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An Incoherent Contradiction
A history of the development of Religious Studies as a scientific enterprise in the modern university is an incoherent contradiction that reveals tensions between putative claims to academic status and the actual reality of continuing infiltrations of extrascientific agendas into the field.
Luther H. Martin and Donald Wiebe
A geological divide
âHistory of religionsâ is an academic label as ambiguous as any. The preposition âofâ, as Bruce Lincoln once remarked, âis not a neutral filler. Rather, it announces a proprietary claim and a relation of encompassmentâ (Lincoln 1996: 225). However, the relational nature of this non-impartial filler is not entirely clear. What does âof religionsâ really mean? Is history thought of as the main driver of religious phenomena (objective genitive)? Are âreligionsâ supposed to provide the framework, the tools, the sense and the meaning of historical research (subjective genitive)? As anyone might guess, this is no linguistic trifle: the two meanings underlie two radically different approaches (see Table 1). Then again, a curious interlocutor â let us say, a prospective student â might feel prompted to ask, does the objective understanding of this not-so neutral label really differ from the study of religions as it is commonly practised in historiographical studies? Is the meaning implied by the subjective genitive all that different from theology? Whatâs the point of having such a doppelgänger of other disciplines? What are, then, if any, the main features of this weird academic discipline?
For all her doubts, our curious interlocutor might think that, after all, if such a discipline is part and parcel of the contemporary academic panorama, then it should also possess a precise disciplinary charter â which might look something like this. History of religions (HoR, henceforth) has been and still is usually conceived of as the study of religion (singular) and/or religions (plural) via comparative methods aimed at recovering and enhancing similarities (and, more rarely, differences) among religious beliefs and practices from the ancient past to the present day. The discipline aims at gaining an insightful and precise classification of religious phenomena which, in turn, is supposed to enlighten the religious contents of human cultures from the first written documents to the newest religious movements, from the ethnographic accounts of bold nineteenth-century explorers to the religious vagaries of the Internet and the spiritual, digital-age miscellanea available online. The available academic handbooks and the most important works from the past usually enlist a series of features deemed:
Table 1 History of what, exactly?
| | Stress on | Method and theory | Adopted by | Theology |
| Objective genitive | history | historical | Historicism | Ă |
| Subjective genitive | religion(s) | religious | Phenomenology | â |
1.to strictly delimit and define the independence of the discipline from other apparently similar fields;
2.to point out the existence of a specific modus operandi;
3.to single out the major accomplishments and benefits deriving from the adoption of such m.o.
And yet, all of this is merely a façade. For all the relief and satisfaction that our curious interlocutor might experience, we should admit, for the sake of professional ethics, that the HoR has instead a rather convoluted history, and an even more complicated academic ID. When we look at the history of the discipline, we can notice that, quite astonishingly, a widespread, shared consensus among the researchers about the nature and scope of the HoR is difficult, if not impossible, to recognize. Indeed, the history of the discipline reveals that the grammatical divide between the objective and the subjective genitives runs like a geological fault across the field, with many shifts and cracks that stretch along the surface. Therefore, in order to navigate this rugged and unstable landscape without getting lost, we could definitely use a map.
Mapping the problematique
As Daniel L. Smail has aptly remarked, âmetaphors do much of our thinking for us. Evoking whole fields of thought, they communicate complex ideas and images with extraordinary efficiencyâ (Smail 2008: 78). In our case, a metaphorical map can be exploited as a cognitive device by which a handy shortcut to highlight the main features that lie unseen is readily provided. The geological divide that characterizes metaphorically the disciplinary landscape is the result of historiographical tension and friction between the two forms of genitives implied in the label âhistory of religionsâ. As we will see in more detail shortly, during the twentieth century this tension climaxed in the objective genitive being adopted by historicism, while the subjective genitive had been mainly embraced by phenomenology (see Table 1). The various unsuccessful attempts to reconcile these two trends might be imagined as cracks that characterize the fault surface of our metaphorical map. Each one of those labyrinthine cracks implies a specific subset of points of view, ideas, issues and â most of all â problems.
By the juxtaposition of metaphor and reality, when we look at the fault zone depicted on our imaginary geological map, we can identify three main layers or discontinuities which represent what can be probably considered as the main issues of HoR qua discipline (see Figure 1):
Figure 1 The disciplinary landscape: major issues in the history of religions visualized as a geological map
1.As hinted at earlier, there has never been a disciplinary consensus on what the discipline should exactly be. In a recent volume, Swiss historian of religions Philippe Borgeaud has underscored that âhistory of religions is a branch of knowledge that has its own specificity, but it is a branch that presupposes a trans-disciplinary curiosity. In fact, history of religions is dependent (among others) on history [âŚ], philology [âŚ], sociology, [âŚ] ethnology and anthropology, [âŚ], psychologyâ (Borgeaud 2013: 33â5). In one of the most remarkable accounts of the discipline from the first half of the 1960s, Mircea Eliade, possibly the most influential historian of religions of the past century, wrote that the âmissionâ of the HoR is indeed âto integrate the results of ethnology, psychology and sociology. Yet, in doing so, it will not renounce its own method of investigation or the viewpoint that specifically defines itâ (Eliade 1964: xiii). To be fair, Eliadeâs statement may sound a bit confusing since it leaves our curious interlocutor wondering about what this specific âviewpointâ should be when so many different disciplines are involved. It is not just our interlocutor who happens to be confused, for the historians of religions themselves have had their fair share of hassles and headaches to figure out what this discipline should be about. In a remarkably comprehensive panorama of the whole history of the discipline published in 2010, Italian historian of religions Natale Spineto frankly admitted that HoR has an âuncertain epistemic foundationâ and that, âindeed, the boundaries of the discipline are not very clear: depending on the disciplinary trend, it is possible to expand them to include substantially every field dedicated to the study of religion. Conversely, it is possible to narrow them to indicate a very restricted number of disciplinary schools of thought and perspectivesâ (Spineto 2010: 1256). This âepistemic patchworkâ definition of HoR as a sort of Frankenstein discipline composed of many heterogeneous pieces, so to speak, is quite common and it is almost always highlighted as something necessary and useful for the wellbeing of the discipline.
2.There has never been a shared disciplinary consensus on what the methods of the HoR should really be. Basically, there are as many methods as historians of religions. âHistory of religionsâ, according to historian Ioan P. Culianu, âis almost never conceived of in the same way by two different scholarsâ (Culianu 1978: 18). Why is that? Basically, every major national school of HoR, more or less influenced by the presence of each pre-existing, locally predominant theological tradition, has developed independently a set of specific peculiarities and idiosyncratic features, so much so that the most important branches do not completely overlap in terms of methods and theories. For instance, according to one of the major encyclopaedic sources currently available on the HoR, German Religionswissenschaft is not quite the same as French histoire des religions, and the Italian storia delle religioni does not coincide exactly with the English history of religions (Casadio 2005a; cf. Wheeler-Barclay 2010: 247). Furthermore, there seems to be a lack of interest in resolving such issues. For instance, here is what Christian K. Wedemeyer wrote back in 2010: âFor some, the study of religion today is precisely attractive because of its intellectual indeterminacy or, to give it a more respectable moniker, its âinterdisciplinarityââ (Wedemeyer 2010: xxv). So, the fact that the historical study of religion is an autonomous branch of academia should be accepted at face value while abiding by the âintellectual indeterminacyâ of its methods â which is something weird at best, reprehensible at worst, considering that such disciplinary identity is not the result of any epistemological reflection about cross-disciplinary integration (e.g. OâRourke, Crowley and Gonnerman 2016). The result is something that, from an institutional point of view, might appear to fly in the face of any disciplinary acceptability.
3.Finally, there has never been a disciplinary consensus on what religion is, must be, or should be. This final point might even be considered the root of all disciplinary evil, as it were, for it is the source of all confusion and ...