Comparative Politics

Judith Bara, Mark Pennington, Judith Bara, Mark Pennington

• Publisher: SAGE Publications Ltd
• Year: 2009
• Print ISBN: 9780761943730, 9780761943723
• eBook ISBN: 9781446241820
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: International Relations
• Index: Politics & International Relations

?Bara and Pennington?s edited volume successfully fills a huge void in the market for introductory textbooks to comparative politics which previously offered either descriptions of political processes and systems or overviews of the methodology of comparative analysis. By applying major political science theories to overviews of the core elements of political systems, the authors both enhance our understanding of these elements and provide readers an excellent introduction to comparative explanation? - Dr David Howarth, University of Edinburgh

?What is distinctive about this authoritative and comprehensive book on comparative politics is the way in which it is underpinned throughout by a theoretical analysis centred on a new institutionalist approach? - Professor Wyn Grant, University of Warwick

?Comparative Politics takes a fresh and original approach to the field… it examines the role of structures, rules and norms in regulating the individual and collective behaviour of political actors. Each chapter provides a critical bibliography and key questions which will be particularly useful for students approaching Comparative Politics for the first time. Altogether this is a comprehensive and useful read which I warmly recommend? - Ian Budge, Professor Emiritus Professor of Government, University of Essex

?This is a most useful book. Teachers of comparative politics often scramble around, with out-of-date textbooks and photocopies of more or less compatible articles. Here is a new book that gives an up-to-date, comprehensive and systematic introduction to the major strands of institutional thought and applies these to the major institutions, processes and policy areas. It will be a great help for many of us, academics and students alike? - Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard, Professor of Comparative Politics, University of Copenhagen

This book provides a distinctive new introduction to the study of comparative politics at undergraduate level. Rich in case study material and global in coverage, Comparative Politics sets out the basic theoretical and methodological foundations for studying different political systems as well as the key structures and actors of which they are comprised.

Part One explores the nature of comparative methodology and introduces students to the major theoretical paradigms that seek to explain the operation of institutions in democratic states and facilitate comparison across different political systems.

Part Two examines the institutional structures of the modern state, outlining the key features such as the electoral systems and territorial and functional divisions of government across a range of modern states.

Part Three analyzes the role of key actors, such as voters and parties, interest groups and social movements, the bureaucracy and the judiciary.

This book will be an essential primer for students on first-year courses in comparative government and politics as well as introductory courses in political science concepts and methods.

Judith Bara is Senior Lecturer in Politics at Queen Mary, University of London and Research Fellow in Government, University of Essex.

David S. Bell is Professor of French Government and Politics and Head of Social Studies and Law at the University of Leeds.

Jocelyn Evans is Reader in Politics at the European Studies Research Institute, University of Salford.

Catherine Needham is Lecturer in Politics at Queen Mary, University of London.

Brendan O?Duffy is Senior Lecturer in Politics at Queen Mary, University of London.

Mark Pennington is Senior Lecturer in Politics at Queen Mary, University of London.

David Robertson is Professor of Politics, University of Oxford and Vice Principal, St Hugh?s College, Oxford.

Part 1

THEORY AND METHOD IN COMPARATIVE POLITICS

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1	Theory, Institutions and Comparative Politics

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Mark Pennington

CHAPTER OUTLINE

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This chapter defines the nature of political institutions and discusses three theoretical frameworks for the comparative analysis and explanation of how institutions work in modern democratic states. These approaches, derived from the ‘new institutionalism’, are rational choice institutionalism, cultural institutionalism and structural institutionalism. In each case discussion focuses on three elements – ontology, explanation of why institutions matter and explanation of the origins of institutions and institutional change. The chapter concludes with a discussion of how elements of the three approaches might be synthesized in order to enhance explanation and analysis.

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Introduction: Why Comparative Politics?

As its name suggests, comparative politics is concerned with the comparative study and analysis of political systems. It aims to overcome the shortcomings of approaches focused purely on case studies of individual countries and of those that build purely abstract theoretical models of decision-making. Comparing the similarities and differences between political phenomena across countries allows social scientists to judge if and how the experience of some states is similar to that of others and to assess whether theoretical models of how people make decisions are able to claim universal validity.

The primary focus of both theoretical and empirical work in comparative politics is on the comparison of institutional practices between states. It examines how institutions vary between states and the effect that different institutional practices have on the outcomes of the political process in different societies. More important, perhaps, it aims to develop an understanding of how and why different institutions have the effects on political outcomes that they do. Within this context, the role of institutions has assumed pride of place in contemporary comparative politics with the wider rise across the social sciences of what has become known as the ‘new institutionalism’. Under the slogan ‘institutions matter’, a broad range of work has been conducted exploring the ways that institutions affect political outcomes. The term ‘new institutionalism’, however, conceals a considerable amount of disagreement between political scientists with regard to what exactly it is about institutions that affects the nature of the political process.

Three ‘schools of thought’

Broadly speaking, it is possible to identify three distinct schools of thought within the new institutionalism (see, for example, Hall and Taylor, 1996). These are:

• Rational choice institutionalism
• Cultural institutionalism
• Structural institutionalism

Distinguishing the key characteristics of these different schools of thought within comparative politics will be the main task of this introductory chapter and is a unifying theme that runs throughout the course of this book. Familiarity with the general principles that define the different elements of new institutional analysis is crucial to developing the more specific aspects of comparative analysis (such as comparative electoral systems, or comparisons of the role of bureaucracy) that will be engaged in subsequent chapters. Before we explore the ways in which these different perspectives analyse and account for the role and significance of institutions, however, it is important to define exactly what is meant by the term institution.

What Is an Institution?

Lane and Ersson define an institution as, ‘a rule that has been institutionalized’. Within this general definition, however, it is possible to distinguish two different ways in which ‘rules may be institutionalized’ (1999: 23).

‘Hard’ institutions

‘Hard’ institutions comprise those formal rules (the political equivalent of driving on the left rules) that characterise a political system such as the rules of the electoral process (first past the post voting rules versus proportional representation, or federalism versus a unitary state, for example). These ‘hard’ aspects of the political apparatus also include fundamental characteristics of the social system, such as laws pertaining to the existence or non-existence of private property, the existence or non-existence of monarchy and the absence or presence of the basic institutions of liberal democracy. Such ‘hard’ institutional practices are typically enforced by formal law, with infringements of the rules punished by way of legally recognised sanctions, such as fines and terms of imprisonment.

‘Soft’ institutions

‘Soft’ institutions, conversely, include those practices that are institutionalised via informal rules and practices rather than in the letter of the law. These may include the cultural traditions and linguistic modes that characterise forms of political address, such as the manner in which political demonstrations are conducted, or the social acceptability of discussing one’s political beliefs in public. They may also include general belief systems and the sense of identity, which govern the expectations that people have about the way that others will or should behave. Soft institutional rules are not enforced by formal sanctions, but are usually maintained through force of habit and by the exercise of informal sanctions against those who ‘break the rules’. These may include ostracism and a general unwillingness to engage with those who fail to conform to culturally accepted practice.

Institutional practice in reality

Societies may differ in terms of both their hard and soft institutional practices. It is important, therefore, to be aware that countries, which appear superficially similar in terms of hard institutions, may have dissimilar soft institutions and this may, or may not, be a significant factor in explaining the outcomes of the political process concerned. Likewise, societies exhibiting similar soft institutions may be characterized by different hard or formal rules.

Whether it is the hard institutional framework of formal law or the soft institutional norms embodied in habits, traditions and beliefs, the unifying theme of the new institutionalism is that institutions matter. Where the proponents of this view differ is in their account of precisely how institutions matter. Disagreements between political scientists on this question arise from fundamental differences in their world view, or ontology, concerning the nature of the relationship between the individual and society. The major purpose of this chapter is to examine the different ontological frameworks of the three branches of new institutional research in contemporary comparative politics.

Rational Choice Institutionalism

Ontology

Rational choice institutionalism in comparative politics represents an attempt to apply micro-economic models of rationality to the analysis of the collective choices that are made in the political process. Its central focus is the purposeful individual and her motivations and beliefs. As such rational choice theory adheres to the principle of methodological individualism. From a rational choice perspective individuals always make deliberate and conscious choices in pursuit of their personal goals. Even when action takes place in a collective setting such as an an interest group or the state, the individual actor must always be the focus of concern. As Buchanan and Tullock put it, ‘collective action is nothing more than, the action of individuals when they choose to accomplish things collectively rather than individually. Institutions such as the state, therefore, are nothing more than the set of processes, the machine, which allows such collective action to take place’ (1962:13).

Centrality of the individual

If individual action forms the core of rational choice institutionalism then the following primary assumptions about the nature of individual choice are central to rational choice ontology:

• Individuals are predominantly self-interested – they choose how to act on the basis of achieving their personal goals, whether these are of a material or non-material nature.
• In pursuit of these goals, individuals act as ‘maximisers’ who seek the biggest possible benefits and the least costs in their decisions.
• The chosen course of individual action will be affected by changes in the structure of costs and benefits at ‘the margin’. The marginal principle implies that other things being equal, any increase in the cost of an action will decrease the likelihood of that action taking place.

Why institutions matter

Building on these primary assumptions, rational choice institutionalism analyses how different institutions affect the pattern of costs and benefits – the incentive structures – that face individual political actors. Individual action always takes place in context of institutional practices whether ‘hard’ or ‘soft’, and the different incentive structures which people face under different regimes may fundamentally affect the outcomes of the political process. According to this view, individuals always make their choices in the same way, that is, they act as maximisers of benefits over costs, but the outcomes of these choices will be affected by the institutions that are present.

The major concern of rational choice institutionalism is on the propensity for different institutions to channel the self-interested choices of political actors towards outcomes, which are positive or negative from a collective point of view. The origin of this approach derives from micro-economics and Adam Smith’s notion of the invisible hand. In The Wealth of Nations Smith sought to demonstrate how, if institutions are properly structured, the pursuit of self-interest by actors within society can lead to beneficial social results, even if those results are not the specific intent of the actors concerned. Smith did not, as is sometimes implied by critics, maintain that the pursuit of self-interest always produces the best results, but focused on the crucial role of the institutional context and in particular the existence of private property and competitive markets as the key factor in determining whether this is so. Following in the wake of Smith, contemporary neo-classical economics has developed a sophisticated framework to explain how self-interested behaviour in the economic marketplace is able to generate outcomes beneficial for society as a whole, and those contexts where ‘market failures’ are likely to be prevalent (Sandler, 2000).

Lessons from economics

In economic theory ‘market failures’ are usually thought to derive from the existence of free-rider or collective action problems and/or from principal versus agent problems. The former occur when individuals are able to derive benefits from a particular good without paying their full personal share of the costs. Collective goods include such things as the maintenance of clean air. The benefits of a clean atmosphere may accrue to all individuals within a given area, irrespective of whether they make a personal contribution to the reduction of pollution. In this situation, the rational choice for the individual is to ‘free-ride’, consuming clean air without making a contribution to its provision, while hoping that others will be willing to foot the bill. If all individuals reason in this way, however, then no one will contribute, the air will remain polluted and choices, which are rational from the viewpoint of the individual, will turn out to be collectively irrational.

Principals and agents

Principal versus agent problems refer to the difficulties that occur in monitoring relationships between individual actors both within and between organisations. If individuals are predominantly self-interested it cannot be taken for granted that they will fulfil their responsibilities to those with whom they have economic or political relations. Other things being equal, the propensity for actors to shirk their responsibilities will be dependent on the ease with which ‘principals’ may monitor the performance of their ‘agents’. In economic theory, principal versus agent problems often refer to the difficulties for the shareholders (the principals) of companies to exert effective control over the managers (their agents) who are contractually responsible for increasing the value of the company stock. Shareholders need to know that managers are not paying themselves salaries and other benefits unwarranted by company performance. Such problems may also occur within companies in terms of the relationship between managers and workers. Managers need to ensure that workers are meeting the terms of their contracts by, for example, arriving at work on time, meeting production targets and so on. The capacity of managers to discourage workers from shirking on the job will be affected by the relative ease or difficulty of monitoring their performance. The costs involved in the monitoring of others behaviour in this context are usually referred to as transaction costs.

Collective goods

Rational choice institutionalism is primarily concerned with the existence of collective action and principal versus agent problems in the political process and the extent to which different institutions in different societies exacerbate or help to overcome such dilemmas. Following the work of Mancur Olson (1965, 1982), collective action problems in politics have been a particular concern for rational choice theorists. According to this perspective, many of the outcomes of the political process have the character of collective goods – they are provided to everybody, irrespective of the contribution that actors make and hence are subject to the free-rider problem. Olson uses this analysis to explain a variety of political phenomena. In The Logic of Collective Action (1965), he explains that the existence of a shared interest between members of a particular group or social class does not guarantee that groups or classes will be able to act politically owing to the prevalence of the free-rider problem. Group or class interests have the character of a collective good where what is individually rational for members of the group or class concerned may not accord with the interests of the group as a whole.

In the Rise and Decline of Nations (1982), Olson furthers this analysis to account for the greater propensity of producer interests in industrial democracies to overcome the collect...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• Preface
• Contributors
• Introduction
• PART 1 THEORY AND METHOD IN COMPARATIVE POLITICS
• PART 2 INSTITUTIONS
• PART 3 ACTORS
• Afterword: Comparative Politics and the Three Approaches Revisited
• References
• Index