New Perspectives on Distributive Justice

Deep Disagreements, Pluralism, and the Problem of Consensus

Manuel Knoll, Stephen Snyder, Nurdane Şimsek

• Publisher: De Gruyter
• Year: 2018
• Print ISBN: 9783110535877
• eBook ISBN: 9783110536201
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Filosofia
• Subtopic: Filosofia politica

Distributive justice is one of the most discussed topics in political philosophy. Focusing on the plurality of irreconcilable conceptions of social and political justice, this book presents an array of new perspectives on the topic. Bringing together 30 original essays of well-established and young international scholars, the volume is essential reading for anyone interested in social and political justice.

Part I: Deep Disagreements

Manuel Knoll

Deep Disagreements on Social and Political Justice: Their Meta-Ethical Relevance and the Need for a New Research Perspective29

Abstract: This article starts off with a historical section showing that deep disagreements among notions of social and political justice are a characteristic feature of the history of political thought. Since no agreement or consensus on distributive justice is possible, the article argues that political philosophers should – instead of continuously proposing new normative theories of justice – focus on analyzing the reasons, significance, and consequences of such kinds of disagreements. The next two sections are analytical. The first sketches five possible reasons for deep disagreements among notions of social and political justice. The second discusses the meta-ethical relevance of the lack of consensus on justice and rejects ethical realism and cognitivism based on the argument from deep disagreements.

1 The need for a new research perspective on social and political justice

Following Neo-Kantians like Jürgen Habermas and in particular John Rawls, leading contemporary political philosophers aim at some form of consensus or rational agreement on justice.30 Rawls conceives of this as a consensus concerning an “initial choice situation” for principles of justice, as a rational agreement on which principles to choose, or as an “overlapping consensus” that a pluralist society should reach with regard to a political conception of justice (1971, § 4, §§ 20 ff.; pp. 18, 118 ff.; 2005, IV §§ 1 – 8, pp. 133 – 172). For Rawls, citizens’ consensus on principles of justice is an essential feature of a “well-ordered society” (1971, § 1, p. 4 f.; 2005, I § 6, p. 35). However, the notion that a consensus on social and political justice could be achieved was questionable from the start. This was made evident by Robert Nozick’s immediate and strong disagreement with Rawls’s fundamental moral conviction that the inequalities of natural endowments are undeserved and call for social redress or compensation (Nozick 1974, pp. 168 f., 225, 228). Likewise, no agreement can be reached about Rawls’s claim that individuals are equal as moral persons (Rawls 1971, pp. 19, 505). Going back to Aristotle, John Kekes argued that people who habitually harm others have a lower moral worth than those who habitually do good (Kekes 1990, pp. 121 – 123). From this perspective, Rawls’s rationalist creed that all persons can be convinced by the same arguments and must therefore reach a rational consensus on principles of justice becomes highly questionable (Rawls 1971, p. 139).

This article argues for the need of a shift of the research perspective on social and political justice. Its first aim is to show that no consensus on justice is possible. The article demonstrates that many convictions and conceptions concerning social and political justice are not only opposed to each other, but that there exist deep disagreements between them. Deep disagreements are disagreements that cannot be resolved through the use of reasons and arguments (cf. Fogelin 2005, pp. 8, 11).31 As a consequence of deep disagreements on social and political justice, political philosophers should redirect their efforts. Instead of continuously proposing and defending new normative theories of justice, they ought rather research the reasons, significance, and consequences of such kinds of disagreements and find out how to cope with them. In order to progress, innovative political thought has to move beyond the idea of the consensus. This move is also necessary because many political conflicts are caused by or can be derived from disagreements on social and political justice that can – in the worst cases – lead to violent conflicts and even civil wars.32

Insights regarding deep disagreements on social and political justice can be found, as early as 1984, in Dagmar Herwig’s systematic study on justice – her “Habilitationsschrift” – that received little attention (Herwig 1984). Herwig’s study shows that two opposing models of justice – “equal treatment” (Gleichbehandlung) and “equalization” (Egalisierung) – can be traced throughout the history of political thought.33 In Justice and Interpretation (1993), Gorgia Warnke questioned the “ideal of political consensus” from the perspective of the “hermeneutic or interpretative turn” in political philosophy and argued that there are “disagreements between equally well-justified interpretations” (Warnke 1993, p. VIIf.).34 Also Stuart Hampshire’s Justice is Conflict and Jeremy Waldron’s Law and Disagreement depart from disagreements on justice and the divergent conceptions of justice prevailing in society (Hampshire 1999; Waldron 1999). Waldron laments that contemporary philosophers are contributing mainly to existing disagreements concerning justice, of which there are many, instead of pondering their significance: “it is rare to find a philosopher attempting to come to terms with disagreements about justice within the framework of his own political theory” (Waldron 1999, p. 1 f.).

For Hampshire, all “modern societies are, to a greater or lesser degree, morally mixed, with rival conceptions of justice, conservative and radical, flaring into open conflict and needing arbitration” (Hampshire 1999, p. 38). These kinds of conflicts about “substantial justice” cannot be overcome but are not a defect. Harmony and consensus are, according to Hampshire, unrealistic goals. The best we can hope for are institutions and procedures that realize “procedural justice” and a fair “adjudication of conflicts” (Hampshire 1999, pp. 29, 45). Procedural justice is usually “imperfect and not ideal”, leading to compromise and not to consensus (Hampshire 1999, pp. 39, 42 – 43). Hampshire requires from all “moral enemies” to follow the principle “that contrary views of what is just and fair are allowed equal hearing, equal access, in the city or state, and that no one conception of substantial justice in society is imposed by domination and by the threat of force” (Hampshire 1999, pp. 46, 29 – 46).35

In section 2 (2.1 – 2.3) this article lays out several of the insurmountable disagreements on just distributions and a just society. This section will demonstrate that from the ancient world to the present day two fundamentally opposed basic conceptions of social and political justice can be traced in Western political thought. In modern terminology, these two irreconcilable conceptions can be characterized as egalitarian and non-egalitarian notions of social and political justice. While champions of egalitarian justice negate the natural and social inequalities of people and hold that it is just to establish arithmetic, numeric or simple equality, non-egalitarians or proportionalists like Plato, Aristotle or Nietzsche conceive of a just distribution of goods as proportional to existing inequalities. For non-egalitarians or champions of proportional justice, it is just to allot equal shares only to equals, not to everyone. The historical sketches in section 2 allow for a more detailed comprehension of the various aspects of the irreconcilable pluralism and conflict within conceptions of justice. Based on this understanding, section 3 sketches five possible reasons for deep disagreements among notions of social and political justice. This is intended as a first and preliminary step towards a better understanding of deep disagreements on justice. Section 4 briefly discusses the meta-ethical relevance of these irreconcilable disagreements. The section argues that statements about a just distribution or a just society do not refer to objective moral facts like ethical realists hold and cannot claim objective moral truth like cognitivists assert. As a consequence of the irreconcilable pluralism and conflict within conceptions of justice, we have to adopt a form of ethical relativism or skepticism that could be called “ethico-political relativism” or “ethico-political skepticism”.

2 From ancient to contemporary philosophy: The irreconcilable pluralism and conflict of conceptions of social and political justice

2.1 Egalitarian versus proportional justice in Plato and Aristotle

Plato’s and Aristotle’s writings contain valuable insights regarding opposing conceptions of distributive justice and the corresponding political systems that can be derived from them. The views of these ancient philosophers on political justice have played a vital role in shaping Western political thought. Their influence can still be traced in the irreconcilable conceptions of social and political justice found in contemporary philosophy. Going back to the Pythagoreans, in the Gorgias and the Laws Plato distinguishes between two concepts of equality. One kind of equality he calls equality of “measures, weights and numbers”, the other one the “most genuine” and “best” equality (Leg. VI 757b; Plato 1997, p. 1433). Both forms of equality are inextricably linked to distributive justice, which Plato understands as political justice. Since Aristotle, the first form of equality is called “arithmetic” or “numeric” equality. In modern democracies this form of equality is realized and manifested in the principle “one citizen, one vote”. Michael Walzer calls this form of equality “simple equality”.36 For Plato, legislators implement this form of equality when they “distribute equal awards by lot” (Leg. VI 757b; Plato 1997, p. 1433; cf. Leg. III 690c). This was the way in which most political offices were distributed in ancient democracies. As an aristocratic political thinker who defends the rule of the morally and intellectually best men, Plato rejects the democratic and egalitarian claim that a distribution of political power should allot equal shares to all male citizens (cf. Knoll 2017a).

The second form of equality is distinguished by Plato as a divine form of equality (Leg. VI 757b). In the Gorgias, Plato calls this form of equality “geometrical equality” (508a, cf. 490b – e). Geometrical equality is proportional equality. In order to politically apply it one needs

to grant much to the great and less to the less great, adjusting what you give to take account of the real nature of each – specifically, to confer high recognition on great virtue, but when you come to the poorly educated in this respect, to treat them as they deserve. We maintain, in fact, that statesmanship consists of essentially this – strict justice (Leg. VI 757c; Plato 1997, p. 1433).

In this crucial and condensed passage Plato presents his theory of proportional justice, which is a political theory of distributive justice. It contains most of the building blocks of Aristotle’s theory of distributive justice and in particular of the conception of political justice he prefers, which is an aristocratic conception focusing on political virtue (cf. Knoll 2010; Knoll 2017b). As the context of the passage elucidates, by addressing the distribution of recognition Plato a fortiori addresses the distribution of political offices and power. For him, such distribution should proceed according to proportional equality. Before political power is distributed, citizens need to be distinguished according to the criteria “virtue” (arête) and “education” (paideia) (cf. Aristotle: Pol. III 13, 1283a25; all trans. from Pol. and EN are M.K.s). The passage elucidates that Plato holds citizens to be quite unequal in these two respects. Political power should be allotted in proportion to the unequal amount of virtue and education citizens actually have. This is in line with his earlier mention of seven opposing “claims” (axiômata) used to justify ruling. There Plato pronounces that the “most important claim” is the one according to which “the ignorant man should follow the leadership of the wise and obey his orders” (Leg. III 690d; Plato 1997, p. 1379). Plato’s distributive principle for political offices is “To each in proportion to his virtue and education”. This principle implies that it is just to allot equal shares only to equally virtuous and educated citizens, not to everyone.

Plato’s theory of political justice is embodied in the “political system” (politeia) he outlines in the Laws. Despite his clear preference for proportional or geometrical justice, he argues for a mixture of the two forms of equality and a mixed constitution. However, like the political system Plato outlined in the Republic, the one of the Laws has a strong aristocratic character that makes sure that all important political offices are distributed to the morally and intellectually best citizens (cf. Knoll 2017a). Plato’s mixed constitution includes the equality of “measures, weights and numbers” only for reasons of the stability of the political community. About the mixture of the two forms of equality, he declares, “So though force of circumstances co...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Table of Contents
• List of Abbreviations
• Introduction: Two Opposing Conceptions of Distributive Justice
• Part I: Deep Disagreements
• Part II: Ancient Perspectives and Critiques of the Centrality of Justice
• Part III: The Problem of Consensus
• Part IV: Expanding the Perspective on Obligations
• Part V: Diversifying the Perspective
• Part VI: The Difference Principle
• Part VII: The Economic Perspective: Adam Smith
• Notes on Contributors
• Author Index
• Subject Index