of desperate expression of the directional tendency I have been describing. They would never become plants, never mature, never fulfill their real potential. But under the most adverse circumstances, they were striving to become. (Rogers, 1980: 118)
Thus this memory highlights two important factors: the tendency towards enhancement cannot be destroyed unless the organism itself is destroyed because it simply exists within it; but the organismâs tendency towards enhancement can be distorted under adverse conditions. This first aspect is fundamental to the whole ethos of the person-centred approach and is integral to any consideration of how change occurs: the actualising tendency is innate and permeates the whole organism, not just one or other part of it. It is continually trying to maintain and enhance the organism as a whole and as it wants for nothing but the maintenance and enhancement of the organism, it is entirely trustworthy. It is not something that requires anything âdoingâ to it in order for it to work â it just is. The second aspect is also important, as will become clear in this chapter, because it underlines the fact that the tendency is susceptible to adverse conditions and so growth and development can become distorted.
Trusting the organismic valuing process
Rogers thought of this tendency within living beings as a kind of organismic valuing process and found evidence of its existence in babies in the way they acted upon their instinctual needs (Rogers, 1973). He found that in experiments where babies were allowed to choose between a variety of foods on offer, the infants made choices based on what they needed to maintain and enhance their own well-being and growth. They would balance their intake of proteins, carbohydrates and vitamins to match their bodyâs needs; if they ate too much of something they would soon stop and counteract the effect by eating a different food group. Rogers thought that the babies could not have learned this â it was evidence of their innate internal valuing process occurring uninhibitedly.
With reference to the therapeutic setting, Rogers believes that trusting in this innate valuing process is central to the activity of counselling. Thus it âis not a matter of doing something to the individual, or of inducing him to do something about himself. It is instead a matter of freeing him for normal growth and developmentâ (Rogers, 1942: 29). Rogersâ memory of the potato sprouts is, for him, comparable to his work with clients whose lives have been âwarpedâ by adverse circumstances (1980: 118). Although some of these peopleâs behaviours may seem âabnormal, twisted, scarcely humanâ, Rogers views these people as striving to enhance themselves in the best ways that are available to them (1980: 119). Even though this may produce somewhat distorted results, the actualising tendency is clearly still present within them and can continue to be trusted. This fundamental trust in the person is a startlingly different stance from that taken by many other therapies, where the emphasis is on in some way constraining rather than liberating the essence of human nature. In these therapies the essence is viewed as at least partly destructive as opposed to wholly constructive.
Rogers has come under criticism for what many believe to be his naive view of human nature (for example, Masson, 1989; Spinelli, 2000; and perhaps most famously, May, 1990). May (1990) described in some detail why he thought Rogersâ view of an essentially âgoodâ human nature was misconceived, arguing in a similar way to Buber (Buber and Rogers, 1960) that there must be both good and evil present within all human beings. Rogersâ response to May was emphatic: âI feel that the tendency toward actualization is inherent. In this, man is like all other organisms. I can count on it being present ⌠I find in my experience no such tendency toward destructiveness, toward evil. I cannot count on the certainty that this individual is striving consciously or unconsciously to fulfill an evil natureâ (Rogers, 1990b: 253). As Spinelli (2000) comments, Rogers may have subsequently wanted to add to the answer he gave to May at that time because it was in some ways inadequate, but Rogersâ fundamental view of the actualising tendency being the enhancing source of human nature did not alter. Even as late as 1986 Rogers, when reflecting on the significant elements of a counselling session with a client, Jan, wrote of âa trust in the âwisdom of the organismâ to lead us to the core of her problems âŚwhen trusted, her organism, her nonconscious mind â call it what you will â can follow the path that leads to the crucial issuesâ (Rogers, 1990a: 151). Implicit within this was his belief that once identified, Jan would also be able to address âthe crucial issuesâ in the best possible way for herself. Thus his trust in the person remained an integral element of the therapeutic relationship: change may occur, not because of what the counsellor does to the client but rather as a result of the counsellor liberating what already exists within the client.
This is exemplified by three filmed interviews conducted by Rogers and other leading therapists of the time (Fritz Perls and Albert Ellis) with a client called Gloria (Shostrom, 1964). Immediately after the sessions, Gloria comments that if she were beginning therapy she would choose to work with Rogers, but in her current state she thought the challenging style of Perls would be of most help. However, Rogers actually met Gloria a year or so after the filmed interviews had taken place, when she came to a conference he was running at which the participants watched the film of Gloriaâs sessions. Rogers reports that on seeing the session of herself with Perls she was clearly distressed, exclaiming âWhy did I do all those things that he asked me to do! Why did I let him do that to me!â (Rogers, 1984: 424). Rogers comments: âShe felt that she had somehow given over her power and this enraged herâ (1984: 424). Rogers, of course, had not âaskedâ Gloria to do anything in his session with her, he had simply trusted her to lead the way in their exploration of her situation, believing in the clientâs ability to find her own ways and means of overcoming her difficulties. It seems that ultimately his way of being with her was of greater value. Thus, the person-centred counsellor, with their trust firmly in the capabilities of the client and their capacity for change, can perhaps best be thought of as attempting to facilitate a reunion: the re-connection of the self with the clientâs inherent capabilities.
The self and unconditional positive regard
How, then, does this actualising tendency become distorted in people â how is the internal valuing process affected when subjected to adverse circumstances? This is another aspect that is central to Rogersâ theory and involves two key concepts: the self and unconditional positive regard. Rogers (1951), in an attempt to clarify his thinking about personality and behaviour, presented his hypotheses at the time in the form of 19 propositions, and number nine offers a succinct description of his understanding of the âselfâ:
As a result of interaction with the environment, and particularly as a result of evaluational interaction with others, the structure of self is formed â an organized, fluid, but consistent conceptual pattern of perceptions of characteristics and relationships of the âIâ or the âme,â together with values attached to these concepts. (Rogers, 1951: 498)
Here, Rogers hypothesises that due to a childâs interaction with their environment, and particularly through their interaction with other people, they develop a sense of their own âselfâ. Within the child there now exists the actualising tendency as before, which the child experiences (without consciously thinking about it) through their own organismic valuing process. But there is also an element of awareness that is conceptualised as âselfâ, which is, at its simplest, an awareness of being in existence. As this concept of self gradually develops, the child increasingly comes to be valued by (and in relation to) the other people around them and the child wants to actualise this self-concept as well as continuing to have their own organismic valuing process. This is a major shift in the childâs development as now, in effect, there is a sub-system of the actualising tendency: self-actualisation.
Distortions in the actualising tendency
Once this differentiation exists within a person it is possible to consider how the actualising tendency could become distorted. If self-actualisation is in no way different from the actualising tendency, then the actualising tendency will function uninhibitedly and the person will naturally continue to maintain and enhance themselves as before. But if there is any discrepancy between the two, then one may begin to function at cross-purposes to the other: the greater the discrepancy, the greater the counter-functioning.
Returning to the babies of the experiment that Rogers referred to, at this stage of their development the actualising tendency functions uninhibitedly within them. Through their own organismic valuing process they function in ways that maintain and enhance themselves. They eat the right types of food in the correct quantities in order to keep themselves nicely balanced. Children generally at this stage of development seem to have a clear sense of what they need and do not need, what they like and dislike. A child does not like the experience of hunger unfulfilled and so will eat. A child enjoys a sense of security and so will value being hugged and caressed. A child enjoys new experiences for the simple sense of discovery that comes with them, such as discovering they can reach and feel their toes for the first time (Rogers, 1973). All of these examples show the actualising tendency at work within the child. The child does not like or value pain, though, or loud and unexpected sounds and this is consistent with the notion that the actualising tendency is concerned with the maintenance and development of life, not the sabotage or destruction of it (Rogers, 1980).
As the child begins to develop a sense of self they become aware of their interaction with others and this brings a new type of sensation. Now, in addition to their own internal valuing process they begin to process their experience in relation to external values. The child needs love and places great value on it, to the extent that they are prepared to adapt their behaviour in order to receive it, even if this contradicts their own internal valuing process. Whether or not this is a learned or inherent need is, for Rogers, somewhat irrelevant â what is important is that the child tends to try to elicit love from significant others (usually parents) by behaving in ways that they hope will achieve this outcome.
While this perceived positive value (the feeling of being loved by the significant other) is in accordance with their own internal values, there is little cause for concern as the two experiences are congruent. But problems start where these two experiences are not the same, where they are incongruent. For example, the child enjoys the moment of experiencing the taste of what grown-ups call âdirtâ but is chastised by the mother, who shrieks, âGet that out of your mouth, itâs disgustingâ. Or the child wriggles and screams in a desperate attempt to avoid eating the yukky green stuff that his father is convinced will be good for him: âCome on, eat it up now like a good boy.â The internal valuing process says one thing yet the other individuals, from whom the child needs love, say the opposite. Because the need for love is so strong it often overrides the childâs internal valuing process. Thus the child denies himself the pleasurable sensation of the delight and the disgust of the taste of the stuff called dirt; he tries to force down a little bit of that yukky green food that makes him feel sick. He does this in an attempt to win the love or positive regard, as Rogers called it, of the other person (Rogers, 1959). Indeed, this need to receive positive regard is so strong that it can potentially become more powerful than the actualising tendency. Thus, although not a motivational drive (the actualising tendency is the only one in Rogersâ theoretical system, as mentioned earlier), ultimately it can be the more dominant force.
Conditions of worth
In the two examples just presented, the positive regard on offer could be described as conditional: the other people (the parents) display displeasure in relation to the childâs actions â they clearly value one type of behaviour more positively than another. Rogers believes that the result of this over time is for the child to introject these values and adopt them as if they are their own. Thus the child deserts their own valuing system, which has the actualising tendency as its trustworthy base, and takes on the values of others in an attempt to maintain the positive regard they provide. For Rogers, this is the root cause of distortion in the otherwise healthy and life-enhancing development of the person. Once the childâs valuing system moves from an internal to an external source they can be described as having acquired conditions of worth, as their sense of worth is dependent on how others regard them. The only way for distortion not to occur is if the positive regard offered is unconditional â if the person can âperceive that of oneâs self-experiences none can be discriminated by the other individual as more or less worthy of positive regardâ (Rogers, 1959: 208). Rogers believes that such a situation does not exist in real life because everyone experiences some conditions of worth. In theory, though, if unconditional positive regard is always experienced, self-actualisation will be congruent with actualisation and the person will exist in a state of continual self-maintenance and enhancement.
The introjection of conditions of worth starts almost as soon as a sense of self emerges but can continue throughout a personâs life. Conditions of worth are not just present between the child and their parents (or significant others) during a certain developmental period, a period that some theories of the person suggest defines the type of person that will emerge into adulthood. A person can continue to be affected by the same or different conditions at any stage of their life. In addition, conditions of worth tend to be communicated in an implicit as well as explicit manner, which perhaps makes it more difficult for a person to realise that the process is...