Inside Israel's Northern Command

The Yom Kippur War on the Syrian Border

Dani Asher

• Publisher: The University Press of Kentucky
• Year: 2016
• Print ISBN: 9780813167374
• eBook ISBN: 9780813167657
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: 20th Century History
• Index: History

On October 6, 1973, Israel's Northern Command was surprised by the thunder of cannon fire and the sight of dense, black smoke. A Syrian force of 1,400 tanks supported by artillery and air power had attacked from the north while the Egyptian military invaded the Sinai Peninsula in the south. Syria sought to avenge its devastating loss of the Golan Heights in the 1967 Six-Day War—a conflict that not only resulted in territorial gain for Israel but also cemented the nation's reputation as the region's preeminent military power. Although Israel ultimately prevailed, the Yom Kippur War (or Ramadan War, as it is known in Arab countries) shattered the illusion of Israel's invincibility.

In Syrians at the Border, Israel's foremost scholar of the war, Dani Asher, and an eminent group of experts provide the definitive history of this key conflict. The contributors—Major General Yitzhak Hofi, the Northern commander in chief; Major General Uri Simchoni, head of Command Operations; Brigadier General Avraham Bar David, head of Artillery; and Colonel Hagai Mann, the command's intelligence officer—all held key positions during the fighting. Together, they offer fresh insight into the prewar debate that raged between the Israeli Northern Command and intelligence officers who believed that Syria would not instigate conflict.

This seminal study also examines the pivotal battles that changed the course of the war, as well as the disastrous effects of a flawed postwar evaluation that adversely affected the careers of several high-ranking intelligence officials and the course of defense strategic planning thereafter. The contributors' incisive analyses contribute significantly to our understanding of this troubled region.

PART I

PREPARATION FOR WAR

CHAPTER 1

PRIOR TO THE YOM KIPPUR WAR, the Northern Command operated from its headquarters in Nazareth under Northern Command GOC Maj. Gen. Yitzhak Hofi. At the time, the Northern Command was responsible for the region that included the Golan Heights, the Jordan and Beit She’an valleys, and the Lebanese border between Rosh HaNikra on the Mediterranean coast, to the Shabaa Farms at the top of Mount Dov (Jabel Rous) on the eastern section of the border.

In November 1970, the rise of Hafez al-Assad to power in Syria, though he continued the rule of the Ba’ath Party, marked the dawn of a new era. The new political stability allowed him to introduce changes, and his policy was characterized by relative moderation and openness both internally and externally.

As soon as he set foot into his new position, Assad introduced a new orientation when he called for the establishment of a pan-Arab united front against Israel. On the Palestinian issue, Assad worked to draw a distinction between the “Palestinian problem” and the “Problem of the Occupied Territories,” the latter of which included the Golan Heights. Efforts were made by the Syrian regime to cooperate with the different Arab nations to create pacts and form ties. Syria strengthened its alliance with Egypt when, following the War of Attrition, it seemed that no political option would resolve Egypt’s problems. The Cairo-Damascus axis, based on and formed by this trend, established an axis through 1971–1973, which laid the ground for the Arab nations’ entry into the Yom Kippur War.

Syria’s political goals, leading up to the Yom Kippur War, remained the same—striving for both internal unification and a position of leadership within the Arab region. At the same time, it was evident that Assad was obsessed with eradicating the stain of the 1967 defeat and restoring the self-confidence of his soldiers, recapturing the territories, and showing the world that given a suitable opportunity the Arabs were capable of holding their own with honor. The need to fight again became an obsession. Without restoring the balance with Israel, there was no hope, in his eyes, of reaching an agreement through political negotiations.

Assad in Syria, like Sadat in Egypt, believed that a change in the balance of power would allow him “another round” against Israel, and this time from a position of a sort of equality and not from a position of weakness and humiliation. No other Arab country felt as strongly as Syria that the very existence of Arab nationality was bound up in the conflict with Israel. Syria wished to turn the wheel back to the period before Israel’s conquests during the Six-Day War. The Syrians, who had never accepted Israel’s existence within the 1967 borders, were furious in light of its expansion and, like Nasser, believed that “what was taken by force would be restored by force.”

Therefore, Assad began his preparations for war with stubborn patience. He operated quietly to prepare the possibility for an attack against Israel. As part of the efforts to prepare for war, Assad addressed the planning and building of military forces. In this, he was assisted by his closest ally among the military personnel from the time of his struggle against his predecessor, Salach Jadid, Syria’s Chief of Staff since 1968, Mustafa Tlass. Tlass was appointed Minister of Defense in March 1972.

On different occasions and particularly at conferences of Arab Defense Ministers and Chiefs of Staff, who discussed the preparations of Arab countries for a decisive war against Israel, Syria’s representatives claimed that their army was not yet ready for such a war, fearing superiority of the Israel Air Force. It pointed out the need for two additional divisions. The Syrian Army’s order of battle during the Six-Day War had included three Majmuas (division-sized groups), temporary headquarters that did not yet function as division headquarters. The Syrian order of battle in the Six-Day War included five infantry brigades and an additional coastal defense brigade, two armored brigades, one mechanized brigade, and six reserve infantry brigades, as well as two or three Special Forces battalions and two reconnaissance battalions.

After the Six-Day War, the Syrian Army grew significantly. The control was reorganized into five divisions. Two armored divisions were established—the 1^st and the 3^rd. The 1^st Armored Division was established based on the senior armored brigades in 1968. The establishment of the 3^rd Armored Division began in 1971. Likewise, three mechanized infantry divisions were united—the 5^th, the 7^th, and the 9^th, founded in October 1971. The main developmental push was felt in the aerial defense alignment. In less than a year, 1972–1973, five surface-to-air missile (SAM) brigades were formed and a SAM alignment was erected around the capital, Damascus, to defend it. Additionally, in July 1973 a system of positions was constructed on the Golan Heights that allowed SAMs to be brought closer to the front.

In February 1973, Assad secretly visited Moscow. He returned to Syria with a Soviet military delegation headed by Marshal Pavel Stepanovich Kutakhov, one of the leading Soviet Air Force commanders. Following the visit, the Soviets provided the Syrians with SAM batteries but did not provide them with new MiG-23 fighter jets.

Various steps were taken to improve the Syrian Army’s fighting capabilities and turn it into a stronger and modernized army. For example, in 1971, seventy percent of the Syrian budget was allocated to military needs, and most of Syria’s economic and human resources were diverted toward preparation for the upcoming military confrontation with Israel. Military improvement was based on purchasing weapons, adopting the Soviet Union’s military tactical doctrine, and obtaining the assistance of Soviet advisors who were integrated into Syrian Army units. These steps allowed Syria to plan and construct an organized defensive alignment against the possibility of an additional Israeli offense while also serving as preparations for an offensive action.

There is no doubt that, despite the measures taken, Syria’s military strength and political status had still not reached a level at which it could solely initiate an offense against Israel. When the Egyptians decided to launch a war against Israel, Syria was already at the top of its force-building power and had no choice but to join the war as a secondary partner. The Syrian entry into the war, alongside Egypt, was intended to take advantage of the opportunity presented and avoid political isolation and the failure to reach existing and future goals if it were to remain a bystander.

A strategy of a joint coordinated attack on both fronts formed the basis of the joint offensive planning that Sadat and Assad had initiated as early as 1971. In 1972 and 1973, cooperation between Syria and Egypt intensified, with Assad and Sadat continuing their mutual visits to Cairo and Damascus, as well as Moscow. Their defense ministers did likewise, along with planning teams made up of senior officers. In February 1973, new Egyptian Defense Minister Mushir (Field Marshal) Ismail Ali came to Damascus on Sadat’s behalf and proposed the launch of a coordinated Egyptian-Syrian attack on Israel. Assad agreed immediately.

On April 23, 1973, the two leaders met again for two days of detailed discussions at the presidential resort in Borg El Arab, west of Alexandria. They determined the main battle lines during that visit.

Through August 21–23, the army heads met at the Egyptian Naval Base at Ras el-Tin for two days of summary discussions and a final examination of the planned maneuvers. Syrian Chief of Staff Yusuf Shakkour and Egyptian Chief of Staff Saad el-Shazly signed an official document that ratified their joint intention to go to war. Syrian Defense Minister Tlass and then-commander of the Egyptian Air Force, Hosni Mubarak, flew from Alexandria to Syria to brief Assad and Sadat, who held a summit meeting at Bloudan, west of Damascus where they reached the decision to go to war in October.

D-Day of October 6 was determined in a secret meeting of the leaders in Cairo on September 12. The H-hour of 14:30 was decided upon in a subsequent meeting between Egyptian War Minister Ismail and Assad in Damascus on October 3. The joint H-hour was set for 14:30, with the open-fire order set for H minus 35 minutes—13:55.

Even if there was agreement regarding the date of the war and the manner of its performance, it seems the partners had not agreed on its goal. While Assad aimed at regaining the whole territory for himself through combat, Sadat merely wished to unfreeze the political deadlock and restart the diplomatic process that had been halted. While Sadat planned an “all-out war with limited goals” (10–15 km), Assad aimed for a war wherein the Egyptian Army would conquer the entire Sinai Peninsula or at least retake western parts as far as the key regions beyond the mountain passes—the Mitla and the Gidi—at Bir Gafgafa and Bir Thamada. Along this war effort, Assad intended to position his forces for a battle to recapture all of the Golan Heights.

In the summer of 1973, to secure the Syrian southern flank of the front, Assad worked to include Jordan in the planned conflict. Jordan’s participation was intended to provide defense for Syria’s Southern Branch and prevent a parallel IDF counterattack on the rear of the front and the Damascus region through the north of Jordan. King Hussein agreed to protect the line and prevent IDF activity in his region. In addition, he promised to send two Jordanian Armored Brigades to participate in the battle over the Golan Heights.

Assad also had to secure his army’s northern flank at the Lebanese border against an Israeli flanking or counterattack through the Lebanese Beqaa Valley toward Damascus. In August 1973, it was decided in a secret agreement with Lebanese President Suleiman Frangieh that Syrian forces would be allowed to enter Lebanon to defend the mountain passes leading to Damascus from Lebanon’s territory. At the same time, and in order to disrupt the IDF forces on this front, an agreement with the Palestinian terrorist organizations—the PLO—was reached so that they would conduct extensive harassment activity along the Lebanese border during the war.

Syrian Order of Battle on the Eve of the Yom Kippur War

• Three mechanized infantry divisions—the 5^th, the 7^th (reinforced during April-May 1973 by a Moroccan Brigade, which included an infantry battalion and an armored battalion) and the 9^th with T-54/55 tanks. The 5^th and 7^th Divisions each had two infantry brigades, one mechanized brigade and one armored brigade, as well as an Artillery Group and Division units. The 9^th Division did not have a mechanized brigade.

• Two armored divisions—the 1^st and the 3^rd, with T-62 tanks, each with two tank brigades, a mechanized brigade, an Artillery Group and Division units

• Two independent armored brigades—the 51st and the 47^th, and an independent mechanized brigade—the 62^nd

• 1500 tanks

• 1000 artillery gun barrels

• Seven commando and paratrooper battalions

• Rifaat al-Assad Force—assigned to secure the regime that included two tank battalions and elite infantry forces

• “FROG” SS rocket launchers

• Thirty-six SAM batteries, half of them SA-6

• Air Force—178 MiG-21 fighter jets, 114 other fighter jets, forty-five helicopters

• Navy—nine missile boats, thirteen torpedo boats

The Syrians planned the war as a single systemic maneuver, the finish lines of which were undefined. It is likely that in their initial plan the Syrians intended to reach the Jordan River. It’s also possible that they planned to cross it, but it is just as possible that they would have been satisfied with preparing defenses along the cliff line on the western slopes of the Golan Heights.

In planning an offensive against the IDF forces alignment on the Golan Heights, the Syrians assessed that they would have to breakthrough an organized defensive layout. This definition is one of the three categories covered in the Soviet military doctrine employed for evaluating a defense layout and determining the force ratios and the best method of breaking through it. These categories include:

• hasty defensive layout—usually established at the end of the offensive phase

• organized defensive layout—land, and other, preparations have been made

• fortified defensive layout—land infrastructure of the defending forces’ layout is deep and complex—consisting of several defense layers—and able to provide prolonged strong protection against an enemy breakthrough.

The classification of the IDF defense layout on the Golan Heights in 1973 as “organized” rather than “fortified” reveals the Syrian assumption that the layout had not been completed. In fact, the layout consisted of only a small number of defense outposts, without depth, and without a continuous, reinforced line of obstacles at the front.

In the Syrians’ view, the IDF’s organized layout included, alongside the defending forces, ground-based defensive lines such as sites and outposts, firing position lines for tanks and anti-tank devices, positions for artillery batteries, command centers, and obstacles mainly in the f...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half title
• Title
• Copyright
• Dedication
• List of Abbreviations and Acronyms
• Military Ranks and Abbreviations
• Table of Contents
• Editorial Notes & Acknowledgments
• Preface
• Foreword
• Introduction
• Part I Preparation for War
• Part II From Desperate Holding to an Offensive Towards Damascus
• Part III Operating the Command Systems at War
• Quantitative Summary of the War on the Northern Front
• Afterword
• Writers and Their Contributions
• Bibliography