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Changing Times: Perspectives on the Citizen-Consumer
From some perspectives the rise of the citizen-consumer is viewed as âempoweringâ, a means of challenging the paternalistic power of the professions and of ensuring that citizens might benefit from more flexible and responsive public service provision. For other commentators, it marks a shift towards a more marketised and privatised form of service delivery, driven by commercial rather than public service values. In this chapter:
- we explore three different perspectives on the citizen-consumer: the sociology of modernity, the political economy of neo-liberalism and Foucauldian conceptions of governmentality;
- we highlight how each understands the place of consumerism in modern times, and draw out some of the analytical and political implications of each.
We begin by noting the slipperiness of the boundary between academic analysis and the perspectives that inform policy and politics. The policy documents or political speeches we make use of during this book all reveal how their authors draw on implicit â and sometimes explicit â theories about how the world has changed, how citizenship is being remade, how economic and social forces imply the need for yet another cycle of reform or modernisation. Similarly those analysing â and often critiquing â the consequences of reform do so from a particular theoretical standpoint, with implicit political implications and evaluations.
âThe world has changedâ: the sociology of modernity
One important area of sociological theorising â work that treats contemporary society as modernity, or as a particular phase or development of modernity â has immediate and compelling relevance for thinking about the citizen-consumer. As Edwards (2000) has argued, consumer culture seems to be intimately bound up with the character of late, reflexive or even post-modernity. Although these different versions of modernity vary in their accounts and assessments of consumer culture, all of them identify it as a core component of modern societies.
Despite such variations, we will refer primarily to the work of Anthony Giddens and Ulrich Beck in this context, partly because they have constructed analyses of modernity in which dynamics of individualisation and reflexivity provide the conditions for âlife politicsâ as projects in which individuals come to define themselves, both individually and collectively. The rise of a consumer culture provides one site through which individuals can define and project their identities. The underlying dynamics that produce this phase of âreflexive modernityâ are, in Giddensâ account, a combination of globalisation, de-traditionalisation and social reflexivity. For Giddens, reflexive modernity is a âpost-traditional social orderâ (1994: 5) in which âtradition changes its status. Traditions have to explain themselves, to become open to interrogation or discourseâ (1994: 5; see also Giddens et al., 1994). The rise of reflexivity dislocates varieties of âtaken for grantedâ or institutionalised social arrangements:
The development of social reflexivity is the key influence on a diversity of changes that otherwise seem to have little in common. Thus the emergence of âpost-Fordismâ in industrial enterprises is usually analysed in terms of technological change â particularly the influence of information technology. But the underlying reason for the growth of âflexible productionâ and âbottom-up decision-makingâ is that a universe of high reflexivity leads to greater autonomy of action, which the enterprise must recognise and draw on.
The same applies to bureaucracy and to the sphere of politics. Bureaucratic authority, as Max Weber made clear, used to be a condition for organizational effectiveness. In a more reflexively ordered society, operating in the context of manufactured uncertainty, this is no longer the case. The old bureaucratic systems start to disappear, the dinosaurs of the post-traditional age. In the domain of politics, states can no longer so readily treat their citizens as âsubjectsâ. (1994: 7)
De-traditionalisation also implies that societies have moved away from cultural formations of deference that supported forms of hierarchical authority and social order. This view of traditional authority in decline links Giddensâ concern with the democratising impact of reflexivity to conceptions of post-modernity (e.g., Lyotardâs view of the loss of belief in âgrand narrativesâ, 1984), and the dissolution of class/status formations (Bauman, 1998). We might also see connections between the rise of consumer culture and the decline of deference and ârespectâ for traditional order or traditional authority. Consumer culture features a populist and quasi-egalitarian impulse, asserting that everyone is entitled to consume and to consume what they want. It disrupts conventions and hierarchies of taste and access. Alternatively, it might be that the decline of deference has made possible the populist sensibility of mass consumerism. The collapse of the Soviet bloc and its aftermath suggests that the dislocation of established authority and the rise of a consumerist (as well as political) conception of individualised freedom are closely associated.
Public services were intimately bound up with established or âtraditionalâ models of authority as governing the relationships between state, services and public. The Policeman (and the implied connection between masculinity and authority is significant) and the Doctor have served as particular embodiments of professional and social authority. It is not just âbureaucraticâ forms of organising authority that have been affected by the decline of deference. Forms of embodied occupational or professional authority have also become vulnerable.
Giddens argues that reflexive modernisation involves a shift towards democratisation â linking more democratic forms of personal relationship, the rise of social movements, the dynamics of organisational decentralisation and the dialogic potentials of an emergent global order (1994: 117â24). Our own view would be somewhat different, suggesting that the decline of deference involves a populist shift in politics and culture that does not necessarily translate into democratic or progressive political forms. On the contrary, one effect is the rise of a âdemotic populismâ that celebrates the people/the popular. Such developments are not intrinsically democratic, even though they may appropriate some of the mechanisms and trappings of institutional democracy (opinion polling, voting by phone/e-mail, etc.). But they are demotic because they claim to speak in the voice of the people. Demotic populism rests on claims that the voice of the people is typically excluded or repressed by the dominant institutional forms of politics and social life. Forms of demotic populism are often framed in an anti-elitist discourse that challenges concentrations of privilege and power in the name of people. As we shall see, this model of populism has strong connections to New Labourâs conception of citizen-consumers.
In several ways, consumer culture embodies this late or reflexive modernity. It is associated with both economic and cultural dynamics of globalisation that create the conditions for the proliferation of commodities and their increasingly aestheticised â or signifying â character (Edwards, 2000). It promotes de-traditionalisation, unlocking taken-for-granted associations of taste, style and social position (developments that are discussed in Featherstone, 1991; Lury, 1996 and Tomlinson, 1990, for example). Finally, consumer culture is associated with reflexivity and some versions of life politics, in which identities are constructed through the signifying practices of consumption choices. As Giddens argued: âLife politics is a politics of identity as well as of choiceâ (1994: 91). There are, of course, substantial arguments about whether consumer culture is a site of politics (even individuated âlife politicsâ) or is a displacement or subordination of politics (e.g., Bauman, 1998).
But we need to step back a little from this general view of the emergence of consumer culture as a core element of late or reflexive modernity to discuss some of the problems with this as an analytic framing for the rise of the citizen-consumer. Almost all aspects of this sociology of modernity have proved controversial, from the view of globalisation to the conception of individuated and reflexive subjects â and some of these are taken up in the following two sections of this chapter. Here, though we concentrate on questions of the time and space of reflexive modernity. A foregrounding of globalisation is often linked to a diminution of spatial differentiation (Massey, 1999). Although Giddens (and Beck) do not treat globalisation solely as a homogenising force, they do see its mix of economic, cultural and political dynamics as generalising a âcosmopolitanâ reflexivity across national boundaries â weakening traditional institutions and authorities wherever they are encountered. The spread of such cosmopolitanism looks more spatially uneven than this, with forms of corporate, religious, military and authoritarian political power being reconvened alongside pressures for democratisation.
This view of modernity and its different phases (early/late; simple/reflexive) tends to collapse spatial difference into time, producing one modernity to which societies approximate in terms of being more or less advanced. Geographers have critiqued this displacement of space by time (Massey, 2005). Others â especially those deriving from post-colonial studies â have challenged the conception of a singular modernity, arguing that the Euro-American model of modernity co-exists uncomfortably with others (even if its economic, political and cultural dominance often obscures their presence, see, for example, Chakrabarty, 2000). There are also questions about the timing of the rise of the consumer culture and the figure of the consumer (see, inter alia, Brewer, 2003; Maclachlan and Trentmann, 2004; Trentmann, 2006a). The threads of consumer culture â commodified consumption, conspicuous consumption and consumption as a site of collective mobilisation and social regulation â have long histories predating the rise of Fordist industrial production and the associated growth of mass consumption usually taken to be the economic and social preconditions for consumer culture (see Edwards, 2000). But more significantly for our work here, Trentmann has argued that both historical studies and contemporary sociology have neglected the âsubjectivities of the consumerâ (2006a: 2). He suggests that:
The expanding literature on consumption has enriched our understanding of the central role of material culture in the reproduction of social relationships and status, everyday routines and selfhood, but has offered surprisingly little in the way of explaining the evolution of the consumer as a master category of collective and individual identity. Put simply, all societies have been engaged in consumption and have purchased, exchanged, gifted or used objects and services, but it has only been in specific contexts in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries that some (not all) practices of consumption have been connected to a sense of being a âconsumerâ as an identity, audience or category of analysis. (2006a: 2)
Our study contributes in some ways to redressing this lack of attention to the consumer as a social category, identity and identification. Rather than assuming that âconsumersâ exist, our inquiry explores how they are summoned in one field of social practice (the use of public services) and how people experience themselves â and what identifications they deploy â in relation to those practices.
Before leaving the sociology of modernity to explore other perspectives, it is worth noting the ways in which sociological analysis has connected with the more situated politics of New Labourâs citizen-consumer. There are strong links between this sociology of modernity and the politics of public service reform in the UK. As we will see in more detail in the following chapter, New Labourâs approach to public service reform has been constructed around the imperatives of modernity and modernisation â drawing on sociological accounts of social changes, including globalisation and more reflexively demanding, less deferential individuals. More particularly, there was the critical role of Tony Giddens in theorising the relationships between late or reflexive modernity and the rise of (and need for) âThird Wayâ politics (1994, 1998). We can trace ways in which New Labourâs version of the Third Way incorporated and adapted â selectively, and in very specific ways â the Giddensian view of modernity. The familiar narrative â âthe world has changed, people have changedâ â was used as a device to underpin a third element: the imperative that âpublic services have to changeâ (see, for example, Blair, 1998). The idea of reflexive individuals has been used to legitimate the need for the public â as consumers â to have access to new sources of information in order for them to make more informed choices. And the individuation thesis is linked to calls for more personalised services tailored to the needs of individuals. Themes from the sociology of modernity are selectively appropriated in order to create a new normative framework of policy development.
Not all sociologists of modernity share the relatively optimistic reading of social and political developments offered by Giddens and others. For example, Zygmunt Baumanâs writings on the rise of consumption associated with what he terms âliquid modernityâ and its implications for welfare states (and their subjects) presents a much bleaker set of analyses. In Baumanâs work, consumption has displaced production as the site of moral worth and value â and (individualised) choice has become a master value. Those excluded from the realm of consumption â primarily because they lack the economic capacity to make and realise choice in the marketplace â are now multiply excluded: from the activities of consumption, from the exercise of choice and from the moral realm of the worthy. âIt is the fault of the excluded that they did nothing, or not enough, to escape exclusion; perhaps they even invited their fate, making the exclusion into a foregone conclusionâ (1998: 85).
Bauman explores the ways in which social divisions and inequalities are reconstituted and recoded through the rise of (commodified) consumption. He is also concerned by the de-politicising effects of the transition from a âwork ethicâ to an âaesthetic of consumptionâ as the dominant principle of social organisation:
Contemporary society engages its members primarily as consumers; only secondarily, and partly, does it engage them as producers. To meet the social norm, to be a fully fledged member of society, one needs to respond promptly and efficiently to the temptations of the consumer market; one needs to contribute to the âsupply-clearing demandâ and in case of economic trouble be part of the âconsumer-led recoveryâ. All this the poor, lacking decent income, credit cards and the prospect of a better time, are not fit to do. Accordingly, the norm which is broken by the poor of today, the norm the breaking of which makes them âabnormalâ, is the norm of consumer competence or aptitude, not that of employment. First and foremost, the poor of today are ânon-consumersâ, not âunemployedâ: they are defined in the first place through being flawed consumers⌠In the book-balancing of a consumer society, the poor are unequivocally a liability, and by no stretch of imagination can they be recorded on the side of present or future assets. (1998: 90â1)
Accordingly, the complex social and political ties that had connected the poor-as-unemployed to the politics of a society governed by the work ethic have been undone. The mixture of fear, concern and solidarity that underpinned welfarist politics has no place in the consumer society:
And so, for the first time in recorded history the poor are now purely and simply a worry and a nuisance. They have no merits which could relieve, let alone counterbalance, their vices. They have nothing to offer in exchange for the taxpayerâs outlays. They are a bad investment, unlikely ever to be repaid, let alone bring profit; a black hole sucking in whatever comes near and spitting back nothing, except, perhaps, trouble. Decent and normal members of society â the consumers â want nothing from them and expect nothing. (1998: 91)
These are concerns that are shared in some ways by writers from our second main theoretical perspective: the political economy of neo-liberalism, albeit from rather different intellectual starting points.
States versus markets: the view from political economy
Many of the criticisms of Giddensian conceptions of modernity have been raised by authors writing from the standpoint of critical political economy or varieties of Marxism (e.g., Benton, 2000; Ferguson et al., 2002). In some cases, critics point to the underestimation of continuities in capitalist social formations â particularly the persistence of class as relations of production, as a form of (deepening) inequalities and as a mode of political organising and conflict. For others, it is the persistence of a capitalist mode of production on an international and global scale that is missing from the model of modernity. As Edwards (2000) has suggested, in relation to conceptions of consumer culture and consumer society, there are also significant distinctions to be drawn between analysts who focus primarily on the symbolic domain (stressing the sign value of commodities or treating consumption itself as a privileged site of signifying practice) and those who emphasise the more âmaterialistâ analysis of production and consumption practices. In this later view, consumer culture is marked primarily by the extension or deepening of commodification: âin contemporary society, almost no human need or activity avoids commodification, and consumer society, despite its internal contradictions, is increasingly all-encompassingâ (Edwards, 2000: 5). From the standpoint of critical political economy, such changes mark the extension of the power and reach of capital into new sites â both spatially through its globalising ambition and socially through the subjection of new areas of human activity to the logics of commodification and market exchange.
In this view, the shift from citizen to consumer marks a new phase in western capitalism, predominantly theorised as the moment of neoliberalism (Harvey, 2005). This has something in common with earlier political-economic discussions of globalisation because of the centrality of the spatial universalisation of the rule of neo-liberalism. But it differs in identifying a particular political and ideological formation that represents itself as a new âlogic of capitalâ and seeks to liberate capital from the shackles of earlier political compromises â not least the impositions of national governments (in the form of taxation and regulation).
Neoliberalism is in the first instance a theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedom and skills within a framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets and free trade⌠There has everywhere been an emphatic turn towards neoliberalism in political-economic practices and thinking since the 1970s. Deregulation, privatization, and withdrawal of the state from many areas of social provision have been all too common⌠Neoliberalism has, in short, become hegemonic as a mode of discourse. It has pervasive effects on ways of thought to the point where it has become incorporated into the common-sense way many of us interpret, live in and understand the world.
The process of neoliberalization has, however, entailed much âcreative destructionâ, not only of prior institutional frameworks and powers (even challenging traditional forms of state sovereignty) but also of divisions of labour, social relations, we...