Criminological and Legal Consequences of Climate Change

Stephen Farrall, Tawhida Ahmed, Duncan French, Stephen Farrall, Tawhida Ahmed, Duncan French

• Publisher: Hart Publishing
• Year: 2012
• Print ISBN: 9781849461863
• eBook ISBN: 9781847319210
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Law
• Subtopic: Environmental Law
• Index: Law

This edited collection, the result of an international seminar held at the International Institute for the Sociology of Law, Oñati, Spain in 2010, explores the potential legal and criminological consequences of climate change, both domestically and for the international community. A novel feature of the book is the consideration given to the potential synergies between the two disciplinary foci, thus to encourage among legal scholars and criminologists not only an analysis of the consequences of climate change from these perspectives but to bring these fields together to provide a unique, inter-disciplinary exploration of the ways in which climate change does, or could, impact on our societies. Such an inter-disciplinary approach is necessary given that climate change is a multifaceted phenomenon and one which is intimately linked across disciplines. To study this topic from the point of view of a single social science discipline restricts our understanding of the societal consequences of climate change. It is hoped that this edited collection will identify emerging areas of concern, illuminate areas for further research and, most of all, encourage future academic discussion on this most critical of issues.

1

Where Might We Be Headed? Some of the Possible Consequences of Climate Change for the Criminological Research Agenda

STEPHEN FARRALL^*

These findings from Sand Canyon Pueblo suggest that climate-induced food stress and consequent violent conflict contributed to the depopulation of the Mesa Verde region in the late A.D. 1200s.¹

INTRODUCTION

IF THE RECENT reports on climate change are to be believed, and there is growing evidence that they are to be,² then the impacts of climate change on the Earth’s eco-system are going to be both dramatic and far-reaching. While it is entirely understandable that government and scientific attention be placed on the immediate physical ramifications of these changes (such as coastal erosion, flooding and habitat loss) and the immediate economic and social impacts of such changes (such as damage to buildings or the degradation or total loss of infrastructure) consideration ought also to be given, not only to the longer-term financial implications,³ but also to some of the less immediately obvious impacts.

This Chapter seeks to explore some of the wider criminological ramifications of climate change for the UK and Europe more widely. The chapter is not intended to be exhaustive, but rather is speculative in both nature and tone. Much of a) what might actually happen as temperatures, sea-levels and rainfall across the globe change and b) how this may affect human societies more generally are far from being clear. What is clear, however, is that few individuals, people or societies will be immune from such changes and that these may very well have far-reaching consequences for the (re)distribution of those things which underpin basic human needs, such as water and food. Thinking through what may happen to various societies as these changes emerge would appear to be a worthwhile and prudent step. The challenge which I rise to herein is trying to think through what this might mean for experiences of crime and criminal justice.

MY OWN EPISTEMOLOGICAL POSITION

I am a sociologist; for me, therefore, crime is a consequential by-product of various aspects of societies, their economies and ways of handling resources and inequalities in access to these (rather than being the result of ‘bad people’, poor thinking styles or other personal deficiencies). It therefore follows that as climate change will affect whole societies and regions of the planet (although with differential impacts, one suspects) so climate change will lead to various social and economic changes.⁴ As, from my perspective, crime is a consequence of other social and economic processes, climate change will lead (via social and economic changes) to changes in crime. By ‘changes in crime’ I mean changes in: the amounts of some crimes which occur; the rates with which these are reported, and also the type and nature of such crimes. There are additional consequences, however, since public sensibilities to ‘crime’ and how best to treat ‘criminals’ may also be impacted upon by climate change-induced shifts in opinions and tolerances.

In thinking about the relationship between climate change and crime, there are two routes into the debate. One is to try to calculate the carbon footprint of crime⁵ and the other is to try to imagine what climate change will do to our experiences of crime. These can be thought of as the crime contributes to climate change model (Model A) and the climate change influences crime model (Model B). For my part, I think that trying to calculate the carbon costs of crime (Model A) is rather to miss the point. Crime ought to be reduced, tackled, punished and so on because it is harmful, rather than because (as a side effect almost) it has a carbon foot print. Moreover, given that climate change is now practically upon us (at the time of writing, Brisbane was being inundated by tropical storms the like of which had not been seen for many decades and some were suggesting that food prices had helped to trigger the unrest in Tunisia and Egypt in early 2011)⁶ we need to turn to what might happen as a result of climate change, not how crime contributes to carbon emission (which is only about one per cent of the entire UK’s output anyway).⁷ As such my contribution is to start to think through and imagine the possible ways in which climate change may change some of the basic social and economic configurations of modern societies and how changes in these may alter those behaviours identified and labelled as ‘crimes’.

I structure the remainder of this chapter by first assessing what might happen in terms of climate change itself during the remainder of this century. This—as hinted at above—is inevitably going to be sketchy in places, but is nevertheless a logical starting place for such an enquiry. Following this I review some of what might happen generally to societies and economic systems as a result of climate change. This leads us, finally, into a consideration of how these (ie the social and economic changes) will in turn impact on crime.

WHAT IS LIKELY TO HAPPEN TO THE GLOBE AS A RESULT OF CLIMATE CHANGE?

Although it is hard to know exactly what is likely to happen with regards to climate change (due to unforeseen circumstances and the feedback loops inherent in any chaotic system) several ‘good guesses’ do exist. Amongst the best of these are those developed by the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Center for New American Security and documented in their jointly published report The Age of Consequences.⁸ This report presents three possible scenarios (the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) approved way of thinking about what might happen): an expected one, a severe one and a catastrophic one (all their terms). Let us examine the most favourable of these projections, since it is that which is (arguably) the most likely to come to fruition (the report’s authors suggest that ‘there is no foreseeable political or technological solution that will enable us to avert many of the climatic impacts projected here’, p55). This scenario predicts an average global temperature rise of just 1.3°C above the 1990 levels by 2040, rising to 2.8°C above 1990 levels by the end of the twenty-first century.⁹ However, while the average increase in temperatures is ‘just’ 1.3°C, this equates to an increase of 2°C over land (where it is generally warmer than over large bodies of water). This is likely to lead to an increase in the levels of glacial ice melt, leading in turn to a rise in sea levels by about a fifth to a quarter of a metre (by 2040). They suggest that:

Global mean sea level increases by 0.23 meters, causing damage to the most vulnerable coastal wetlands with associated negative impacts on local fisheries, seawater intrusion into groundwater supplies in low-lying coastal areas and small islands, and elevated storm surge and tsunami heights, damaging unprotected coastlines. Many of the affected areas have large, vulnerable populations requiring international assistance to cope with or escape the effects of sea level rise. Marine fisheries and agricultural zones shift poleward in response to warming, in some cases moving across international boundaries.¹⁰

And go on to add that:

Regionally, the most significant climate impacts occur in the southwestern United States, Central America, sub-Saharan Africa, the Mediterranean region, the mega-deltas of South and East Asia, the tropical Andes, and small tropical islands of the Pacific and Indian Oceans. The largest and most widespread impacts relate to reductions in water availability and increases in the intensity and frequency of extreme weather events. The Mediterranean region, sub-Saharan Africa, northern Mexico, and the southwestern United States experience more frequent and longer-lasting drought and associated extreme heat events, in addition to forest loss from increased insect damage and wildfires. Overall, northern mid-latitudes see a mix of benefits and damages. Benefits include reduced cost of winter heating, decreased mortality and injury from cold exposure, and increased agricultural and forest productivity in wetter regions because of longer growing seasons, CO₂ fertilization, and fewer freezes. Negative consequences include higher cost of summer cooling, more heavy rainfall events, more heat-related death and illness, and more intense storms with associated flooding, wind damage, and loss of life, property, and infrastructure.¹¹

If this all sounds pretty nasty, one has to bear in mind that the next scenario (‘severe’) is premised on the notion that many of the assumptions underlying the IPCC’s report are unduly optimistic (in that they ignore feedback processes), and that the average global temperature rise might be nearer to 2.6°C above 1990 levels, and with a sea level rise of 0.52 metres within 30 years from 2007—ie by 2037. Campbell et al suggest¹² that the severe scenario will result in the following: reductions in water availability; reductions in crop yields; and lower levels of yields from ocean fisheries. The ‘catastrophic’ scenario (based on a temperature rise of nearly 6°C and two metres of sea-level rise) is truly terrifying. However, being based on the likely situation 100 years hence is probably too far off for any degree of certainty to be attached to it—other than, that is, that the future looks extremely bleak.

Dyer¹³ suggests that the severe scenario is likely to lead to several of the world’s largest cities being inundated due to rising sea-levels and the continual establishment of new ports and abandonment of these as the sea encroaches ever upwards. Crop yields will decline dramatically as usable land is lost to the sea or the costs of irrigating it become too great. Populations which cling to the coasts in some parts of the world will be forced inland or will start to try to move to parts of the world which are less prone to flooding or drought. It is to a consideration of this that I now turn.

HOW WILL THIS START TO IMPACT UPON AND SHAPE OUR SOCIETIES? HOW WILL SUCH RESHAPING AFFECT INDIVIDUAL HUMAN AND SOCIETAL EXPERIENCES? HOW WILL THESE VARY ACROSS COUNTRIES, REGIONS AND BY THOSE KEY SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES WE KNOW TO BE ASSOCIATED WITH LIFE CHANGES AND LONG TERM OUTCOMES?

It is to a consideration of this that I now turn. What are the secondary consequences of this for people/populations? What will this do to human societies?

Before we go on to look at what the likely consequences of the above may be for crime, we need to examine what may happen to our societies generally, since this will provide us with some clues as to what may happen to crime. Again my focus is largely at the macro-level, focusing on whole systems impacts, rather than the immediate consequences for individuals.

Lever-Tracy,¹⁴ in her own consideration of what climate change may do to the existing varieties of capitalism, suggests that the pressing need to tackle climate change may challenge the basis of our modern economic institutions and those with an interest in maintaining them.¹⁵ The political, economic and social ideologies which foster and which are fostered by current forms of capitalism may face some challenges as a result of some of the consequences of climate change. Capitalism, however, is likely to endure as a general approach to the economy; the changes in it may, however, bring new winners and new losers, which may bring to the fore a new set of relationships between government and the industrial sectors. For instance, if the ‘small is beautiful, local is best’ ideology firmly takes hold, then small businesses serving local needs may profit, while larger entities may face a withdrawal of public support.

However, the most telling part of Lever-Tracy’s essay concerns human values and how these may be affected by climate change. As she notes, values which emphasise the short term and the immediate may cease to appeal to many people. The emphasis on immediate profits and super-individualisation are relatively recent features of society, and values which promote respect for the environment and a longer term, less individualistic stance may come to the fore. As evidence of this, Lever-Tracy points to the fact that many migrants take jobs in societies which do not value their real skills or qualifications so that their children may have a better life and also that the tsunami of 2004 saw a global outpouring of sympathy and concern for those effected—even though they be socially, culturally and geographically distant strangers. As Tracy-Lever writes ‘values of discipline, solidarity and loyalty to family and community can become elevated over those of individual satisfactions and freedoms’¹⁶ during periods when core social values change dramatically and speedily. These periods of ‘intergenerational cultural landslides’—where the core values of one’s parent’s generation are overturned—may be provoked by dramatic changes (such as climate change).¹⁷ If more and more tightly-focused regulation is required in order for businesses to show that they are complying with any emerging green agenda, so neo-liberalism, which has tended to view regulation with askance, may itself face ideological challenges (see Doran, this collection). Of course, the above reading may prove to be too optimistic; as nations are forced into accepting those fleeing from countries which are no longer viable, so we may witness an increase in the distinctions between ‘them’ and ‘us’, with all of its attendant xenophobia, intolerance and hatred. Such developments, which may be sharply experienced in some locales but not others, may result in the general breakdown of society and/or the creation of two parallel societies—one of ‘pre-mass migration residents’ and one of ‘mass-migrants’.

One of the recent features of international capital has been the tendency for large firms to move capital and resources around the globe relatively easily and with little or no concern for the economic and social impacts of this (witness the opening of overseas call centres, the location of industrial plants in countries with lower staff-costs or weaker health and safety regimes, etc). If, as seems likely, certain parts of the globe start to appear to be geographically or geo-politically insecure, such firms may move capital and resources from such places to safer locales. This ‘migration’ of capital will—again—leave some areas with little or no legitimate forms of employment. Such possibilities make migration—either for economic reasons or for the simple need to find somewhere to live—all the more likely. We might then expect to see a decrease in the population in some areas of the globe and an attendant increase in some other parts of the globe. Campbell et al suggest that for Europe

Environmental pressures will accentuate the migration of peoples to levels that effectively change the ethnic signatures of major states and regions. In Europe the influx of illegal immigrants from Northern Africa and other parts of the continent will accelerate and become impossible to stop, except by means approximating blockade. There will be political tipping points marked by the collapse of liberal concepts of openness, in the face of public demands for action to stem the tide. As the p...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Acknowledgements
• Contents
• List of Contributors
• Introduction: Exploring the Legal and Criminological Consequences of Climate Change: An Introduction
• 1. Where Might We Be Headed? Some of the Possible Consequences of Climate Change for the Criminological Research Agenda
• 2. International Legal Responses to the Challenges of a Lower Carbon Future: Energy Law for the Twenty-first Century
• 3. UK Climate Change Litigation: Between Hard and Soft Framing
• 4. Climate Change and Paradoxical Harm
• 5. Corporate Governance and Climate Change
• 6. Climate Change, Environmental (In)Security, Conflict and Crime
• 7. Analysis of Climate Change from a Human Rights Perspective
• 8. Climate Change and Aid Funding: An Appraisal of Recent Developments
• 9. Climate Change: Effects on Mobility of EU Workers and the Need to Safeguard Supplementary (Occupational) Pension Rights
• 10. Defining Pollution Down: Forestry, Climate Change and the Dark Figure of Carbon Emissions
• 11. Personal Carbon Trading: Towards Sustainable Consumption in an Age of Climate Change and Energy Constraints
• 12. State Responsibility for the Adverse Impacts of Climate Change on Individuals: Assessing the Potential for an Interdisciplinary Approach
• 13. Situating Climate Change in (International) Law: A Triptych of Competing Narratives
• Index