Black Rage in New Orleans

Police Brutality and African American Activism from World War II to Hurricane Katrina

Leonard N. Moore

• Publisher: LSU Press
• Year: 2010
• ISBN:
  9780807145951
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: African American History
• Index: History

In Black Rage in New Orleans, Leonard N. Moore traces the shocking history of police corruption in the Crescent City from World War II to Hurricane Katrina and the concurrent rise of a large and energized black opposition to it. In New Orleans, crime, drug abuse, and murder were commonplace, and an underpaid, inadequately staffed, and poorly trained police force frequently resorted to brutality against African Americans. Endemic corruption among police officers increased as the city's crime rate soared, generating anger and frustration among New Orleans's black community. Rather than remain passive, African Americans in the city formed antibrutality organizations, staged marches, held sit-ins, waged boycotts, vocalized their concerns at city council meetings, and demanded equitable treatment.Moore explores a staggering array of NOPD abuses—police homicides, sexual violence against women, racial profiling, and complicity in drug deals, prostitution rings, burglaries, protection schemes, and gun smuggling—and the increasingly vociferous calls for reform by the city's black community. Documenting the police harassment of civil rights workers in the 1950s and 1960s, Moore then examines the aggressive policing techniques of the 1970s, and the attempts of Ernest "Dutch" Morial—the first black mayor of New Orleans—to reform the force in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Even when the department hired more African American officers as part of that reform effort, Moore reveals, the corruption and brutality continued unabated in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Dramatic changes in departmental leadership, together with aid from federal grants, finally helped professionalize the force and achieved long-sought improvements within the New Orleans Police Department. Community policing practices, increased training, better pay, and a raft of other reform measures for a time seemed to signal real change in the department. The book's epilogue, "Policing Katrina, " however, looks at how the NOPD's ineffectiveness compromised its ability to handle the greatest natural disaster in American history, suggesting that the fruits of reform may have been more temporary than lasting. The first book-length study of police brutality and African American protest in a major American city, Black Rage in New Orleans will prove essential for anyone interested in race relations in America's urban centers.

1 NEGRO POLICE WILL AID IN LAW AND ORDER

The Fight for Black Police in the Crescent City

In the immediate aftermath of World War II, African Americans across the urban South tested the region’s commitment to democracy by demanding integration of local police departments. While black citizens had made similar requests during the interwar period, these requests became more serious and radical as black citizens looked at equal police protection as a critical component of democracy and as local police departments began to focus much of their attention on African American activity. Across the South, African Americans from various backgrounds argued with local white politicians that the hiring of black police would improve police-community relations, act as a form of protection against police brutality, reduce the high rate of crime in the black community, and create new economic opportunities. For instance, in Atlanta, the All Citizen’s Registration Committee, which included Martin Luther King, Sr., held a protest march in 1946 with protestors holding signs reading, “Negro Police Will Aid in Law and Order,” “For Negro Police,” and “105,000 Negro Citizens Rate at Least 1 Negro Police.” In Memphis, the rape and sexual assault of two African American women in 1945 galvanized the black community to vehemently protest police brutality and demand black officers as well. While these complaints had been echoed privately for decades, they were now voiced openly as black citizens made a connection between citizenship, democracy, and protection by the police as well as protection from the police. These protests were clear indications that all was not well between the city’s black community and its law enforcement officers. As the postwar period got underway, black citizens would unify and rally around the issue of police violence and sexual assault. New Orleans fit this pattern.¹

DEMANDING INTEGRATION

On Sunday, March 4, 1945, “thousands of civic-minded” black citizens gathered at Booker T. Washington High School in New Orleans and approximately three thousand of those in attendance signed a petition demanding that city officials appoint African Americans to the New Orleans Police Department (NOPD). The petition argued that since African Americans played an “important part” in the local war effort and were property owners, they were in need of proper police protection, which they argued, “must necessarily come from members of his own race.” The petition also argued that in all-black neighborhoods, “orderly and well-meaning folks” would get better service from black officers. Further, black women and children who encountered the police would receive more sympathetic treatment, rather than neglect. The demand for black police that evening was even endorsed by the conservative New Orleans Ministerial Union, which gave its unwavering support to the petition to get African Americans on the force. That evening the letter was sent to Mayor Robert Maestri.²

The former Louisiana conservation commissioner and protégé of Huey P. Long entered city hall in 1936. Despite only finishing the third grade, Maestri was arguably the wealthiest person in New Orleans and its largest property holder. After taking over his father’s furniture store and investing the profits in real estate, the young businessman turned to politics despite whispers throughout the city that most of his money came from prostitution and illegal gambling. He spent his first few years as mayor improving city services and listening and responding to citizen complaints. After a relatively easy reelection campaign in 1942, Maestri became bored with politics, and city services, including the NOPD, underwent a decline. During the war years, the NOPD was repeatedly criticized for not cracking down on prostitution, gambling, and other forms of vice, as crime rose throughout the city. Superintendent of Police George Reyer and Maestri repeatedly refused to address citizen complaints about the corruption within the NOPD. Into this context stepped the city’s African American community, which wanted Maestri to integrate the New Orleans Police Department.³

The signed petition sent to Maestri was a clear indication that the city’s black community was beginning to recognize its increased voting strength. Although throughout much of the early twentieth century, black activists pressed for black police officers, their lack of political power caused white politicians not to take their demands seriously. However, as black voting strength grew in the aftermath of Hall v. Nagel and Smith v. Allright, two court cases that outlawed the white primary and gave voting access to African Americans, white leaders could no longer ignore the call for black police officers. For instance, in 1940 there were only 400 African American voters in New Orleans, but by 1948 there would be more than 13,000 African Americans registered to vote. In making their request for an integrated NOPD, black leaders argued that the presence of African American police would not only act as a deterrent to police brutality, but it would also help reduce the high rate of crime in the black community and give blacks a say in how laws were enforced.⁴

Like many other police departments in the South, the NOPD was a haven for white working-class males. The typical officer was poorly educated, raised in a segregated world, was hostile to civil rights issues, hailed from a blue-collar background, had served some time in the military, and had joined the NOPD because it was the best job he could find. In segregated New Orleans the NOPD considered themselves to be the frontline defenders against integration and they were very protective of their status and identity as police officers. As the white middle class expanded after the war, white police officers came to represent the face of the white working class.

Upon receipt of the signed petition demanding the integration of the NOPD, Mayor Maestri agreed to consider the request. Black citizens were not that optimistic that Maestri would respond favorably since during his nine years as mayor he had paid very little attention to black concerns. As expected, no action was ever taken on the petition. When the mayor failed to respond to the demand for black police officers, the Negro Interdenominational Ministerial Alliance (NIMA), under the leadership of Reverend Abraham Lincoln Davis, decided to get involved. Davis was perhaps the best person to spearhead the drive to integrate the NOPD because as a well-respected minister and co-founder of the NIMA he was widely known across black New Orleans. The Bayou Goula native grew up as a pastor’s kid and in 1941 the twenty-year-old Davis started pastoring in New Orleans with a practical theology that stressed black liberation. Unlike the majority of black pastors, educators, and professionals, Davis was outspoken and did not hesitate to voice the grievances of the community. So when Maestri denied the petition regarding black police officers, the young pastor made a thorough investigation of the civil service rules that governed the testing, selection, and appointment of new police officers. As Davis expected, local civil service rules said nothing about excluding African Americans—it was just custom that kept black folk off the NOPD. After presenting their findings to Maestri, Davis and the Alliance were assured by the mayor that if black candidates passed the requisite tests, they would be appointed to the force. Minimum qualifications for the NOPD dictated that the candidate be between the ages of 21 and 40, be at least 5’6” in height, weigh a minimum 150 pounds, have an 8th grade education, supply four “responsible references, and be a registered voter. The yearly salary was $1,600. In addition to the physical requirements, prospective patrolmen were also required to pass a battery of written tests on such subjects as moral character, health, education, and appearance.⁵

When Davis and the Alliance discovered that there were more than thirty vacancies on the force, they encouraged African Americans to take the police exam. They also passed out petitions under the headline, “Petition, Requesting the Appointment of Negro Police Officers.” It read: “Because of the now and urgent NEED, as a Property Owner and Tax Payer, I favor and fully support the appointment of Negro Policemen as Law Enforcement Officers to help serve the 165,000 or more Negro Population of the City, and herewith registering my endorsement of the petition.” The bottom of the petition gave clear instructions: “Please Sign—Get Others to Sign— Return Promptly.” Despite their efforts few responded, and one year later they were still trying to persuade black citizens to take the exam. Under the headline, “Negro Policemen Are Possible,” the Louisiana Weekly, the city’s popular black newspaper, printed a statement by the Alliance outlining the procedure for gaining an appointment to the NOPD.⁶

When the Civil Service Commission announced that the next set of exams was going to be held on August 24, 1946, the Alliance recruited potential applicants. Members of the black community went on an aggressive recruitment drive for black officers because they felt that city officials were open to the idea of black police officers. Prospective applicants were told that since there were 125 vacancies on the NOPD, the mayor “might easily be influenced by the large number of Negroes who have registered in recent weeks.”⁷

Of the approximately six hundred prospective applicants who took the test on August 24, 1946, twenty-five were African American. Otis Fisher was one of those who took the test. “I enjoyed taking the exam. We were all treated well.” When asked by a reporter whether or not he and other black applicants finished their exam before or after their white counterparts, he stated that as a group black applicants finished ahead of the whites.⁸

The persistence of Davis and the efforts of the middle-class-oriented NIMA to desegregate the NOPD say a great deal about the politics of unfair police protection in New Orleans. First, it illustrates that police brutality cut across class lines and unified the community. In as much as the NIMA was filled with conservative black ministers who often preferred to work behind the scenes and broker deals with the city’s business and economic elite, their willingness to spearhead the fight and their outspokenness about the necessity for black police officers show that many middle-class blacks held deep concerns about the city’s police department. Second, it is an example of how World War II ushered in a new era of political activism for African Americans who had supported the war effort abroad, and who were now looking for victory at home. Despite being segregated in daily life and still being denied the right to vote, African Americans in New Orleans coalesced around the issue of police violence and in the process they were defining one aspect of freedom as the right to fair police protection.

As civil rights activists continued to observe the police testing process, they were closely watching the 1946 mayor’s race that pitted a young reformer named Delesseps Story (Chep) Morrison against the incumbent Maestri. The LSU-trained attorney and state representative from New Roads, Louisiana, received the backing of prominent business leaders who were eager to see New Orleans develop commercially and industrially. They were also tired of Maestri and his connection to Longite politics. In a surprise election Morrison beat Maestri by 4,372 votes. This election signaled that the residents of New Orleans were ready for change, and black residents were eager to see if integrating and reforming the NOPD were on the young mayor’s to-do list.⁹

Black activists were confident that Morrison was open to the idea of black police officers when he appointed a new police superintendent shortly after his election. Adair Watters, a former marine colonel and influential member of Morrison’s campaign team, accepted Morrison’s offer to lead the NOPD only after Morrison promised that he would not interfere or politicize law enforcement in New Orleans. Based upon a 1946 report by the local Bureau of Governmental Research, Watters would have his hands full because the NOPD was in shambles. The survey revealed a dysfunctional department characterized by uneven enforcement of the law, an institutional culture of corruption and graft, a weak administrative structure, and haphazard personnel procedures. Morrison biographer Edward Haas believes that the NOPD in 1946 “reflected decades of local indifference toward police administration and organization.”¹⁰

Upon assuming his new position, Watters wasted little time in cleaning up the department. He raised salaries, recruited new officers, consolidated precincts, put more officers on the streets, transferred corrupt officers, cracked down on graft and corruption, and restructured the department to make it more effective. Watters was hopeful that an influx of young rookie recruits would ultimately change the culture of the department. But because protective civil service rules prevented Watters from firing police officers, new recruits quickly adopted the attitudes of their supervisors. In the midst of Watters’s efforts to reshape the NOPD, black residents were hoping that the integration of the NOPD was a part of his program since it was learned that four black applicants had made the eligible list for appointment.¹¹

As Morrison was settling into New Orleans city hall, it was revealed that four African American males had passed the police test: Otis Fisher, Ernest Raphael, James Russell, and Herwald M. Price. Although Price thought about staying in New York City after his discharge from the military and joining the integrated New York Police Department, he decided that it would be more constructive to come home “and fight it out here.” These four were now eligible for appointment to the police force. New Orleans civil service procedure called for the highest-scoring applicants on the test to be ranked and then when police officials were ready to fill vacancies they would ask civil service officials to certify a certain number plus two extras. Their appointments were now in the hands of Superintendent Watters and Mayor Morrison. The Louisiana Weekly argued that it was now up to Wat-ters and Morrison “whether or not New Orleans will follow the progressive example” of other southern cities such as Richmond, Charlotte, and Tampa, all of whom had black officers.¹²

When word reached the black community that four African Americans had passed the test, civil rights groups were eager to see them appointed. The Louisiana Veterans Organization (LVO), a black group, sent a strong letter to Mayor Morrison about the critical need for black police. “The current crime wave in New Orleans has grown so acute that citizens’ lives are almost constantly in danger. We feel that the need for Negro policemen is badly felt at this time. Recently, a number of Negroes passed the city civil service examination and qualified for the police force. These men have met all requirements. We respectfully request that you disregard past precedents and recommend some of these men for appointment. We are certain that such action would be for the good of all.”¹³

Although Morrison acknowledged receipt of the letter from the LVO, he made no mention of black police appointments. Instead, he denied the existence of a crime problem in the city and referred the issue of black police to Superintendent Watters. Black New Orleanians now felt as if they were caught in a classic case of catch-22. Undeterred, the LVO sent another letter to Watters two weeks later, but as Earl Mitchell, executive secretary of the LVO, remarked, “as before the letter has been ignored.”¹⁴

Like the LVO, the Louisiana Weekly was eager to know the cause of the delay in their appointments because, according to the rules of the civil service commission, the eligible list for appointment was only good for twelve months. “Citizens Wonder What’s Holding Up Appointment of Policemen Here,” read the headline, which once again made a strong appeal for black officers. In mid-December the Louisiana Weekly sent a reporter to meet with Watters on the subject of black officers. When Watters was asked about the possibility of black officers, he gave a rather evasive response: “I am sorry I cannot answer that question. It will be up to my superior to answer whether there will be Negro Police or not.”¹⁵

Despite their pleas, Morrison had no intention of appointing the candidates. Throughout the South the possibility of African American males serving as police officers sent shivers up and down the spines of white conservatives. The revolutionary consequences of seeing an African American on the city’s police force, carrying a gun and with the power to enforce the law, was too much of a threat. One of the main concerns was the fear that African American police officers would harass and rape white women. The underlying argument against black cops was that since African Americans needed to be policed, and the police department functioned for the benefit of whites, then African Americans had no place on the police force.

Despite successfully passing the exam, the four black candidates never received an appointment to the NOPD. Nonetheless, black residents continued to apply pressu...